Solitudinem fecerunt,
pacem appelunt
Publius Gaius Cornelius Tacitus
Op Deterrence of Aggression - The Road to Damascus
The “Deterrence of Aggression” [AR = Rada al-Adwan, also seen as "Deterring Aggression" and "Aggression Shield" ] battle was launched by the Syrian opposition factions against the Syrian regime forces and the militias supporting it to direct a "preemptive strike against the Syrian regime forces". The fast-moving situation caused astonishment around the world, with regional countries and major powers alike were seemingly unprepared for the abrupt change in Syria. Bashar al-Assad and his family fled to Moscow.
The situation in Syria seemed frozen on the ground and politically since the signing of the ceasefire agreement under Russian-Turkish sponsorship in Idlib Governorate in March 2020, which halted the extensive military operations between opposition forces and government forces in northwestern Syria. The government forces had witnessed increasing internal deterioration due to the collapse of the currency, the weakness of the economy, and the spread of corruption and crime. But in the meantime, the Syrian armed opposition has been working to strengthen its military capabilities, transforming its structure into a semi-regular armed force, and improving its level of training.
The factions under the "Military Operations Administration" led by the Syrian Ahmed al-Sharaa (nicknamed Abu Muhammad al-Julani) achieved vast field progress in record time. The battles of the Syrian revolution had never been decided with such speed, moving from Idlib to Aleppo, reaching the impregnable Hama and Homs in the blink of an eye, as if they were folding the earth.
Syria used to have reliable military forces to make sure the situation remained essentially under control, but economic problems have undermined the country's ability to maintain military strength, which is why the government forces fled or surrendered quickly. Since the outbreak of the latest round of Israeli-Palestinian conflict last year and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as well as the recent conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, Assad's key allies have all been undermined and are unable to provide enough support to defend the regime, enabling opposition forces to seize the major cities in such a short time.
The Iranian press spoke about the possibility of betrayals within the ranks of the Syrian army to explain its retreat in the face of the advance of the armed factions. A key turning point came when Assad lost the support of even those who had stood by him for years. Economic hardships, sanctions, and a growing sense of hopelessness led many to believe that change was inevitable, even if it came at the cost of destruction. The strategic mistake of the ruling elite – betting on a military solution to the conflict while ignoring political dialogue, both domestically and internationally – ultimately left Assad vulnerable to determined and well-organized adversaries.
The Syrian crisis, which began as a standoff between the government and certain opposition groups, evolved into a prolonged conflict fueled by a complex mosaic of local, regional, and international interests. Years of relentless warfare and an unwillingness to seek compromise led to worsening economic inequality, a brain drain of skilled workers, the collapse of state institutions and infrastructure, and the fragmentation and corruption of the political elite. Society, worn down by a lack of prospects, became deeply fractured, and the growing discontent among the population only hastened the weakening of the central government.
The opposition fighters who overthrew al-Assad announced a general amnesty for all military personnel conscripted into service under the former ruler. “Their lives are safe and no one may assault them,” they said in a statement on Telegram. An estimated 20,000 to 50,000 prisoners were freed, but it is believed that as many as 150,000 people were arrested, many of whom remain missing.
Syria may fall into long-term turmoil, because different regional armed forces have different goals and demands in the highly complicated Syrian issue. the government cannot withstand the current change, and no power can build up new order or create a new balance of power immediately. For a long time, multiple foreign forces have been supporting Syrian anti-government forces to weaken and fight the Assad regime, with US troops still occupying oil fields and key transportation routes, which have seriously damaged Syria's reconstruction process and economy.
Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi Al-Jalali said the government was ready to "extend its hand" to the opposition and turn its functions over to a transitional government. Ghazi al-Jalali said most cabinet ministers are still working from offices in Damascus to ensure a “quick and smooth” transition after al-Assad’s fall. The opposition forces that entered Damascus have said they will work with Jalali. Mohammed al-Bashir, the head of the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) in Idlib, is expected to be selected as the head of Syria’s new transitional government.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) was the largest single fighting group in operation Deterrence of Aggression, launched by rebels in 2 November 2024. Formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, then Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, it is a group of allied factions, including Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Liwa al-Haqq, Jabhat Ansar al-Din and Jaysh al-Sunna. At the start of the Syrian war, Jabhat al-Nusra was formed in 2012 by ISIL (ISIS), from which it split a year later and declared allegiance to al-Qaeda. It severed ties with al-Qaeda and joined with other factions to rebrand as HTS in 2017. HTS in effect controlled Idlib and was estimated to have up to 30,000 fighters.
HTS would worry about integrating with other opposition groups, in particular the Turkiye-sponsored Syrian National Army, because it was just at the end of 2022 that there were fatal clashes between the two. Those groups have a long history of undercutting each other and mistrust, and it’s going to be hard to organise them into a cohesive unit. the Kurdish-led and US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is warry of any experience of being under the rule of a group that is an ally of Turkiye. The Kurds might push for some kind of autonomy or federalism.
Germany’s Federal Foreign Office acknowledged that HTS will “certainly play a role in the future of Syria”. Spokesman Sebastian Fischer noted concerns about HTS’s past links to al-Qaeda, which it split from in 2017, and alleged antidemocratic practices in its stronghold of Idlib. The group, however, “has tried in recent months and years to distance itself from its jihadist origins and also to build up civil structures”, he said. How seriously this new direction could be taken would depend on how HTS “deals with civilians and, in particular, minorities in the area they now control”, Fischer said. “Ultimately, HTS must be judged by its actions,” he said.
Syria had a shattered economy that requires billions of dollars of investment to fix, and there will likely be millions of people returning home from abroad who will need to be reintegrated into Syrian society. There are also many armed fighters, across the different actors, who will need to be incorporated into the country’s security forces. Only an empowered transitional government can address these requirements and, simultaneously, also try to negotiate with foreign actors on Syrian territory to leave the country. Syria has many regions with different powerbrokers, each with its own distinctive circumstances resulting from the war that require tailored approaches by the transitional government. Reconciling the different regional powerbrokers under a coherent national policy is very important for the future stability and success of Syria.
On December 11, the cities of Hasakah and Raqqa witnessed an uprising by Arab tribes - who constitute the majority of the population in the two governorates - against the control of the SDF organization, which led to civilian casualties, which increased the state of popular resentment against the organization.
Post-Assad - Israel
Technically at war with Syria since 1948, Israel views the collapse of Syria as removing a long-standing adversary. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have targeted Syria's arms stockpiles and military installations to eliminate its war potential. Syria was also a critical link for Iran to supply Hezbollah in Lebanon. Syria's disintegration benefits Israel by weakening the Axis of Resistance and reducing external pressure on its policies regarding Palestinian territories. Additionally, Syria's fragmentation has enabled Israel to solidify its control over the Golan Heights, nullify the 1974 ceasefire agreement, and expand its territory by seizing Syria-controlled Golan areas.
The Israeli army seized the UN buffer zone adjacent to the occupied Golan Heights in violation of a 50-year agreement with Syria. Israel was capitalising on the fact that there is an atmosphere of chaos and the opening of other fronts in Syria. But this is also a hedge against whatever happens in Syria going forward. The Israelis were happy that al-Assad was gone because that means that Iranian influence in Syria was most likely gone, but they were also concerned by the nature of the HTS government. Israel conducted more than 100 air strikes targeting military sites in Syria on 09 December 2024 alone, a war monitor said. A research centre thought to be involved in the production of chemical weapons was also hit, it said. More than 150 sites, said by Israel to be chemical storage facilities or weapons storehouses, had been struck. Tel Aviv is working to prevent the Syrian army's weapons stockpile from falling into the hands of the armed opposition, for fear that they will be used against it in the future.
