Iraq Survey Group Final Report
30 September 2004
Please see the correction regarding Niro Atomizer Inc.
In March 2005, the Special Advisor added addenda to his original report:
Note for the Comprehensive Report with Addenda
Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD [PDF]
Volume I
Cover Page
Transmittal Message
Acknowledgements
Cover Page 2
Scope Note
| Regime Strategic Intent | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Contents | |||
| Key Findings | 1 | ||
| Who Made Iraq's Strategic Decisions and Determined WMD Policy | 5 | ||
| Saddam's Place in the Regime | 5 | ||
| The Apex of Power | 5 | ||
| Personalized Rule | 5 | ||
| Saddam's Unsettled Lieutenants | 5 | ||
| A Few Key Players in an Insular Environment | 7 | ||
| Saddam Calls the Shots | 8 | ||
| Saddam Shows the Way | 9 | ||
| Harvesting Ideas and Advice in a Byzantine Setting | 10 | ||
| Weaving a Culture of Lies | 11 | ||
| Saddam Became Increasingly Inaccessible | 11 | ||
| Saddam's Command By Violence | 12 | ||
| Saddam's Effect on the Workings of the Iraqi Government | 13 | ||
| Suspicion of Structures | 13 | ||
| Powerless Structures | 13 | ||
| The Higher Committee | 14 | ||
| The Foreign Policy Committees | 15 | ||
| Saddam's Grip on National Security and WMD Development | 16 | ||
| Saddam Holding Court | 18 | ||
| Saddam and Fiscal Policy | 18 | ||
| How Saddam Saw His Subordinates | 19 | ||
| Mining Respect and Expertise | 19 | ||
| Mutuality of Fear | 19 | ||
| Dazzled by Science | 19 | ||
| How Saddam Saw Himself | 21 | ||
| Saddam's Psychology | 21 | ||
| Saddam's Personal Security | 21 | ||
| Saddam the Dynasty Founder | 21 | ||
| Saddam and His Sense of Legacy | 22 | ||
| Desire . . . Dominance and Deterrence Through WMD | 23 | ||
| Saddam's Role in WMD Policy | 23 | ||
| What Saddam Thought: The Perceived Successes of WMD | 24 | ||
| What Saddam Thought: External Concerns | 28 | ||
| Iran | 29 | ||
| Israel | 31 | ||
| The United States | 31 | ||
| WMD Possession-Real or Imagined-Acts as a Deterrent | 34 | ||
| Saddam's Prioritization of Getting Out From Under Sanctions | 34 | ||
| Efforts To Lift Sanctions | 35 | ||
| Realizing Saddam's Veiled WMD Intent | 41 | ||
| Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline | 41 | ||
| Ambition (1980-1991) | 41 | ||
| Decline (1991-1996) | 42 | ||
| Scientific Research and Intention to Reconstitute WMD | 44 | ||
| Reaction to Sanctions | 44 | ||
| Husayn Kamil's Departure | 46 | ||
| Cooperating With UNSCOM While Preserving WMD | 47 | ||
| Recovery (1996-1998) | 48 | ||
| Impact of the "Chicken Farm" Documents | 49 | ||
| Looking Ahead to Resume WMD Programs | 49 | ||
| Guarding WMD Capabilities | 51 | ||
| Iraq's Internal Monitoring Apparatus: The NMD and MIC Programs | 53 | ||
| Suspending Cooperation With UNSCOM | 55 | ||
| Transition (1998-2001) | 56 | ||
| Nullifying All Obligations To UNSC Resolutions | 57 | ||
| Preserving and Restoring WMD Infrastructure and Expertise | 59 | ||
| Pumping Up Key Revenue Streams | 60 | ||
| Miscalculation (2002-2003) | 61 | ||
| Renewing UN Inspections | 63 | ||
| Iraq's Other Security Concerns | 64 | ||
| Sorting Out Whether Iraq Had WMD Before Operation Iraqi Freedom | 64 | ||
| Alternative Hypotheses on Iraq's Nonuse of WMD During Operation Iraqi Freedom | 66 | ||
Annexes | |||
| A. The Quartet-Influence and Disharmony Among Saddam's Lieutenants | 69 | ||
| B. Iraq's Intelligence Services | 73 | ||
