Iraq Survey Group Final Report
Delivery Systems
Annex B
Liquid-Propellant Missile Developments
2.1 Al Samud Program
In 1993, Iraq began developing liquid-propellant ballistic missiles. The program began as the Ababil-100 liquid-propellant missile program, which later became known as the Al Samud. This missile was based on SA-2 and Scud technology and manufacturing techniques; it was monitored closely by the UN. Research and development continued until 2001 when the program was terminated and replaced by the Al Samud II.
Figure 3. Al Samud short diagram.
Figure 4. Al Samud long diagram.
Table 3 Original Al Samud Parameters |
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Subsystem | Parameter | Characteristic | Units | Data | Notes |
Missile | Overall | Length | m | 7.6 | |
Diameter | mm | 500 | |||
Lift-off mass | kg | 1,500 | Approximate figure | ||
Inert mass | kg | 340 | +/- 30kg | ||
Warhead | Mass | Total | kg | 270 | |
Explosive | kg | 160 | 60% TNT, 30% RDX, 10% Al | ||
Length | Overall | m | 1.68 | ||
Cylindrical | m | 0.23 | |||
Conical | m | 1.45 | |||
Material | Wall | mm | 3 | Carbon steel | |
Propulsion | Engine | Thrust | t | 3.5 | |
Burning time | s | 68* | Nominal | ||
s | +2* | Contingency | |||
Tanks | Ullage volume | % | 5 | Up to 8% | |
Ox, length, overall | m | 2.600 | Domes each 0.335 high | ||
Ox, length, parallel | m | 1.930 | |||
Fuel, length, overall | m | 1.691 | Domes each 0.335 high | ||
Fuel, length, parallel | m | 1.021 | |||
Thickness | mm | 2 | Aluminum | ||
Propellant | Oxidizer | ----- | AK-20K | ||
Oxidizer flow rate | kg/s | 11.5* | |||
Total mass | kg | 724* | Usable, for 63s burning time | ||
Fuel | ----- | TG-02 | |||
Fuel flow rate | kg/s | 3.5* | |||
Total mass | kg | 220* | Usable, for 63s burning time | ||
Air supply | Air bottle | Diameter | mm | 300 | Spherical, one only |
Pressure | bar | 300-360 |
2.2 Al Samud Static Test Data
Table 4 Static Tests Supporting the Al Samud Program |
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# | Date | Fuel | Oxidizer | Filling Site | Notes (residual fuel, oxidizer) |
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Filled | Fired | Type | Source | Vol. (l) | Type | Source | Vol. (l) | |||
01 | 00.10.96 | 00.10.96 | TG-02 | Bat. 76 | 210 | AK-20K | Bat. 76 | 360 | Bat. 76 | IZ chamber & injector head |
02 | 14.04.97 | 00.04.97 | TG-02 | Bat. 76 | 210 | AK-20K | Bat. 76 | 360 | Bat. 76 | Structural test of missile |
03 | 00.08.97 | 00.08.97 | TG-02 | Bat. 76 | 210 | AK-20K | Bat. 76 | 360 | Bat. 76 | Structural test of missile |
04 | 10.04.98 | 15.04.98 | TG-02 | Bat. 76 | 210 | AK-20K | Bat. 76 | 360 | Bat. 76 | |
05 | 20.04.98 | 22.04.98 | TG-02 | Bat. 76 | 210 | AK-20K | Bat. 76 | 360 | Bat. 76 | |
06 | 00.06.99 | 07.06.99 | TG-02 | Bat. 76 | 210 | AK-20K | Bat. 76 | 360 | Bat. 76 | Check IZZ engine |
07 | 00.07.99 | 00.07.99 | TG-02 | Bat. 76 | 210 | AK-20K | Bat. 76 | 360 | Bat. 76 | Check IZZ engine |
08 | 21.07.99 | 22.07.99 | TG-02 | Bat. 76 | 210 | AK-20K | Bat. 76 | 360 | ||
09 | 06.08.99 | 07.08.99 | TG-02 | Bat. 76 | 210 | AK-20K | Bat. 76 | 360 | Bat. 76 | Check IZZ purge system |
10 | 22.11.99 | 23.11.99 | TG-02 | Bat. 76 | 210 | AK-20K | Bat. 76 | 360 | Bat. 76 | Check telemetry |
11 | 04.12.99 | 05.12.99 | TG-02 | Bat. 76 | 210 | AK-20K | Bat. 76 | 360 | Bat. 76 | Check telemetry |
