Iraq Survey Group Final Report
Investigation of Potential Centrifuge-Related Facilities
ISG investigations of sites related to the pre-1991 centrifuge program did not uncover any attempt to utilize these facilities to support a renewed centrifuge effort. ISG site visits revealed significant looting and destruction, which have rendered the sites inoperable.
- Site exploration of the Al-Furat site conducted in September 2003 revealed looting and occupation by squatters. In the pre-1991 program, a centrifuge assembly hall and cascade had been planned for Al-Furat. The IAEA removed the centrifuge-related equipment from this site in the 1990s.
ISG investigation into known or potential support facilities also found no evidence these sites had been involved in any renewed enrichment work.Along with research and development and production facilities, a centrifuge program would require a large infrastructure for fabrication, assembly, testing, and material support. The following sites were investigated because of their potential as locations where key elements of the reconstitution could take place:
- Ash Shaykhili Storage Facility
- Al Karama State Company (Al-Waziriya Site (al Samud Factory, Khadimiyah Site (Ibn Al-Haytham), Al-Fatah Factory (Al Quds Factory)
- Basdr and Umm Al-Marik State Companies (Khan Azad Military Production Plant)
- Al-Tahadi State Company
- Salah al-Din State Company (Samarra Electronics Plant)
- Al-Nida State Company
- Nassr State Company (Taji Steel Fabrication Plant)
- Ur State Company (An-Nasiriyah Aluminum Fabrication Plant)
Ash Shaykhili Storage Facility
Ash Shaykhili Storage Facility—prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom—had stocks of fluorine, Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride (AHF), and UF6 cylinders in Building 27A. Building 27B also contained a specialized ventilation system with scrubbers, which would be ideal for pilot-scale development of UF6 production process. In the early 1990s, the IAEA either destroyed or collected centrifuge components from various sites across Iraq and placed them in storage at Ash Shaykhili. The IAEA inspectors, upon returning to Iraq in late 2002, performed a detailed inspection of the Ash Shaykhili storage site and made several more inspections of the site in early 2003.
In late April 2003, the site was surveyed by Coalition forces, which found it damaged and burned from bombing and looting. Also in early July 2003, an ISG team returned to Ash Shaykhili to assess the condition of Buildings 27A and 27B. They found that the contents of Building 27A had been burned and everything inside Building 27B had been removed, except for portions of the air-handling duct work (see Figure 15).
The results of environmental samples taken at Building 27B, during the April 2003 ISG site visit, indicated the presence of fluorides at the site, which we suspect are the result of pre-1991 activities. ISG did not find that any nuclear-related activity had been established here and based on the current condition of the Ash Shaykhili, ISG concludes that it would not be able to support any centrifuge activities without major rework.
Al Karama State Company
The al Karama State Company consists of several facilities that have precision machining capabilities. Al Karama’s subordinate facilities are:
- Waziriyah Site (al Karama Missile and Electronics Plant).
- Khadimiyah Site (Ibn Al-Haytham Missile Production and RDT&E Center).
- Al Samud Factory (Abu Ghurayb Missile and GSE Support Facility).
- Al Fatah Factory.
- Al Quds Factory.
Although the facilities associated with the Al Karama State Company continued to function during the 1990s, ISG did not find that any of these sites were used to support a uranium enrichment program.
An ISG exploitation team visited the Karama Al-Wazeriya Site in early August 2003 and concluded that the site appeared to have been abandoned for at least several months. According to one source at this site, no missiles were produced at the facility after the site was bombed during Operation Desert Fox in 1998. Iraq did not rebuild the missile production capability at Al-Wzaeriya after Desert Fox, and instead used the site as the headquarters for Al Karama.
Khadimiyah Site (Ibn Al-Haytham Missile R&D Center)
The Khadimiyah Site was part of the al Karama State Company and Iraq’s primary production and integration facility for the al Samud and al Samud II Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM). The facility suffered damage from Coalition air strikes in late March 2003.
