Iraq Survey Group Final Report

 

Procurement Supporting Iraq’s Delivery Systems

Iraq used covert procurement methods to acquire materiel that was either banned or controlled under UNSCRs 661, 687, the Annexes to the Plan approved by UNSCR 715, and the Export/Import Mechanism approved by UNSCR 1051. ISG judges that these efforts were undertaken to reestablish or support Iraq’s delivery systems programs. The period from 1998 to the start of OIF showed an increase in Iraq’s procurement activities, and it is in this period that ISG believes Baghdad made its most serious attempts at reconstituting delivery system capabilities similar to those that existed prior to 1991.

Desert Storm and the various UNSC Resolutions led to the near destruction of Iraq’s surface-to-surface (SSM) missile force and production infrastructure.

Iraq began building its permitted missile design and manufacturing capabilities, including the ability to produce limited quantities of certain chemicals used in rocket propulsion.

• By the end of the 1990s, as was the case prior to Desert Storm, Iraq had the ability to design and build many of the necessary systems for an SSM with the exception of complete liquid-propellant rocket engines and guidance and control systems.
  
• According to a former MIC executive with direct access to the information, Iraq overcame these deficiencies by implementing a covert procurement system. Iraq used this system to buy restricted items from foreign sources through third party countries. These items were controlled by UNSCR 661 and 687, which put sanctions in place to prevent the export of certain goods, particularly military equipment, to Iraq.
  
• Many of these procurement activities started in 1998 after the UN inspectors were expelled from Iraq. (NOTE: For a complete description of Iraq’s procurement process, refer to the “Procurement: Illicit Finance and Revenue” section of the ISG report.)
  

From 1991 to 1996, Iraq began establishing contacts and making limited purchases of controlled delivery system-related items. The initial efforts were undertaken in an environment of massive civil engineering work to rebuild Iraq’s war-damaged infrastructure and while the UN inspection Regime was still an unknown quantity.In addition, strenuous efforts were devoted to rebuilding Iraq’s armed forces to counter any threat from Iran.

ISG has uncovered documentary evidence and personal statements suggesting that, despite UN restrictions, Iraq entered into discussions with both Russian entities and North Korea for missile systems, though there is no evidence to confirm that any deliveries took place.

• Sources and documents suggest that Iraq was actively seeking to obtain the SS-26/Iskander missile from Russia.
  
• Document exploitation has revealed that Firas Tlas, the son of former Syrian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Mustafa Tlas, visited Iraq in July 2001 and discussed a variety of missile systems and components that he could supply through Russia. Firas offered to sell Iraq the S-300 SAM and the 270-km-range SS-26/Iskander-E short-range-ballistic missile, or to provide assistance to help Iraq produce the Iskander. Firas claimed that he had previously met with Izakoff, the former Defense Minister of the Soviet Union, who told him that his [Izakoff’s] friend owned documents for “TEMPS” missiles, called “Sterlite” in the West. Reportedly, Izakoff said the missiles had a range of 1,500 km and were very accurate. Tlas said Izakoff claimed that Mikhail Gorbachev destroyed the missiles, but that Izakoff could supply the documents so that Iraq could produce them. According to Firas, Izakoff said that Dimitrof (sic) (a close friend of the President) presented the subject to Russian President Putin, and President Putin agreed to provide assistance.
  
• Huwaysh claimed that Iraq had contacted both Syrian and Russian entities to discuss Iraq acquiring the Iskander missile in 2002. Russia would not export any military hardware without an end user certificate signed by the issuing government agency, which is the capacity in which Syria would have served.
  

NOTE: The TEMP-S is known in the West as the SS-12 Scaleboard and has a range of 900 km. These were destroyed under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty signed in the late 1980s.

• ISG recovered documents containing contract and money flow information concerning illicit trade between Iraq and North Korea. These documents show that, late in 1999, senior officials in Iraq, including ?Abd Hamid Mahmud Al Khatab Al Nasiri (the presidential secretary), the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) began to discuss establishing trade with North Korea. In December 1999, Huwaysh formally invited a North Korean delegation to visit Iraq. The Iraqis and North Koreans decided that a face-to-face meeting would be held on or about 8 October 2000 in Baghdad. The North Korean Chang Kwang Technology Group was identified as the technology supplier and the prime technical mediator for the North Korean side. After an exchange of several communiqués, the representatives from both countries agreed to a list of specific subjects that would be discussed at the meetings, including technology transfer for SSMs with a range of 1,300 km, coastal protection missiles with a range of 300 km, and the possibility of North Korean technical experts working inside Iraq.
  