12 | 13.07.00 | 15.07.00 | TG-02 | Karamah | 210 | AK-20K | Karamah | 360 | Bat. 76 | |
13 | 05.08.00 | 08.08.00 | TG-02 | Karamah | 242.5 | AK-20K | Karamah | 402.5 | Bat. 76 | (10, 41) |
14 | 06.09.00 | 07.09.00 | AZ-11 | China | 267 | AK-20K | USSR | 463 | Bat. 76 | Tb 61s, (2, 2.5) |
15 | 11.10.00 | 12.10.00 | AZ-11 | ? | 267 | AK-20K | USSR | 430 | Bat. 76 | IZ regulator, tb 69s (2.5, 2) |
16 | 16.10.00 | 17.10.00 | TG-02 | USSR | 267 | AK-20K | USSR | 431.5 | Bat. 76 | Tb 61s |
17 | 17.03.01 | 18.03.01 | AZ-11 | 266 | AK-20K | USSR | 428 | Bat. 76 | Repeat of 16 | |
18 | 03.04.01 | 03.04.01 | TG-02 | USSR | 275 | AK-20K | USSR | 442 | Bat. 76 | IZZ turbo-pump |
19 | 25.04.01 | 26.04.01 | TG-02 | USSR | 285 | AK-20K | USSR | 460 | Bat. 76 | IZZ vanes [TVC] |
20 | 11.06.01 | 12.06.01 | TG-02 | USSR | 271 | AK-20K | USSR | 451 | Bat. 76 | Tb 58s, original engine |
21 | 16.10.01 | 17.10.01 | TG-02 | USSR | 216 | AK-20K | USSR | 357 | Bat. 76 | IZZ turbo-pump, tb 49s, (22, 8) |
22 | 28.11.01 | 29.11.01 | AZ-11 | ? | 191 | AK-20K | USSR | 352 | Bat. 76 | Tb 45s, (10, 40) |
23 | 16.02.02 | 17.01.02 | AZ-11 | ? | 190 | AK-20K | Al Qa’qa’a | 350 | IAH | Tb 49s, (8, 19) |
24 | 01.04.02 | 02.04.02 | TG-02 | USSR | 210 | AK-35K | Ibn-Sina’ | 350 | Bat. 76 | Test effects of AK-35K |
Figure 5. Al Samud Flight tests (1997-2000).
Figure 6. Al Samud flight tests (2001).
2.4 Al Samud II Static Test Data
Table 5 Static Tests Supporting the Al Samud II |
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# | Date | Fuel | Oxidizer | Filling Site | Notes (residual fuel, oxidizer) (in liters) |
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Filled | Fired | Type | Source | Vol. (l) | Type | Source | Vol. (l) | |||
01 | 31.07.01 | 01.08.01 | TG-02 | AK-20K | 347 | AK-20K | USSR | 557 | Bat. 76 | Tb 74s, (15, 12) |
02 | 07.03.02 | 08.03.02 | AZ-11 | 370 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 597 | IAH | Tb 85s, (14, 18) | |
03 | 26.03.02 | 27.03.02 | TG-02 | Raya | 364 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 601 | IAH | Tb 75s, (33, 10) |
04 | 07.04.02 | 08.04.02 | TG-02 | Raya | 386 | AK-20K | Raya | 605 | IAH | Stabilizer test (70, 35) |
05 | 15.05.02 | 16.05.02 | TG-02 | Raya | 371 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 603 | IAH | T-pump test, tb 30, leak! |
06 | 01.07.02 | 01.07.02 | TG-02 | Raya | 375.5 | AK-22K | Qa’qa’a | 612 | IAH | IZZ chamber, (66, 15) |
07 | 08.07.02 | 08.07.02 | TG-02 | Raya | 375 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | ? | IAH | Failed, oxidizer pipe leak |
08 | 16.07.02 | 16.07.02 | TG-02 | Raya | 370.9 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 609 | IAH | IZZ vanes, orig engine - Fail |
09 | 31.07.02 | 01.08.02 | TG-02 | Raya | 371 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 609 | IAH | Tb 81s, IZZ vanes (36, 2) |
10 | 07.08.02 | 07.08.02 | TG-02 | Raya | 370 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 607 | IAH | IZZ gas generator |
11 | 29.08.02 | 30.08.02 | TG-02 | Raya | 370 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 614 | IAH | IZZ chamber, ok |
12 | 05.09.02 | 06.09.02 | TG-02 | Raya | 375 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 614 | IAH | Engine burnt - Fail |
13 | 09.11.02 | n/a | TG-02 | Raya | 372 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 598 | IAH | IZZ t-pump, (13, 20) OK |
