Iraq Survey Group Final Report
Regime Strategic Intent
Regime Strategic Intent | |||
---|---|---|---|
Key Findings | 1 | ||
Who Made Iraq's Strategic Decisions and Determined WMD Policy | 5 | ||
Saddam's Place in the Regime | 5 | ||
The Apex of Power | 5 | ||
Personalized Rule | 5 | ||
Saddam's Unsettled Lieutenants | 5 | ||
A Few Key Players in an Insular Environment | 7 | ||
Saddam Calls the Shots | 8 | ||
Saddam Shows the Way | 9 | ||
Harvesting Ideas and Advice in a Byzantine Setting | 10 | ||
Weaving a Culture of Lies | 11 | ||
Saddam Became Increasingly Inaccessible | 11 | ||
Saddam's Command By Violence | 12 | ||
Saddam's Effect on the Workings of the Iraqi Government | 13 | ||
Suspicion of Structures | 13 | ||
Powerless Structures | 13 | ||
The Higher Committee | 14 | ||
The Foreign Policy Committees | 15 | ||
Saddam's Grip on National Security and WMD Development | 16 | ||
Saddam Holding Court | 18 | ||
Saddam and Fiscal Policy | 18 | ||
How Saddam Saw His Subordinates | 19 | ||
Mining Respect and Expertise | 19 | ||
Mutuality of Fear | 19 | ||
Dazzled by Science | 19 | ||
How Saddam Saw Himself | 21 | ||
Saddam's Psychology | 21 | ||
Saddam's Personal Security | 21 | ||
Saddam the Dynasty Founder | 21 | ||
Saddam and His Sense of Legacy | 22 | ||
Desire . . . Dominance and Deterrence Through WMD | 23 | ||
Saddam's Role in WMD Policy | 23 | ||
What Saddam Thought: The Perceived Successes of WMD | 24 | ||
What Saddam Thought: External Concerns | 28 | ||
Iran | 29 | ||
Israel | 31 | ||
The United States | 31 | ||
WMD Possession-Real or Imagined-Acts as a Deterrent | 34 | ||
Saddam's Prioritization of Getting Out From Under Sanctions | 34 | ||
Efforts To Lift Sanctions | 35 | ||
Realizing Saddam's Veiled WMD Intent | 41 | ||
Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline | 41 | ||
Ambition (1980-1991) | 41 | ||
Decline (1991-1996) | 42 | ||
Scientific Research and Intention to Reconstitute WMD | 44 | ||
Reaction to Sanctions | 44 | ||
Husayn Kamil's Departure | 46 | ||
Cooperating With UNSCOM While Preserving WMD | 47 | ||
Recovery (1996-1998) | 48 | ||
Impact of the "Chicken Farm" Documents | 49 | ||
Looking Ahead to Resume WMD Programs | 49 | ||
Guarding WMD Capabilities | 51 | ||
Iraq's Internal Monitoring Apparatus: The NMD and MIC Programs | 53 | ||
Suspending Cooperation With UNSCOM | 55 | ||
Transition (1998-2001) | 56 | ||
Nullifying All Obligations To UNSC Resolutions | 57 | ||
Preserving and Restoring WMD Infrastructure and Expertise | 59 | ||
Pumping Up Key Revenue Streams | 60 | ||
Miscalculation (2002-2003) | 61 | ||
Renewing UN Inspections | 63 | ||
Iraq's Other Security Concerns | 64 | ||
Sorting Out Whether Iraq Had WMD Before Operation Iraqi Freedom | 64 | ||
Alternative Hypotheses on Iraq's Nonuse of WMD During Operation Iraqi Freedom | 66 | ||
Annexes | |||
A. The Quartet-Influence and Disharmony Among Saddam's Lieutenants | 69 | ||
B. Iraq's Intelligence Services | 73 | ||
C. Iraq's Security Services | 85 | ||
D. Saddam's Personal Involvement in WMD Planning | 97 |
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