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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Iraq Survey Group Final Report


Regime Finance and Procurement
Annex J


The Procurement of Conventional Military Goods in Breach of UN Sanctions

Before the 1991 Gulf war, Iraq indigenously produced ammunition, small arms, gun barrels, and other basic military items. The war, however, destroyed Iraq’s military industrial base leaving Saddam’s Regime with critical shortages of military spare parts, ammunition, and other materiel. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 661 frustrated Saddam’s attempts to reconstitute his military capacity following Desert Storm, because UNSCR 661 prohibited UN members from exporting conventional military goods and related technologies to Iraq.

Many individuals, foreign companies, and some countries knowingly violated UN sanctions. In some cases, governments failed to comply with or enforce sanctions out of recalcitrance of international norms or inability or negligence to monitor the commercial activities of certain individuals and firms willing to conduct illicit business with Saddam’s Regime. Governments not only included UN members, but also permanent members of the UNSC.

Iraqi efforts to obtain military goods and related technologies in the mid-1990s until OIF in March 2003 can be divided into several categories: raw materials; consumables; and military goods. Iraq sought materials such as steel, aluminum and titanium to supply its military manufacturing industry. Under Saddam, Iraq constantly needed spare parts for manufacturing and for military equipment. As with any military organization, the Iraqi military always required consumables such as batteries, tires, and ammunition. We judge that Iraq’s most pressing requirement, however, was for military equipment.

  • For potential suppliers, the sale of military equipment offered the strongest profit margins.
  • Since the beginning of sanctions in 1990, Saddam successfully acquired a wide range of military goods or their component parts for SAM systems, main battle tanks, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), combat aircraft, GPS jammers, and night-vision equipment.
  • Throughout this investigation, ISG has exploited information from captured documents from various Iraqi ministries and agencies and debriefings of both detainees and willing sources from the former Iraqi Regime. Examples found by ISG, provided below, represent only a small cross section of the total illicit dealings with Iraq. However, a full investigation of all violations of UNSCR vis-à-vis Iraq is outside the scope of ISG’s investigation.

The United Nations Sanctions on Iraq

The UNSC passed numerous resolutions from 1990 to 2003 prohibiting member states to export, military goods and technology to Saddam’s Regime, placing financial constraints on UN members conducting business with Iraq, establishing WMD and military restrictions on Iraq, and the formulation and implementation of the UN OFF program. UNSC passed two UNSCR, 661 (1990) and 687 (1991) that specifically prohibited the export of military goods to Iraq by UN members. Paragraph 24 of UNSCR 687 reads:

In accordance with UNSCR 661 and subsequent related resolutions and until a further decision is taken by the Security Council, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply or promotion or facilitation of such sale or supply, to Iraq by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessel or aircraft, of; arms and related material of all types, specifically including the sale or transfer through other means of all forms of conventional military equipment including paramilitary forces and spare parts and components and their means of production for such equipment.

These restrictions included prohibitions on the licensing of military technology and other transfer arrangements used in the production, utilization, or stockpiling of military items. These UNSCR also prohibited the use of personnel or materials for training or technical support services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, maintenance, or support of military goods.

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Ukrainian Companies

Summary of Ukrainian involvement 1995-2003: Documents obtained by ISG indicate that Iraqi delegations visited Ukraine in 1995, and Ukrainian groups visited Iraq between 1998 and 2003. During these visits, both parties discussed missile deals. Another source indicates that in 2001 and 2002 Ukrainian delegates provided Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) components to Iraq. In addition, ISG recovered papers that indicate Ukrainen companies had offered to supply other military equipment to Iraq.

1995-2003: Ukrainian and Iraqi Delegation Visits

Information supplied by an Iraqi scientist, indicates that Iraqis visited Ukraine in 1995 and that the Al-Karamah State Establishment hosted many visits from Ukrainian suppliers who were negotiating for contracts from 1998 to 2003.

  • An Iraqi scientist stated that Ukrainian suppliers were the most frequent visitor to Iraq assisting Iraq with its missile program. The Ukrainians visited many times led by a Mr. Orshansky. Orshansky usually brought 50 to 60 people from multiple Ukrainian companies dealing with a range of issues including civil power projects as well as missile and other military technologies. The Ukrainians wanted to sign a contract to supply theory, design, and equipment, but the deal was never completed due to the defection of Husayn Kamil from Iraq in 1995.

2001-2002: Ukrainian Company May Have Supplied Military Goods to Iraq

A source indicates that aUkrainian company supplied components for UAV.

  • In 2001 and 2002, the Ukrainian company, Orliss, provided UAV components, such as engines and gyroscopes, to the Iraqi Government. The individual from Orliss who handled these transactions was Olga Vladimirovna, Director of the Orliss Company. Vladimirovna provided her business card to several individuals at the Ibn Firnas Company.

2003: Papers Indicate Ukraine Company Supplied Military Goods

Recovered papers indicate that a Ukrainian company was offering to supply military equipment in early 2003.

  • Recovered documents indicate that the Al-Karamah State Establishment purchased equipment through ARMOS Trading Company in Baghdad from the Mont Elect Company, Ukraine before January 2003. Two payments were made of $405,000.00 for the equipment. Signatures on the document included representatives from: ARMOS; Al-Karamah State Establishment; Sa’ad General Company; Al-Karamah; Dr. Sergei Semonov, for the Montelect Establishment, and the Trade Office of the MIC.

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Cypriot Companies

1997: Cypriot Company Offered T-72 Tanks, Anti-Aircraft Missile Systems, and Sniper Rifles

Recovered documents refer to aCypriot company’s offer of military goods; including tanks, anti-tank weapons, and anti-aircraft weapons systems.

  • A letter dated 23 August 1997 from a Cypriot company F and F Dawn, Ltd. (located in Limassol, with offices also in Paris) shows that the General Manager, Ahmad Fayiz Al Mirabi, offered military goods to the Al-Basha’ir Company and Mr. Munir Mamduh.
  • A second letter, marked ‘Top Secret’, from the Office of Army Chief of Staff Major Colonel Aziz Ahmad Husayn to the GMID, dated 21 September 1997, refers to an offer to sell Baghdad “tanks (142 T-72 with a possible total of 300), bombers, missiles (Tow-2 /anti-tank), anti-aircraft missiles system (Stinger) and Barrett USA semi-auto sniper rifles.”

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by French Companies

Summary of French involvement 1998-2003: Some French businessmen sought business with Iraq during this period. In one instance, a French businessman brought a tank carrier to a weapons convention in Baghdad, and in another instance, a French electronic warfare expert visited Iraq. In addition, the MIC attempted to acquire components for the French-manufactured Roland missile system.

1998-1999: Tank Carrier Imported to Iraq

A letter from Aqra General Trade Company Baghdad dated 18 November 1998 requests an entry visa and reads, ‘‘Find attached herein a copy of the passport of Jean Claude, a French citizen and the manager of the French company Lura. Mr. Claude will bring a tank carrier model to the MOD that will be supplied to Baghdad by the end of this month. Kindly facilitate the procedures to issue him an entry visa to Iraq, considering that our company will bear his stay expenses in Baghdad.’’

  • A second letter from Aqra General Trade Company Baghdad dated 8 December 1998 reads, ‘‘Reference to our letter we would like to inform you that the vehicle (Tank Carrier) arrived at Abi Gharib [most likely Abu Ghurayb] Customs Department, kindly notify the competent authorities to give Mr. Jean Claude an entry visa to Iraq ASAP.’’
  • A letter to the Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Directorate from the MoD Armament and Equipping Directorate dated 12 September 1999 reads, ‘‘kindly acknowledge that Mr. Jean Claude, Manager of the French Company, Lura visited the country on Saturday, 11/09 to operate the Rescue and Armor Transport Vehicle stored at Modern Vehicles storehouse. Kindly appoint an officer to escort the afore-mentioned with the technicians for three or four days.’’
  • Another letter to the Armament and Equipping Directorate dated 18 September 1999 from the Manager of the Aqra Company, states, “During the visit Mr. Jean Claude, Commercial Manager of the French company, made to Baghdad, it was agreed, in the presence of the committee formed by the ministry to take over and inspect the vehicle, to send a technical expert to train some specialists how to operate the vehicle. Kindly take the necessary actions to issue entry visas for Jean Claude, the Commercial manager and Philippe Robert, the Technical Expert.’’

