Russo-Ukraine War - May 2025
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On 24 February 2022, Ukraine was suddenly and deliberately attacked by land, naval and air forces of Russia, igniting the largest European war since the Great Patriotic War. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a "special military operation" (SVO - spetsialnaya voennaya operatsiya) in Ukraine. The military buildup in preceeding months makes it obvious that the unprovoked and dastardly Russian attack was deliberately planned long in advance. During the intervening time, the Russian government had deliberately sought to deceive the world by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.
"To initiate a war of aggression... is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." [Judgment of the International Military Tribunal]
As spring turned to summer in May 2025, the war in Ukraine entered what analysts described as a new and violent phase. The conflict, now more than three years old, saw Russian forces launching renewed offensives across multiple sectors while Ukrainian defenders maintained fierce resistance along the entire front line. The period was marked by intense combat engagements, with Ukrainian forces reporting approximately 196 combat engagements daily during the first half of May. The fighting remained concentrated in the eastern Donetsk region, particularly around the critical cities of Pokrovsk, Toretsk, Lyman, and Kupiansk.
In late April and early May, Russian forces initiated a renewed offensive north of Kharkiv, Ukraine's second-largest city. Ground forces attempted to push across the border near Vovchansk and Lyptsi, aiming to stretch Ukrainian defenses and possibly threaten Kharkiv with ground encirclement. Russian units, supported by intense artillery and drone bombardments, gained ground in several villages but were met with coordinated Ukrainian defense. Despite the devastation, military analysts agreed that Kharkiv was not in imminent danger of being overrun, as Ukrainian lines remained firm and the logistical cost for Russia to sustain a full-scale offensive that deep into Ukrainian territory remained prohibitive without air superiority.
The southern front around Orikhiv and Robotyne in the Zaporizhzhia region continued to serve as one of the deadliest battlefields in the war. Following a winter lull, Russian forces resumed offensive operations in late March, testing for weakness in Ukraine's layered defensive lines. However, the cost proved staggering for the attackers. According to Ukrainian General Staff reports confirmed by British and Estonian military intelligence, Russia suffered an estimated seven thousand to ten thousand killed or wounded since April alone in this sector. Ukrainian forces also successfully withdrew from certain frontline sectors in Donetsk Oblast to preserve forces and obtain better defensive positions, demonstrating tactical flexibility in the face of sustained Russian pressure.
Russian territorial gains in May 2025 were incremental but costly. Russia captured approximately 450 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory during the month, representing its fastest monthly advance in at least six months. However, these gains came at an extraordinary cost in personnel and equipment. Geolocated footage confirmed Russian control over several villages including Vozdvyzhenka in Donetsk Oblast, while Ukrainian forces claimed to have retaken other settlements such as Pishchane near Pokrovsk. The frontline remained highly dynamic, with neither side achieving decisive breakthroughs despite the intensity of combat operations.
Deep Battle: Missile and Drone Strikes
May 2025 witnessed an unprecedented escalation in long-range strike operations by both sides, fundamentally changing the character of the deep battle. Ukraine demonstrated growing capability and audacity in striking strategic targets deep within Russian territory, while Russia intensified its systematic campaign against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and military targets. The drone war reached new levels of sophistication and scale, with both sides deploying thousands of unmanned systems for reconnaissance, strike, and deception operations.
Ukrainian forces conducted repeated drone strikes against Russian oil refineries throughout May, including successful attacks on the Ryazan Oil Refinery that caused it to cease operations. Ukrainian drones struck the Borisoglebsk air base in Voronezh Oblast, targeting Russian Su-34s, Su-35s, fuel tanks, and warehouses storing guided bombs. The Ukrainian Air Force claimed destruction of more than 200 Shahed drones in a single strike on a warehouse in Oryol Oblast, demonstrating the effectiveness of Ukrainian deep strike capabilities. These operations forced Russia to disperse its strategic aviation assets and increased the vulnerability of previously secure rear-area facilities.
The most dramatic Ukrainian operation came in late May, setting the stage for even more audacious strikes in June. Ukrainian intelligence forces destroyed various Russian equipment in Donetsk Oblast with drones, including a Pole-21 Electronic Warfare System used to disrupt GPS signals. Ukrainian forces also bombed command posts of the Russian 20th Army's 3rd Motor Rifle Division near Demidovka and the 8th Combined Arms Army in Khartsyzk. These precision strikes demonstrated Ukraine's growing ability to identify and target high-value Russian military assets through a combination of intelligence gathering and long-range strike capabilities.