• A set of memoranda recovered by ISG shows that a high-level of dialogue between Iraq and North Korea that occurred from December 1999 to September 2000 led to plans for a North Korean delegation to secretly visit Iraq in October of 2000. Among the topics for discussion was the supply of “technology for SSMs with a range of 1,300 km and Land-to-Sea Missiles (LSMs) with a range of 300 km”. During the course of discussions with Iraq, the North Korean side acknowledged the sensitivity of transferring technologies for these missiles but indicated North Korea was prepared “to cooperate with Iraq on the items it specified”. There is no evidence, however, that the missiles were ever purchased.
  

To improve its delivery system capabilities, Iraq sought technical experts from other countries to provide assistance. Much of the foreign assistance for the Al Samud missile program came from experts in Russia, but Iraq did receive assistance from other countries. According to some sources, this assistance was often not sanctioned by the home countries of the missile experts providing the aide.

• According to Huwaysh and an Iraqi computer specialist with direct access to the information, in 1998 MIC entered into a contract with a company called Babil to hire Russian missile experts as consultants. Babil would hire the experts, who then traveled to Iraq and worked on Iraqi missile programs, particularly the Al Samud. The initial value of the contract was approximately $11 million. That September, the Babil Company sent to Iraq missile experts from Russia who came from various universities, research institutes, factories, and production organizations. The experts were paid a cash salary of $2,000 each month they worked in Iraq.
  
• These individuals were in Baghdad for approximately three months starting in September 1998 and worked at locations physically separated from the actual production facilities. While there, they engaged in discussions with the Iraqis and drew up plans related to missile development and production. Upon returning to Russia, they continued to assist Iraq and were visited in Russia by various Iraqis.
  
• Huwaysh claimed that experts from Russia provided assistance to Iraq’s missile programs beginning in 1998. In October 1999, the Russian experts provided technical reviews for the Al Samud program over a six-month period. This review included evaluations of the entire missile production system. These experts continued to provide assistance to the Al Samud program even after the review by providing a package of design calculations for liquid-propellant missiles and drawings for an inertial navigation system (INS). Huwaysh said UNMOVIC inspectors did not detect the experts from Russia during a site visit in 2002. Huwaysh speculated that if the Russian government found out that the experts were working in Iraq, they would probably have been punished, implying that the Russian government had not sanctioned these activities.
  
• A former Iraqi rocket motor test engineer claimed that experts from the FRY were involved in the development of the Al Fat’h missile system. Their involvement included analyzing instruments on the rocket motor test stand and providing an INS that was considered inadequate and of poor quality.
  
• A former senior executive in MIC who had direct access to the information admitted that, in 1999, Iraq signed a technical assistance contract with a commercial cover company, that operated outside of Belarus. The assistance included providing improvements to unidentified Iraqi missile systems. The contract also stipulated that experts from Belarus would maintain a semi-permanent presence in Iraq while the contract was in effect. According to the source, the head of the Belarusian delegation was an individual related to the office of the president of Belarus, that suggests that the government of Belarus may have been aware of this activity.
  

Numerous source admissions and documents have surfaced, which show some of Iraq’s efforts at acquiring guidance and control components for its various missile systems. Because of its inability to successfully indigenously produce such complete components, Iraq was heavily reliant upon foreign suppliers to provide such items as accelerometers and gyroscopes.

• Two scientists in the Iraqi missile program provided information concerning Iraq’s attempts to improve missile accuracy to ISG, both of whom had direct access to the information. In 1999, Al Karamah signed three contracts with companies from Russia for G&C technical assistance and equipment. The contracts’ terms were as follows:
  
  • The first contract was for approximately 25 inertial navigation systems designed to input to the Al Samud guidance system. They were a modernized version of the Scud guidance system and contained two MG-4, dual-axis flexible gyroscopes, two AK-5 accelerometers, one aligned on the yaw (lateral) axis to correct for the effects of wind drift in the trajectory, and the other aligned along the axial (thrust) axis to derive the cut-off velocity for thrust termination to control the missile’s range. The contract also required delivery of approximately five assembled and 20 unassembled pseudo-Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) in addition to some guidance test equipment.
    