1999-2000: Deputy General Manager of French Company Visits Iraq

Recovered documents include letters dated December 1999 and January 2000 that show that the Deputy General Manager of a French company called SOFEMA planned to visit Iraq on 15 January 2000 on behalf of a number of French Military Companies. Mr. Dominique Salini’s 29 December 1999 introduction letter from the al-Hadar Company is included in the textbox below. A subsequent letter to the GMID M6 Section from the head of Air Defense Security dated 3 January 2000 requests an opinion on holding a meeting with a representative from the IIS and Salini.

2002: Documents Indicate French Experts Visited Iraq and Agreed to Military Technology Transfer

A recovered document indicates that a French electronic warfare/radar expert met with representatives of the Al Kindi Research Facility in November 2002. The purpose of the meetings was to facilitate military-related microwave, direction finding, and passive radar technology transfer. The translated documents include military-related technology transfers and Iraqi contractual agreements with foreign manufacturers. ISG also acquired two meeting logs among the documents.

  • The subject meeting log indicated that on 3 November 2002 an individual identified as a French expert and referred to as Mr. Cloud (possibly Mr. Claude from the prior paragraphs), visited the Al Kindi Electronic Warfare/Radar Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Center. The Log states that the office of Mohammad Fadil financed Mr. Cloud’s visits to Iraq. Fadil brought Cloud to Iraq on 2 previous occasions.

Letters Dealing With a Planned Visit of Mr. Salini of the French SOFEMA Company to Iraq in Early 2000

In the name of God, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate
Republic of Iraq
Presidency of the Republic
General Directorate of Military Intelligence
Air Defense Security System

Serial No. /Sect 2/Div 5/
Date / /1/2000

To/General Directorate of Military Intelligence/M4/Sect 6
Subject/Requesting for your opinion

1. Al Hadar Company “Al Hadhar Company” Letter, numbered 271, dated 29/12/1999, which has been sent by your directorate.

2. Please give us your opinion on holding a meeting between Mr. Dominique Salini, Deputy General Manger Commercial of the French Company SOFEMA, and our representatives.

Please review and inform us…with our best regards.

Intelligence Major General Head of Air defense Security System


Call the company representative in Iraq (TC: Handwritten note).

Waiting for the company to respond to the new appointment 17/1. (TC: Handwritten note).


In the Name of God, Most Merciful, Most Compassionate

Serial No.: 271

Date: 29/12/1999

Sect 6

Mr.: NR993 gentlemen (TC: There is a big scratch over the “NR993” and “Sect 6” is written in place of it)

Our Greeting,

Mr. Dominique Salini is visiting Iraq. He is the Deputy General Manager Commercial of French Company SOFEMA, which is considered marketing company representing a lot of French military companies. We kindly request a meeting to discuss your needs with him. He will visit Iraq between the period 15/1/2000 to 19/1/2000. Attached is the company catalog for reviewing.

With all our respect.

Attachment: Company catalog.

Deputy Manager

‘Isam Al ‘Aqidi

Copy for the branch


Bulgaria - Sivishtov 5250 – St. T. Milanovich No.10 A – Telefax: 00359631-25577

Iraq – Baghdad – Al-Masbah Tel: 7172829- Fax: 7172738 – Telex: 213175 ISAM –

P.O. Box: 4245, Sabe Abkar - Baghdad

  • At the 3 November 2002 meeting, Cloud was brought in due to his expertise and experience in obtaining equipment in support of the Dawa II. Fadil, Cloud, and Saeed discussed technical issues indicating he could provide solutions through Fadil’s office.
  • Fadil, Cloud, and Saeed also discussed the technical specifications of Radioson equipment, direction finding equipment, and a land-based station that was tabled in a previous meeting.
  • Saeed, Fadil, and Cloud discussed the possibility of obtaining or constructing a base to manufacture microwave parts, passive and active sensors, signal enhancers, and low distortion components. Cloud promised to provide Saeed and Fadil with information regarding these electronic warfare products.
  • A second document identified as a technical cooperation memorandum outlines Saeed’s meeting with Cloud. The memorandum was presented to the General Manager of the Al Kindi Electronic Warfare/Radar Research Center. The document confirms that a meeting took place as scheduled with Saeed, Fadil, and Cloud.
  • Fadil, Saeed, and Cloud agreed to cooperate so Cloud could facilitate the transfer of high frequency (HF), microwave, and passive radar military-related technology to Iraq. A memorandum of ‘‘4 November’’ (probably 2002) requests permission to proceed with the technological transfer process.

2002-2003: Iraq’s MIC May Have Attempted To Procure French Roland Missile Parts

A source related that Iraq attempted to acquire battlefield and air defense technology 25 days before the onset of OIF.

  • Beginning in late December 2002, the Iraqi MIC initiated efforts to acquire replacement parts for the Roland II surface to air missile system, valves for Iraq’s air defense system, and various other high technology items with military and battlefield applications. These efforts were underway up until 23 days before the onset of hostilities. The MIC Commercial Section corresponded with Majda Khasem Al-Khalil (a Lebanese female) who in turn met directly with the French Thompson Company regarding the acquisition of the missile parts.

Al-Khalil later provided samples of night vision goggles and protective Kevlar devices to the MIC. The paragraphs below describe the development of this effort as portrayed from the Iraqi side.

  • On 25 December 2002, a high level MIC official requested permission to acquire ‘hard cables’ for Iraq’s air defense headquarters. The MIC official supplied Al-Khalil, Sour Debbar, and Dr. Awad Al-Souri as points of contact capable of supplying these materials. Al-Khalil was described as “the Lebanese.”
  • On 22 February 2003, Ra’ed Ismail Jamil, General Manager of the Salahadin General Company, and a Brigadier General Hassem discussed the purchase of parts for the Roland II system with Al-Khalil. A communication sent the same day by Jamil and Hassem notified the MIC Deputy Minister that, based on his orders, they invited Al-Khalil to reach “clear and final agreements” regarding subjects already discussed and that they had arranged for her safe passage with border control.
  • During a meeting with Jamil and Brigadier Hassem, Al-Khalil mentioned that she met with French experts regarding to rehabilitating Iraqi Roland II parts. Al-Khalil had learned from those experts that it was not possible to rehabilitate those parts due to their deteriorated state, but it was possible to provide 50 new parts at the same price to repair the old ones. The 50 new parts met the same technical specifications the Iraqi MIC stated for the old parts. Al-Khalil informed Jamil and Hassem that she provided the French experts with technical questions and designs. The aforementioned experts addressed the questions and designs “thoroughly, clearly, and completely.”
  • On the evening of 22 February 2003, Al-Khalil promised to have the new components within ready 30 days of the ministry’s acceptance of the contract. Al-Khalil further agreed to ship the old Iraqi parts back to Baghdad without repair. The MIC assumed responsibility for the transportation and movement of the parts through Iraqi customs. The Ministry believed that they could use internal components from the old parts as spare parts in the future.
  • Al-Khalil further stated she was ready to import “set valves from either types, 12 sets of each at $250,000” as requested by the MIC Deputy Minister. A-Khalil agreed to deliver these items within 10 days of signing of an agreement. She further mentioned that “the French side” was ready to implement this agreement and take care of the documentation process regarding shipping and warranty certification, but that she would need some money to cover this process. Al-Khalil stated she was ready to provide a bond accepted from the Iraqi side towards a down payment and she provided complete specifications for both sets of valves.

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by North Korean Companies

Summary of North Korean involvement 1999-2003: Starting in 1999, North Koreans visited Iraq to hold talks relating to rocket engines. By 2003, North Korea and Iraq had negotiated and signed contracts for missile components, ammunition, and other goods. North Korea later reciprocated by inviting the Iraqi leadership to Korea. According to documentation, in May 2001 a delegation from North Korea, including specialists in defense, were due to visit Iraq.

1999-2001: Planning for Military Procurement Delegation Visits

Recovered documents indicate that Iraq and North Korea government officials proposed numerous delegation visits in letters written between 1999 and 2000.