14 | 16.11.02 | 16.11.02 | TG-02 | Raya | 372 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 598 | IAH | IZZ t-pump (37, 36) |
15 | 24.11.02 | 25.11.02 | TG-02 | Raya | 370 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 605 | IAH | IZZ engine, tb20s,(436 ox) F |
16 | 04.12.02 | 05.12.02 | TG-02 | Raya | 368 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 601 | IAH | Tb 78s, (3, 12) OK |
17 | 02.01.03 | 02.01.03 | TG-02 | Raya | 368 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 601 | IAH | Orig engine, IZZ vanes (25, 27) |
18 | 11.01.03 | 12.01.03 | TG-02 | Karamah | 369 | AK-20K | Raya | 606 | Taji | IZZ engine, (15, 55) OK |
19 | 26.01.03 | 27.01.03 | TG-02 | Karamah | 365 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 602 | IAH | IZZ engine, (0, 48.5) OK |
20 | 03.02.03 | 04.02.03 | TG-02 | Karamah | 368 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 605 | A Ghraib | Tb 81s, IZZ vanes (28, 26.5) |
21 | 22.02.03 | 23.02.03 | TG-02 | Karamah | 366 | AK-20K | Qa’qa’a | 605 | A Ghraib | New TVC vane material |
2.5 Al Samud II Flight Test Data
Figure 7. Al Samud II flight tests.
2.6 Al Samud II Missile Material Balance
Materials Balance
To determine the likely number of missiles that could potentially remain in an inventory, the technique of materials balance can be employed. This involves the collection of data associated with all aspects of the production and consumption of the missiles concerned. The production numbers may be gleaned from the factory producing the hardware or where the missiles are integrated or even loaded with propellants. Consumption numbers can be derived from tests, either static or flight, deliveries to the armed forces or those withdrawn due to damage or other causes.
If a materials balance of complete missiles cannot be accomplished, an equivalent might be derived from the many subsystems that make up the complete missile—such as warheads, engines, or even propellants. This latter approach has been used in an attempt to account for both Scud and Al Samud II missile inventories.
ISG believes that a complete material balance for the Al Samud II missile may not be possible due to various factors. Documentary data indicating the total number of missiles produced have not been recovered by ISG and the disposition of the missiles is unknown. However, a very good estimate of the total number produced can be achieved based on the knowledge that the Iraqis had a production rate goal of 10 per month, according to an official in Iraq’s missile program. This rate varied month to month due to availability of parts. The missile began production in late 2001 with the first 10 being delivered to the Army in December 2001. Assuming these production figures were maintained between December 2001 and December 2002, ISG believes a likely total of 130 Al Samud II missiles may have been produced during this period. According to a former senior official at Al Karamah, Iraq produced approximately 20 missiles during the first quarter of 2003. Another source claimed that, after UNMOVIC inspectors departed the country in March 2003, Iraq was able to assemble about 4 Al Samud missiles from remaining parts, which had been placed in mobile trucks to avoid destruction. These 24, in addition to the 130 previously mentioned, yield a total of 150 Al Samud II missiles produced.