| C. Iraq's Security Services | 85 | ||
| D. Saddam's Personal Involvement in WMD Planning | 97 | ||
| Regime Finance and Procurement | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Contents | |||
| A Word on the Scope of This Chapter | 1 | ||
| Key Findings | 3 | ||
| Chapter Summary | 7 | ||
| The Regime Timeline | 9 | ||
| Ambition (1980-91 | 9 | ||
| Decline (1991-96) | 9 | ||
| Recovery (1996-98) | 9 | ||
| Transition and Miscalculation (1999-2003) | 10 | ||
| Directing and Budgeting Iraq's Illicit Procurement | 11 | ||
| Overview | 11 | ||
| President and Presidential Secretary's Role in Illicit Procurement | 11 | ||
| Presidential Diwan's Role in Illicit Procurement | 12 | ||
| Diwan's Role in Supplemental Funding of Government Ministries | 12 | ||
| Extent of Knowledge of the Former President of the Diwan | 13 | ||
| Budgeting Iraqi Procurement | 14 | ||
| General Government Budget | 14 | ||
| Sources of Government Revenue | 14 | ||
| Supplemental Budgetary Process | 14 | ||
| Supplemental Budget Submission Procedure | 14 | ||
| Approval and Authorization of Supplemental Funding | 16 | ||
| Disbursal of Supplemental Funds | 18 | ||
| Financing Iraq's Illicit Procurement | 19 | ||
| Overview | 19 | ||
| Iraqi Economy's Role in Illicit Procurement | 19 | ||
| Economic Ambition (1980-91) | 19 | ||
| Economic Decline (1991-96) | 21 | ||
| Economic Recovery (1997-99) | 22 | ||
| Economic Transition and Miscalculation (1999-2003) | 22 | ||
| Iraq's Revenue Sources | 22 | ||
| Bilateral Trade Protocols | 24 | ||
| Phases of the UN OFF Program | 28 | ||
| Disposition of UN OFF Funds | 28 | ||
| Oil Voucher Process | 29 | ||
| Secret Voucher Recipients | 30 | ||
| Iraqi Oil Vouchers Provided to International Leaders | 31 | ||
| American and British Oil Voucher Recipients | 33 | ||
| Benon Sevan's Use of Iraqi Oil Vouchers | 33 | ||
| Iraqi Intelligence Service Nominations for Oil Vouchers | 33 | ||
| Oil Export Surcharges | 33 | ||
| How Surcharges Were Collected | 35 | ||
| Kickbacks on Commercial Goods Import Contracts | 35 | ||
| Private-Sector Oil Sales | 37 | ||
| Role of the SOMO | 38 | ||
| SOMO's Relationship to the MoO | 40 | ||
| Official Oil Accounts | 40 | ||
| Banking and the Transfer of Financial Assets for Procurement | 45 | ||
| CBI | 45 | ||
| CBI's Role in Licensing Money Exchangers | 45 | ||
| CBI's Role in Tracking Foreign Accounts for Iraq | 46 | ||
| Iraqi Bank Holdings | 47 | ||
| Funding of the Ministries | 47 | ||
| The Use of Foreign Banks | 48 | ||
| Use of Banks in Lebanon | 49 | ||
| Use of Banks in Jordan | 49 | ||
| Use of Banks in Syria | 50 | ||
| Use of Banks in Turkey | 50 | ||
| Use of Banks in Egypt | 50 | ||
| Use of Banks in Belarus | 50 | ||
| Regime Attempts To Recover Funds Prior to OIF | 51 | ||
| The Role of Cash Transactions | 51 | ||
| Iraq's Gold Reserves | 51 | ||
| Executing Illicit Procurement in Iraq: Ministries, Commissions, and Front Companies | 53 | ||
| Overview | 53 | ||
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 53 | ||
| MFA-IIS Connections | 54 | ||
| MFA's UN Sanctions Counter-Strategy | 55 | ||
| MFA and Iraq's Bilateral Protocols | 56 | ||
| Ministry of Trade | 56 | ||
| MoT's Role in Procurement | 57 | ||
| Facilitating Illicit Procurement With Cover Contracts | 58 | ||
| Facilitating Illicit Trade Through Commercial Attaches | 58 | ||
| Ministry of Defense | 61 | ||
| MoD Procurement Leadership | 61 | ||