  • A letter dated 11 August 1999 marked ‘Top Secret and Personal’ from the Presidential Secretary and addressed to the Minister of Military Industries, refers to an invitation and a letter on 2 August 1999. The letter indicates that permission for the MIC and the MoD had been granted to allow a verbal invitation to the North Korean Defense Minister or his deputy to visit Iraq.
  • A letter dated 28 February 2000, shows that the North Korean Defense Industry Department of Korean Workers Party officially invited an Iraqi military delegation to visit North Korea. The visit was arranged to show North Korea’s willingness to supply Iraq with military equipment and to allow for discussions between military experts. The letter later states that the North Koreans believed the proposed visit would open good relations between the militaries “against the common enemies.”
  • A letter from the Defense Industry Department of Korean Workers Party, dated 30 July 2000, gave compliments to the Iraqi Minister of Military Industries and indicated an appreciation for the invitation of the Korean delegation to Iraq. “On our belief, in the present situation of international circumstance, it will be most preferable that your delegation visit our country first to open the wonderful relationship and to continue the reliable and extensive cooperation in the field of military industries between two ministries. In this great chance together with, we would like to emphasize that our last invitation of your delegation to our country remains still valid and effective.”
  • A letter from the Defense Industry Department of Korean Workers Party to the Minister of Military Industries in Iraq (probably the MIC), dated 23 September 2000, accepted Iraq’s invitation and acknowledged that the North Korean side would send a high-ranking delegation, headed by the Deputy Minister, for seven to 10 days starting on about 8 October 2000. The letter indicated that the North Koreans hoped this visit would be a “turning point” for establishing new relations in military fields between the two ministries against “our common enemies.”
  • A record of a telephone call dated 5 October 2000 between the Secretary General and Brigadier General Hadi Tarish, from the MIC, with the Staff Brigadier General A’adel Hameed, specified the proposed subjects to be discussed during the North Korean delegation’s visit on 10 October 2000. The topics included: the upgrade of communications systems, especially HF, the modernization of anti-tank missiles, the possibility of purchasing an assembly line to produce 30mm artillery, the development of SAMs, and air defense systems. The air defense topics described were the modernization of SAMs, including, “early warning systems, SAM/2 T, and SAM/2 A.”
  • A captured telephone contact note dated 10 October 2000 confirmed that the first meeting with the North Korean delegation was planned for 11 October 2000 with the MIC Director in attendance. The note specified that the Iraqi attendees would include staff from the Director, Armament and Accommodations, Staff Brigadier General A’del Hameed, concerned representatives from the Air Force Command-Air Defense Command, Communications Administration, a Navy Representative and a SSM Command Representative.

11 August 1999 Handwritten Document From the Director of the IIS marked Secret/Personal

  1. This organization is preparing for cooperation with Iraq in the fields of furnishing weapons and military equipment, to pass special technology for its manufacture and upgrade as follows:

    1. Jamming systems against enemy aircraft radars, the communication amongst the aircraft, and their communication with ground bases.

    2. Upgrade of radar systems, command systems, and Russian early warning (radars) used in Iraq, among them (P-14, P-18, P-19, K66, H.FINDER).
    3. Development of air defense systems, types (Volga and SAM 2).
    4. Development of automatic firing systems against aircraft launchers.
    5. Development of special radars for missiles, linking it with systems to disrupt enemy missile targeting.
    6. Pass on technology for surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 1300 kilometers and land-to-sea missiles with a range of 300 kilometers.
    7. Long-range launcher tubes, caliber 230mm and 122mm, capacity (22) launchers.
    8. Pass on technology to build a mini-submarine.
    9. Repair and maintenance of Eastern made equipment and weapons according to what the Iraqi side has determined.
  2. The Korean side is prepared to send a technical delegation to discuss preliminary measures with Iraqi specialists in order to obtain an agreement on the proposals. After that, the Iraqi side is sending a technical delegation to visit Korea to complete discussions and (conduct) a field survey on the specialized factories.

  3. Currently, there is a desire from the Iraqi side to cooperate with the Korean side to arrange and prepare a secret visit for the Korean Minister of Defense or his deputy to Iraq for high-level discussions in this area.
  4. The Korean side has conveyed through the source that Iraq is not allowed to associate itself with long-range missiles as specified, but it can deal with missile technology as long as it doesn’t exceed the range of 150 kilometers, as decreed by Security Council decisions. Whereas, they exhibit their readiness for cooperation in the fields specified by Iraq.
  5. In light of what was presented, we propose cooperation with the Korean proposal, in pursuance of the aforementioned plans, especially and forming a working team from MIC, Air Force Command, Air Defense Command and the Intelligence Service to deal with the proposals and negotiate inside and outside of Iraq. The results have been submitted to the President to receive approval of a visit by the Korean Minister of Defense or his deputy.

Note: This note was directed to a North Korean organization called the “Chang Kwang Group”

2000: Contracts Negotiated for Iraqi Defense Programs

Information from a former high ranking official who worked in the MIC, corroborated by captured documents, indicates that Iraq and North Korea had negotiated contracts worth $10 million to support the Iraqi military programs by mid-2001. These contracts included a Volga air-defense missile homing head, ammunition, small machines, and spare parts.

  • Between the end of 2000 and the beginning of 2001, North Korea and Iraq reportedly began discussing contracts supporting the Iraqi missile program, particularly for guidance and control systems. While the head of the MIC, Abd Al-Tawab Mullah Huwaysh, handled the negotiations with the North Koreans, orders for the negotiations were passed directly from Saddam via the Technology Transfer Office of the IIS.
  • A five-person North Korean delegation, headed by the deputy Minister of Defense, visited Iraq at the end of 2000. A 7-person Iraqi delegation to North Korea reciprocated this visit, lead by the deputy Minister of the MIC, General Muzahim Sa’b Hasan al-Nasiri. Another North Korean delegation traveled to Iraq in the third quarter of 2002.
  • The Harith Company and Al-Karamah State Establishment signed the first contract at the end of 2001 for the development of a Volga homing head by adding infrared sensor. Another 3 to 4 Hutteen Company contracts followed for small ammunition, small machines, and spare parts. The total value of these contracts was $10 million.
  • Iraq also proposed that North Korea supply and install guidance and control kits in 50 of Iraq’s Al Samud and Al Fat’h missiles. Each kit wouldconsist of 2 gyros, 3 accelerometers, and an on-board computer. The first installment was for 10 kits. North Korea, however, rejected the proposal in the near term, but agreed to study it further.
  • The Syrian companies Lama and SES allegedly facilitated the Iraq-North Korea contracts, charging an additional 10-15 percent commission on the contract value. (See also the Front Company discussion.)

Recovered documents from 2001 corroborate the information given by this source. These documents show that a North Korean company signed four contracts and discussed others with Iraq. This included the supply of missile components, a deal to modify radars and the Volga missile system, the supply of engineers, an agreement for ammunition manufacturing equipment, and the supply of components for ammunition. These contracts were between the Iraqi companies Al-Karamah, Hutteen, and Al Harith and the North Korean Hesong Trading Corporation, based in Pyongyang. The goods were to be shipped to Syria and then onto Baghdad.

  • The first contract was for the procurement of components for short-range missiles, associated test equipment, installation in Iraq, and for the training of Iraqi engineers.
  • The second contract was for the modification of ABARONA, P-15 radars, and modifications to the Volga System (S-75), including technology transfer and the supply of 20 North Korean engineers.
  • The third contract was for an automatic copying machine for the manufacture of 122mm guns, a screw filling machine, and TNT for munitions.
  • The fourth contract was for fuses for 57mm anti-aircraft gun ammunition, RPG-7 projectiles, and delay mechanisms for the RPG-7.
  • Minutes of a meeting dated 06 September 2001 refer to another contract that has the names of high ranking official “His Excellency Pak Gyong Chol the 1st Deputy Minister of D.I” and Muzahim S Hasan, the MIC Deputy Minister. The minutes refer to an earlier meeting held in Pyongyang 11 June 2001 and to a visit by a delegation to Baghdad Iraq from 2 to 7 September 2001. They refer to 6 contracts in total and to future long-term cooperation. Supplied goods included: ammunition, communication equipment, short-range S-S missiles, artillery and night vision systems, powder for ammunition, and light naval boats.
  • A 31 December 2001 letter from SES International (a Syrian Company) to Tosong Technology Trading Corporation indicates that the North Korean company received a cash payment from Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO). SES took a 10 percent commission for their efforts, according to their agreement with the Al-Basha’ir Company, the MIC’s chief procurement front company.
  • By 2 March 2002, a letter from Al-Basha’ir Company to Tosong Technology Trading stated that contracts were signed and will be financed according to the Iraqi–Syrian Protocol. The letter also stipulated that Tosong must nominate a Syrian company for this purpose.
  • In a 4 April 2002 letter, a Mr. J.B.K from the Tosong Technology Corp’s Damascus office suggested to Mr. Muzahim Hassan, the MIC Deputy Minister, that a more suitable transportation method for the contracted goods should be found. He recommended that the goods in question should be moved to Syria by aircraft rather than using ship transportation.