  • The second contract was for approximately 100 modern, strapped down G&C systems that incorporated two, dual-axis flexible gyroscopes and three orthogonally configured accelerometers, which were also to have a digital output. The contract was amended to include an on-board flight computer and control system. The G&C systems on this contract were also designed to work in the Al Samud guidance units and were smaller than the ones listed in the first contract. Other items specified in the contract include individual parts such as: MG-4 gyros (approximately 30) and AK-5, A-15 and A-16 accelerometers (between 50 and 60). NOTE: Approximately 10 AK-5 accelerometers were received in June 2000 and another five to 10 in January 2001. The contract also included test equipment; e.g., servo test units, a single axis rate table, a single axis vibration tester, an environmental chamber, and a test unit for an optical dividing head.
    
  • The third contract was for the purchase of eight IMUs, with fiber-optic gyroscopes, and four IMUs with ring laser gyroscopes. These systems were destined for the Al Karamah and Al Milad companies and were intended for use in the Al Samud and the Al Fat’h missile systems. Up to seven of the guidance systems were delivered to the Al Karamah General Company in the second half of 2002. All of the G&C systems and related components were stored at the Al Quds Factory of the Al Karamah General Company immediately before OIF. Although some examples of this hardware were recovered, the Al Quds Factory itself has been completely looted and no items remain.
    

Figures 27 and 28 depict some of the many guidance items recovered by ISG; Figure 29 Shows an Actuator stepper motor.

• Recovered documents provide details of Iraqi contracts for SSM technical assistance and missile-related hardware. According to these documents, in 1999 the Al Basha’ir Trading Company of Iraq began a series of contracts for G&C equipment, technology, training, and missile design training with the Infinity DOO Company from the FRY. ISG has not been able to confirm the delivery of the items specified in the contracts.
  
• A former high-ranking official in MIC recalled that, at the end of 2000, Iraq signed contracts with North Korea worth at least $9 million. Iraq made a downpayment of $1.3 million. Some of the contracts specified providing G&C systems, inertial navigation systems, and on-board computers intended to improve the accuracy of SSMs having an operational range of 150 km or less. Iraq also sought to purchase gyros and accelerometers and asked if they could purchase existing SS-21 Tochka components. According to the source, Iraqi missile personnel believed that Tochka components would provide greater benefit to the solid-propellant Al Fat’h system than the liquid-propellant Al Samud.
  
  • ISG recovered contracts between North Korea and Iraq related to guidance and control components. According to the contracts in late in 2001, an eight-person delegation from North Korea visiting Iraq reached agreements to sign six contracts to improve Iraq’s missile system capabilities. One of the contracts was between the Al Karamah General Company and the Hesong Trading Corporation, North Korea, for the purchase of potentiometers (used in G&C systems), missile alignment equipment (pre-launch), batteries, and test stands for servos and jet vanes used on SSMs. Also, technical assistance was to be made available if required by Iraq. The equipment was to be delivered via Syrian ports within 9 months of contract initiation. ISG has been unable to locate any of the delivered equipment.
    
  • ISG gleaned the following information from acquired documents concerning contract number six between Al Basha’ir Trading Company Ltd of Baghdad and Infinity DOO of Belgrade, FRY. Contract number six, apparently signed 19 January 2001, for a total cost of $2,600,251, was for guidance and control testing equipment and training courses. ISG has been unable to confirm that these items were ever delivered. The test equipment was as follows:
    
  • test stand designed for static testing of dynamically tuned gyros.
    
  • test stand for solid state accelerometer static testing.
    
  • an OMEGA-5 interference test stand for testing gyro rigidity and drift.
    
  • equipment for developing homing and proximity fuzes.
    
  • software for research and development of all systems.
    
  • hardware-in-the-loop simulation software.
    
  • and SSM simulation software.
    
• The following are excerpts from documents received by ISG. The information is related to contract number eight which is between Al Milad General Company of Baghdad and Infinity DOO of Belgrade, FRY concerning guidance and control equipment. ISG has been unable to confirm that these items were ever delivered. Contract number eight, signed on 19 January 2001, for a total cost of $183,480, was for:
  
  • the design of an on-board computer system capable of withstanding 20 G’s of acceleration and 40 G’s of shock.
    
  • a two-week training course for customer experts.
    
  • a complete set of design (calculations), technical and technological documentation along with qualification testing procedures for the computer.
    
• A former high-ranking official in MIC said that, in mid-2001, the Technology Transfer Department of the IIS procured between 10 and 20 gyros and accelerometers from China for approximately $180,000. The items were intended for the G&C system of the Al Samud missile. The gyros were of the resonant type with a drift rate of ½ degree per hour. The source indicated that the Iraqis were never able to use the gyros and accelerometers because the packages were incomplete and therefore inoperable.
  