| MoD Procurement Directorates | 61 | ||
| Budgeting and Financing Military Procurement | 62 | ||
| MoD Procurement Process | 63 | ||
| Procurement for the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard | 64 | ||
| Military Industrialization Commission | 65 | ||
| Procurement Leadership in the MIC | 65 | ||
| MIC: Benefi ciary of Illicit Funds | 66 | ||
| MIC Banking and Financing | 66 | ||
| Items Procured via the MIC's Link to Iraqi Intelligence | 69 | ||
| MIC Front Companies | 72 | ||
| Iraqi Intelligence Service | 77 | ||
| IIS Procurement Leadership and Mission | 77 | ||
| IIS Procurement Cooperation with Foreign Intelligence Services | 79 | ||
| Items Procured by the IIS | 79 | ||
| IIS Front Companies | 80 | ||
| Special Security Organization | 82 | ||
| SSO Procurement Leadership and Mission | 82 | ||
| Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission | 82 | ||
| Ministry of Transport and Communication | 83 | ||
| Mission and Key Procurement Companies under the MoTC | 83 | ||
| Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research | 84 | ||
| University Collaboration With MIC | 84 | ||
| Exploitation of Academic Exchanges for Procurement | 85 | ||
| Ministry of Agriculture | 85 | ||
| Ministry of Interior | 86 | ||
| Front Company Conglomerates: Al-Eman and Al-Handal | 86 | ||
| The Al-Eman Network | 88 | ||
| Al-Handal General Trading Company | 90 | ||
| Supplying Iraq With Prohibited Commodities | 93 | ||
| Overview | 93 | ||
| Procurement Suppliers During the Decline Phase, 1991 to 1996 | 93 | ||
| Romania | 93 | ||
| Ukraine | 95 | ||
| Jordan | 100 | ||
| Procurement Suppliers During the Recovery Phase, 1996 to 1998 | 102 | ||
| Syria | 102 | ||
| Turkey | 104 | ||
| South Korea | 107 | ||
| People's Republic of China | 108 | ||
| France | 111 | ||
| Former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia | 112 | ||
| Bulgaria | 113 | ||
| Procurement Suppliers in the Transition and Miscalculation Phases, 1998 to 2003 | 116 | ||
| Russia | 116 | ||
| North Korea | 119 | ||
| Transportation Routes From North Korea to Iraq | 121 | ||
| Payment Methods for North Korean Contracts | 121 | ||
| Poland | 121 | ||
| Methods Used To Hide Transshipment to Iraq | 121 | ||
| Polish-Iraqi Procurement Financial Flows | 122 | ||
| India | 122 | ||
| Belarus | 125 | ||
| Key Belarusian Individuals Linked to Illicit Trade With Iraq | 126 | ||
| Materials, Equipment and Services Provided by Belarus | 127 | ||
| Payments From Iraq to Belarus | 129 | ||
| Taiwan | 129 | ||
| Egypt | 130 | ||
| Yemen | 131 | ||
| Opening Conventional Trade With Yemen for Oil and Cash | 131 | ||
| Yemen Emerges as an Intermediary for Iraqi Illicit Imports | 132 | ||
| Importing Prohibited Commodities | 133 | ||
| Overview | 133 | ||
| Deceptive Trade Practices Supporting Illicit Procurement | 133 | ||
| Use of Trade Intermediaries | 133 | ||
| Disguising the Nature of Prohibited Goods | 134 | ||
| Consealing the Identity of Commodities | 135 | ||
| Discussing the Commodity's Destination | 137 | ||
| Use of Illicit Smuggling and Transportation Networks | 137 | ||
| Smuggling by Air | 138 | ||
| Smuggling by Land | 138 | ||
| Smuggling by Sea | 139 | ||
| Smuggling via Jordanian Ports | 139 | ||
| Smuggling via Syrian Ports | 142 | ||
| Smuggling via the Arabian Gulf | 142 | ||
Annexes | |||
| A. Translations of Iraq's Bilateral Trade Protocols | 145 | ||
| B. Known Oil Voucher Recipients | 167 | ||