2001: North Korean Delegations Plan To Visit Iraqi Intelligence Organizations

A recovered letter dated 16 May 2001 from the authorized manager of the Al Maimana General Trading Company to, intelligence agent nr993 of the Directorate of General Military Intelligence, reads, “For the sake of improving the job that our company, is doing with your department, a delegation from North Korea including a large number of the specialized companies in the field of defense will visit the country for the period from 29 May 2001 to 03 June 2001.”

2001: North Korean Delegations Visited Iraq

Evidence supplied by an Iraqi with direct access indicates that the Al-Karamah State Establishment had many foreign suppliers and, in 2001, hosted visitors from North Korea.

  • Representatives from a North Korean company reportedly visited Iraq for three days in April or May 2001. The North Korean delegates attended meetings covering a range of subjects, including one meeting focused on rocket engines.
  • The North Koreans were interested in technical aspects surrounding Iraq’s indigenously produced rocket engines and how Iraqi engineers welded their combustion chambers and nozzle assemblies.
  • Iraq’s main interest during the discussions was to obtain parts and solutions to missile-related engineering problems.

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Russian Companies

Summary of the Russian involvement 1999-2003: Russian engineers visited Baghdad providing technical assistance for the al Samud missile program. Russian companies prepared equipment for air defense, offered missile launchers, signed a contract for missile gyros, and invited Iraqis to visit Moscow factories. Russians offered to supply military technology for Iraqi rockets and missiles. Meetings were also held in the Iraqi Embassy in Moscow where Russian companies offered to provide technical expertise to improve and to build weapons systems, including tanks.

1999: Russian Missile Technical Support Visit

A source indicates that seven Russian engineers provided technical assistance to the al-Samud missile program in 1999. The Russians also reportedly supplied machines and parts to Iraq. The MIC arranged and funded the contract that the Iraq Intelligence Service (IIS) oversaw.

  • In April 1999, seven Russian engineers spent three months in Baghdad providing technical assistance to Iraq’s al-Samud liquid-propellant missile program. The group of engineers included a Russian expert in engines, two experts in guidance and control, an expert in airframes, one who worked on test benches, a lab tester, and one expert in the supply of machines and parts. Each Russian had an individual contract for an unknown amount of money for their technical expertise.
  • The visit also included a $10 million contract for parts and machines such as a flow forming machine, a milling machine, a furnace, and raw materials. These machines and equipment were housed at the Al-Karamah State Establishment.
  • The MIC arranged and funded the contract with the Russians. The IIS directorate within the MIC, however, oversaw the contract. IIS officers occasionally attended meetings between the Russians and the Iraqi representatives from the Al-Karamah State Establishment.
  • From January to February 2003, a Russian technical team reportedly visited Iraq to train Iraqi technicians on upgrading an air defense system. The Russians conducted the training in Baghdad.

2000-2001: Russian Establishment Offered Military Goods

According to captured documents, a Russian company offered to prepare military air defense equipment and a written proposal to supply a defense system called the S-300.

  • A letter dated 4 September 2000 from the authorized Manager of the Al Maimana General Trading Co. Ltd., to Intelligent Agent nr993 of the GMID reads, “we are enclosing you the offer of the Russian Lemz Establishment which includes the possibility of preparing equipment of air defense (radars, communications equipment, land services equipment etc).”
  • A second letter dated 16 November 2000 to intelligence agent nr993 of the GMID reads “Since we have connections with many Russian and French companies that showed its readiness to deal with us in the field of importing equipment of air defense and its spare material, our company, Al Maymana General Trading Company, Ltd., is happy to present its services to you in the field of importing the materials and the equipment that you need to serve our great Iraq and from a Russian and European origins.”
  • A third letter dated 3 March 2001, to Intelligence Agent nr993 states, “Our Company, Al Maymana General Trading Company Ltd has done great efforts to provide the armed forces to serve our great Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein (may God keep him safe). Through our job, a credible side has proposed the possibility of a Russian Air Defense system, type S-300 PMU (four launching sites with 36-70 missiles) and entering it to the country.

2001: Offer to Supply Rockets and Technology

Sources and documents suggest that Iraq was actively seeking to obtain the SS-26/Iskander missile from Russia.

  • Document exploitation has revealed that Firas Tlas, the son of former Syrian Defense Minister Lieutenant Mustafa Tlas, visited Iraq in July 2001 and discussed a variety of missile systems and components he could supply through Russia. Firas offered to sell Iraq the S-300 SAM and the 270km range SS-26/Iskander-E short-range ballistic missile, or to provide assistance to help Iraq produce the Iskander. Firas claimed that he had previously met with Izakoff, the former Defense Minister of the Soviet Union, who told him that his [Izakoff’s] friend owned documents for “TEMPS” missiles called “Sterlite” in the West. Reportedly, Izakoff said the missiles had a range of 1,500 km and were very accurate. Tlas said Izakoff claimed that the missiles were destroyed by Mikhail Gorbachev, but that Izakoff could supply the documents so that Iraq could produce them.
  • Huwaysh claimed that Iraq had contacted both Syrian and Russian entities to discuss Iraq acquiring the Iskander missile in 2002. Russia would not export any military hardware with out an end-user certificate signed by the issuing government agency, which is the capacity in which Syria would have served.

2001: A Russian Company Offers to Supply Services and Missiles

Documents recovered indicate that a Russian company in which the Russian Government was a principle shareholder (51 percent) offered missile launchers and expertise for the production of military equipment.

  • GMID letters mention a Russian Company called Motovilikha Plants Corporation and the Manager, Nikolay Dimitshtico. A 13 June 2001 letter informed the Iraqi MoD that the Modtovilikha Plants Corporation can export through the Russian Ross Iron Export Organization and that the MoD will receive a bid for the BM-21 missile launcher from them.
  • Correspondence between the GMID and MIC also mentions that the delegation from Motovilikha Plants Corporation informed MoD that they could assist Iraq with their expertise in the production of military equipment.
  • Correspondence between the GMID and the Military Attaché instruct the GMID to export only through the Ross Iron Export Organization. The Attaché also received a bid on missile launchers (BM 21).
  • Captured correspondence reveals that the GMID directed the Military Attaché to contact the Motovilikha Plant Corporation to ascertain if the corporation has a delegation from the Russian Government to handle export of the weapons. The GMID also asked if Motovilikha is prepared to submit a bid for the weapons.
  • The Iraqi Military Delegation, headed by the Assistant of the Army Chief of Staff, transmitted the Gun Directorate requirements to the Motovilikha Delegation.
  • A GMID investigation of Motovilikha Plants Corporation revealed that the Russian Government owned 51 percent of the shares of this company. The Military Industry Organization controlled 21 percent of the shares, specializing in the production of missiles. The company employees owned the remaining shares.
  • On 21 April 2000, the factory sent specialists to Iraq to submit price offers for upgrades of the BM-21 missile launchers. A letter from the company lists the following goods as “available for supply:”
    • The 152mm gun system;
    • The towed 120mm gun with an automatic guidance system;
    • The 240mm gun with automatic guidance system; and
    • Missiles with high explosive warheads.

The company also informed the Iraqi MoD and IIS that they are upgrading the BM-21 launcher system extending the range from 20 km to 40 km. After upgrading the BM-21, it will become the BM 9A52-2.

2001: Supply of Components for Al-Samud Missiles

Captured documents indicate aproposed Iraqi visit to Moscow to submit a list of required missiles components, such as accelerometers, gyros, and control electronics, to Russian companies.

  • General Major Muzhair Sadiq Saba signed a 9 March 2002 letter on the subject of Russian companies. The letter refers to the contents of a secret letter dated 19 June 2001, concerning the import of substances for the Al-Samud missile. Saba described an individual named Iyad abd al-Qahhar abd al-Salam as “a distinguished industrialist.”
  • According to the letter, Abd-Al-Salam was assigned to control unfilled missile requirements, such as acceleration sensors (accelerometers), valves, and controlling electronics. Saba further requests that a list of essential required items be provided, so al-Salam can obtain them during his visit to Moscow.
  • The letter also indicates that al-Salam carried out the first stage of manufacturing a digital computer for Al-Karamah and that he received an invitation from a Russian company to visit factories in Moscow to obtain detailed knowledge of other products. The letter is from the Al-Karamah State Establishment and is directed to the deputy of the Minister’s Council President and the MIC Minister.