Al Samud Factory (Abu Ghurayb Missile Facility)
Al Samud Factory was Iraq’s primary al Samud component production facility. The al Samud Factory was significantly damaged during Operation Iraqi Freedom by Coalition air strikes in late March 2003. ISG visited the site on 28 September 2003 and verified both the bomb damage and the effects of the massive looting.
Badr and Umm Al-Marik State Companies (Khan Azad Military Production Plant)
Badr fabricated mechanical components for the pre-1991 gas centrifuge program and initially retained flow-forming capability after Operation Desert Storm. Such flow-forming machines—had they been maintained through the years—could have been used for making metal rotors. ISG has not found that these machines were used for fabrication of rotors for gas centrifuges in a renewed centrifuge program. Site visits conducted in May 2003 revealed that the site was in severe disarray (see Figure 16) and could not function again without extensive renovations.
Al-Tahadi State Company
Al-Tahadi was established in 1995 by the MIC. Former PC-3 engineers from Tarmiyah were transferred to this facility where they continued their work on electromagnetic devices and transformers and their research on permanent magnets. Al-Tahadi had a good lab for measurement of magnetic properties that included a computerized system that could measure the magnetic properties of hard and soft materials. Al-Tahadi was looted, and no documents or equipment remain at the site.
Salah Al Din State Company (Samarra Electronics Plant)
The Salah al-Din Company is an electronics company located near Samarra that produced radar equipment, antennae for various purposes, communication equipment, printed circuit boards for electronic equipment, and plastic covers for agricultural purposes. Exploitation of this site in July 2003 confirmed that the plant appeared to produce different types of electronics and electronic components for various uses. The presence of certain industrial chemicals seems to be consistent with the types of industry found at the facility. The facility itself appeared to be in reasonably good shape. This site did not suffer from some of the large-scale looting and scavenging prevalent in other facilities.
Al-Nida State Company
This facility, along with the Rashid State Company’s Tho Al-Fiqar Factory, had general-purpose machine shops utilizing CNC lathes, CNC milling centers, hydraulic presses, welding equipment, coordinate measuring machines, quality-control laboratories, nondestructive testing equipment, and CAD/CAM computers prior to the recent war. Such facilities would be necessary for a reconstituted centrifuge program. An ISG team visited the Al-Nida site in late August 2003 and found that the entire plant had been systematically looted of all equipment, computers, and documents.
Rashid State Company’s Tho Al-Fiqar Factory (formerly the Nassr State Establishment Mechanical Plant)
Prior to Operation Desert Storm, the machining plant at Nassr produced centrifuge and EMIS components for Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. After Operation Desert Storm, an IAEA inspection team found vertical flow-forming machines. In August 2003, an ISG exploitation team visited this site. The team found four flow formers, none of which were functional because they lacked parts.
- Also found were seven, five-axis machine tools. The Iraqis assisting the team mentioned that the five-axis machine tools could not function as designed. The team also found two-axis milling machines, four Hartford milling machines (two vertical and two horizontal), and large stamping and press machines for serial production of tail fins for rockets.
The team also found thousands of 81-mm aluminum tubes. The Iraqis stated that on the site approximately 90,000 tubes were classified as rejected tubes or tubes that did not pass prescribed testing. The Iraqis stated that they had a 10-percent acceptance rate of domestically made 81-mm tubes. Figure 17 shows a nonfunctioning flow former at Tho Al-Fiqar, aluminum tubes for 81-mm rockets, and a fully assembled 81-mm rocket.
Ur State Company (An-Nasiriyah Aluminum Fabrication Plant)
Iraq attempted to indigenously produce aluminum tubes for its 81-mm rocket program by using the extrusion facilities at Ur State Company. The extrusion equipment reportedly was designed to extrude only 6063 type aluminum alloy; thus, attempts made to extrude 7075 aluminum alloy (the type required for centrifuges) were unsuccessful.
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