Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear DeterrenceRussia Ministry of Foreign Affairs 08 Jun 2020 -- These Basic Principles represent a strategic planning document in the area of ensuring defence and reflect the official view on the essence of nuclear deterrence, identify military risks and threats to be neutralized by implementation of nuclear deterrence, the principles of nuclear deterrence, as well as the conditions for the Russian Federation to proceed to the use of nuclear weapons.
Twenty-First Century Nuclear Deterrence: Operationalizing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review By Ryan W. Kort, Carlos R. Bersabe, Dalton H. Clarke, and Derek J. Di Bello Joint Force Quarterly 94 July 2019 -- "Furthermore, the United States should strongly consider a potentially controversial new concept involving custodial sharing of nonstrategic nuclear capabilities during times of crisis with select Asia-Pacific partners, specifically Japan and the Republic of Korea."
Legal Decision B-412441: The Boeing Company GAO B-412441, 16 Feb 2016, Released 25 Oct 2016 -- The Boeing Company, of St. Louis, Missouri, protests the award of a contract to Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation Aerospace Systems, of Redondo Beach, California, by the Department of the Air Force, Rapid Capabilities Office, under request for proposals (RFP) [redacted], for the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) and low rate initial production (LRIP) contract. Boeing alleges that the Air Force failed to consider risks inherent in Northrop's approach that should have rendered Northrop's proposal unacceptable or significantly increased Northrop's evaluated cost. Boeing also alleges that the Air Force unreasonably rejected cost data supporting Boeing's proposed costs and employed an arbitrary and unreasonable cost realism methodology.
UN Security Council Resolution 2270 (2016) - Adopted by the Security Council at its 7638th meeting, on 2 March 2016UN Security Council 02 Mar 2016 -- "Expressing gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“the DPRK”) on 6 January 2016 in violation of resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013) and 2094 (2013), and at the challenge such a test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (“the NPT”) and to international efforts aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond"
Deficiencies in the Iran nuclear dealIsrael Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015 -- The agreement is supposed to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and should include an enforcement mechanism. However, no such mechanism exists. Instead, conflicts can only be resolved by mutually agreed consensus.
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 14 Jul 2015 -- "The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons."
Independent Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise 02 Jun 2014, Released 30 Jun 2014 -- The Independent Review Team (henceforth called the Review) examined the nuclear deterrent mission in the Departments of the Navy and Air Force and sought to identify leadership, organization, investment, morale, policy, procedural, and/or other shortcomings that are adversely impacting the mission. The Review visited six Navy and seven Air Force nuclear field activities, multiple support organizations, and headquarters organizations."
Statement by the PresidentThe White House 27 Sep 2013 -- "Just now, I spoke on the phone with President Rouhani of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The two of us discussed our ongoing efforts to reach an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program. I reiterated to President Rouhani what I said in New York -- while there will surely be important obstacles to moving forward, and success is by no means guaranteed, I believe we can reach a comprehensive solution. "
Review of the Department's Preparation to Respond to a WMD IncidentU.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division May 2010 -- "The use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), whether by a hostile nation, a terrorist group, or an individual, poses a potentially serious threat to the United States. One of the greatest concerns is that a WMD may fall into the hands of terrorists or that terrorists will develop their own WMD. (...) This review evaluated the readiness of the Department and its components to respond to a potential WMD incident. In addition, we examined the readiness of Department components' field offices in the National Capital Region (NCR) to respond in a coordinated way to a WMD incident."
Nuclear Posture Review Report April 2010 -- After describing fundamental changes in the international security environment, the NPR report focuses on five key objectives of our nuclear weapons policies and posture: 1) Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; 2) Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy; 3) Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; 4) Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners; and 5) Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management - Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission December 2008 -- "Incidents related to the Air Force's mishandling of nuclear weapons and components led to the creation of the Task Force in June 2008 to provide advice on nuclear matters for the Secretary of Defense. This review was to be conducted in two phases: Phase I reviewed the Air Force's nuclear mission and was completed in September 2008; Phase II was directed at the stewardship of the nuclear mission more broadly throughout the Department of Defense (DoD). This report covers Phase II findings and recommendations. (...) In Phase II, the Task Force found that the lack of interest in and attention to the nuclear mission and nuclear deterrence, as discussed in our Phase I report, go well beyond the Air Force. This lack of interest and attention have been widespread throughout DoD and contributed to the decline of attention in the Air Force. This report details policy, organizational, and procedural issues that must be addressed across DoD in order to retain disciplined and effective nuclear forces."
Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management: Phase I: The Air Force's Nuclear Mission 10 Sep 2008 -- "Serious incidents in 2006 (a misshipment to Taiwan of intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM] components) and 2007 (an unauthorized weapons transfer) alerted the Department of Defense (DoD) to the Air Force's mishandling of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-related materiel. The ensuing investigations revealed a serious erosion of focus, expertise, mission readiness, resources, and discipline in the nuclear weapons enterprise within the Air Force. In June 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appointed this Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management to recommend necessary improvements and measures to enhance deterrence and international confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent. (...) Secretary Gates asked the Task Force to report on needed Air Force measures in 60 days and Department of Defense measures in 120 days. This report is the first of those two"
Program Plan Outline for Advanced Certification Report to CongressNational Nuclear Security Administration 2008 -- "The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-161), created the Advanced Certification (AC) subprogram in the Science Campaign. The stated purpose of this new activity is to address issues raised in the summer 2007 JASON review of the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), in the context of any stockpile strategy. In their review, the JASON panel issued recommendations in four generic areas (...) This outline describes how the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) will address each of these recommendations [PDF]
DPRK Successfully Conducts Underground Nuclear TestKCNA 10 Oct 2006 -- The Korean Central News Agency released the following report: The field of scientific research in the DPRK successfully conducted an underground nuclear test under secure conditions on October 9, Juche 95 (2006)
The Future of Britain's WMD by Dan Plesch The Foreign Policy Centre Mar 2006 -- "This report discusses the successor to Britain 's Trident nuclear missile system. It examines British dependence on the United States and concludes that most of the discussion on the replacement is based on the false premise that the UK has an independent nuclear weapon. (...) The report also concludes that Trident should not be replaced and should be phased out now, as neither Trident nor any US-supported successor would meet the '1940 requirement' for a system that the nation can rely on if it stands alone as in 1940."
Transcript: Speech by Jacques CHIRAC, President of the French Republic, during his visit to The Stategic ForcesPrésidence de la République française 19 Jan 2006 -- "As I emphasized immediately after the attacks of 11 September 2001, nuclear deterrence is not intended to deter fanatical terrorists. Yet, the leaders of States who would use terrorist means against us, as well as those who would consider using, in one way or another, weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they would lay themselves open to a firm and adapted response on our part. And this response could be a conventional one. It could also be of a different kind".
Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran Edited by: Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, Mr. Patrick Clawson Publication Date: November 2005 Iran edges closer to acquiring a nuclear bomb and its missiles extend an ever darker diplomatic shadow over the Middle East and Europe. Iran could diminish American influence in the Gulf and Middle East by increasing the pace and scope of terrorist activities against Iraq, Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states, Israel, and other perceived supporters of the United States.
STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DETERRENCE Edward A. Corcoran 29 November 2005 - This paper examines the utility of strategic nuclear weapons. More recently, as the Soviet threat has all but disappeared, emerging nuclear threats from proliferation and terrorism reinforce the need for deterrence. Nevertheless, the usefulness of nuclear weapons in general and strategic nuclear weapons in particular has drastically declined.
Iran's statement at IAEA board meetingIRNA 12 Aug 2005 -- Sirous Nasseri, a member of Iran's nuclear negotiating team with the European Union troika, Britain, Germany, and France, read the statement of the Islamic Republic at the emergency meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Iraq Survey Group Final ReportCentral Intelligence Agency 30 Sep 2004 -- " Given Iraq's investments in technology and infrastructure improvements, an effective procurement network, skilled scientists, and designs already on the books for longer range missiles, ISG assesses that Saddam clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and that the systems potentially were for WMD. (...) Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity and signifi cance of the pre-1991 Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq's ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed after that date. (...) Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable (...) In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons."
