Russo-Ukraine War - July 2025
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On 24 February 2022, Ukraine was suddenly and deliberately attacked by land, naval and air forces of Russia, igniting the largest European war since the Great Patriotic War. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a "special military operation" (SVO - spetsialnaya voennaya operatsiya) in Ukraine. The military buildup in preceeding months makes it obvious that the unprovoked and dastardly Russian attack was deliberately planned long in advance. During the intervening time, the Russian government had deliberately sought to deceive the world by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.
"To initiate a war of aggression... is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." [Judgment of the International Military Tribunal]
July 2025 marked a period of accelerating Russian territorial gains across eastern Ukraine, with Russian forces advancing at their fastest pace in over a year. During the week of July 22-29 alone, Russia captured approximately 105 square miles of Ukrainian territory, more than three times the rate of the previous week. The month saw Russian forces making concerted pushes toward several strategically important cities, with the eastern front bearing the brunt of renewed offensive operations.
The situation around Pokrovsk emerged as particularly critical during July. Russian forces entered the outskirts of this key logistics hub for the first time, threatening a vital road and rail junction that Ukrainian forces had used to supply other embattled eastern positions including Chasiv Yar and Kostyantynivka. Russian operational doctrine during this phase focused on flanking maneuvers designed to threaten encirclement rather than direct frontal assaults, forcing Ukrainian defenders into difficult decisions about whether to hold positions and risk being cut off or retreat and surrender strategically important ground.
Throughout July, the Ukrainian General Staff reported an average of 170-183 combat clashes per day across multiple sectors of the front. The Pokrovsk direction saw the heaviest fighting, with Ukrainian forces repelling dozens of assault actions daily near settlements including Novotoretske, Promin, and Kotliarivka. The intensity of combat remained high in the Kupiansk and Lyman directions as well, though Russian advances in these areas were more modest compared to the progress made toward Pokrovsk.
By the end of July, Russian forces had increased their control of Ukrainian territory to approximately 114,189 square kilometers, representing 18.9 percent of Ukraine. In the month from June to July 2025, Russia gained approximately 213 square miles of Ukrainian territory. Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces maintained only a small foothold of about five square miles across Russia's Kursk and Belgorod regions, a figure that remained unchanged for six weeks during July. The Ukrainian position in Russian territory had been steadily eroded since Ukraine's bold incursion in August 2024, with Russian forces having pushed back most of the initial gains.
Deep Battle Operations
July 2025 witnessed an unprecedented escalation in Russian long-range strike operations against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, with Moscow launching a sustained campaign designed to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses and degrade civilian morale. Russia set multiple records during the month, including firing over 700 drones in a single attack on July 9, eclipsing previous records by hundreds of strike platforms. Just days later on July 12, another massive barrage involved 597 drones and 26 cruise missiles striking targets across Ukraine from Kharkiv in the east to Lviv in the west.
The scale and intensity of Russian aerial attacks continued to escalate throughout July. During the first ten days of the month alone, Russia launched 2,464 drones and 58 missiles into Ukraine. For the entire month of July, Russian forces fired approximately 4,929 drones and 148 missiles at Ukrainian targets, averaging around 234 drones and seven missiles per day. This represented a significant increase from June's average of 181 drones and eight missiles per day, and more than double May's daily average of 124 drones and four missiles.
The most devastating attack of the month occurred on July 31, when Russian forces launched an overnight assault using more than 300 drones and eight missiles against Kyiv. The attack killed at least 18 people, including a six-year-old boy, and wounded 159 others across 27 locations in four districts of the capital. The relentless nature of the strikes forced thousands of Kyiv residents to seek shelter in metro stations during multi-hour barrages that punctuated the night with explosions and the distinctive whine of approaching drones.
Russia's strategy increasingly relied on the use of decoy drones alongside actual strike platforms to saturate Ukrainian air defenses. These decoy drones, which mimicked the signatures of armed Shahed attack drones, forced Ukraine to expend valuable interceptor missiles and stretched defensive resources across the country. Ukrainian air defense systems managed to shoot down or electronically jam the majority of incoming threats, but the sheer volume meant that significant numbers still reached their targets, causing civilian casualties and infrastructure damage.
The primary targets of Russian strikes in July included energy infrastructure, civilian residential areas, and military-industrial facilities. Ukrainian power generation capabilities continued to deteriorate, with the country having lost approximately 48 percent of its pre-war installed capacity of 56.1 gigawatts. Civilian casualties from aerial attacks reached a three-year monthly high in July, with 286 civilians killed and 1,388 injured, the highest numbers since May 2022. Aerial bombs dropped by Russian forces accounted for a significant increase in casualties, causing 276 casualties in July compared to 114 in June.
