Russo-Ukraine War - April 2025
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On 24 February 2022, Ukraine was suddenly and deliberately attacked by land, naval and air forces of Russia, igniting the largest European war since the Great Patriotic War. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a "special military operation" (SVO - spetsialnaya voennaya operatsiya) in Ukraine. The military buildup in preceeding months makes it obvious that the unprovoked and dastardly Russian attack was deliberately planned long in advance. During the intervening time, the Russian government had deliberately sought to deceive the world by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.
"To initiate a war of aggression... is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." [Judgment of the International Military Tribunal]
Throughout April 2025, Russian forces maintained offensive operations across the thousand-kilometer front line, though the pace of territorial gains continued to decline from previous months. The British Ministry of Defence assessed that Russia seized approximately 143 square kilometers in March 2025, down dramatically from the 700 square kilometers captured in November 2024. By April 2025, Russian territorial gains had slowed to an average of roughly six square kilometers per day, representing a sustained pattern of diminishing returns despite continued heavy casualties.
The fiercest fighting remained concentrated in the Donetsk region, particularly south of Pokrovsk and around Toretsk. Russian forces conducted sustained assaults aimed at penetrating Ukrainian defensive lines and threatening key logistics hubs. Social media posts by Ukrainian soldiers described fears of possible encirclement in certain locations and breaches of defensive lines in others. The Russian command set ambitious targets, with military analyst Oleh Romanenko reporting that orders from the top aimed to reach the borders of the Dnipropetrovsk region by May 9th, when Moscow planned to celebrate the 80th anniversary of Nazi Germany's defeat. Moving into Dnipropetrovsk would mark the first time Russian troops entered that region and represent the first new Ukrainian region to come under partial Russian occupation since the early weeks of the full-scale invasion.
In the northeastern sectors, Russia continued operations to encircle Kupiansk that had been ongoing since November 2024, having captured approximately 500 square kilometers in that campaign. However, Ukrainian forces demonstrated resilience by regaining positions around the key cities of Pokrovsk and Toretsk in previous weeks, which helped slow Russian advances. The Institute for the Study of War assessed that Russia's rate of advance had been steadily declining since November 2024, partly due to Ukraine's success in counterattacking in eastern regions.
Both sides operated along extensively fortified front lines featuring dense minefields, trench systems, anti-armor obstacles, and fortified artillery positions. These defensive works imposed severe costs on attacking forces and dramatically limited potential breakthroughs. Despite Russia maintaining the strategic initiative across the front line, as President Putin claimed, the war remained fundamentally a grinding attritional conflict with minimal territorial changes relative to the scale of forces engaged and casualties sustained.
In the Kursk region of Russia, Ukrainian forces maintained a salient captured during their August 2024 incursion, though Russian forces worked to compress this pocket. North Korean troops, numbering around 11,000, were initially deployed to this sector to support Russian efforts to push Ukrainian forces back across the border. However, reports in late January indicated these North Korean units had withdrawn from frontline positions after suffering heavy casualties, with Ukrainian forces claiming to have inflicted approximately 38,000 Russian casualties in the Kursk operation overall.
The operational environment was characterized by heavy use of drones at all levels. First-person view drones dominated frontline engagements, while longer-range systems struck logistics nodes and command posts. Russian forces employed massed artillery fire and aviation strikes, launching guided bombs against Ukrainian defensive positions. Ukrainian forces relied increasingly on precision strikes and electronic warfare systems to counter Russian numerical advantages. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons confirmed that prohibited CS gas was found in samples from frontline areas, adding another troubling dimension to the battlefield conditions.
Deep Battle: Missile and Drone Strikes
April 2025 witnessed a dramatic intensification of Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, representing some of the heaviest aerial bombardment of the war. On the night of April 23-24, Russia launched one of its largest attacks on Kyiv since the full-scale invasion began, employing a massive combined assault that drew a rare rebuke from U.S. President Donald Trump, who called the deadly strikes "not necessary" and displaying "very bad timing." This attack pattern reflected a broader Russian strategy of attempting to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses through mass drone and missile barrages while negotiations over a potential ceasefire dragged on.