The future of Syria depended on the extent to which the armed groups within the country can agree on political solutions. Coordination and communication between foreign military troops of the major powers and regional powers like the US, Russia, Iran and Turkey are also important,
Post-Assad - Russia
Russia and Iran had been the closer allies for Syria, but it is unclear whether that will be the case moving forward. There was a lot of blood and a lot of hatred between the groups … because over the years, these two states, Russia and Iran, killed a lot of Syrians. They’re the ones that basically propped up the Assad regime for the past five to six years.
In September 2014, in order ot fight the self-proclaimed "caliphate" of Islamists, the US and allied air forces entered the war, intending to achieve a turning point in favor of the forces loyal to them. Only a year later, Russia joined the conflict, whose goal, on the contrary, was to ensure that the destruction of the "caliphate" would tip the scales in Assad's favor. Between the beginning of the war and the day when the Russian Aerospace Forces launched their first strikes on targets in Syria, four and a half years passed. For four and a half years, the Assad state successfully resisted and won. And in 2024, it fell apart in four and a half days.
Boris Rozhin, an analyst at the Centre for Military-Political Journalism, told the Moskovskaya Kommsomelts newspaper that Russia “had been stabbed in the back” in Syria because Iran had not passed on information about the HTS attack and not committed soldiers to support Assad’s forces. “What happened can be regarded as a betrayal,” he said.
Western nations, spearheaded by Washington and London, had long expressed dissatisfaction with Moscow’s growing influence in the region over the past decade. Acting as a key ally of Assad and forging successful relationships with several Middle Eastern states, Russia had emerged as a critical player in this strategically vital area. Moscow’s achievements in both the military and diplomatic spheres, including its role in conflict resolution and cooperation with nations such as Türkiye, Iran, and Gulf states, deeply unsettled the West. The undermining of the Syrian regime was thus aimed at weakening Russia’s regional influence, stripping it of a key ally, and potentially ousting its military presence from Syria.
Political scientist Andrey Kortunov noted 09 December 2024 in Kommersant " Moscow no longer holds the main trump card in the person of the sole Syrian leader, but still retains several strong cards. Total Russian investments in Syria amount to more than $20 billion. Moscow is one of Damascus's leading trade partners. The Syrian diaspora in Russia is not very numerous, but it is economically very successful and socially active. And in Syria itself, the stable sympathies for Russia, formed back in the distant Soviet times, have not disappeared."
Russia's main interest was to preserve the bases in Tartus and Khmeimim, which should be the subject of negotiations with the authorities of the new Syrian state, which was now emerging from the ruins of the old one. Russia's naval and air bases in Syria are crucial resupply hubs for its ambitious strategy of expanding its military influence in Africa. — Without these bases, Putin can still operate in Africa but it becomes far more difficult to resupply troops. Russia gained 49-year leases in 2017 to the naval base in the city of Tartus and the airfield at Khmeimim that supplies its African operations.
The bases were completely surrounded, with no one allowed in or out, and all transport routes cut off for now. Hmeimim was encircled by militants (which the Russian Foreign Ministry had started calling the opposition). Militants were stationed at checkpoints and even patrol inside the base. Tartus had been abandoned, and ships with military personnel are positioned in the coastal zone. The preliminary agreement for the presence of our contingent is 75 days, after which withdrawal was expected.
Russian military bases hosted instructors, advisors, the "African Corps," Ministry of Defense personnel, and special forces. The issue of Russia's military bases in Syria remains unresolved. If guarantees were in place, there would be no attacks on the bases, and Russian forces would have freedom of movement. They could fly out of Hmeimim, but now the option of evacuation by sea is being seriously considered. The city of Baltiysk ordered the Sparta II bulk carrier and the Alexander Shabalin large amphibious assault ship to prepare for departure for Tartus.
Three days after the takeover of Damascus, a Russian military convoy was seen moving Northbound on the M1 highway in Jableh, Syria presumably heading to nearby Khmeimim Airbase. Russian forces were fleeing Tartous without HTS escort, in front of stunned French jihadis and under the bullets of Ansar al-Tawhid fighters. The Russians were conducting an emergency dismantling of equipment and military property in the port of Tartus. Several hundred russian special forces have already arrived to ensure the safety of the retreat.