| C. Iraq's Budgetary Process | 201 | ||
| D. Iraq Economic Data | 207 | ||
| E. Illicit Earnings Sources and Estimation Methodology | 217 | ||
| F. Iraqi Oil Smuggling | 221 | ||
| G. Iraq's Banking System | 251 | ||
| H. UN Security Council Resolutions Applicable to Iraq | 257 | ||
| I. Suspected WMD-Related Dual-Use Goods and Procurement Teransactions | 261 | ||
| J. The Procurement of Conventional Military Goods in Breach of UN Sanctions | 267 | ||
| K. Suspected Intermediary and Front Companies Associated With Iraq | 291 | ||
| L. Procurement Acronyms | 295 | ||
| Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline Events |
|---|
Volume II
Cover Page
| Nuclear | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Contents | ||||
| Key Findings | 1 | |||
| Evolution of the Nuclear Weapons Program | 3 | |||
| The Regime and WMD Timeline | 3 | |||
| The Early Years: Ambition | 3 | |||
| Decline (1991-96) | 4 | |||
| Recovery and Transition (1996-2002) | 5 | |||
| Miscalculation (2002-2003) | 6 | |||
| Results of ISG's Investigation on Nuclear Issues | 7 | |||
| Investigation Into Uranium Pursuits and Indigenous Production Capabilities | 9 | |||
| Foreign Pursuits | 9 | |||
| Indigenous Production Capabilities | 11 | |||
| Iraq's Known Uranium Holdings | 13 | |||
| Iraqi Uranium Conversion Program | 15 | |||
| Aluminum Tube Investigation | 21 | |||
| Elements of ISG Investigation | 21 | |||
| Purported High-Level Interest in Aluminum Tubes | 22 | |||
| Possible Association of Iraqi Nuclear Entities With the Tubes | 22 | |||
| Tube Characteristics and Shipping Requirements | 23 | |||
| Indigenous Tube Manufacture-A Possible Sign Baghdad Did Not Need High-Specification Tubes | 27 | |||
| Iraqi Interest in 84-mm Tubes | 30 | |||
| Carbon Fiber | 30 | |||
| Carbon Fiber and Iraq's Pre-1991 Gas Centrifuge Program | 30 | |||
| Iraqi Concealment of Carbon Fiber-Related Activity, Materials, and Documents After Operation Desert Storm | 31 | |||
| The MIC Carbon Fiber Project in 2001/2002 | 32 | |||
| Flow-Forming Machinery | 33 | |||
| Planned Magnet Production Lines at Al Tahadi | 34 | |||
| Procurement Details | 36 | |||
| Rotating Machinery Department | 36 | |||
| Investigation of Potential Centrifuge-Related Facilities | 38 | |||
| Support Facilities | 38 | |||
| Ash Shaykhili Storage Facility | 39 | |||
| Al Karama State Company | 39 | |||
| Al-Wazeriya Site | 39 | |||
| Khadimiyah Site (Ibn Al-Haytham Missile R&D Center) | 39 | |||
| Al Samud Factory (Abu Ghurayb Missile Facility) | 39 | |||
| Badr and Umm Al-Marik State Companies (Khan Azad Military Production Plant) | 39 | |||
| Al-Tahadi State Company | 40 | |||
| Salah Al Din State Company (Samarra Electronics Plant) | 40 | |||
| Al-Nida State Company | 40 | |||
| Rashid State Company's Tho Al-Fiqar Factory (formerly the Nassr State Establishment Mechanical Plant) | 40 | |||
| Ur State Company (An-Nasiriyah Aluminum Fabrication Plant) | 40 | |||
| Uranium Enrichment-EMIS | 42 | |||
| Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS) | 42 | |||
| Facilities | 42 | |||
| Al Safa'a EMIS Plant at Tarmiya | 42 | |||
| Al Fajr EMIS Plant at Ash Sharqat | 45 | |||
| Al-Jazira (Mosul Feed Materials Production Facility) | 45 | |||
| Al-Zawra State Company | 45 | |||
| Al-Nida State Company (Zaafaraniya Mechanical Workshop Al-Rabiyah) | 45 | |||
| Al-Radwan (Batra Military Production Facility) | 47 | |||
| Al-Nassr Al-Adhim State Company | 47 | |||