Between January and May 2025, Russian drone strikes averaged approximately 120 strikes per day, utilizing primarily Shahed-type drones. These Iranian-designed weapons were now being produced in significant numbers at Russian facilities, with Moscow having established production lines at locations including the Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant in Tatarstan. Russia was producing Shahed-type drones domestically under various designations including Gerans (Russian analogues), Garpiyas (made with Chinese components), and Gerberas (low-cost decoys that mimicked Shaheds on radar but carried little or no explosives, designed to deplete Ukraine's expensive interceptor missiles). Ukrainian defense intelligence estimated Russia was capable of producing an average of 170 Shahed-type drones per day, totaling approximately 5,100 per month.
The humanitarian toll of these strikes was severe. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine reported that civilian casualties in Ukraine were 70 percent higher in March 2025 compared to twelve months earlier. Since January 2025, more than 3,500 newly displaced people had transited through evacuation centers, with over 200,000 evacuated or displaced from frontline areas between August 2024 and early 2025. Attacks on frontline regions were increasing, with civilians bearing the highest cost. The strikes targeted not just military infrastructure but also residential areas, energy facilities, and civilian gathering places, creating a climate of terror designed to force population displacement.
Russian attacks deliberately targeted critical infrastructure and first responders. A UN Human Rights Council investigation found that Russian drone attacks in southern Ukraine spanning over 300 kilometers along the right bank of the Dnipro River amounted to crimes against humanity, specifically "murder and forcible transfer of population." Russian military units frequently released videos from drone-eye views of civilians being killed, posting them online to amplify threats and terrorize remaining residents. The systematic coordination of these attacks was designed to drive Ukrainians out of their homes and render large areas unlivable.
In retaliation, Ukrainian forces conducted their own deep strike campaign against Russian territory. On April 28, Ukrainian drones struck the Kremniy-El plant in Bryansk, a major electronics facility producing components for Russian missile systems including Topol-M, Bulava, and Iskander missiles, as well as radar and electronic warfare systems. Throughout April, Ukrainian strikes targeted Russian oil refineries and energy infrastructure across multiple regions, with the Ryazan oil refinery struck repeatedly and forced to cease operations. A journalistic investigation estimated that Ukrainian strikes on Russia's energy sector had caused at least 60 billion rubles (approximately 714 million dollars) in damage by March 2025, with some reports suggesting up to 17 percent of Russia's refining capacity had been temporarily knocked offline.
Ukrainian deep strikes also targeted Russian military leadership and installations. On April 25, a car bomb killed Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, a senior officer in Russia's General Staff Main Operational Directorate, in a Moscow suburb. Ukrainian intelligence claimed multiple strikes against Russian airbases, drone launch sites, and military production facilities. However, Ukraine's deep strike capabilities remained constrained by limitations on Western-supplied long-range missiles and production capacity for domestically-developed systems.
The aerial campaign demonstrated the centrality of unmanned systems to modern warfare. Both sides were locked in an action-reaction cycle of developing new drone variants, improving air defenses, and adapting electronic warfare tactics. The scale of drone usage was unprecedented in military history, with thousands of unmanned systems operating across the theater daily, fundamentally altering the character of the conflict.
New Weapons, Weapon Production, and Effectiveness
April 2025 marked a significant acceleration in Ukraine's domestic weapons development and production capabilities. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense authorized over 120 new weapons and military equipment models for operational use within the Armed Forces during April alone, with over 85 percent produced by domestic manufacturers. This represented an extraordinary surge in military innovation driven by battlefield necessity. Deputy Defense Minister Valerii Churkin announced that over 400 newly developed Ukrainian-made weapons and equipment items had been codified since the beginning of the year.
The categories of weapons codified in April were dominated by unmanned aerial systems, UAV-compatible munitions, electronic warfare assets, and vehicles. Ukrainian defense manufacturers produced and tested significant quantities of communications equipment and unmanned ground robotic systems. Particularly notable was the codification of over 40 models of unmanned aerial systems with fiber-optic control, which provided resistance to Russian electronic warfare jamming that had plagued radio-controlled drones. This technological adaptation demonstrated Ukraine's ability to rapidly iterate solutions to battlefield problems.