2002: Russian and Belarusian Companies Supply Missile Test Equipment

Recovered documents refer to the procurement of missile test equipment from Russia and Belarus.

  • A contract from the Al Kindi General Company dated 18 June 2002 is addressed to, “The agreement of the Deputy Prime Minister- the Minister of MIC…to buy the following subjects: checking system of gyroscope with two axes, thermal rooms, and checking vehicles system.”
  • This signed contract between the Russian Systemnikh Company and Al-Karamah State Establishment does not indicate preparation of a checking system of the gyroscope with 3-axis because of the limited investment available from the Al-Karamah and Al-Milad companies. However, the information recorded reads, “it should be known that we have a possibility to get 3 axes information by using 2 axes with adding specified programming with coordinating with Belarus side.”

2001-2003: Proposed Procurement of Missile Tracking and Test Equipment

Captured documents describe the proposed procurement of military technology from Russia for the manufacture of missiles and the design and manufacture technology for missile telemetry equipment (tracking equipment).

  • Iraqi correspondence from Dr. Zabun, the former head of MIC R&D and of the MIC Special Office, to the Deputy Prime Minister and to the MIC Minister proposed the procurement of Russian missile technology and equipment on 28 November 2001.
  • One technology description refers to a Russian special “military standard specification.” The special offer from a Russian military expert named “Yosbov” included a study of the development, manufacture, assembly, and use of missiles, with a total cost of $100,000 for Russian and English languages copies and $70,000 for Russian language only. The documentation states that, this technology would particularly “contribute in developing [Iraq’s] space and missile programs.”
  • Another desired technology includes a telemetering system which was described as, “urgently needed for missile program especially Al-Samud and Al-Fat’h missiles.” Dr. Zabun described this telemetering system as having a frequency range of between 2.1 to 2.4 GHz with 500 usable channels and an output microwave power of 15 watts. Also, Dr. Zabun listed a requirement for a smaller size unit to fit into the missiles. The radio frequency transmission range for the missile package was specified at 200 km.
  • There was also an arrangement for supplying 20 “loaded parts,” for 20 experiments. These ground parts were to be placed in three data receiving points transmitted to the missile-monitoring center to allow for analysis and missile tracking. This contract included spare parts, accessories, and a transfer of technology allowing for the design and manufacture of the telemetering equipment in Iraq.
  • The telemetering system offered three receiving and transmitting stations with accessories in addition to an operating room equipped with computers and programs for displaying and analyzing data. The offer also included a training course conducted by five Russian experts in Iraq for five Iraqi engineers.
  • Dr. Zabun anticipated that the Iraqi cadre training would be conducted in two stages, the first in Moscow, for six specialists and for 600 hours, and the second in Iraq for one month under Russian specialist supervision.
  • ARMOS, a MIC-run Iraqi-Russian front company, served as liaison between the MIC and the Russian suppliers. The Iraq military attaché in Moscow provided the contracts and related documents to the Russians for signature.
  • The contract was hidden behind the guise of the “nuclear disaster victims fund Al-Karamah.” The contract reads “as for the second party (the Russian Nuclear Disaster Victims Fund Institution)—the Russians blockade imposed on Iraq will not be considered ‘a forceful circumstance’.’’
  • The telemetering package total cost was $500,000. The Iraqis planned to deposit the funding for the contract in the Ahli Bank in Amman, Jordan. A memo from the manager of ARMOS, dated 29 January 2002, states that the chairman of the Russian Nuclear Disaster Victims Fund requested that ARMOS deposit the amount for the 2 contracts into these accounts.

ISG judges that this telemetering equipment would have provided Iraq with ground-based transmitting and receiving stations and the associated modules for fitting into missiles. The ground-based stations would have utilized monitoring equipment for the tracking of missiles during flight tests. This telemetering equipment would have had a working operational transmission range of 200 km, despite the UN imposed 150 km range limit for Iraq’s indigenously produced missiles.

2002—Russian Company’s Sales Contract for Military Helicopter Equipment

ISG recovered a contract between Al-Basha’ir Company of Iraq and Notr Inc of Russia that negotiated the sale of Russian MI-8MT helicopter equipment. Please see Figure 38 and overleaf for a copy of this contract.

2003: Iraqi MIC Delegation Visits Russia

Information from a former high-level Iraqi official indicates that an Iraqi joint delegation met with representatives from four or five private Russian companies to discuss how the companies could provide technical expertise to the Iraqi military.

  • In January 2003, members of an Iraqi delegation held meetings with representatives from 4 or 5 Russian companies in the trade section office of the Iraqi embassy in Moscow. Dagher Muhamad Mahmud, the MIC Deputy Director, Sulayman Al-Huraymis, Director of the IIS M-23 Directorate, and Dr. Suham, Director of the ARMOS Company participated in the meetings.
  • Several Russian company representatives met with Iraqi delegates and discussed providing technical expertise to the MIC. Dagher and Russian representatives discussed using their company’s expertise to improve and build weapons such as artillery and tanks. Dagher also discussed financial matters involving the MIC’s debt to Russian companies.

2003: Russian Team Visits Iraq To Train Air Defense Technicians

According to an official from the Iraqi Al Kindi Company, a Russian technical team visited Iraq in January or February 2003 to train technicians on an upgrade to an air defense system. The training was conducted in Baghdad.

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Bulgarian Companies

Summary of Bulgarian Involvement 1999-2002: Bulgarian companies contracted to upgrade Iraqi tanks and invited Iraqis to visit Bulgaria to view military equipment including a fighter jet engine workshop.

1999-2002: Bulgarian Company Supplies Iraq With Military Goods

Recovered documents indicate that a Bulgarian Company offered to supply Iraq with night vision goggles and parts for Iraqi T-55 tanks and aircraft from 1999 to 2002.

  • Letters from the General Manager of SARA-M, Sofia, dated 1999-2002, offered the Brigadier General of GMID various military goods.
  • A letter refers to previous meetings, in which the Iraqi side requested tanks and night vision goggles. In this letter, SARA-M attached a factory catalogue translated into Arabic and stated that they hope “that it satisfies, through which they can serve our heroic Army to break down the embargo implemented upon our struggling nation.” The SARA-M Company General Manager also stated that he is ready to discuss means of supply, quantity, and price with the GMID.
  • In another letter, SARA-M referred to an Iraqi request to supply radiators and tanks air pressures devices, stating that SARA-M can provide 100 radiators and “T- 55 tanks air pressures devices”to stores in Baghdad.
  • The SARA-M representative also offered a quotation for Russian-origin aircraft wheels. The wheels were apparently stored in special warehouses in Bulgaria and were ready for deliver to Baghdad.
  • In another letter, SARA-M offered to supply Iraq with night vision goggles. It states that the goggles were “for the infantry, chopper pilots, and tank drivers. An offer is made to send Iraq samples to be checked.”

2001: Offer To Supply Military Goods

Recovered documents show that a Bulgarian company signed contracts to upgrade Iraqi tanks and missiles in 2001, including supplying spare parts and a technology transfer.

  • The MIC invited a delegation from the JEFF Bulgarian Company to Iraq to negotiate technical offers on updating tanks and missiles, (several types including Perchora—SA-3) providing spare parts, fighter/helicopter engines, and various other military equipment. In addition, they discussed the transfer of technology related to a number of “important and sensitive projects.” The negotiations ended with signing a number of contracts to the amount of $50 million.
  • The MIC requested that the JEFF Bulgarian Company submit a formal invitation to visit the helicopter and engine maintenance factories specified in the final contract.
  • The JEFF Bulgarian, Co., invited four people to visit Bulgaria to view equipment and jet fighter engine workshops.
  • The MIC proposed that Mr. Majid Ibrahim Salman (also called Majid Mohammed Ismail) serve as the Iraqi representative for the technology transfer, negotiating with the company, maintaining an ongoing relationship with experts, and controlling the operations. The JEFF Bulgarian, Co., agreed to bear all expenses for Salman’s accommodations and hospitality. The IIS financed a two-day visit in Syria for Salman. The IIS Deputy Minister signed the instructions on 3 September 2001.