On the Russian side, the tempo of attacks against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure reached alarming levels. During one night in late May, Russia launched 472 drones and seven missiles at Ukraine, representing the highest number of drone attacks to date. A drone attack in Kyiv killed two people and injured at least six others, while also damaging the main building of the National Bank of Ukraine. Russian airstrikes continued to target Ukrainian energy infrastructure, although President Putin temporarily ordered a 30-day halt to attacks targeting Ukrainian energy facilities following a phone call with President Trump. The pause proved temporary and selective, as Russian forces continued strikes on other target categories.
The drone warfare evolved into a brutal cat-and-mouse game with both sides adapting to electronic warfare and counter-drone technology. Russian strikes averaged approximately 120 drone attacks per day during the first months of 2025, but this would increase dramatically in subsequent months. Russia primarily used Shahed-type drones, with production ramping up at facilities in Tatarstan. The Iranian-designed drones, now manufactured in Russia, were complemented by Russian-produced Garpiya drones made with Chinese components and Gerbera decoy drones designed to deplete Ukrainian air defense interceptors.
New Weapons, Production, and Effectiveness
The weapons landscape of the war underwent significant transformation in May 2025, with Ukraine receiving new Western systems while dramatically expanding domestic production capabilities. The arrival and operational employment of F-16 fighter jets marked a milestone in Ukraine's air defense modernization, though the aircraft were deployed primarily in defensive roles rather than offensive operations. Ukraine had received its first F-16s in mid-2024, and by May 2025, the country operated approximately 24 to 30 of these American-made fighters, with more deliveries expected from Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway.
The F-16s proved valuable for air defense missions, intercepting Russian cruise missiles and preventing Russian aircraft from entering Ukrainian airspace. The aircraft were equipped with AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles and AIM-9X Sidewinder infrared-guided missiles, providing significantly improved capabilities over Soviet-era systems. However, three F-16s were reported lost by May 2025, highlighting the challenges of operating advanced Western aircraft in a high-threat environment. The United States approved a $310.5 million maintenance and training package in May to support Ukraine's F-16 operations, addressing critical sustainment challenges.
Beyond the F-16 program, Ukraine was negotiating for more advanced fighter aircraft. In a development that would materialize later in the year, Sweden began discussions for providing 100 to 150 Saab JAS-39 Gripen fighters, which Ukrainian pilots had been training on since 2023. The Gripen was particularly attractive to Ukraine due to its ability to operate from dispersed locations including highways, its lower maintenance requirements compared to other Western fighters, and its compatibility with both American and European weapon systems. France also provided Mirage 2000-5F fighters with additional batches expected.
Ukraine's domestic weapons production underwent remarkable expansion during this period, becoming a cornerstone of the country's war effort. By May 2025, approximately 40 percent of weapons used on the battlefield were Ukrainian-made, compared to less than 10 percent at the start of the full-scale invasion. The country's defense industry employed nearly 300,000 people across approximately 500 to 800 arms producers. Ukrainian manufacturers focused particularly on drone production, with plans to produce 2.5 million drones in 2025. This massive expansion included first-person view drones, interceptor drones, reconnaissance systems, and unmanned ground vehicles.
Ukraine also made significant progress in missile production. The country unveiled new domestically produced weapons including the Palyanytsia missile drone, the Ruta missile, and an extended-range version of the Neptune cruise missile. The Neptune had gained fame earlier in the war for sinking the Russian cruiser Moskva. Ukraine also developed the Peklo missile drone and the Flamingo cruise missile, with serial production underway. These systems provided Ukraine with growing capability to strike Russian targets at extended ranges without relying solely on Western-supplied systems subject to usage restrictions.
Artillery ammunition production also expanded significantly, with Ukraine reportedly producing 50 percent of its artillery ammunition needs by 2024 and planning to produce nearly all requirements by late 2025. However, challenges remained. Ukrainian soldiers reported quality issues with some domestically produced ammunition. The country lacked the ability to produce its own gunpowder and relied on steel casings that soldiers had to fill themselves. Western nations proved generous with finished weapons but less willing to provide raw materials for Ukrainian industrial production. Despite these limitations, the growth represented a remarkable achievement given that Ukraine had produced almost no military equipment at scale before the invasion.