Ukraine continued its own deep strike campaign against Russian territory throughout July, though on a smaller scale than Russian operations. Ukrainian drones struck targets across multiple Russian regions, including oil refineries, military bases, and weapons production facilities. Notable Ukrainian strikes included attacks on the Lukoil refinery in Volgograd, an electronics plant in Penza that produced combat control systems, and a bitumen plant in Nizhny Novgorod Oblast. Ukrainian forces also destroyed Russian Iskander launchers at a base in Klintsy, Bryansk Oblast, killing eight Russian soldiers. Russian defense systems reported intercepting 107-122 Ukrainian drones on typical nights, with Ukrainian strikes causing temporary flight restrictions at major Moscow airports on several occasions during July.
New Weapons and Production
July 2025 represented a pivotal moment in Ukraine's defense industrial transformation, with President Zelenskyy announcing ambitious plans to reach 50 percent domestic weapons production within six months. At the time, Ukrainian domestic manufacturing already accounted for approximately 40 percent of weapons used by the military, a remarkable achievement for a country that had minimal indigenous production capacity before the full-scale invasion. The new government approved in mid-July committed to aggressively expanding this capability as uncertainty grew about the reliability and speed of Western weapons deliveries.
Ukrainian drone production emerged as the crown jewel of the country's defense industrial revolution. By July 2025, Ukraine was producing over four million drones annually, with virtually all of the unmanned aerial vehicles used by Ukrainian forces being domestically manufactured. The country's Defense Procurement Agency reported that more than 71 percent of all weapons acquired during the first half of 2025 came from domestic sources. This represented a fundamental shift from the early months of the war when Ukraine relied almost entirely on aging Soviet-era equipment and emergency Western donations.
The scale and sophistication of Ukrainian weapons development expanded dramatically. Ukraine developed long-range strike drones capable of hitting targets deep inside Russia, including the Palianytsia turbojet missile-drone that Zelenskyy described as a new class of weaponry. Work continued on the Flamingo cruise missile, which Ukrainian officials claimed could travel 1,800 miles and carry a powerful explosive payload, though some observers questioned whether the system had been overhyped. Ukraine also made breakthroughs in NATO-standard ammunition production, with several private companies obtaining licenses from European manufacturers to produce compatible munitions domestically.
Artillery production saw substantial increases, particularly with the Bohdana self-propelled howitzer system. Monthly output rose from six units to at least eleven, with some sources suggesting production reached twenty units per month. Significantly, this production was led by the private sector rather than state-owned enterprises, demonstrating the dynamism of Ukraine's emerging defense industry. The country also made progress on a new land-attack cruise missile based on the Neptune anti-ship platform, with the project expected to receive international funding.
Ukraine initiated programs for joint weapons production with international partners, both on Ukrainian soil and abroad. Legislation introduced in early July created special legal frameworks to establish new factories and production sites within Ukraine and in countries participating in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Turkey's Baykar announced it was building a drone production facility in Ukraine expected to be completed during 2025. Ukraine also negotiated joint production of microsatellites with French partners and collaborated with Sweden's SAAB on weapons development. Germany's Rheinmetall had previously announced plans to build at least four factories in Ukraine focusing on artillery shells, military vehicles, gunpowder, and anti-aircraft weapons.
Russian weapons development during July focused primarily on scaling up existing production rather than introducing revolutionary new systems. Russia claimed to have developed fiber-optic-guided first-person-view drones with 50-kilometer ranges, using cables weighing less than four kilograms. This represented an attempt to counter Ukrainian electronic warfare systems that had proven effective at jamming radio-controlled drones. Russia continued to benefit from Iranian drone technology, with production of Shahed drones being ramped up significantly. North Korean workers were reportedly being sent to Russia's Alabuga Special Economic Zone to assist with drone manufacturing, with plans to increase production from 2,000 to 5,000 units per month.
Personnel Levels and Problems
July 2025 highlighted the severe personnel challenges facing both militaries, though Russia's casualty rates reached staggering proportions that would have been unthinkable in any previous conflict. United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio claimed in late July that Russia had lost 60,000 soldiers killed in July alone, a figure that underscored both the intensity of the summer offensive and Moscow's apparent willingness to accept extraordinarily high losses to achieve territorial gains. Earlier assessments from UK intelligence estimated that Russian forces had suffered 236,000 casualties in the first eight months of 2025, including 32,000 casualties in June at a rate of 1,080 per day.
By late July, cumulative Russian casualties since the start of the invasion had reached catastrophic levels according to Western intelligence estimates. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated in June that Russia had suffered approximately 950,000 killed and wounded, including 250,000 dead. The United Kingdom Defense Ministry's June estimate exceeded one million total casualties, including 250,000 killed. Ukrainian General Staff figures, which tended to run higher than Western estimates, placed total Russian losses at over 1.04 million by late July. Independent Russian media investigation by Mediazona had confirmed the names of over 119,000 Russian soldiers killed by mid-July, though the actual figure was certainly much higher given that only publicly available information was used for verification.