• An Iraqi scientist with direct access to the information claimed that entities in the FRY in 2002 offered to supply Al Milad with a navigation system for the Iraqi Jinin program (a cruise missile based on the HY-2). All requirements for the Jinin project were communicated to the foreign vendors directly.
  
• According to an Iraqi national with indirect knowledge of proscribed equipment smuggling, Wi’am Gharbiyah, a Palestinian businessman, successfully smuggled missile gyros into Iraq from Russia via Syria in 2002. Gharbiyah, whose earlier attempt to illegally import gyros from Russia to Dr. Muzhir of Al Karamah was foiled in Jordan due to detection by the UN in late 1995, used one of his contacts to propose to the Iraqi government to sell approximately 400 components containing gyroscopes and accelerometers in 2001. Using the IIS front company Al Karradah, the components were successfully delivered to Al Karamah through Syria in July 2002. ISG has not been able to confirm that this transaction occurred.
  
• ISG has uncovered evidence that Iraq had numerous contracts with Dr. Degtaryev, a Russian missile guidance expert and the head of SystemTech. ISG has been unable to confirm whether these contracts were fulfilled.
  
  • Huwaysh claimed that Dr. Degtaryev was subcontracted through the Belarusian firm Infobank to build 3 guidance sets for the Al Samud, but these were detained during shipment through Jordan. Iraq then placed an additional order for 3 guidance sets, that were successfully delivered. Huwaysh stated that these sets were never used because they were sent to a facility for replication but they were unable to duplicate them by the time of OIF.
    
  • A former Iraqi senior executive in MIC stated that the Al Karamah General Company signed and executed several contracts with Dr. Degtaryev. Through the ARMOS Company, Al Karamah signed contracts with Degtaryev. He visited Iraq several times along with other experts and executed several contracts with the Al Milad, Al Karamah, and Al Harith companies valued at $20 million.
    
  • According to documents ISG retrieved from the office of MIC, Iraq signed contracts for missile guidance electronics with the firm SystemTech run by Degtaryev. Although ISG has been able to recover some of the delivered components, ISG has not confirmed that these contracts were fully executed.
    

Iraq relied on foreign suppliers for production-related machinery for use in its Al Samud programs. Iraq’s success at acquiring this machinery probably affected the production rate of these missiles. Russian entities were the main suppliers of machinery and tooling, though other suppliers may have played a role.

• A high-level Iraqi official and an Iraqi scientist claimed that, beginning in 1998, in addition to engineering and technical support, experts signed contracts to supply many of the pieces of equipment for the Al Samud program. This equipment included many of the production machines along with related dies, moulds, and fixtures for the Al Samud program. Two small automatic circumferential and longitudinal welding machines were sent from Russia. The Russians also provided jigs and fixtures that were made in Russia and then imported into Iraq.
  
• ISG learned through interviews with a former high-ranking official in MIC that, in June 2001, Iraq signed a contract with a company from Russia for machinery and equipment that was worth $10 million. The machinery included a flow former, furnaces, and welding machines. The flow former was tested in Russia and installed at the Al Samud site in Abu Ghurayb but was not used before the war. The original contract length was 18 months; however, it was extended because the work specified in the contract was incomplete. At the start of OIF, work on the engine fixtures for Al Samud II was 60-70% complete, work on the airframe design was 50 percent complete, and work that would have contributed to the test and assembly of new engines was 40 percent complete. These projects were intended to help establish a proper production line for the Al Samud II because the missiles produced before June 2001 were not of consistent quality, which made them unreliable. The experts co-operated with the Iraqis until OIF. ISG has no evidence that the government of Russia sanctioned or approved these contracts.
  
• A former high-ranking official in Iraq’s ballistic missile program stated that, in 1999, Al Karamah signed a contract worth $1.6 million with a Russian company for Al Samud airframe production, assembly, and testing. According to the contract, the payments would be tied to item deliveries. The first payment of $100,000 would be paid after receiving the design drawings. The contract was modified in 2001 when the Al Samud missile diameter increased to 760 mm. By 2003 only 65% of the design drawings were received.
  

ISG judges that Iraq received at least 380 SA-2/Volga liquid-propellant engines from Poland and possibly Russia or Belarus. Source claims corroborated by contract information support this judgment. This figure is also consistent with what Iraq declared to the UN.