On the Russian side, weapons production also increased substantially, though at enormous economic cost. Russia planned to produce 1.4 million drones in 2025, ten times the 2023 production level. Russian forces introduced new systems including the TOS-2 multiple launch rocket system, though Ukrainian artillery claimed the first confirmed destruction of this platform in the Pokrovsk region. Russia continued to rely heavily on North Korean ammunition supplies, with some estimates suggesting 50 percent of Russian artillery ammunition came from North Korea by early 2025. However, Russia's strategic bomber fleet and long-range strike capabilities would face severe challenges in June when Ukraine launched its most audacious strike operation of the war.
Personnel Levels and Problems
The human cost of the war reached staggering proportions by May 2025, with both sides suffering casualties that would have been unthinkable in modern conventional warfare. Russian losses were particularly severe, representing one of the bloodiest military campaigns in modern history. According to multiple Western intelligence assessments, Russia had suffered approximately 950,000 total casualties since the invasion began, with casualties defined as killed, wounded, or missing. Of these, estimates suggested between 200,000 and 250,000 Russian soldiers had been killed, with the daily casualty rate averaging between 1,200 and 1,300 soldiers during April and May 2025.
British Defence Intelligence reported that Russia suffered approximately 160,000 casualties in just the first four months of 2025, making it potentially the deadliest year of the war. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that 100,000 Russian soldiers had died in 2025 alone by July. These losses exceeded all Soviet and Russian military fatalities combined in all conflicts since World War II, which totaled roughly 50,000 deaths over 77 years. Russia was losing soldiers at approximately five times the rate Ukraine suffered, according to analysis of cemetery data, obituaries, and official records by independent media outlets.
The composition of Russian casualties revealed the social and geographic inequities of the war. Russian forces drew heavily from the country's Far North, Far East, and prisons, not from the populations of Moscow and St. Petersburg. By November 2024, mobilized troops comprised 11.1 percent of confirmed deaths, while convicts accounted for 13.3 percent. Officer casualties decreased as a percentage of total losses, falling from higher rates early in the war to between 2 and 3 percent by November 2024, reflecting both tactical changes and the intensive recruitment of volunteer infantry who suffered far higher casualty rates. More than 100,000 Russian families had contacted Ukraine's "Want to Find" project seeking information about missing soldiers.
North Korean forces added a new dimension to Russian personnel challenges. Pyongyang deployed approximately 11,000 troops to fight alongside Russian forces in the Kursk border region. However, these forces proved problematic. North Korean troops suffered heavy losses, with estimates ranging up to 4,000 casualties, and demonstrated poor coordination with Russian forces. By late May, North Korean soldiers withdrew from frontline positions in Kursk Oblast due to these heavy losses, though Pyongyang promised to send more troops. The North Korean forces were described as difficult to identify due to similarities with ethnic Buryat Russians and wore Russian uniforms, complicating battlefield identification.
Ukrainian casualties, while substantial, appeared significantly lower than Russian losses though exact figures remained difficult to verify. President Zelenskyy stated in December 2024 that 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed with 370,000 wounded since the invasion began. However, other estimates varied widely. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimated in May 2025 that more than 700,000 Ukrainians had been killed or wounded, while the Center for Strategic and International Studies in June 2025 estimated 400,000 total Ukrainian casualties, including 60,000 to 100,000 killed. The wide variation in estimates reflected the difficulty of obtaining accurate casualty data and different methodologies for counting wounded personnel.
Ukraine faced significant mobilization challenges. The country had a pre-war population of approximately 44 million, but by May 2025, approximately 9.4 million Ukrainians were displaced, including 3.8 million internally and 5.6 million as international refugees. This massive population displacement complicated military recruitment efforts. Reports emerged in May of hundreds of soldiers defecting from the 155th Mechanized Brigade during training in France, highlighting morale and organizational challenges. Despite these difficulties, Ukrainian forces generally maintained cohesion and demonstrated remarkable resilience, adapting tactically to preserve forces and maintain defensive integrity even when conducting withdrawals from untenable positions.
Support to Ukraine
Western support for Ukraine in May 2025 remained substantial but faced significant uncertainty and political challenges. The United States had provided approximately $66.9 billion in military assistance since the February 2022 invasion, with total U.S. military assistance since 2014 reaching nearly $70 billion. However, the Trump administration, which took office in January 2025, adopted a significantly different approach from the Biden administration. President Trump made achieving a negotiated peace agreement the priority and did not seek congressional approval for new funding, though the U.S. largely continued delivering previously committed aid.