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now called Serbia and Montenegro) Possible Breaches of UN SanctionsSummary of Yugoslav involvement 1999-2002: Representatives from several Yugoslavian companies reportedly visited Iraq in 1999 and 2001 to discuss missile components and related support sales. In 2001, a Yugoslavian company also offered to provide Iraq with parts for 125mm tank main guns.

1999: Federal Republic of Yugoslavian (FRY) Delegations Visit Iraq

Information supplied by an Iraqi Scientist indicates that the Al-Karamah State Establishment hosted FRY delegations in 1999.

  • During the summer of 1999, FRY companies visited Iraq twice. Although their visits were mostly about missile engine parts, they discussed “all aspects of supplying the Al-Karamah State Establishment.”
  • The Yugoslavian delegation included the former Ambassador to Iraq and expert named Georgi Bladagovich of the Infinity Company. Bladagovich had been in Iraq before the start of Desert Storm.

2001: Iraqi Delegation Visits FRY To Discuss Missile Technology

According to a high-ranking Al-Kindi official, senior Iraqi military officials and businessmen visited FRY in mid-2001 to discuss Iraq’s air defense and missile testing capability.

  • The Iraqi Minister of Defense, General Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al-Ta’i, reportedly led the delegation to Serbia. The delegation also included the Director of the Al- Kindi Company in Mosul, Dr Sa’ad Dawould Al Shamma’, and several high ranking Iraqi air defense officials.
  • The primary purpose of the trip was to discuss Serbian air defense artillery systems used in the war with NATO. Al-Ta’i wanted to acquire thermal tracking capabilities for their Bijoura Radar System. Iraq also reviewed Serbian proposals for purchasing missile testing wind tunnels. During the discussions, the Serbians reportedly committed to provide Iraq with spare parts for existing radar systems in the Iraqi inventory.
  • As part of the visit, the Iraqi delegation met with a soldier was allegedly responsible for shooting down a US F-18 aircraft with the Bijoura system. The Bijoura Project engineer participated in this discussion, noting that a “classical version” of the system downed the aircraft. Afterward, several Iraqi delegates doubted the accuracy of the story.

2001: Offer To Supply 125mm Tank Main Gun Components

Recovered documents demonstrate a Yugoslav company’s offer to supply parts for a 125mm gun. The gun was part of an Iraqi tank called ‘Saddam The Lion.’

  • A letter dated 8 June 2001, from Col Krsta Grujovic of Yugoimport was sent to the General Manager of the Saddam General Company and reads as follows: “referring to preparation of the parts of 125 mm gun, we would like to point out the following; although we know the availability of technical schemes with you, the producing company intents sending a copy of these schemes for signature from both sides. In order to be approved for delivery purpose and to make sure that there are no mistakes in documents, we will submit these schemes in two weeks. There are some parts available for the producing company and mechanical operations were done until semi-finial stage. The producing company intents to provide these parts to gain time and not charging you price difference. The schemes of these parts will be submitted in two weeks.”
  • A handwritten internal memo, dated 5 July 2001 was attached to the Yugoimport letter. This memo, addressed to the projects department, was signed by Ra’id Sabah, the Manager of Saddam General Company. The memo’s heading indicates that the gun parts and technology (schemes and drawings) mentioned are designed for a tank gun, “for the product Saddam the Lion.”

2002: A FRY Company Offered Technical Cooperation With Iraq

Captured documents indicate that a Yugoslavian company offered Iraq missile system maintenance services, air-to-air missiles, and other related military technologies.

  • The letter, marked ‘Secret,’ refers to a Yugoslav company called Cofes and reads, “referring to your letter # Cofes 1096, dated 25 05 2002, concerning the cooperation aspects with the Yugoslav company Cofes and according to the special catalogue attached with your letter mentioned above. We would like to inform you our need to cooperate in the following aspects listed below and would look forward to meet with Cofes company’s specialists to discuss with them the aspects listed below and specify the methods of cooperation. Please review and inform us with regards.”
  • The letter subsequently lists the following equipment:
    • “Missile system maintenance
    • Homing AA missiles
    • Programmable missile targets
    • Navigation
    • Modification of charging the missile with fuel and oxidants facilities for the missile maintaining.”

Possible Belarusian Breaches of UN Sanctions

Summary of Belarusian Involvement 2000-2003: Iraqi delegations visited Belarus to negotiate the purchase of air defense systems and electronic warfare technology. Belarusian experts visited Iraqi air defense systems. Belarusian firms agreed to multiple contracts to import missile guidance and control equipment to Baghdad.

2000-2001: Two MIC Delegations Visit Belarus

In 2000 and 2001, two MIC delegations visited Belarus, according to an official from the Al-Kindi Company. The purpose of the visit was to upgrade Iraqis air defense and electronic warfare capability.

  • Both Iraqi delegations were headed by Abd al-Tawab Mullah Huwaysh, the former MIC Director, Dr. Sa’ad Dawould Al Shamma, the former Director of Al- Kindi, and Brigadier General Hussein, the former Director of the El Milad Company. The delegations also included several high-ranking Air Defense Force officials.
  • While in Belarus, the delegations reportedly focused on air defense cooperation, specifically involving the acquisition of an upgraded version of the Russian made P-18 radar, which used digital electronics and sophisticated anti-jamming capabilities. As a result of this trip, Belarus allegedly supplied Iraq with a new model of the P-18 and spare parts. According to the source, Iraq had an older metric version of the radar in their inventory.
  • In addition, the MIC delegation sought to acquire two or three Russian made S-300 air defense systems. Once acquired, Iraq planned to create the infrastructure to build an Iraqi version of the system. Part of the plan for infrastructure included sending Iraqi technicians to Belarus for training. At the first delegation meetings, a contract was signed to train Iraqi technicians on the S-300 system.
  • The MIC delegation subsequently discussed the acquisition of the Strela Air Defense System, a new system with a 7-11 km range. They reportedly also discussed acquisition of GPS jamming and Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) technology. Specific upgrades focused on the El Bijoura air defense radar system and acquisition of new missile guidance systems to increase missile engagement ranges.

2002: Contracts To Supply Gyros and Guidance Equipment

Recovered documents show that aBelarusian company representative was contracted to procure missile guidance and control equipment for Iraq in 2002.

  • Notes of a meeting state that representatives of a Belarusian entity called EGC conducted technical discussions with Iraq from 10 to 17 February 2002. These negotiations ended with signing an agreement no. 209/2002 totaling $5,053,971. EGC acknowledged through this agreement that they would supply control and guidance missile system (CGMS) equipment needed by the Al-Karamah State Establishment.
  • Additional notes from the 10 to 17 February 2002 meeting refer to another contract with EGC worth $20,771,700. This agreement was for the supply of laboratory and experimental equipment necessary to “implement scientific research for CGMS and improve quality and production.”
  • A letter dated 28 February 2002, addressed to the MIC refers to orders to import strategic material and equipment for the Al-Karamah State Establishment. In the letter, Dr. Hadi Tarish Zabun arranged to “discuss with Alexander Dekteryoff to supply gyroscope and other accessories.” Dekteryoff was the Belarusian representative for the deal. The letter also mentions two contracts for items delivered through Syria totaling $5, 261,507. The letter specifies the following payment procedures:
    • Payment of “15 percent of the total amount of both contracts” ($789,226) to the Belarusian Infobank.
    • The remaining amount “shall be paid in cash within ten days after receiving the shipment,” according to both contracts.
    • The company shall issue a credit letter for 3 percent, to us, through Infobank “good for the duration of the contract, as a good business performance.”
  • The same letter also requested that MIC approve and appropriate the amount of $5,261,507 in cash through the “Iraqi-Syrian agreement” (presumably the Iraq-Syria trade Protocol). After approval, the Syrian agent would pay the Belarusian side in cash in Amman or at another place of their choosing.
  • Another letter to the Vice Premier of MIC dated 20 March 2002 refers to additional contracts with Belarusian companies and an Alexander Dekteryoff, PhD.
  • Approval was granted for the Al-Karamah State Establishment to carry out a contract with Dekteryoff to import CGMS, according to two agreements. The first agreement was for $5,053,791. The second agreement was for 207,716 Euro, which was modified in accordance with letter from Dekteryoff’s representative to $182,137.
  • This agreement was considered to be a high priority, expedited contract. According to the letter, “Your Excellency has previously approved to finance the two agreements through the Iraqi-Syria Accord. Due to the important nature of the imported material, it is necessary to expedite the contract, in order for Al-Karamah State Establishment to carry out the programs assigned in an exact and advanced manner (which is considered scientific and technological priority). And making the first payment would expedite the shipment of the goods, as promised by Mr. Dekteryoff.”
  • The March 2002 letter also specified payment via the Syrian trade Protocol, “Your Excellency, would you please, approve the payment of 15 percent that’s equal $785389.24 in cash, from our account in Amman, and appropriate the rest of the remaining amount for the two contracts through the Iraqi-Syrian accord. Furthermore, we will ask the Syrian side to be apprehensive about the contract in order for them to get their share of the deal ASAP.” A note in the margins of this letter instructs ‘‘immediately make payment of 15 percent and the rest of amount according to the Syrian agreement.’’
  • The letter is signed by Raja’ a Hassan Ali, Director General of the Trade Bureau, Dr. Muthher Sadiq Saba’, Director General of Al-Karamah, and Dr. Hadi Tarish Zabun, Director of the Minister’s office.