| Disposition of EMIS-Related Equipment | 47 | |||
| Laser Research in Iraq | 50 | |||
| Laser Related Work After Operation Desert Storm | 50 | |||
| Current Status and Future Potential | 51 | |||
| Iraq's Pre-1991 LIS Efforts | 51 | |||
| Rail Gun Summary | 52 | |||
| Rail Gun Efforts | 52 | |||
| Issues Related to NuclearWeapons Design and Development | 59 | |||
| Casting Technology | 59 | |||
| Explosive and Lens Fabrication Capabilities | 59 | |||
| High-Speed Switches | 60 | |||
| Fireset Development and Testing | 60 | |||
| Neutron Generators | 60 | |||
| Migration of the Capabilities From the PC-3 Nuclear Weapons Project | 61 | |||
| IAEC Modernization | 66 | |||
| Interest in the IAEC and Intervention by Saddam Husayn | 66 | |||
| Increased Funding and Publicity of IAEC Activities | 67 | |||
| Infrastructure Improvements at the IAEC: The Modernization Project | 67 | |||
| Perceptions the Regime Was Preparing for Reconstitution of the Nuclear Program | 69 | |||
| IAEC Work on Neutron Generators | 69 | |||
| University Programs | 70 | |||
| Hidden Enrichment Technology | 73 | |||
| Survey of Structures at Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center | 75 | |||
Annexes | ||||
| A. Definitions Used by Teams During Survey | 81 | |||
| B. Team Results | 83 | |||
| C. Analysis of the Videotapes Compiled From Video Recce Mission 5/6 November 2003 | 91 | |||
| D. Results of Mission Survey of Tuwaitha Nuclear ComplexOver the Period 20-22 November | 107 | |||
| E. Summary of Known UN-Tagged Equipment | 113 | |||
| F. Photography Highlights: Tuwaitha Mission, 20-22 November 2003 | 117 | |||
| G. Tuwaitha Maps, Buildings, and Numbers | 127 | |||
Volume III
Cover Page
| Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Contents | |||
| Key Findings | 1 | ||
| Evolution of the Chemical Warfare Program | 5 | ||
| Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline | 5 | ||
| The Early Years, 1960-1980: A Slow Start | 5 | ||
| The Chemical Corps and Al-Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Research Foundation | 5 | ||
| Full Capability, 1981-1991: Ambition | 6 | ||
| Foundation of the Al Muthanna State Establishment | 6 | ||
| Agent Production Begins and Al Muthanna State Establishment Takes Shape | 6 | ||
| Early Weaponization: Simple Solutions | 8 | ||
| CW-A Permanent and Pivotal Strategic Weapon | 9 | ||
| The Decline, 1991-1996 | 9 | ||
| Destroying Iraqi Weapons | 9 | ||
| Recovery and Transition, 1996-2003 | 12 | ||
| Miscalculation, 2002-2003 | 13 | ||
| Command and Control | 14 | ||
| Preamble: Muddling Through After the Gulf War | 14 | ||
| Iraq Could Maintain CW Competence With Relative Ease | 15 | ||
| Infrastructure-Research and Development | 16 | ||
| Creation of the Iraqi Industrial Committee | 17 | ||
| The Power of the IIC | 17 | ||
| The IIC's Master Plan for Self-Reliance: The List of 1,000 Chemicals | 18 | ||
| Dual-Use Chemicals on the List of 1,000 Chemicals | 18 | ||
| Thionyl Chloride | 19 | ||
| DCC | 19 | ||
| Thiourea | 22 | ||
| Chemicals From the List Move Toward Production | 22 | ||
| Infrastructure-Production Capability | 23 | ||
| State of Chemical Industry at OIF-Limited Break-Out Capability | 24 | ||
| Weaponization | 29 | ||
| Suspect Munitions Activities | 29 | ||
| Disposition of CW Munitions Post-1991 | 29 | ||
| The 1991 Decision To Destroy Undeclared Weapons | 31 | ||
| Iraq Unilateral Weapons Destruction in 1991 | 31 | ||