European countries stepped forward to fill gaps and assume greater responsibility. By the beginning of 2025, Europe and the United States each provided approximately half of all military aid to Ukraine. However, in terms of equipment actually used on the battlefield, the distribution differed: the U.S. supplied about 20 percent of all military equipment Ukraine employed, Europe provided 25 percent, and Ukraine itself produced approximately 40 to 55 percent domestically. European countries had provided approximately 132 billion euros in total aid including military, financial, and humanitarian assistance by December 2024.
Major European donors maintained significant support levels in May 2025. Germany announced military support worth around 40 billion euros since the invasion began, and the UK and Germany assumed joint leadership of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group. Norway pledged 2 billion euros for Ukraine in 2025. The Czech-led artillery initiative delivered 1.6 million rounds of large-caliber ammunition. Belgium pledged a 1 billion euro aid package including F-16s, while the Netherlands provided air defense equipment, ammunition, and other military aid worth 500 million euros. Sweden contributed $275 million alongside Denmark and Norway for a joint Nordic effort totaling $500 million for air defenses, anti-tank weapons, ammunition, and spare parts.
NATO as an alliance took on a greater coordination role. In July 2024, NATO agreed to assume greater responsibility for coordinating military assistance and training, working in conjunction with the U.S.-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Allies agreed to a minimum baseline funding of 40 billion euros for Ukraine military assistance within the next year. In July 2025, a new mechanism called the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List emerged to coordinate aid, though this required European funding rather than U.S. appropriations. The shift represented a fundamental change in how Western support was organized and financed.
Critical weapons systems continued flowing to Ukraine despite political uncertainties. The U.S. approved maintenance and training support for F-16 operations worth $310.5 million in May. Various European nations provided Patriot air defense systems, IRIS-T systems, and other air defense capabilities. Switzerland's Patriot systems were redirected to Ukraine by U.S. decision. Germany ceased publishing details of military aid shipments to hinder Russian analysis of logistical patterns. France delivered mobile field hospitals and counter-drone radar systems. Italy unveiled humanitarian aid packages including medical supplies, generators, and construction materials.
However, support faced challenges and interruptions. In early July 2025, the U.S. administration suspended some military aid during a Department of Defense capability review, including Patriot missiles and precision-guided artillery. This suspension surprised even the White House and State Department, and President Trump reversed the decision within days. Additionally, President Trump redirected 20,000 anti-drone missiles meant for Ukraine to American forces in the Middle East. These incidents illustrated the fragility of support and the competing priorities within Western governments, particularly the United States.
Looking forward from May 2025, longer-term support mechanisms were being established. The G7 allocated approximately 6.3 billion euros in financial aid largely through the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan mechanism, which used interest from frozen Russian assets to fund support. The EU considered doubling military aid to 40 billion euros including 2 million ammunition units. International partners discussed shifting from direct bilateral donations of military equipment to financing procurement from industry, with greater emphasis on joint production initiatives between Ukraine's defense industry and European defense manufacturers. These structural changes aimed to create more sustainable long-term support frameworks less dependent on year-to-year political decisions.
Support for Russia
Russia's war effort in May 2025 depended critically on support from North Korea, Iran, and China, though the nature and depth of this support varied significantly among the three partners. These relationships, sometimes collectively referred to as the "Axis of Upheaval" or "CRINK" (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea), represented transactional partnerships driven primarily by shared grievances against the U.S.-led international order rather than genuine ideological alignment or formal alliance commitments. By May 2025, North Korea had arguably become Russia's most important military partner, surpassing both Iran and China in terms of direct battlefield support.
North Korean support proved most visible and militarily significant. Pyongyang provided massive quantities of artillery ammunition and missiles, with some estimates suggesting 50 percent of Russian ammunition used in Ukraine came from North Korea. Ukrainian forces reported regular interception of North Korean missiles used in Russian strikes. Beyond materiel, North Korea deployed approximately 11,000 troops to fight alongside Russian forces in the Kursk border region, marking the first time a foreign military participated directly in ground combat supporting Russia. These forces suffered heavy casualties, estimated at up to 4,000, and demonstrated poor coordination with Russian forces, leading to their withdrawal from frontline positions by late May with promises of fresh deployments.