• According to a high-level official in Iraq’s missile program, Iraq received 280 SA-2 engines, some of which were secondhand and some damaged, from Poland through a company known as Evax. A majority of these engines reportedly arrived in 2002. Additionally, the source speculated that Iraq had possibly imported 100 SA-2 engines from Russia through an Iraqi company known as Al Rawa’a.
  
• A letter dated 2 July 2001 signed by Dr. Hadi Taresh Zabun, the head of MIC’s procurement department, indicated that MIC had received approval to enter into contract with Evax for an additional 96 SA-2 engines under the same terms and prices as their earlier contract for 38 engines. Another document referenced a subsequent contract for Iraq to receive the remainder of the 200 engines they had ordered, 96 of which they had already received. This was followed by a letter dated 11 April 2002 from the Polish company Evax to the Deputy Minister of Military Industrialization, which states that a third shipment has arrived at the port of Tartus and is on its way to Baghdad (the Al Karamah General Company), comprising 32 Volga rocket engines and 750 pieces (pressure valve, air valve, servo, and miscellaneous other materials). The letter also states that a shipment of 104 samples is delayed in Poland awaiting the required inspection before they can be exported (comment: this may refer to the rest of the 200 engines in the contract).
  
• A source with indirect access to information claimed that, in December 2002, Iraq successfully procured either from Belarus or Russia, approximately 100 Volga engines and 380 missile thermal batteries. They then imported these items via Sudan and Syria by using a front company called Al Rawa’a. ISG has no evidence that these East Europeans countries either sanctioned or approved these transactions.
  

Officials within Iraq’s missile programs have disclosed information about Iraq’s pursuit of carbon fiber technology for use in its solid rocket motor programs. Companies from Russia were Iraq’s main targets for the acquisition of this technology.

• A former senior-level official in Iraq’s missile program provided information about Iraq’s attempts to obtain carbon fiber technology that is used for solid rocket motors such as the Al Fat’h. MIC began pursuing carbon fiber technology from Russia in the last quarter of 2002; this effort ran in parallel with work being accomplished by the Military Engineering College under contract to the Al Rashid General Company. Iraq’s Military Engineering College and the Al Rashid General Company were responsible for Iraq’s indigenous carbon fiber production efforts. Al Rashid was responsible for the solid-propellant motor case and the Iraqi Military Engineering College was responsible for the carbon fiber production lines. The contract, which included one carbon fiber filament winding machine, one mandrel manufacturing machine, one mandrel extraction machine, one high-powered cleaning machine used to remove the gypsum from the mandrel, and one curing furnace was not completed by the required date and an extension was granted. By the start of OIF, the majority of the components were finished.
• A former high-level official in MIC claimed that during the first quarter of 2003, an unidentified Russian company contacted the ARMOS Company to facilitate a visit by Iraqi researchers to the Russian carbon fiber production lines and have the experts from Russia provide technical assistance. MIC created a delegation, authorized by Huwaysh, to travel to Russia to speak with the technicians and visit the lines. The Iraqi delegation was canceled due to the start of OIF.
  

Iraq’s inability to successfully produce all the chemicals necessary for propellants for its missile systems forced Iraq to acquire these chemicals from foreign entities. Iraq attempted to use a front company to mask these activities from international attention. ISG discovered numerous occasions in which Iraq attempted to acquire chemicals for use in their liquid-propellant missile program. ISG has not been able to confirm that contracts were ever agreed to for all these chemicals or if any agreed contracts were ever fulfilled.

• Documents ISG recovered from the Baghdad offices of the Arabic Scientific Bureau (ASB) and Inaya Trading company describe solicited quotes from Chinese and Indian companies (including the Inaya Trading Company) for chemicals and materials used with liquid-propellant missiles. Some of the chemicals in which the ASB was interested were: Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), Diethylenetriamine (DETA), Hydrazine, Hydrogen Peroxide, Xylidene, and Triethylamine. These chemicals are common fuels and oxidizers used in liquid-propellant engines. The documents do not, however, indicate whether any contracts were signed or material delivered, and, since the dates reported are late 2002, purchase of the chemicals may have been stopped by OIF.
  
• ISG has learned that in 2002 proposals were placed before MIC by the Al Anas Trading Agency Co., Ltd., through Dr. Nazar ?Abd-al-?Amir Hamudi, for amounts totaling hundreds of tons of many different liquid propellants, their constituents or pre-cursor chemicals. The information states not only was Iraq actively looking for stocks of propellants that were currently in widespread use but also that they were seeking tens of tons of more advanced, higher energy liquid propellants. ISG believes that, due to the start of OIF, these chemicals were never delivered.
  