Ukraine's broader weapons production had tripled from 2023 to 2024, reaching approximately 10 billion dollars in 2024 and targeting 15 billion dollars for 2025. The production involved over 800 private and state-owned companies and more than 300,000 workers. By early 2025, Ukraine was covering nearly half of its weapons needs domestically, compared to less than 10 percent at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Ukrainian officials reported that the country's overall production capacity could reach 35 billion dollars worth of military equipment, though funding constraints held back this expansion.
Ukrainian industry achieved breakthroughs in several critical areas. The country began licensed production of NATO-standard 155mm, 120mm, and 105mm ammunition through partnerships with companies like Czechoslovak Group. Ukrainian Armor planned to ship 100,000 rounds in 2025 and 300,000 in 2026. Domestic missile production had increased eightfold in 2024 compared to the previous year, with Ukraine developing the Long Neptune cruise missile with a 1,000-kilometer range and the Palianytsia turbojet-powered missile drone. The Flamingo cruise missile, advertised as capable of traveling 1,800 miles, was reportedly entering production, though skeptics questioned whether it had been fully proven.
Ukrainian electronic warfare developments were described as among the most advanced in the world, surpassing both Russian and European systems in some respects. The Lima system demonstrated capability to disrupt the course of Russian guided aerial bombs, addressing one of the most serious threats Ukrainian forces faced. Ukraine's drone industry expanded dramatically, with the country expected to produce over 4 million drones in 2025, having had virtually no drone industry three years earlier. President Zelenskyy set ambitious targets of producing 30,000 advanced long-range drones and 3,000 missiles.
However, challenges remained. Ukraine still depended heavily on Chinese components for first-person view drones, creating vulnerability to supply disruptions. The Ukrainian parliament's failure to equalize VAT treatment for domestic versus imported components gave Chinese manufacturers a competitive advantage, prompting calls for regulatory reform. Air defense systems remained in critically short supply despite imports and domestic development efforts. International partnerships were essential, with joint production agreements established with companies from France, Turkey, Sweden, and other nations. Baykar was constructing a drone production facility in Ukraine expected to be completed during the year.
On the Russian side, weapon production benefited from support by allies in the so-called "CRINK" alliance (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea). North Korea supplied Russia with an estimated five million artillery shells and over 100 ballistic missiles, significantly bolstering Russian fires capabilities. Russia had also domestically produced Shahed-type drones at scale, reducing dependence on Iranian imports while improving design features. Russian industry maintained production of missiles, artillery ammunition, armored vehicles, and other systems, though facing constraints from Western sanctions and Ukrainian strikes on production facilities. Both sides were locked in an industrial competition where production capacity increasingly determined battlefield outcomes.
Personnel Levels and Problems
By April 2025, personnel challenges had emerged as perhaps the defining constraint on both sides' military operations. For Russia, casualties had reached catastrophic levels despite territorial gains. UK Defense Intelligence revealed that Russia likely suffered approximately 950,000 total casualties by early May 2025, with 160,000 of those occurring in just the first four months of 2025, putting the year on track to be the deadliest of the entire war. According to Ukrainian General Staff reporting, average daily Russian casualties during April exceeded 1,200, totaling approximately 36,000 for the month, slightly down from March's daily average of 1,300.
U.S. SACEUR General Christopher Cavoli estimated in April that Russia had suffered more than 790,000 killed or injured since the start of the full-scale invasion. Russian journalist organization Mediazona and BBC Russian confirmed the identities of over 119,000 Russian military personnel killed by mid-2025, though actual numbers were certainly higher given incomplete reporting and state secrecy. The proportion of officer deaths had declined from up to 10 percent early in the war to 2-3 percent by late 2024, reflecting both tactical changes and heavy reliance on infantry recruits who suffered disproportionate casualties.
To sustain these losses, Russia announced its largest conscription round in over ten years in April and stated ambitions to build an army with 1.5 million active servicemen. Russia was firing an average of 10,000 artillery shells daily and needed sustained manpower to maintain this operational tempo. The Russian military increasingly relied on volunteers motivated by financial incentives rather than ideology, with one study finding 55 percent of Russian prisoners of war had been motivated to fight to "improve their livelihoods" while 36 percent were ideologically motivated. Russia also faced desertion problems, with one incident involving 100 Russian soldiers breaking down a fence and escaping a military camp in Krasnodar after being detained for attempted desertion.