According to multiple sources, Iraq expended up to 27 missiles during experimental tests (flight and static tests). Beginning 1 March 2003, UNMOVIC began a destruction program, which accounted for 72 missiles destroyed. ISG have obtained information given in Table 6, which shows serial numbers associated with 62 of the 72 missiles destroyed. However, the dates of destruction do not appear to correlate to those dates provided by the UNMOVIC spokesman during the period of destruction. According to reporting, Iraq launched five Al Samud II missiles during OIF. Table 7 details some of the additional al Samud subsystems destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision. Coalition forces may have been responsible for the destruction and recovery of up to 15 missiles based on available data. According to a foreign government service, two Al Samud II missiles were taken to Iran.ISG has not been able to confirm this claim. Taking these figures into account, ISG has developed possible scenarios for material balance for the Al Samud II missile given in Table 6
Table 6 Al Samud II Missiles Destroyed Under UNMOVIC Supervision in 2003 |
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Date | Serial No. | Date | Serial No. | Date | Serial No. |
03 Mar 03 | 020279 | 06 Mar 03 | 020294 TE | 11 Mar 03 | 020233 |
03 Mar 03 | 020272 | 06 Mar 03 | 020297 TE | 11 Mar 03 | 020283 |
03 Mar 03 | 020228 | 06 Mar 03 | 020302 TE | 11 Mar 03 | 020232 |
03 Mar 03 | 020226 | 07 Mar 03 | 010206 TL | 12 Mar 03 | 020237 |
03 Mar 03 | 020236 | 07 Mar 03 | 020310 TL | 12 Mar 03 | 020236 |
03 Mar 03 | 020229 | 07 Mar 03 | 020308 TL | 12 Mar 03 | 020292 |
04 Mar 03 | 020296 | 08 Mar 03 | 020280 | 13 Mar 03 | 020314 |
04 Mar 03 | 020295 | 08 Mar 03 | 020288 | 13 Mar 03 | 020313 |
04 Mar 03 | 020286 | 08 Mar 03 | 020287 | 13 Mar 03 | 020316 |
05 Mar 03 | 020217 TE | 08 Mar 03 | 020306 | 14 Mar 03 | 020311 |
05 Mar 03 | 010227 TE | 08 Mar 03 | 020209 | 14 Mar 03 | 020312 |
05 Mar 03 | 020264 TE | 08 Mar 03 | 020303 | 14 Mar 03 | 020299 |
05 Mar 03 | 020284 TE | 09 Mar 03 | 020285 | 14 Mar 03 | 020315 |
05 Mar 03 | 020277 | 09 Mar 03 | 020282 | 15 Mar 03 | 020235 |
05 Mar 03 | 020278 | 09 Mar 03 | 020281 | 15 Mar 03 | 020234 |
05 Mar 03 | 020273 | 09 Mar 03 | 020304 TE | 15 Mar 03 | 020290 |
05 Mar 03 | 020274 | 09 Mar 03 | 020291 TL | 16 Mar 03 | 020220 |
05 Mar 03 | 020293 | 09 Mar 03 | 020289 TL | 16 Mar 03 | 020242 |
06 Mar 03 | 020222 | 10 Mar 03 | 020225 | 17 Mar 03 | 020240 |
06 Mar 03 | 020227 | 10 Mar 03 | 020224 | 17 Mar 03 | 020221 |
06 Mar 03 | 020275 | 10 Mar 03 | 020298 |
Table 7 |
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No. | Engine Serial No. | Fuel Tank Serial No. | Oxidizer Serial No. | Tail Serial No. | Warhead Serial No. |
1 | 57013 | FU-125 | Ox-115 | 109 | 130 |
2 | 56820 | FU-132 | Ox-120 | 118 | 133 |
3 | 89834 | FU-113 | Ox-127 | 121 | 134 |
4 | 88240 | FU-123 | Ox-102 | 120 | 135 |
5 | 50413 | FU-115 | Ox-126 | 102 | 136 |
6 | 57007 | FU-129 | Ox-132 | 111 | 122 |
7 | 82439 | FU-117 | Ox-121 | 112 | 124 |
8 | 57918 | FU-111 | Ox-124 | 113 | 120 |
9 | 82551 | FU-134 | Ox-123 | 119 | 121 |
10 | 27736 | FU-114 | Ox-125 | 126 | 115 |
11 | 31414 | FU-121 | Ox-118 | 117 | 132 |
12 | 53005 | FU-130 | Ox-140 | 124 | 131 |
13 | 53401 | FU-138 | Ox-135 | 126 | 128 |
14 | 82626 | FU-142 | Ox-138 | 128 | 118 |
15 | 54115 | FU-139 | Ox-136 | 131 | 116 |
16 | 82414 | FU-140 | Ox-129 | 123 | 119 |
17 | 89720 | FU-145 | Ox-122 | 132 | 126 |
18 | 55404 | FU-116 | Ox-131 | 130 | 113 |
19 | 51725 | FU-133 | Ox-117 | 127 | 117 |
20 | 54108 | FU-135 | Ox-128 | 125 | 103 |
21 | 80120 | FU-127 | Ox-130 | 114 | |
22 | 89925 | FU-126 | Ox-133 | ||
23 | 113741 | FU-128 | Ox-134 | ||
24 | 52916 | FU-103 | Ox-141 | ||
25 | 55017 | Ox-092 | |||
26 | 54418 | Ox-104 |
Table 8 ISG Assessment of Al Samud II Missile Accountability | |||
Worst Case | Likely Case | Best Case | |
Missiles Produced | 150 | 130 | 121 |
Used in tests | 22 | 25 | 27 |
Destroyed under UNMOVIC | 72 | 72 | 72 |
Launched during OIF | 5 | 5 | 5 |