2002-2003: Belarusian Experts Assist in the Maintenance and Repair of Iraqi Missile Batteries With Russian Cooperation

Captured documents show that Belarusian experts visited Iraq and assisted with the maintenance and repair of missile batteries. The work was complete in February 2003.

  • Correspondence from the GMID dated 30 December 2002 refers to a number of Belarusian experts who visited Pigura Missile Batteries of the 145th Missile Brigade. The experts engaged in maintenance and repair operations with the following units in the Iraqi 145th Brigade: 166th Battery, 30th Battery, 31st Battery, and 35th Battery.
  • Captured documents reveal a letter, dated after 17 February 2003, from the Iraqi Air Force Command to the Military Attaché in Moscow. The letter directed their Military Attaché in Moscow to inform the Russian IroKlub Company that six of 10 amplifiers they had supplied to Iraq had malfunctioned. ISG judges that these malfunctions may have been the Russian missile equipment that the Belarusians were repairing.
  • A letter sent to GMID from the Air Defense Security System stated that the Belarusian experts left Iraq by land to Syria on 24 February 2003 in accordance to the orders of the Russian Ambassador to leave Iraq before 26 February 2003.
  • Another report refers to the visit of 18 Belarusian experts working at Al-Harith Establishment / MIC. The report stated that the experts formed a repair and maintenance workgroup for artillery batteries.

Possible Syrian Breaches of UN Sanctions

Summary of Syrian involvement 2001-2003: With the assistance of Firas Tlas, the son of the former Syrian Defense Minister, Damascus offered Iraq missile technology and fuels. Firas Tlas and the MAS Economic Group offered Iraq the services of South African engineer, Chinese, and Syrian Engineers in 2002. Firas Tlas made several additional visits to Iraq and signed several military contracts. Syria also offered the services of a French expert who expressed his wish to visit Iraq to provide details about documents. Syria also planned to supply Iraq with spare parts for a 155mm weapon system in March 2003.

2001: Correspondence and Meetings Referring to Supplying Military Goods

Documents recovered indicate that Firas Tlas met with former Russian senior officials who offered to supply Iraq with military equipment and technology, including production technology relating to surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 700 km. ISG believes that in this particular case Firas Tlas was acting as a facilitator attempting to supply Iraq with goods of Russian origin, goods from Yemen, and experts from China, South Africa, and Syria.

  • A recovered letter, dated 12 May 2001, was sent to the Iraqi MOD from the Chairman of the Board of the MAS Economic Group offering cooperation in supplying military goods through bids and tenders.
  • Sources and documents suggest that Iraq was actively seeking to obtain the SS-26/Iskander missile from Russia.
  • Document exploitation has revealed that Firas Tlas, the son of former Syrian Defense Minister Lieutenant Mustafa Tlas, visited Iraq in July 2001 and discussed a variety of missile systems and components he could supply through Russia. Firas offered to sell Iraq the S-300 SAM and the 270km range SS-26/Iskander-E short-range ballistic missile, or to provide assistance to help Iraq produce the Iskander. Firas claimed that he had previously met with Izakoff, the former Defense Minister of the Soviet Union, who told him that his [Izakoff’s] friend owned documents for “TEMPS” missiles called “Sterlite” in the West. Reportedly, Izakoff said the missiles had a range of 1500km and were very accurate. Tlas said Izakoff claimed that missiles were destroyed by Mikhail Gorbachev, but that Izakoff could supply the documents so that Iraq could produce them.
  • Huwaysh claimed that Iraq had contacted both Syrian and Russian entities to discuss Iraq acquiring the Iskander missile in 2002. Russia would not export any military hardware with out an end-user certificate signed by the issuing government agency, which is the capacity in which Syria would have served.
  • Tlas also mentioned that he met with a Yemeni tradesman called “Shahir ‘Abd-al-Haq.” During this meeting, the tradesman said the Iraqi Minister of Defense sent him to see Tlas to help import Yemeni spare military parts into Iraq. These Yemeni contracts included parts for MiG-21, a PMP pontoon bridge, and Ilyushin 76 military transport aircraft.
  • Tlas clarified that Shahir accompanied him on the plane when he arrived in Iraq on 29 Jun 2001. Tlas was surprised when Shahir was not allowed access to Iraq and that he met with Tariq ‘Aziz, the Deputy Prime Minister, at the airport. Later Aziz told Tlas that Shahir was not allowed to enter Iraq because he “co-operates with the Israeli intelligence.”
  • In an internal memo from Major Quays Mahdi of the GMID, referred to his attendance at a 1 August 2001 meeting. with a four-person Russian delegation, Mr. Tlas, and representatives of the Iraqi Air Defense, Air Force, and Army Aviation commands. According to this memo, the meeting took place in the Commanding Officer’s Club. The Iraqi Directorates represented were: Armaments, Electrical Mechanical Engineering, and Missiles. Staff Chief Marshall Sa’ad of the MoD directed the meeting.
  • The Russian delegation at this meeting in August 2001 included Paris Ivanovish, a specialist in the fields of the Volga and Bichora systems, as well as being a representative of a military factory that specializes in air defense; Georgi Sergeevich Pitrov an specialist in air to air missiles and the Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Government Office called “Log;” Oleg Georgovich Orlov a Czech-based businessman specializing in weapons; and Vadim Borisovich Kaziulin.
  • The Russian delegation agreed with the requests to supply equipment to Iraq as specified. Both parties agreed to send six experts to Iraq. The group was to review and decide what the Iraqis required in regard to the maintenance and production workshops associated with tanks, armor and infantry. This group was scheduled to arrive in Iraq 15 days after the meeting. Staff General Khaldun Khattab Umar, the Secretariat of the MoD, was the group’s contact.

2002: MAS Economic Group Requests Iraqi Entry Visas for Military Technicians

A letter from the MAS Economic Group dated 30 January 2002, requested the urgent issue of Iraqi entry visas for 3 Chinese and 2 Syrians who were to work for the MoD. In July 2002, another letter from the MAS Group referred to 3 South African engineers residing in Damascus who were awaiting visas from Baghdad. A letter from Iraqi Staff Major General Talib ’Uwayn Juma’h, the Army Chief of Staff, approved the extension of the Iraqi visas for the three South African experts on 10 August 2002.

2002: Procurement of Military Goods and Services for Iraq

Documents recovered show that ARMOS requested a bid for for rocket fuel from the Syrian MAS Economic Group in 2002. The company Director of MAS was Firas Tlas, the son of former Syrian Defense Minister. Firas was also involved in a Chinese offer in 2002 to help with the Iraqi Air Defense System.

  • A letter from Dr. Siham Al Din Khayri Al Ali, the Deputy Director of ARMOS Trading, dated 15 October 2002, requested a bid from the MAS Economic Group for rocket fuel. One of the types of fuel listed included one entry for 15 tons of hydrazine at 97-percent purity.
  • A recovered letter from Firas Tlas, dated 21 October 2002, states, “Technicians from the Syria have been dispatched to China to deal with some quite influential companies (companies that have a great influence upon the Chinese government) and that these companies have expressed their desire to co-operate with Iraq for a modernization of the air defense systems.” The letter further states that the meeting should take place, “in either Damascus or in Peking and that they held no objection to the idea of sending a delegation to visit Peking.”
  • Another letter from Tlas, also dated 21 October 2002, relays to “Abu Mustafa” that technicians from “our side have been sent to China in order to do business with esteemed powerful companies with the government and that they have complied positively to co-operate with you to develop the Air defense Systems.” Also, that associate meetings should be held in Damascus or Beijing and that there was no objection to sending a delegation invitation letter to visit them. The letter gives regards and a wish to visit Mustafa soon in Baghdad.