Inquiry into Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)Australia Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Released on 01 Mar 2004 -- "The United States and the United Kingdom argued that war against Iraq was necessary because Iraq had defied, over a period of 12 years, United Nations Security Council resolutions, which sought the disarmament of Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. In particular, both governments and the Australian government which joined in the coalition, argued that intelligence had revealed that Iraq continued to possess and indeed was increasing its holdings of weapons of mass destruction. (...) The arguments about the need to go to war were controversial (...) In Australia, the Senate referred this matter to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD on 18 June 2003. The Committee was asked to consider the nature, accuracy and independence of the intelligence used by the Australian government and the accuracy and completeness of the presentation of that intelligence by the Australian government to the Parliament and people of Australian."
WMD in IraqCarnegie Endowment for International Peace 07 Jan 2004 -- The following is taken from a new Carnegie study, WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications. This report attempts to summarize and clarify the complex story of WMD and the Iraq war. It examines the unclassified record of prewar intelligence, administration statements of Iraq's capabilities to produce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and long-range missiles, and the evidence found to date in Iraq.
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director GeneralIAEA 10 November 2003 -- "This report on safeguards issues in the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) responds to paragraph 7 of the Board of Governors' resolution GOV/2003/69 of 12 September 2003. It covers relevant developments from the time of the Director General's visit to Iran on 20 21 February 2003 and Iran's acknowledgement of its centrifuge enrichment programme, but concentrates on the period since his last report (GOV/2003/63 of 23 August 2003). This report begins with the background to the issues in question (Section A) and a chronology of recent events (Section B). Information on the Agency's verification activities is summarized in Section C, organized according to the various technical processes involved (the details of which are set out in Annex 1). Section D provides a summary of the Agency's findings, while Section E sets out its current assessment and next steps. Annexes 2 and 3 to this report contain, respectively, a list of the locations identified to date as relevant to the implementation of safeguards in Iran, and a map showing those locations. Annex 4 is a list of relevant abbreviations and terms used in the text of the report."
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction - Intelligence and AssessmentsIntelligence and Security Committee Sep 2003 -- "The purpose of this Report is to examine whether the available intelligence, which informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly assessed and whether it was accurately reflected in Government publications. This Report does not judge whether the decision to invade Iraq was correct." [PDF 600 Kb]
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors GOV/2003/63 [Date: 26 August 2003 - Restricted Distribution; For official use only] Item 5 (b) of the provisional agenda (GOV/2003/44) Derestricted 12 September 2003 (This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 12 September 2003)
Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Report by the Director GeneralIAEA 06 Jun 2003 -- "At the meeting of the Board of Governors on 17 March 2003, the Director General reported on discussions taking place with the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran) on a number of safeguards issues that needed to be clarified and actions that needed to be taken with regard to the implementation of the Agreement between Iran and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Safeguards Agreement)1. This report provides further information on the nature of the safeguards issues involved and the actions that need to be taken, and describes developments in this regard since March." [PDF 216 Kb]
Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production PlantsCentral intelligence Agency 28 May 2003 -- "Coalition forces have uncovered the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program. (...) The design, equipment, and layout of the trailer found in late April is strikingly similar to descriptions provided by a source who was a chemical engineer that managed one of the mobile plants. Secretary of State Powell's description of the mobile plants in his speech in February 2003 to the United Nations (see inset below) was based primarily on reporting from this source." [PDF Version 741 Kb]
"Moscow Treaty is Full of Holes," by Senator John KerryWashington File 05 Mar 2003 -- This column by Senator John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), was published in The Boston Globe March 5: "President Bush claims that his Moscow Treaty "will liquidate the legacy of the Cold War" by eliminating thousands of nuclear arms left over from a bygone era when the United States and Russia faced each other across the nuclear divide. In reality, it does no such thing."