Ukrainian casualties were more difficult to assess given government secrecy, but President Zelenskyy stated in December 2024 that 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed and 370,000 wounded, though he updated this figure in early 2025 to report that more than 46,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed and nearly 380,000 others injured. U.S. estimates ranged higher, with some sources suggesting 400,000 killed or injured. The UALosses project, considered reliable by multiple investigative organizations, documented by name the deaths of 79,213 Ukrainian fighters as of late October 2025, with 81,728 missing in action.
Ukraine faced severe manpower constraints that limited offensive operations and stressed defensive positions. The mobilization system struggled to generate sufficient replacements while maintaining economic function. Some units experienced cohesion problems, with Ukrainian authorities investigating reports that hundreds of soldiers from the 155th Mechanized Brigade had defected during training in France. Approximately 63,000 Ukrainian service members were listed as missing as of mid-February 2025, 90 percent of whom were thought to be soldiers, many likely prisoners of war. As of April 2025, approximately 6,404 Ukrainian soldiers were being held as prisoners by Russia.
Both sides faced challenges in training and integrating replacements. Russian forces increasingly relied on hastily-trained volunteers and conscripts, while Ukrainian forces struggled to provide adequate training given the tempo of operations and need to maintain frontline strength. The heavy casualties among experienced personnel degraded unit effectiveness on both sides. Medical evacuations and amputations reached historically significant levels, with Ukrainian sources recording 95,000 amputations carried out on military personnel and civilians by August 2025, comparable to amputation rates in World War One.
Personnel shortages interacted with strategic decisions. Russian commanders accepted extraordinarily high casualties to achieve incremental gains, reflecting calculations that manpower advantages over Ukraine justified these losses. Ukrainian commanders faced difficult decisions about when to withdraw from positions to preserve forces versus holding terrain at high cost. The personnel dimension increasingly shaped operational planning and strategic calculations for both sides.
Support to Ukraine
Western military support to Ukraine evolved significantly during April 2025 as the Trump administration's approach to the conflict differed markedly from the Biden administration's policies. Since Russia's full-scale invasion, mostly Western nations had pledged approximately 309 billion euros (360 billion dollars) in total aid to Ukraine as of August 2025, with approximately 149.3 billion euros (174 billion dollars) in direct military assistance. The United States had provided approximately 66.9 billion dollars in military assistance since February 2022, while European countries collectively provided approximately 84.7 billion euros (99 billion dollars).
However, the character of this support changed after President Trump took office in January 2025. Trump adopted a policy prioritizing negotiated peace rather than continued military assistance, and did not seek congressional approval for new Ukraine military aid funding, though the U.S. largely continued delivering previously committed aid. This created uncertainty about the sustainability of American support, which had previously constituted roughly half of all Western military assistance. According to defense expert Malcolm Chalmers, by early 2025 the United States provided 20 percent of all military equipment Ukraine was using, with 25 percent provided by Europe and 55 percent produced domestically by Ukraine, though the American 20 percent was described as "the most lethal and important."
European allies moved to assume greater responsibility for Ukraine's defense. On April 11, European leaders convened the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting in Brussels, with British Defense Secretary John Healey chairing the session. Healey announced that new pledges of military aid totaled over 21 billion euros (24 billion dollars), describing it as "a record boost in military funding for Ukraine." However, questions persisted about whether these figures represented genuinely new commitments or reannouncements of previous pledges, as Ukraine had complained in the past that some countries repeated old offers or failed to deliver aid worth the money promised.
Specific European contributions in April included Britain working with Norway to provide over 580 million dollars for hundreds of thousands of military drones, radar systems, anti-tank mines, and maintenance contracts for armored vehicles. Denmark announced its 25th military aid package, pledging 317 million Danish Kroner (48.2 million dollars) for artillery ammunition. Germany, having provided or pledged around 40 billion euros in support since February 2022, worked with allies to supply packages using new NATO supply lines. Sweden, Denmark, and Norway jointly contributed 500 million dollars worth of air defenses, anti-tank weapons, ammunition, and spare parts.