2003: MAS Economic Group Facilitates French Military Sales Catalogue Dissemination

An internal GMID memo from Lt. Col. Imad Salih dated 13 January 2003, refers to a Syrian MAS Economic Group letter with 5 attached CDs and catalogues from a French expert named Eric Joubert. The Syrian Company was facilitating the supply of the French technology. The documents contained information and equipment lists of interest to the GMID directorate and the Iraqi intelligence service. Joubert expressed his wish to visit Iraq to give more details about the CDs and catalogues.

2003: Contract for Supply of Spare Parts for 155mm Weapon Systems

Recovered documents indicate that a Syrian company agreed to supply Iraq with Syrian Defense establishment components of 155 mm weapon systems.

  • A recovered contract dated 20 February 2003 names the legal representatives from the Iraqi Al Sumud and Al-Basha’ir General Companies and a name of the legal representative for the Syrian, SES International . The contract designates that SES will supply the MIC with 100 parts for the 155 mm weapon system. These parts, produced by the Syrian Defense Plants Establishment, cost $2,574,000.
  • The contract specified a guarantee deposit letter from the Al Mawarid Bank, Beirut, Lebanon for $514,000 as a down payment on the deal. The deposit letter was to be directed to a “Jasim Ahmad Hasan and a Hashim Karim ‘Abbas” in regards to the sponsoring of a representative of the SES International Corporation.

Possibel Breaches of UN Sanctions by Jordanian Companies

2001: Jordanian Company Offers To Supply an Ammunition Production Line

  • A letter dated 28 January 2001 from the Al-Basha’ir for Trading Investment Company of Amman, Jordan (Jordanian branch of the Iraqi Al-Basha’ir Company) to the ARMOS Trading Company Baghdad refers to a presentation given by Al Bash’air for the proposed installation of an assembly line, portions of which were manufactured in Yugoslavia (tender no. 2000/56/70).
  • Specifications indicate that this proposed technical transfer was for the production of .22 caliber ammunition. The proposal included: a block diagram, “know how” documents, installation, supervision over equipment installation, trial run and performance tests on equipment, and technical assistance. Annual production capacity amounts were estimated as 25 million rounds. This production line cost $ 9,466,015.

Possible Yemeni Breaches of UN Sanctions

2001: Government of Yemen Offers to supply Military Goods to Iraq

Recovered documents refer to the Yemen Ambassador meeting with the Iraqi military to discuss a list of guaranteed military materials. According to the documents, the President of Yemen gave his blessing to support the effort to supply military goods to Iraq.

  • A letter from the Iraqi Defense Minister Sultan Hashem Ahmed dated 23 March 2001 speaks of a meeting with the Republic of Yemen’s Ambassador, Mr. Abid Al-Malek Saeed. The letter states that Yemen had been helping the Iraqi Armed forces through a Yemeni business-man named Mr. Shaher Abid Al Haqq.
  • Reference is given to a meeting held 19 February 2001, were the Yemeni side was ready to export military materials from Yemen and Ethiopia to Iraq. The letter indicates the President of Yemen, Ali Abid Allah Salah, gave his blessing to the deal and that the Iraqis were given guarantees for the spare parts. These parts were specifically drawn from the stocks of the Yemeni armed forces, air force, army aviation and included armor, trucks, and weapons.
  • A follow-up meeting was held on 22 March 2001, which included the Yemeni Ambassador and Mr. Al-Haqq. Al-Haqq and the Ambassador provided the Iraqi military with a list of guaranteed available military materials and prices. Al-Haqq also revealed that he had met with the President Salah who had given his blessing for these efforts and support. The letter indicates that the President Salah, “believes that the support of Iraq with the proposed exports is necessary” and he had made calls to his brother, an Air Force Commander, asking him to present everything possible to Iraq, even if he has to take supplies from the Yemeni Air Force and ask Russia and others for replacement material.

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Chinese Companies

Summary of Chinese involvement 2001-2003: According to multiple sources, Chinese companies provided Iraq with limited rocket guidance software, missile gyros, and accelerometers. Chinese companies also attempted to sell the former Regime jamming equipment.

2001: Chinese Company Attempts To sell Military Goods to Iraq

According to a former Iraqi government official, Chinese administrators attempted to sell a camera and a jamming system that could be used against infra-red missiles. The deal failed because of both the price and undetermined Iraqi requirements.

  • A member of the Chinese High Committee for Electronic Warfare (EW), Professor Xu Govan (phonetic), negotiated with the Iraqi MIC for the sale of 1 CCD Camera and 1 Jamming System for infra-red missiles. Xu was an expert in electro-optics and wanted to sign a memorandum of understanding with MIC specialists to provide EW equipment. A large Chinese company, the CIEC Company, accompanied Xu to the negotiations with the MIC.
  • The MIC determined that the jammer failed to meet Iraqi requirements and was too expensive. Xu loaned the CCD Camera to the MIC to test.
  • According to the source, Xu was an IIS agent, recruited on 17 May 2001. At recruitment, Xu signed a commitment to work for the IIS, received a $7,500 recruitment bonus, and began drawing a $500 per month stipend. The IIS filmed Xu’s recruitment. The IIS tasked Xu to collect information on laser tracking systems, laser guidance systems, and information on the cooperation between Iran and China.

2001: Iraqi Embassy Officer Coordinates the Procurement of Gyros and Accelerometers

A former high ranking official in the MIC with direct access to the information supplied information on Abdul Al-Wahab, an Iraqi IIS officer stationed at the Iraqi Embassy in China who managed the Iraqi-Chinese technology procurement relationship. Al-Wahab reportedly arranged the procurement of gyros and accelerometers from China for Iraq in 2001.

2002: IIS and IAEC Import Chinese Missile Software

According to reporting, Iraq imported rocket guidance software from China, which was labeled as children’s software. Directorate M16 of the IIS and the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission imported the software.

  • From 2002, until the beginning of hostilities in 2003, Iraq imported rocket guidance software from China disguised as children’s computer software. The software was used to guide the missiles Iraq fired at US Forces in Kuwait during initial hostilities in 2003. Iraq paid for the software with hard currency or oil.

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Czech Companies

2001: Offer To Supply GPS Jamming Equipment

Recovered documents indicate that a Czech Republic Company called Metropol Limited offered portable GPS Jamming Equipment and other military goods to Iraq.

  • A Metropol letter dated 24 October 2001 indicates that the company was “in a position to offer the supply of equipment against enemy’s cruise missiles and aircraft.” The letter offers to supply portable jamming equipment that might be used “against GPS which are used for navigational purposes (and in equipment, such as cruise missiles).”
  • In additional captured letters dated 21, 24, and 29 October 2001, Metropol offers Iraq aircraft engines, helicopter engines, and night vision goggles for helicopters. The company also offered to supply Iraq with 82 mm and 120 mm mortars, new and overhauled tank engines (T-72 and T-55), Krasnopol 152/155 mm guided artillery weapons, Igla 9k38 portable air defense systems (1000 missiles with launching containers), and Kornet E anti-tank systems (1000 missiles and 50 launchers). The Metropol offer also included missile aggregates for Volga air defense systems including batteries, hydraulic systems, servos and engines, spare parts for B-755 engines, parts for the S-75 Volga Launcher, and spare parts for the P-14 Oborona.

Possible Breaches of UN Sanctions by Indian Companies

2002: Indian Individual Coordinated the Purchase of Missile-Related Materials for Iraq

According to recovered documents, an Indian and Iraqi national negotiated for the procurement of conventional military goods for Iraq.

  • Between November and December 2002, an individual from India and an Iraqi, negotiated the procurement of goods, including turbojet engines for Mig-23 and Mig-29 aircraft, diesel engines for tanks, a radar system, and ammunition.
  • The Baghdad office of the Arabic Scientific Bureau and Inaya Trading were also involved in the attempted procurement of dual-use chemicals associated with missile propellant uses. However, the documents do not indicate if contracts were signed or if shipments took place.


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