If Russia left Syria, the Ministry of Defense's African Korps transport hub would lose access to Africa. Or Russian bases could be used to pressure Russia into peace on terms favorable to Ukraine and the US. Many in the corridors of power are saying that Syria has become a bargaining chip between global powers. It might indeed be a trade-off, but without Russia's involvement. There seemed to be no visible benefits for Russia.
According to the well-known Russian propagandist Anastasia Kashevarova, by preliminary agreement the Russians were given 75 days, after which they will have to completely withdraw their contingent from Syria.
Post-Assad - Iran
Tehran faces the daunting challenge of overhauling its foreign policy, a task that is causing a deep internal crisis. Tensions are rising between reformist forces advocating for dialogue with the West and conservatives who insist that maintaining a hardline approach is the only way to retain influence and control. This divide is further intensified by the anticipated power transition from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to his son Mojtaba Khamenei, which, according to many analysts, could occur as early as 2025. This transition is likely to trigger a new wave of domestic political conflicts. Increasingly, there are fears that the Islamic Republic could face internal fractures, potentially escalating into open conflict between various political and ethnic factions.
The new political parties in Syria are likely to distance themselves from Iran in order to improve relations with the West, other Arab nations, and Türkiye. Assad’s departure undermined Iran’s image as a guarantor of stability for its allies. Additionally, the weakening of Iran’s influence in Syria complicated its position in the entire region. Hezbollah, which had relied heavily on Syrian support, was now a lot more vulnerable. And, confident that Tehran no longer has considerable control over the region, Israel increased pressure on Iranian infrastructure in Syria.
Iranian media and officials have sought scapegoats for the unfolding catastrophe, and Assad has become the primary target of criticism. In its publications, Pars Today unequivocally places the blame on Assad, stating: “Bashar refused to stand to the end, and no one could change the outcome. Even Iran’s direct appeals had no effect on him because he understood that the army and society (for reasons ranging from betrayal to lack of motivation or corruption) would not support him. It was clear five days ago that resistance would not occur; only the speed of events was surprising. Bashar is not an ideologically driven leader like Yahya Sinwar, capable of holding out to the bitter end. For him, it was safe enough to leave Damascus."
Iran faced a serious challenge in maintaining its influence in Syria. Tehran hopes to preserve its strategic relations with Damascus, even if the opposition comes to power. However, Iranian officials are skeptical about the new Syrian authorities, who might reconsider Syria’s traditionally close ties with Iran. For decades, Syria has been a key player in Iran’s Middle East strategy, serving as an important ally in the Axis of Resistance. Through Syria, Iran has supported Hezbollah in Lebanon and pursued its geopolitical ambitions. However, the rise to power of the opposition forces – many of them backed by the West, Türkiye, and the Gulf monarchies – could jeopardize this cooperation model.
Ettelaat newspaper published an article by Mohammad Ali Mohtadi titled “Will Iran’s turn come after Syria?” in its 11 December 2024 issue, in which the author believes that “there is a large and well-thought-out conspiracy by the United States, Israel, and perhaps some countries in the region, with the aim of working to collapse the axis of resistance and bring about geopolitical changes in the region. If this conspiracy succeeds, the Islamic Republic will be the next immediate target on the list.”
Ahmad Naderi, a member of parliament and university professor who had previously criticized Iran’s lack of intervention in recent events in Syria, said 08 December 2024 that Iran’s strategy after the fall of Bashar al-Assad should be toward “testing the nuclear bomb.” Naderi considered that Bashar al-Assad’s trust in the Gulf states, especially the UAE, was a mistake, and stressed that “Iran’s strategy from now on should be based on two points: first, reviving the wounded resistance front, and second, testing the nuclear bomb.”