Critical gaps remained in Ukraine's arsenal. President Zelenskyy renewed urgent appeals for more Patriot air defense systems following Russian strikes that killed 20 people including nine children. The Czech-led artillery initiative had delivered 1.6 million rounds of large-caliber ammunition by April, providing crucial support to Ukrainian artillery forces. However, air defense remained critically under-resourced relative to the scale of Russian aerial attacks. European nations were increasingly moving from direct bilateral donations of military equipment from national inventories toward financing procurement for direct acquisition from industry, with greater emphasis on joint production initiatives between Ukraine's defense industry and European partners.
NATO as an alliance took on a greater role in coordinating military assistance and training through 2024 and into 2025. In July 2024, NATO allies agreed to a minimum baseline funding of 40 billion euros for Ukraine military assistance within the following year. The UK and Germany assumed leadership of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in 2025, while the UK and France led proposals for a "coalition of the willing" to support any potential peace agreement. In July 2025, the Trump administration announced the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) mechanism for new assistance, though Trump made clear the U.S. would not pay for this assistance and it would be funded by NATO allies.
Non-European support also contributed to Ukraine's war effort. South Korea pledged 394 million dollars for 2024 and an additional 100 million dollars in April 2025. Canada pledged 22 billion Canadian dollars in total assistance including 1.46 billion in military aid. Japan committed 1.5 trillion yen in loans and grants. Australia provided 2 billion Australian dollars in support. However, some potential supporters maintained neutrality or opposition to military aid, with countries like Brazil and South Africa refusing weapons transfers.
The support came with conditions and limitations. Western nations initially hesitated to provide heavier weapons or allow their use against targets deep in Russia, fearing escalation. Since June 2024, these restrictions were progressively lifted, allowing strikes against Russian military targets near the border. Questions persisted about whether European support could fully replace American assistance if U.S. policy changed dramatically. The Kiel Institute noted a significant gap between European funding committed and funding actually allocated or spent, and estimated that fully replacing U.S. military assistance would require Europe to double its arms assistance levels.
Support for Russia
Russia's ability to sustain its war effort depended critically on support from what analysts termed the "CRINK" alliance—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This grouping, sometimes called the "axis of upheaval," represented a set of intensifying bilateral relationships rather than a formal military alliance, but proved essential for Russia's continued prosecution of the war. These partnerships were driven by shared antipathy toward U.S.-led international order, mutual economic interests, and transactional benefits rather than shared ideology.
China's role as Russia's most important economic partner was paramount. China accounted for roughly 35 percent of Russia's oil and gas export revenue in 2024, approximately 83 billion dollars of a 241 billion dollar total, providing a critical balance-of-payments lifeline despite Western sanctions. This financial support enabled Russia to sustain its wartime economy and import essential goods. While China avoided providing lethal military aid to Russia, it supplied dual-use technologies and components that found their way into Russian weapons systems. Chinese components were essential to Russian drone production, particularly for Shahed-type systems manufactured at Russian facilities. Trade between Russia and China expanded dramatically after February 2022, with Russia reorienting its economic structures away from the West toward Asian markets.
The relationship between China and Russia was anchored by the close personal ties between Xi Jinping and Putin, formalized in their "no-limits" strategic partnership signed in February 2022 just before Russia's invasion. China and Russia conducted frequent joint military exercises, with China-Russia bilateral exercises accounting for 83 percent of all exercises involving CRINK countries. However, China carefully calibrated its support to avoid secondary sanctions and maintained diplomatic postures emphasizing peace negotiations. Chinese officials regularly called for ceasefires and diplomatic solutions while providing Russia economic sustenance to continue fighting.
Iran emerged as a crucial military technology provider, though its role evolved over the course of the war. Iran initially supplied hundreds of Shahed loitering munitions to Russia starting in 2022, providing Russia with a cheap, effective deep strike capability. By 2023, Russia had acquired domestic production capability for these drones and was producing thousands at facilities including the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan, reducing dependence on direct Iranian supply. In January 2025, Iran and Russia signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty formalizing their defense cooperation, though it did not contain a mutual defense clause that would obligate Russia to defend Iran militarily.