| Destruction of Chemical Munitions, Bulk Agent, and Precursors | 31 | ||
| Chemical Munitions-Searching Military Depots and Caches | 33 | ||
| Investigating Ammunition Supply Points | 33 | ||
| Investigation | 34 | ||
| Investigating Captured Enemy Ammunition Points (CEA Consolidation Points) | 35 | ||
Annexes |
|||
| A. IIS Undeclared Research on Poisons and Toxins for Assassination | 43 | ||
| B. Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex | 61 | ||
| C. The Iraqi Industrial Committee | 85 | ||
| D. Tariq Company's Activities | 89 | ||
| E. Al-Abud Network | 93 | ||
| F. Detailed Preliminary Assessment of Chemical Weapons Findings | 97 | ||
| G. Chemical Warfare and the Defense of Baghdad | 107 | ||
| H. Summary of Key Findings at Captured Enemy Ammunition Consolidation Points | 113 | ||
| I. Review of 24 Iraqi Ammunition Supply Points | 123 | ||
| Biological Warfare | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Contents | |||
| Key Findings | 1 | ||
| Evolution of the Biological Warfare Program | 5 | ||
| The Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline | 5 | ||
| Evolution of the Biological Warfare Program | 5 | ||
| Ambition: The Early Years, 1960-1985 | 5 | ||
| Renewed Ambition and Near-Realization: 1985-1991 | 8 | ||
| The Beginning of the Decline: Opportunity Through Ambiguity and the End of the Game (1991-1996) | 11 | ||
| Recovery and Transition 1996-2003 | 15 | ||
| Research and Development | 18 | ||
| Building Human Capital | 19 | ||
| Research Facilities | 20 | ||
| Iraqi BW Agent Research | 20 | ||
| Bacillus anthracis ('Agent B') | 20 | ||
| Clostridium botulinum (Botulinum toxin, 'Agent A') | 21 | ||
| Clostridium perfringens ('Agent G') | 22 | ||
| Afl atoxin ('Agent C') | 22 | ||
| Brucella | 22 | ||
| Ricin | 23 | ||
| Wheat Cover Smut ('Agent D') | 25 | ||
| Viruses | 25 | ||
| Camel Pox | 27 | ||
| Smallpox | 28 | ||
| Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever | 32 | ||
| Acute Hemorrhagic Conjunctivitis (Enterovirus 70) | 32 | ||
| Rotavirus | 32 | ||
| Other R&D Related to BW Development | 32 | ||
| Biopesticides | 32 | ||
| Single Cell Protein R&D | 34 | ||
| Growth Media R&D | 34 | ||
| Drying Process/Carrier/Particle size | 37 | ||
| Production Capability | 38 | ||
| Break-Out Production Capability Pre-OIF | 42 | ||
| Mobile Assets | 42 | ||
| Weaponization | 45 | ||
| Attempts at BW Weaponization | 47 | ||
| The Gulf War | 48 | ||
| Concealment And Destruction of Biological Weapons | 49 | ||
| Iraq's Initial WMD Concealment Effort | 49 | ||
| The Destruction of Iraq's BW | 50 | ||
| What Remained Hidden and Undeclared 1995-1998? | 53 | ||
| Weaponization Related Activities in the Years Following Desert Storm | 53 | ||
| Unresolved Issues | 56 | ||
| Program Direction | 56 | ||
| Research and Development | 56 | ||
| IIS Laboratories | 57 | ||
| Seedstocks | 57 | ||
| Disposition of Iraq's BW Program Culture Collection | 57 | ||
| Agent Production | 57 | ||
| Drying of BW Agents | 58 | ||
| Bacterial BW Agent Production and Storage | 58 | ||
| Weaponization | 59 | ||
Annexes |
|||
| A. Bulk BW Agents | 61 | ||
| B. BW Research and Development Facilities | 63 | ||
| C. ISG Investigation of Iraq's Reported Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production Capability | 73 | ||
| D. Trailers Suspected of Being Mobil BW Agent Production Units | 79 | ||
Glossary and Acronyms
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