The composition of Russian forces continued to evolve as the war ground on. Volunteers had become the largest category of Russian casualties, representing approximately 32,100 of the confirmed deaths identified by Mediazona. Recruited prisoners accounted for 17,800 confirmed deaths, while mobilized soldiers represented about 13,000 confirmed fatalities. Nearly 5,400 officers had been confirmed killed, though officer deaths as a percentage of total casualties had declined from ten percent early in the war to between two and three percent by late 2024, reflecting the massive influx of volunteer infantry who suffered casualty rates many times higher than their commanding officers.
Russia's mobilization strategy in July avoided announcing a formal new mobilization campaign that might spark public backlash. Instead, Moscow relied on continuous recruitment of volunteers attracted by high salaries and signing bonuses, supplemented by prisoners, foreign mercenaries, and North Korean soldiers. More than 100,000 Russian families had contacted Ukrainian-run initiatives searching for information about missing soldiers, suggesting that official casualty figures significantly understated the true scale of losses. Russia continued to recruit from North Korea, with reports indicating that several thousand North Korean soldiers had been deployed to fight in the Kursk region, with some killed in action by July.
Ukrainian personnel challenges in July were less about raw numbers and more about the sustainability of current force levels. President Zelenskyy had estimated in January 2025 that Ukraine had suffered approximately 400,000 killed and wounded since the invasion began, including 43,000 killed. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimated between 60,000 and 100,000 Ukrainian soldiers killed and 300,000 to 340,000 wounded. While these figures were substantial, they paled in comparison to Russian losses, reflecting Ukraine's more defensive posture and better use of combined arms tactics.
The critical challenge for Ukraine in July was the shortage of trained personnel to hold extensive defensive lines while simultaneously conducting offensive operations where opportunities arose. Ukrainian forces were stretched thin across a front line extending roughly 1,000 kilometers, with some units reporting severe fatigue after months of continuous combat. Mobilization remained politically sensitive, though Ukraine had implemented various measures to expand the personnel pool, including approving one-year contracts for volunteers aged 18-24 not subject to mandatory mobilization. The shortage of manpower meant that Ukrainian commanders often had to make difficult choices about which sectors to reinforce and which to hold with minimal forces, accepting calculated risks that Russian breakthroughs might occur in less critical areas.
Support to Ukraine
Western military support to Ukraine underwent significant turbulence during July 2025 as the United States under President Trump pursued an unpredictable policy that oscillated between renewed commitments and temporary suspensions. At the beginning of July, the Trump administration suspended some weapons shipments to Ukraine while conducting a capability review, a decision that caused alarm in Kyiv and among European allies. The suspension was particularly concerning because it affected critical air defense systems, including Patriot interceptor missiles that Ukraine desperately needed to counter the escalating Russian aerial campaign.
By mid-July, however, Trump had reversed course following his increasing frustration with Putin's apparent lack of interest in serious peace negotiations. Trump restored military aid deliveries and announced a new support mechanism called the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List, though he made clear that the United States would not pay for this assistance. Instead, European NATO allies would purchase American-made weapons that would then be transferred to Ukraine. This arrangement aimed to maintain support for Ukraine while shifting the financial burden to Europe, consistent with Trump's broader approach to European security.
The PURL mechanism gained traction during July with commitments from Germany, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada. Germany pledged over two billion dollars in new military support, addressing urgent Ukrainian requirements for air defense systems, Patriot interceptors, radar systems, and precision-guided artillery. The United Kingdom announced it would provide hundreds of air defense missiles for Ukraine using funds from sanctioned Russian assets. However, actual weapons deliveries lagged behind announcements, and data from Germany's Kiel Institute showed that Western military aid to Ukraine plunged by 43 percent in July and August compared to the first half of 2025 despite the PURL program.
European countries had begun assuming leadership roles in coordinating Ukraine support as American policy became less predictable. The United Kingdom and Germany took over leadership of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group from the United States in 2025. British Defense Secretary John Healey led efforts to coordinate a 50-day drive to get weapons to Ukraine, coinciding with Trump's deadline for Russia to agree to a ceasefire. France and the United Kingdom also led proposals for a coalition of the willing to support any potential peace agreement.
European support faced its own challenges during July. France, Italy, and Spain came under criticism for not contributing enough relative to their economic size and strategic interests. For the first time since June 2022, total European military aid commitments surpassed those of the United States, with Europe providing 72 billion euros compared to America's 65 billion euros through early 2025, according to the Kiel Institute. However, much of this European commitment represented future pledges rather than immediate deliveries, and the gap between announced support and actual weapons reaching Ukrainian forces remained frustratingly wide.