The Russia-Iran relationship was transactional, with Russia providing Iran with advanced military equipment in exchange for drone technology and support. Russia planned to provide Iran Su-35 fighter aircraft, with Iran intending to operationalize these jets by the end of 2025 to replace its aged F-14s. The two countries also integrated their payment systems and activated a new free trade agreement to reduce tariffs and circumvent Western sanctions. However, questions emerged about the relationship's durability after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria in late 2024, which removed a key area where Russia and Iran had cooperated.
North Korea emerged as perhaps Russia's most militarily significant partner by April 2025. North Korea deployed approximately 11,000 to 15,000 troops to fight alongside Russian forces in the Kursk border region starting in late 2024, marking the first time a state directly contributed combat personnel to the conflict. These troops suffered heavy losses, with Ukrainian sources claiming to have inflicted significant casualties, but provided Russia with badly-needed manpower at a critical juncture. In April 2025, Russia and North Korea officially confirmed their troops were fighting side-by-side, with Putin thanking "our Korean friends" for their solidarity and Kim Jong Un praising his soldiers' "sacred mission."
Beyond manpower, North Korea supplied Russia with massive quantities of artillery ammunition and ballistic missiles. U.S. officials estimated North Korea sent Russia approximately five million artillery shells through 2024 and into 2025, along with over 100 ballistic missiles that were launched into Ukraine. For Russia, firing 10,000 artillery shells daily, this ammunition supply was crucial for sustaining operational tempo while domestic production ramped up. Reports indicated Ukrainian forces observed marked improvement in the accuracy of North Korean missiles, suggesting Russia was providing technical assistance to enhance their effectiveness.
In exchange for these contributions, Russia provided North Korea with substantial financial benefits, diplomatic support, and defense cooperation. Russia shipped oil to North Korea above UN Security Council-permitted levels, unfroze North Korean assets, facilitated access to the global financial system, hosted North Korean workers in violation of sanctions, and increased food exports. More significantly, Russia appeared to be providing advanced military technology, including potentially improved air defense systems, submarine reactor technology, and assistance with intercontinental ballistic missile development. The CSIS Korea Chair estimated North Korea earned between 9.6 and 12.3 billion dollars from its provision of equipment to Russia, a massive windfall for an economy whose total trade amounted to just 2.7 billion dollars in 2024.
The relationship between Russia and North Korea extended beyond immediate wartime needs. In June 2024, Russia and North Korea signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty that committed them to mutual support if either was attacked, creating a formal defense pact comparable to the one North Korea already maintained with China. North Korea also sent approximately 25,000 workers to Russia's Alabuga Special Economic Zone to assist with Shahed drone manufacturing, aiming to increase monthly production from 2,000 to 5,000 units. This represented deep integration of North Korean labor into Russia's defense industrial base.
The CRINK countries conducted increasingly frequent joint military exercises and diplomatic coordination. Russia, China, and Iran held trilateral exercises starting in 2019, continuing periodically through 2024. High-level diplomatic meetings between CRINK members increased dramatically after 2022, with 14 high-level meetings between Russia and North Korea in 2025 alone. In September 2025, all four CRINK leaders attended the same gathering for the first time at a Chinese-hosted military parade in Beijing commemorating the end of World War II, symbolizing their growing alignment.
However, significant limitations constrained CRINK cooperation. These relationships were primarily bilateral and transactional rather than representing a coherent alliance comparable to NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Iran and North Korea had minimal direct interaction. China remained cautious about the depth of support it provided, particularly regarding direct military aid that could trigger secondary sanctions. When Israel attacked Iran in 2025, neither China nor Russia provided meaningful military support, demonstrating limits to their partnerships. Each CRINK country pursued its own interests and accepted support from others when advantageous but did not subordinate national priorities to alliance commitments.
Nevertheless, CRINK support proved essential for sustaining Russia's war effort. Without North Korean artillery shells, Iranian drone designs, and Chinese economic lifelines, Russia would have faced severe constraints on its ability to maintain offensive operations and replace losses. The partnerships allowed Russia to circumvent Western sanctions, acquire military technology and supplies, and present itself as leader of a "multipolar world" opposing U.S. hegemony. Whether these relationships would persist after the war remained uncertain, but in April 2025 they represented a critical component of Russia's strategy for continuing the conflict.
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