Damaged/Captured/to Iran | 15 | 15 | 17 |
Unaccounted for | 36 | 13 | 0 |
The Liquid Fuels Committee (LFC)
Until April 1998, both the Air Defense and the Naval Defense and the Naval Defense forces had supplied Al Karamah with whatever propellant was required for testing on an ad hoc basis. Both felt unable to continue this relationship as it was adversely affecting their own propellant stocks. On hearing this news, Staff Lt. Gen. Muzahim Sa’b al-Hasan Muhammad Al Nasir called a meeting of representatives from the Military Industrialization Commission (MIC), the Army (Surface-to-Surface Missile [SSM] Command), Air Defense Forces, Al Karamah, and the Naval Defense Forces. The armed forces could satisfy their own propellant requirements but, for Al Karamah’s new development program, there was none available. Thus, arrangements had to be made to satisfy this need whilst maintaining stock availability to the other armed services.To do this, a committee called the LFC was set up by the MIC in 1998 to manage and coordinate the requirements of all liquid-propellant research, production, and supply (regeneration, manufacture, or importation) to the various users.
There were three goals of the LFC:
- Now - To ensure the continued supply for current requirements of TG-02 and AK-20K
- Near Term - The production of AZ-11 and AK-27P
- Far Term - The production of Hydrazine, Unsymmetrical Di-Methyl Hydrazine (UDMH), Nitrogen Tetroxide, and Hydrogen Peroxide
By the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), objective 1 was achieved, some movement was in progress toward objective 2, and most of the candidate propellants in objective 3 were at least being researched.
The LFC consisted of the following personnel:
Name | From, Position | Notes |
Dr. Muzhir [Modher] Sadiq Saba’ Khamis Al-Tamimi | Al Karamah, DG | Chairman |
Jasim Muhammad Salman al-Tamimi | Al Karamah | Deputy Chairman |
Dr. Yusif ?Ulwan Hammadi Al ?Ithawi | Ibn-Sina’, DG | |
Dr. Hikmat Na’im Al Jalu | Ibn-Sina’, former DG | |
Dr. Thabit Jasim | Ibn-Sina’, former DG | |
Ghazi Faysal Najm-al-Din | Al Basil | |
Dr. Zuhayr Mahmud Al Qazzaz | Al Basil | |
Dr. Jalil Rahif’ Akal | Al Basil | |
Dr. Agil ?Awad | Al Basil | |
Dr. Jasim | Al Kindi | |
Fu’ad Muhammad Basim | Al Qa’qa’a | |
Sami Da’ud | Sa’d Company | Al Zahrawi Center |
Dr. Hamzah Yasin ?Issa | MIC Center | |
Dr. Ghanim Maqbul ?Ulwan | Al Amin |
2.7 Liquid-Propellant Material Balance
Closure of the material balance for liquid propellants is extremely difficult because of the amount of regeneration due to the effects of aging on propellants. The records kept concerning regeneration do not make reference to the sources of fresh material acquired in the regeneration process. Instead, they provide only an input-output picture.
The Liquid Fuels Committee (LFC) was initiated in August of 2000 to analyze performance capabilities for various propellants, research techniques for producing candidate chemical propellants or their pre-cursors, and study synthesis routes and manufacturing capabilities of various companies. Through studies of companies and capabilities, the LFC awarded contracts to companies to begin manufacturing. The projected production capabilities were 50 tons/yr of Di-methyl amine (DMA), 20 tons/yr of DETA, 50 tons/yr of TEA, and 50 tons/yr of xylidine. Schematics of liquid-propellant production and research are shown in Figures 8 and 9. This production when combined with the imported quantities of propellant far surpassed the requirements of the Al Samud II program. A schematic materiel balance of the liquid propellant used for the Al Samud II program is shown below in Figures 10 through Figure 12, with the production or sources along the top, above the total and consumption along the bottom of each table.
Figure 8. Liquid-propellant production.
Figure 9. Liquid-propellant research.
Figure 10. Oxidizer materiel balance (1995-2003).
Figure 11. Fuel materiel balance (1995-2003).
Figure 12. High-energy propellant materiel balance (1995-2003).
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