Iran's Axis of Resistance may collapse, but the country remains a critical regional player. Tehran's strategy of building an "axis of resistance" suffered disintegration and dissolution. This regional network of armed groups and allies, long supported by Iran, has taken a major hit. Assad has been a key linchpin in Iran’s regional strategy, providing vital geographic links and bolstering its influence against Israel through the Hezbollah group in southern Lebanon. Ali Akbar Velayati, an adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, had previously referred to Syria as the “golden link” in the chain of resistance. Therefore, the loss of Assad in Syria not only disrupts this chain, but also undermines Hezbollah’s position, reducing Iran’s deterrent power throughout the region.
The losses suffered by Hezbollah dealt yet another blow to Iran. The Lebanese organization, long regarded as one of Tehran’s key instruments in its struggle against Israel, now finds itself isolated and weakened. The loss of arms supply routes and the destruction of its logistical chains have cast doubt on its combat readiness. The organization was now forced to reconsider its strategies, and its capacity to conduct effective military operations has been significantly curtailed.
The Kurdish forces - the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - who enjoyed American backing, seized the Bo Kamal crossing on the border with Iraq. From Iran's perspective, this was a real defeat, since thid crossing was an important component of the supply chain of the "Iranian axis," through which fighters, weapons, and money passed to pro-Iranian forces in Syria as well as to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Tehran leveled accusations against the Ukrainian government. Ibrahim Rezaei, the spokesperson for the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, claimed that Ukraine is supporting armed opposition groups in Syria by supplying them with drones. He noted that terrorists in Syria are better equipped than in the past because of drones supplied by the Ukrainian government. Rezaei asserted that the Ukrainian government must be held accountable for this situation. While Kiev has yet to respond to these allegations, the intense anti-Iranian rhetoric coming from certain media outlets closely affiliated with Ukrainian leader Vladimir Zelensky suggests that there may be some truth to Iran’s claims.
In September, major Turkish media sources reported that Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) had established contact with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) jihadists. The media was surprised that Ukraine was willing to engage in dialogue with rebels engaged in terrorist activities against civilians. In support of this claim, the media presented photographic evidence showing a Ukrainian HUR official conversing with an HTS agent.
Iran also claimed to possess credible evidence indicating that representatives of the Kiev regime had trained HTS militants to operate drones and were involved in illegal arms trade. Tehran asserted that the HUR not only offered technical support to the militants but also trained them in the use of drones for combat purposes.
Iran planned to leverage its economic, cultural, and religious ties to strengthen its foothold in Syria. Tehran may offer new forms of cooperation focused on infrastructure development and post-conflict reconstruction to maintain its influence. However, Iranian experts believe that the new Syrian leadership will be cautious about cooperating with Iran, and will aim to avoid dependency on any single power. The future of Iran-Syria relations in this new reality remains uncertain.
Commander of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Major General Hossein Salami reaffirmed 15 December 2024 supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei’s recent statement that Syria will eventually be freed from occupation through the efforts of its youth. Major General Salami said foreign powers are tearing Syria apart, likening them to "hungry wolves," with Zionists present in the South and other forces active in the North and East of the country.
“The Zionists are so entrenched that they can observe families in Damascus with the naked eye; this is unacceptable. As our Leader has emphasized, Syria will be liberated by its resilient and skilled youth, by the grace of God,” he stated. General Salami referred to Ayatollah Khamenei’s remarks earlier in the week, where the Supreme Leader predicted that Syrian youth would rise, resist, and ultimately overcome their current circumstances, much like the youth of Iraq.
“The occupied areas of Syria will undoubtedly be liberated by the determined Syrian youth. There should be no doubt about this,” the Leader said, adding, “The United States’ influence in the region will also come to an end. By God’s will and power, the resistance front will expel them from the region.” Salami also highlighted that the Zionists would face significant repercussions for their actions in Syria. “They will pay dearly and will ultimately be buried in this land, but achieving this will take time,” he remarked.
The IRGC commander clarified that Iranian military advisors were deployed to Syria to uphold dignity rather than pursue territorial or political ambitions. Iran was the first to assist Syria after foreign-backed riots erupted in 2011. By 2017, Syrian forces, supported by Iran and Russia, achieved a decisive victory over the Daesh terrorist group.