The Russia-North Korea relationship deepened substantially in 2024 and 2025. Russia supplied coal, fertilizers, iron ore, and refined petroleum to North Korea via railway crossings and the modernized port of Rajin. Russian oil shipments to North Korea exceeded UN Security Council resolution limits, with more than 165,000 barrels delivered in March 2025 alone. In return, North Korea provided seafood, rare earth metals, and critically needed military supplies. By summer 2025, reports emerged that 25,000 North Korean workers would be sent to Russia's Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan to assist with manufacturing Shahed drones, potentially increasing production from 2,000 to 5,000 units monthly. Russia and North Korea signed a mutual defense pact, strengthening the relationship beyond mere transaction.
Iranian support, while significant earlier in the war, faced complications by May 2025. Iran had provided hundreds of Shahed loitering munitions to Russia, which became central to Russian strike operations against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. Russia established domestic production of these drones on its territory with Iranian technical assistance. Iran also supplied missiles and shared expertise on sanctions circumvention accumulated over decades of Western pressure. Russia and Iran signed a 20-year strategic partnership treaty in January 2025, though notably this lacked a mutual defense clause unlike Russia's pact with North Korea.
However, Iran's ability to support Russia diminished as Tehran faced its own security crisis. Sustained Israeli and U.S. strikes severely damaged Iranian military capabilities and infrastructure. Russia and China provided rhetorical support but did not offer the military assistance Iran expected from strategic partners. This exposed the transactional and limited nature of these relationships. Iran's weakened position paradoxically pushed Russia to rely more heavily on North Korea, which offered similar services without the vulnerabilities Israel had exploited. Russia was reportedly considering providing Iran Su-35 fighter aircraft to replace aging F-14s, with plans to operationalize these by end of 2025, but Iran's military setbacks complicated technology transfers.
China's role remained the most economically significant but militarily ambiguous. China accounted for roughly 35 percent of Russia's oil and gas export revenue in 2024, approximately $83 billion of a $241 billion total, providing a critical balance-of-payments lifeline despite Western sanctions. This economic relationship proved essential for sustaining Russia's war economy. Chinese companies also dramatically increased sales of industrial items to Russia that could contribute to arms production, primarily machine tools and electronics. However, China maintained careful distance from direct military support.
China's position reflected competing priorities. Beijing maintained its "no limits" strategic partnership with Russia, and Chinese troops participated in Russia's Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9, 2025, alongside North Korean forces. Yet China also sought to position itself as a potential peace broker and worried about the Russia-North Korea relationship's implications for the Korean Peninsula. Chinese officials reportedly expressed concern about North Korea's accelerating military cooperation with Russia, particularly regarding missile technology transfers that could destabilize Northeast Asia. China faced the challenge of supporting Russia economically while avoiding direct involvement that could trigger secondary Western sanctions or damage China's relationships with European nations.
The support from these three nations highlighted the limits of what analysts termed the "Axis of Upheaval." None provided the depth of support Western nations gave Ukraine. China offered economic lifelines but avoided direct military aid. Iran provided drones and missiles but proved unable to sustain this support under its own military pressure. Only North Korea committed troops, but these forces proved tactically ineffective and suffered devastating casualties. The relationships remained fundamentally transactional, lacking the institutional frameworks and genuine solidarity that characterized Western support for Ukraine. As one Russian political scientist observed, "these are transactional relationships" where the smaller, weaker partners must accept whatever help the larger powers are willing to provide.
Conclusion
May 2025 represented a pivotal period in the Ukraine war characterized by intense combat, evolving military capabilities, and shifting international dynamics. The frontline remained largely stalemated despite Russia's incremental gains achieved at enormous cost. The deep battle intensified dramatically with both sides demonstrating growing long-range strike capabilities, though Ukraine would launch its most audacious operation immediately after this period. The weapons landscape transformed as Ukraine received Western systems while dramatically expanding domestic production, reducing but not eliminating dependence on foreign supplies. Personnel losses reached historically unprecedented levels, particularly for Russia, raising questions about long-term sustainability. Western support remained substantial but faced political uncertainties, while Russia's partnerships with North Korea, Iran, and China proved transactional and limited. As the war entered its fourth year, neither side appeared capable of achieving decisive military victory, setting the stage for what would likely be prolonged attritional warfare accompanied by continuing diplomatic efforts to reach negotiated settlement.
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