Switzerland announced in July that the United States had informed it that Washington was diverting Swiss orders for Patriot air defense systems to help Ukraine, highlighting the scramble to find additional interceptors for Ukrainian defenses. It remained unclear whether these Patriots would go directly to Ukraine or would replace units from other European countries donated to Kyiv. NATO agreed to coordinate regular deliveries of large weapons packages worth around 500 million dollars each month, though actually meeting this target proved challenging given competing priorities and production constraints.
Beyond weaponry, international support for Ukraine in July included financial assistance to keep the government operational. The European Union continued providing macro-financial assistance as part of G7 initiatives to leverage frozen Russian assets. The need for sustained financial support remained acute, with Ukraine's budget deficit running at over 20 percent of GDP excluding grants. As Ukraine ramped up domestic weapons production, international investment in Ukrainian defense industrial capacity became increasingly important, with various partnerships established for joint production ventures.
Support for Russia
July 2025 underscored North Korea's emergence as Russia's most important military partner, surpassing even Iran in strategic significance. North Korean support to Russia's war effort had expanded far beyond initial weapons shipments to include direct troop deployments and industrial cooperation. Several thousand North Korean soldiers were fighting alongside Russian forces in the Kursk region by July, with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un personally mourning soldiers killed in action during anniversary celebrations of the Russia-North Korea mutual defense pact. This represented the first time since the Korean War that North Korean forces had engaged in sustained combat operations abroad.
The depth of Russia-North Korea cooperation extended to industrial production. Reports indicated that 25,000 North Korean workers were being sent to Russia's Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan to assist with manufacturing Shahed drones, with Russia planning to increase production from 2,000 to 5,000 units monthly. Satellite imagery revealed new dormitory construction at the site to accommodate North Korean workers. In exchange for its support, North Korea received crucial economic assistance including Russian oil and wheat shipments, hard currency payments, combat experience for its military personnel, and possibly transfers of advanced military technology including assistance with improving the accuracy of North Korean missile systems.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited North Korea in July, meeting with Kim Jong Un to further strengthen bilateral ties. The partnership served both countries' interests in challenging what they perceived as Western-dominated international order. For North Korea, the relationship with Russia provided a counterbalance to its heavy dependence on China, giving Pyongyang greater strategic autonomy. The nuclear-armed North Korea represented a safer long-term partner for Russia than Iran, which faced mounting pressure from Israeli and American strikes during 2025.
Iranian support to Russia, while still significant, appeared to be plateauing by July 2025. Iran had supplied thousands of Shahed drones that Russia used extensively in attacks on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Iran had also provided tactical gear, artillery, and assistance in establishing domestic drone production facilities within Russia. In exchange, Russia reinvigorated plans to provide Iran with Su-35 fighter aircraft to replace its aging F-14 fleet, with Iran planning to operationalize these jets by the end of 2025. The two countries signed a 20-year strategic partnership treaty in January 2025 that called for cooperation against common military threats, though it lacked a mutual defense clause.
However, Iran's value as a Russian partner had diminished somewhat following sustained Israeli and American strikes that degraded Iranian military capabilities. Russia and China had provided only limited support to Tehran during these confrontations, highlighting the transactional and ultimately limited nature of the axis. Iran's weakening meant it had less to offer Russia beyond continued drone supplies, and Russia appeared to be pivoting toward deeper cooperation with North Korea as a more reliable partner.
Chinese support for Russia remained primarily economic rather than military during July 2025. China had become Russia's largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching record levels despite Western sanctions. China increased purchases of Russian oil and natural gas, providing crucial economic support that helped Moscow sustain its war effort. The two countries continued to operate under their February 2022 no-limits partnership, with President Xi Jinping and President Putin maintaining close personal ties. However, China remained cautious about providing direct military assistance to Russia, concerned about Western sanctions and the impact on its broader economic interests.
Chinese officials watched with some concern as Russia's partnership with North Korea deepened, particularly North Korea's direct involvement in the Ukraine war. Beijing valued stability on the Korean Peninsula and saw North Korean missile tests and military adventurism as potentially threatening Chinese interests. The strengthening Russia-North Korea axis gave Pyongyang leverage in its relationship with China, complicating Beijing's efforts to manage North Korean behavior. Nevertheless, China continued to support Russia diplomatically, shielding Moscow from some international pressure and maintaining economic ties that were vital for Russia's ability to sustain military operations.
The broader CRINK axis, encompassing China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, continued to coordinate to some degree in challenging Western influence, though cooperation remained largely bilateral rather than truly multilateral. Russia benefited from this network of relationships by accessing weapons, industrial capacity, and economic lifelines that helped it continue the war despite unprecedented Western sanctions. The axis demonstrated its symbolic unity at events like the Victory Day parade in Moscow where leaders from all four countries participated. However, each partnership was fundamentally transactional, with limits on how much support each country would provide based on its own narrow interests rather than true alliance commitments.
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