Post-Assad - Houthis
The Houthi militia in Yemen appeared to be facing a sensitive and challenging phase. The military and security movements carried out by the group in areas under its control indicate growing concern about the spread of the popular uprisings or the escalation of regional pressures on it. The Houthi leadership is working to strengthen its security and political grip in Sanaa and the strategic governorates, anticipating sudden changes that may threaten its influence. The Iranian decline at the regional level, whether due to international sanctions or diplomatic pressure, could push Tehran to abandon the Houthis as it did previously with other allies, which would deepen the state of apprehension within the group.
Post-Assad - Turkey
Joe Truzman reported 15 December 2024 that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham had reportedly closed some military camps belonging to Palestinian armed groups in Syria. Also, groups operating in the Yarmouk camp had to give up their weapons. Among the groups affected are present said that the meeting included the following factions: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Islamic Jihad Movement, the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front, the General Command, and the Saiqa. In addition to one of the leaders of the Military Operations Administration that took control of Damascus. The Fatah and Hamas movements did not attend. HTS was not happy with Palestinian groups who allied themselves with Assad's regime. Hamas may have an opportunity to form a relationship with HTS since the group opposed Bashar al-Assad's bombing of Syria during the civil war. The disagreement led to a split between Hamas and Assad up until recent years when Hezbollah spearheaded mediation efforts between both actors.
Syria became a home for Palestinian terrorist groups, including their leaders. Moreover, groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad built infrastructure there, including a branch called "The Martyr Ali al-Aswad Brigade" that sent fighters to southern Lebanon to fight alongside Hezbollah during the recent war with Israel.
Rumors circulated about handing over some Palestinian sites outside the camps in Qusaya and Sultan Yacoub in the Bekaa to the Lebanese army. However, the military official of the General Command in Lebanon, Abu Rateb, denied this information and considered them rumors that have no connection to the truth.
Post-Assad - Turkey
Ankara aims to maintain control over northern Syria, bordering Turkiye, where the US-backed Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), designated as terrorists by Turkey, currently operate. Syria's fragmentation posed a threat to Turkiye due to the Kurdish aspiration for an independent state, which threatens Turkiye's national security and territorial integrity. Approximately 30 million Kurds live in the mountainous regions of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkiye.
The local Kurds, who are supervised by the US, would like to leave the Syrian state project or consolidate their autonomy. Not allowing this is Turkey's main goal, and it is looking after the forces that have brought down the defense of now former President Bashar al-Assad.
Russia's withdrawal from Syria would give Turkey an opportunity to become a player in the European energy market by constructing a pipeline to Europe. Proposed by Qatar in 2009, the $10 billion, 1,500-kilometer Qatar–Türkiye pipeline was designed to transport gas from Qatar’s vast South Pars/North Dome field to Europe via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Turkish distribution terminals. Assad refused to sign a proposed agreement with Qatar in 2009. This agreement would have enabled the pipeline to bypass Russia, supplying Europe directly.
Taking Manbij from the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) had always been on Turkiye’s agenda. Turkish drones gave air support to the SNA (Syrian National Army) factions that fought SDF in the city. The reason Turkiye targets the SDF is it believes the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Kurdish militia that leads the SDF, is the Syria branch of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), against which Turkiye fought a 40-year war. Turkiye believes the organisation aims to establish an independent state, taking territory from Turkiye. The SNA factions that took Manbij say their next target will be Raqqa, where the SDF [is also in control]. Turkiye wants the SDF on the eastern side of the Euphrates River.
Post-Assad - Kurds
The commander-in-chief of the SDF, Mazlum Abdi, officially declares the readiness of the pro-Kurdish administration to cooperate with the new authorities in Damascus, confirming the presence of contacts through the same United States and at the same time criticizing Assad.
According to some estimates, Deir ez-Zor holds 70% of Syrian oil reserves and a major gas field. It is linked via a pipeline to Syria's other fossil fuel deposits in Al-Hasakah and Homs.
