Iraq Survey Group Final Report

Nuclear

Nuclear
Key Findings				1
Evolution of the Nuclear Weapons Program				3
	The Regime and WMD Timeline			3
	The Early Years: Ambition			3
	Decline (1991-96)			4
	Recovery and Transition (1996-2002)			5
	Miscalculation (2002-2003)			6
Results of ISG's Investigation on Nuclear Issues				7
Investigation Into Uranium Pursuits and Indigenous Production Capabilities				9
	Foreign Pursuits			9
	Indigenous Production Capabilities			11
	Iraq's Known Uranium Holdings			13
Iraqi Uranium Conversion Program				15
Aluminum Tube Investigation				21
	Elements of ISG Investigation			21
	Purported High-Level Interest in Aluminum Tubes			22
	Possible Association of Iraqi Nuclear Entities With the Tubes			22
	Tube Characteristics and Shipping Requirements			23
	Indigenous Tube Manufacture-A Possible Sign Baghdad Did Not Need High-Specification Tubes			27
	Iraqi Interest in 84-mm Tubes			30
Carbon Fiber				30
	Carbon Fiber and Iraq's Pre-1991 Gas Centrifuge Program			30
Iraqi Concealment of Carbon Fiber-Related Activity, Materials, and Documents After Operation Desert Storm				31
	The MIC Carbon Fiber Project in 2001/2002			32
Flow-Forming Machinery				33
Planned Magnet Production Lines at Al Tahadi				34
	Procurement Details			36
Rotating Machinery Department				36
Investigation of Potential Centrifuge-Related Facilities				38
	Support Facilities			38
			Ash Shaykhili Storage Facility	39
			Al Karama State Company	39
			Al-Wazeriya Site	39
			Khadimiyah Site (Ibn Al-Haytham Missile R&D Center)	39
		Al Samud Factory (Abu Ghurayb Missile Facility)		39
		Badr and Umm Al-Marik State Companies (Khan Azad Military Production Plant)		39
		Al-Tahadi State Company		40
		Salah Al Din State Company (Samarra Electronics Plant)		40
		Al-Nida State Company		40
		Rashid State Company's Tho Al-Fiqar Factory (formerly the Nassr State Establishment Mechanical Plant)		40
		Ur State Company (An-Nasiriyah Aluminum Fabrication Plant)		40
Uranium Enrichment-EMIS				42
	Electromagnetic Isotope Separation (EMIS)			42
	Facilities			42
			Al Safa'a EMIS Plant at Tarmiya	42
			Al Fajr EMIS Plant at Ash Sharqat	45
			Al-Jazira (Mosul Feed Materials Production Facility)	45
			Al-Zawra State Company	45
			Al-Nida State Company (Zaafaraniya Mechanical Workshop Al-Rabiyah)	45
			Al-Radwan (Batra Military Production Facility)	47
			Al-Nassr Al-Adhim State Company	47
	Disposition of EMIS-Related Equipment			47
Laser Research in Iraq				50
	Laser Related Work After Operation Desert Storm			50
	Current Status and Future Potential			51
	Iraq's Pre-1991 LIS Efforts			51
Rail Gun Summary				52
	Rail Gun Efforts			52
Issues Related to NuclearWeapons Design and Development				59
	Casting Technology			59
	Explosive and Lens Fabrication Capabilities			59
	High-Speed Switches			60
	Fireset Development and Testing			60
	Neutron Generators			60
Migration of the Capabilities From the PC-3 Nuclear Weapons Project				61
IAEC Modernization				66
	Interest in the IAEC and Intervention by Saddam Husayn			66
	Increased Funding and Publicity of IAEC Activities			67
	Infrastructure Improvements at the IAEC: The Modernization Project			67
	Perceptions the Regime Was Preparing for Reconstitution of the Nuclear Program			69
	IAEC Work on Neutron Generators			69
University Programs				70
Hidden Enrichment Technology				73
Survey of Structures at Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center				75
Annexes
A. Definitions Used by Teams During Survey				81
B. Team Results				83
C. Analysis of the Videotapes Compiled From Video Recce Mission 5/6 November 2003				91
D. Results of Mission Survey of Tuwaitha Nuclear ComplexOver the Period 20-22 November				107
E. Summary of Known UN-Tagged Equipment				113
F. Photography Highlights: Tuwaitha Mission, 20-22 November 2003				117
G. Tuwaitha Maps, Buildings, and Numbers				127

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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Iraq Survey Group Final Report

Nuclear

Annexes