• A former executive in MIC told ISG that Iraq had wanted to purchase or produce AZ-11 liquid propellant because it is a more energetic fuel and produces greater thrust. Therefore, the Iraqis made several attempts to acquire AZ-11 fuel from the Ukraine but they were never successful.
  

Iraq also undertook efforts to improve its solid-propellant program by importing chemicals needed in the production of solid-propellants. Though ISG has not been able to confirm that contracts were ever agreed to for all these chemicals or if all of the contracts were ever fulfilled, ISG did discover large amounts of imported aluminum powder during a site visit to Al Amin Factory, part of the Al Rashid General Company.

• Some 60 tons of imported aluminum powder, suitable for use in solid-propellant rocket motors, was discovered during an ISG site exploitation inspection of Al Amin Factory. At the then current rate of demand, this would have satisfied the requirement for hundreds of motors. Considerable quantities of other propellant materials had also been imported and were potentially available for use.
• A former high-ranking official in the Iraqi missile program who had direct access to the information claimed that Iraq purchased chemicals used in solid-propellant rocket motors. The official reported that, in 1999, the Al Rashid General Company purportedly placed orders for raw materials that are used in the production of solid-propellants for missiles. Among the orders was a purchase made from the Al ?Ayan Company, owned by Jabir Al Dulaymi, for six tons of ammonium perchlorate (AP) and six tons of aluminum powder. The Al ?Ayan Company purchased these items from a French company for Al Rashid. ISG has no evidence that the French government either sanctioned or approved this transaction.
  

• A few officials have provided information about Iraq’s dealings with the Indian firm NEC for chemicals for solid-propellants. ISG has no confirmation that the government of India either sanctioned or approved these activities, and Indian authorities arrested NEC’s director, Hans Raj Shiv, in 2003 for his illicit activities.
  
  • According to Huwaysh, former Director of MIC, he had many business dealings with the Indian firm NEC. Huwaysh says that as late as April 2003, Hans Raj Shiv, the director of NEC, was working in NEC’s Baghdad office. Examples of the Iraqi-NEC business relationship are: NEC supplied the Al Qa’qa’a General Company with a nitric acid production capability used in the production of explosives. Between 1999 and 2002, Iraq purchased from NEC at least 10 cells that were used to process sodium chloride, probably related AP production.
    
  • ISG has learned from an Iraqi scientist with direct access to the information that, from 1999 to April 2003, Iraq procured from NEC Engineers Private, Ltd., the design and construction of AP processing facilities. AP is a major constituent of solid-propellants. The procurement included machine equipment, tools, and direct engineering assistance. This contractual relationship resulted in the construction of two AP production facilities. The Iraqis did most of the work on the first facility but NEC provided technical assistance, the electrolytic cells, and the centrifuges. This facility had an output capacity of 50 tons per year (NFI). The second AP facility, with a capacity of 180 tons per year, required much more involvement by NEC who provided the equipment, production technology, and engineering support. The Iraqi Al Faw Company was involved with the physical construction of this facility. ISG judges that these two facilities, if run at full capacity, would have produced sufficient oxidizer a year to manufacture 300 tons of propellant – more than sufficient to support Iraq’s declared solid-propellant programs and enough to facilitate work on motors for new missiles.
    
• According to a former high-ranking official in the Iraqi missile program, the Al Rashid General Company purchased raw materials for solid-propellant motors beginning in 1999. Among the items were:
  
  • 356 tons of AP. Six tons of AP from the Al Rayan Company, which was purchased from France; an additional 350 tons purchased from the following entities: NEC, which purchased the AP from an unnamed source; Al Sharqiyah, which purchased the AP from an unnamed purchased the AP from China; and Al Maghrib, which purchased the AP from France;
    
  • 126 tons of aluminum powder. An initial order of six tons of aluminum powder from an unidentified source; an additional 120 tons purchased from NEC and three Iraqi companies (Al Sharqiyah, Al Maghrib, and Al ?Ayan) who purchased it from France;
    
  • 104 tons of HTPB. An initial order of four tons of hydroxyl terminated polybutadiene (HTPB), a binder, purchased from the Al Taqaddum Company, which purchased it from an Italian company; and an additional 100 tons of HTPB from NEC, which purchased it from a United States company,
    
  • 2 tons of methyl aziridinyl phosphine oxide (MAPO) from NEC, which purchased it from China;
    
  • 60 tons of dioctyl azelate (DOZ) from Al Sharqiyah, which purchased it from a Japanese firm.