In the province of Deir ez-Zor, fighting continued 11 December 2024 between the Kurdish "Syrian Democratic Forces" (SDF) and associations led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA). The militants of the pro-HTS "Department of Military Operations" completely took control of the city of Deir ez-Zor and the military airport located there. The Kurds did not resist and withdrew to the opposite bank of the Euphrates. In the Kurdish media, the retreat from the territories previously taken (actually transferred by the Syrian Armed Forces who fled from there) was explained by some agreements with the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham terrorists, concluded with the mediation of the Americans.
Against the background of the ongoing clashes, there was a split in the ranks of the "Military Council of Deir ez-Zor" — the American-backed Arab formation within the "Syrian Democratic Forces" responsible for this province. Some of the fighters, led by commander Abu al-Haris al-Shaaiti, deserted and joined the "legitimate opposition" and "progressive jihadists," some remained loyal to the leadership of the SDF.
US was working to prevent resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS] in Syria. By 2014, ISIS had gathered enough strength to spill over the Syrian border into Iraq. ISIS captured huge swaths of territory and declared the formation of its so-called caliphate. By 2019 the Kurds were detaining over 10,000 ISIS fighters and families. By 2022 more than 42400 foreigners accused of Islamic State (ISIS) links remained abandoned by their countries in camps and prisons in northeast Syria.
But by late 2024 ISIS detention facilities were under threat in several areas and ISIS prisoners were being moved to higher-security prisons, the US-backed SDF commander told CNN 11 December 2024. He also said the SDF had to suspend anti-ISIS operations amid attacks from Turkish-backed groups. "With the increasing threats that faced the city of Manbij, we relocated ISIS detainees from the prisons there to other, more secure detention facilities,” Gen Mazloum Abdi told CNN. “Detention centers in both Raqqa and Hasakah are facing similar threats".
Despite the disappearance of ISIS (a terrorist organization banned in Russia) from the media, the group's cells continue to operate in the Syrian desert and had carried out a number of attacks on the SDF in Deir ez-Zor province.
Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the Former Leader of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and now Leader of the Syrian Transitional Government, said 15 December 2024 in a Message to the Kurds; that the Kurdish People are part of the Syrian Homeland, and that he and the incoming Government will do everything they can to return the Afrin and other Areas in the North under the control of Turkish Forces, back to the Kurds.
Captagon Cartel
The new Syrian authorities took control of military bases and distribution centers for amphetamine-based stimulants that have flooded the black market across the Middle East, and vowed to destroy them. Captagon has turned Syria into the world’s largest drug-reliant narcostate, and become Syria’s largest export, surpassing all of its legal exports combined. Syria - which the US Office of Foreign Assets Control described as a world leader in the production of Captagon - was producing 80% of this narcotic substance. What actors will replace Syria for Captagon production? How long will this take? What happens in the meantime [a lot of cranky customers desperate for crank, aka “chemical courage”?] Over the past years, global and regional ports have turned into crime scenes due to the flow of Captagon drug coming from Syria, which has become, according to reports from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, one of the largest producers of the drug in the world. Captagon production was banned and subject to international control, and today it is produced, illegally, from amphetamine.
Captagon networks around the world have made huge profits from sales estimated by the British government at $57 billion, and Syria has been a major center for the industry. While it is difficult to estimate the amount of money the Syrian regime is making, a statistic by the Newlines Institute for Studies in Washington put the value of Captagon seizures at about $5.7 billion.
The convergence of the threads of the complex Captagon network at the hands of Syrian businessman Taher al-Kayali, and the flow of the drug seized from Latakia, revealed a connection between Maher al-Assad, commander of the Syrian army’s Fourth Division, and the president’s brother, according to Cecilia Anesi, founder of the Investigative Journalism Project in Italy.
The exact number of small Captagon laboratories in Syria is not known, but investigative reports indicate that there were at least 15 large factories producing Captagon, in addition to other narcotic drugs, according to the COAR Research Center in Cyprus. The main production sites are concentrated in Homs Governorate and in the town of Al-Bassa, a remote area in Latakia Governorate, and another factory is run by the Fourth Division, according to the same center.
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