Iraq Survey Group Final Report
Regime Strategic Intent
| Regime Strategic Intent | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Key Findings | 1 | ||
| Who Made Iraq's Strategic Decisions and Determined WMD Policy | 5 | ||
| Saddam's Place in the Regime | 5 | ||
| The Apex of Power | 5 | ||
| Personalized Rule | 5 | ||
| Saddam's Unsettled Lieutenants | 5 | ||
| A Few Key Players in an Insular Environment | 7 | ||
| Saddam Calls the Shots | 8 | ||
| Saddam Shows the Way | 9 | ||
| Harvesting Ideas and Advice in a Byzantine Setting | 10 | ||
| Weaving a Culture of Lies | 11 | ||
| Saddam Became Increasingly Inaccessible | 11 | ||
| Saddam's Command By Violence | 12 | ||
| Saddam's Effect on the Workings of the Iraqi Government | 13 | ||
| Suspicion of Structures | 13 | ||
| Powerless Structures | 13 | ||
| The Higher Committee | 14 | ||
| The Foreign Policy Committees | 15 | ||
| Saddam's Grip on National Security and WMD Development | 16 | ||
| Saddam Holding Court | 18 | ||
| Saddam and Fiscal Policy | 18 | ||
| How Saddam Saw His Subordinates | 19 | ||
| Mining Respect and Expertise | 19 | ||
| Mutuality of Fear | 19 | ||
| Dazzled by Science | 19 | ||
| How Saddam Saw Himself | 21 | ||
| Saddam's Psychology | 21 | ||
| Saddam's Personal Security | 21 | ||
| Saddam the Dynasty Founder | 21 | ||
| Saddam and His Sense of Legacy | 22 | ||
| Desire . . . Dominance and Deterrence Through WMD | 23 | ||
| Saddam's Role in WMD Policy | 23 | ||
| What Saddam Thought: The Perceived Successes of WMD | 24 | ||
| What Saddam Thought: External Concerns | 28 | ||
| Iran | 29 | ||
| Israel | 31 | ||
| The United States | 31 | ||
| WMD Possession-Real or Imagined-Acts as a Deterrent | 34 | ||
| Saddam's Prioritization of Getting Out From Under Sanctions | 34 | ||
| Efforts To Lift Sanctions | 35 | ||
| Realizing Saddam's Veiled WMD Intent | 41 | ||
| Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline | 41 | ||
| Ambition (1980-1991) | 41 | ||
| Decline (1991-1996) | 42 | ||
| Scientific Research and Intention to Reconstitute WMD | 44 | ||
| Reaction to Sanctions | 44 | ||
| Husayn Kamil's Departure | 46 | ||
| Cooperating With UNSCOM While Preserving WMD | 47 | ||
| Recovery (1996-1998) | 48 | ||
| Impact of the "Chicken Farm" Documents | 49 | ||
| Looking Ahead to Resume WMD Programs | 49 | ||
| Guarding WMD Capabilities | 51 | ||
| Iraq's Internal Monitoring Apparatus: The NMD and MIC Programs | 53 | ||
| Suspending Cooperation With UNSCOM | 55 | ||
| Transition (1998-2001) | 56 | ||
| Nullifying All Obligations To UNSC Resolutions | 57 | ||
| Preserving and Restoring WMD Infrastructure and Expertise | 59 | ||
| Pumping Up Key Revenue Streams | 60 | ||
| Miscalculation (2002-2003) | 61 | ||
| Renewing UN Inspections | 63 | ||
| Iraq's Other Security Concerns | 64 | ||
| Sorting Out Whether Iraq Had WMD Before Operation Iraqi Freedom | 64 | ||
| Alternative Hypotheses on Iraq's Nonuse of WMD During Operation Iraqi Freedom | 66 | ||
Annexes | |||
| A. The Quartet-Influence and Disharmony Among Saddam's Lieutenants | 69 | ||
| B. Iraq's Intelligence Services | 73 | ||
| C. Iraq's Security Services | 85 | ||
| D. Saddam's Personal Involvement in WMD Planning | 97 | ||
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