DoD Understates Heat Danger in NBC Defensive Gear By Bernard J. Fine, March 2003 -- On March 3, 2003, the Department of Defense conducted a news briefing on the U.S. military's chemical and biological defense readiness. The presentation was not at all helpful in terms of informing us of the actual dangers from heat injuries that our troops in the Persian Gulf can be expected to face when wearing chemical-biological protective clothing. (...) When taken in the context of the known environment of Iraq, these statements appear to be at variance with both the scientific information available and Army policy pertaining to operations in the heat. [MS Word 71.5Kb]
IAEA Board of Governors Adopts Resolution on Safeguards in North Korea 12 February 2003 -- The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on the implementation of IAEA safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 12 February 2003. The Board -- the 35-member policymaking body of the Agency -- took the action after consideration of a report from IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei.
Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei 12 February 2003 -- Once again, the Board is meeting to consider recent events relevant to the compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) with its safeguards agreement with the Agency. As I stated to the Board meeting on 6 January, the DPRK has been in chronic non-compliance with its safeguards agreement since 1993 when the Agency was unable to verify that the DPRK had declared to the Agency all nuclear material that is subject to safeguards. And since 1994 the DPRK has sought shelter behind the US-DPRK "Agreed Framework," claiming a legally untenable "unique status" under the NPT to circumvent compliance with its non-proliferation obligations. This status claimed by the DPRK has been rejected by the Board of Governors and the General Conference, which unequivocally declared the safeguards agreement to be binding and in force.
Human Performance of Military Tasks While Wearing Chemical Protective Clothing By Bernard J. Fine, 23 September 2002 -- "The purpose of this letter is to provide you with a brief overview of the ability of U.S. troops to function in a chemical-biological warfare environment in the hope that it will raise in your mind the advisability of asking certain questions of those in the administration who are so eager to wage war using other people's children (...) A worst case scenario can only predict a disaster of major proportions. Wearing chemical protective clothing while under enemy fire in a hot ambient temperature is a stress of the very highest order"
Statement by the President 10 Dec 2002 -- Today I have issued the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The strategy establishes a comprehensive approach to counter the growing threat from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons.
NATIONAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION December 2002 -- "Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-nuclear, biological, and chemical-in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States. (...) An effective strategy for countering WMD, including their use and further proliferation, is an integral component of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America. As with the war on terrorism, our strategy for homeland security, and our new concept of deterrence, the U.S. approach to combat WMD represents a fundamental change from the past. To succeed, we must take full advantage of today's opportunities, including the application of new technologies, increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis, the strengthening of alliance relationships, and the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries." [PDF 414 Kb]
Text of New U.N. Resolution on Iraq 08 Nov. 2002 -- The Security Council, (...) Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);(...)"
Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for 25 October 2002 -- Nevertheless, the DPRK, with greatest magnanimity, clarified that it was ready to seek a negotiated settlement of this issue on the following three conditions: Firstly, if the U.S. recognizes the DPRK's sovereignty, secondly, if it assures the DPRK of nonaggression and thirdly, if the U.S. does not hinder the economic development of the DPRK.
DoD Briefing on Iraqi Denial and Deception 08 Oct. 2002 -- "What we will do is try to demonstrate the extensive history of the Hussein regime's denial and deception techniques. And they are much more than techniques and tactics. Iraqi denial and deception is a highly organized and comprehensive program to hide weapons of mass destruction and their development."
C.I.A. Letter to Senate on Baghdad's Intentions 07 Oct 2002 -- Letter dated Oct. 7 to Senator Bob Graham, Democrat of Florida and chairman of the Intelligence Committee, by George J. Tenet, director of central intelligence, about decisions to declassify material related to the debate about Iraq
Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs Central Intelligence Agency - 04 October 2002 -- "Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. Baghdad hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information" "
Iraq's Decade of Defiance September 2002 -- "serves as a background paper for President George W. Bush's September 12th speech to the United Nations General Assembly. This document provides specific examples of how Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has systematically and continually violated 16 United Nations Security Council resolutions over the past decade. This document is not designed to catalogue all of the violations of UN resolutions or other abuses of Saddam Hussein's regime over the years."