Russo-Ukraine War - March 2025
| Su | M | Tu | W | Th | F | Sa |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ||||||
| 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
| 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 |
| 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 |
| 30 | 31 |
A number of claims and counterclaims are being made on the Ukraine-Russia conflict on the ground and online. While GlobalSecurity.org takes utmost care to accurately report this news story, we cannot independently verify the authenticity of all statements, photos and videos.
On 24 February 2022, Ukraine was suddenly and deliberately attacked by land, naval and air forces of Russia, igniting the largest European war since the Great Patriotic War. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a "special military operation" (SVO - spetsialnaya voennaya operatsiya) in Ukraine. The military buildup in preceeding months makes it obvious that the unprovoked and dastardly Russian attack was deliberately planned long in advance. During the intervening time, the Russian government had deliberately sought to deceive the world by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.
"To initiate a war of aggression... is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." [Judgment of the International Military Tribunal]
By March 2025, the war in Ukraine entered a critical phase marked by slow but steady Russian territorial gains and mounting pressure on Ukrainian defensive positions. Russian forces gained approximately 73 square miles during the month from late February to late March, with weekly gains averaging around 16 square miles. While these advances were modest in absolute terms, they represented a continuation of Russian momentum that had been building since late 2024. The strategic picture remained largely unchanged, however, with neither side achieving breakthrough victories.
Russia occupied approximately 112,453 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory by late March, constituting roughly 18.6 percent of Ukraine's total land area. Russian forces maintained approximately 640,000 troops deployed inside Ukraine according to Ukrainian estimates, out of a total active-duty force that exceeded 1.13 million personnel. The invasion force had grown dramatically from the initial 150,000 troops in 2022, demonstrating Russia's commitment to sustaining the offensive despite massive casualties.
The frontline situation was particularly dire around Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region, where Russian forces employed what Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi described as total infiltration tactics. Small Russian infantry groups exploited gaps in Ukrainian lines caused by severe manpower shortages. Ukrainian officers reported that drivers, artillerymen, and cooks were holding sections five to ten kilometers wide with as few as twelve fighters. Some brigades defending critical areas had reportedly run out of infantry entirely, allowing Russian forces to penetrate defensive positions.
President Vladimir Putin declared in March 2025 that there were reasons to believe Russia could finish off Ukrainian forces, with intelligence suggesting preparations for a major summer offensive. Russian forces planned to expand operations into Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, though previous attempts to open new fronts had met with limited success. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned repeatedly that Russia was preparing intensified ground operations in the spring, though Ukrainian officials expressed doubts about Russian forces' ability to successfully assault major cities like Sumy.
The fighting was characterized by intense attrition and horrific conditions. Civilian casualties continued to rise dramatically, with at least 164 civilians killed and 910 injured in March alone, representing a 50 percent increase from February. Most casualties occurred in Ukrainian-controlled territory from missile attacks, loitering munitions, and artillery strikes near the frontline. More than 200,000 people were evacuated from frontline areas in the six months leading up to March, adding to the 10.6 million Ukrainians already displaced since the invasion began.
Deep Battle: Missile and Drone Strikes
The deep strike campaign intensified dramatically in March 2025, with both sides launching unprecedented numbers of long-range attacks against each other's territory. Russia maintained relentless pressure on Ukraine's energy infrastructure despite international efforts to broker temporary ceasefires. A 30-day moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure, announced on March 25 following US-mediated talks, quickly proved ineffective as both sides accused each other of violations.
Russian forces launched at least 31 long-range missile and drone strikes during the week of March 22-28 alone, targeting locations across Ukraine including the Kyiv region. Ukrainian forces intercepted strikes in at least 15 instances across 10 regions, but many attacks penetrated air defenses. Russian shelling, missiles, and drones killed at least 15 civilians in the Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Kherson regions during this single week. Energy facilities in Odesa region suffered five consecutive days of attacks in early March, causing widespread power outages.
Russia's missile and drone production reached formidable levels by early 2025. Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Russia planned to manufacture nearly 2,500 high-precision missiles throughout 2025, spanning cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic classes. This represented a massive industrial mobilization, with Russia also planning to produce 57 combat aircraft including Su-57, Su-35, Su-34, and Su-30 models, nearly 250 T-90M tanks, 1,100 armored personnel carriers, and 365 artillery systems by year's end.
Russian drone production proved equally impressive and troubling for Ukraine. By mid-2025, Russia was capable of producing an average of 170 Shahed-type drones per day, with plans to increase production to 190 drones daily by year's end. This amounted to more than 5,100 drones per month. The Shahed-type drones, including Russian-made Gerans and Garpiyas, cost only $20,000-$50,000 to produce domestically but delivered devastating impact. Russia launched a record 810 drones in a single night in September, marking the largest drone assault of the entire war.
Between January and May 2025, Russian drone strikes averaged 120 per day, escalating to 185 per day from May through August. Russia also deployed new variants including Gerbera decoy drones designed to mimic Shaheds on radar, forcing Ukraine to expend expensive interceptor missiles on cheap targets. A new jet-powered version of the Shahed drone emerged, extending range and complicating air defense efforts further.
Ukraine responded with increasingly sophisticated deep strike capabilities of its own. Ukrainian drones struck Russian energy infrastructure repeatedly, causing an estimated 60 billion rubles in damage by March 2025. Most spectacularly, Ukraine executed Operation Spiderweb on June 1, 2025, using 117 first-person-view drones smuggled into Russia and launched from concealed cargo containers. The operation damaged or destroyed at least 41 Russian aircraft at four strategic airbases, including multiple Tu-95 Bear and Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers. This represented roughly one-third of Russia's strategic cruise missile-carrying bomber fleet and dealt a severe blow to Russian long-range strike capabilities.
Ukrainian forces also targeted Russian oil refineries, weapons factories, and military production facilities deep inside Russian territory. Strikes on the Tambov Gunpowder plant, various oil depots in Krasnodar and Saratov regions, and drone manufacturing facilities near Moscow demonstrated Ukraine's growing ability to strike throughout Russian strategic depth. By mid-2025, Ukrainian drone strikes had forced nearly 40 percent of Russia's oil refining capacity offline, with approximately 70 percent of shutdowns directly linked to these attacks.
New Weapons, Weapon Production, and Effectiveness
The war fundamentally transformed into a drone-dominated conflict by March 2025, with unmanned systems inflicting an estimated 60 to 70 percent of all casualties on both sides. This represented more damage than all other weapons combined and marked a revolutionary shift in modern warfare. First-person-view drones, which cost less than $500 to produce, became the primary anti-tank weapon and accounted for massive destruction of armored vehicles and artillery systems.
Ukraine dramatically ramped up domestic weapons production out of necessity as Western support became uncertain. Ukraine manufactured over 2 million drones in 2024 and planned to produce at least 4 million in 2025, with some estimates reaching 4.5 million. The country also aimed to manufacture 3,000 missiles and 30,000 long-range drones in 2025, according to statements from then-Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal in January. Ukrainian companies developed the FP-1 drone capable of traveling 1,600 kilometers and carrying 60 kilograms of explosives, responsible for 60 percent of strikes deep inside Russian territory.
Ukraine unveiled the Palianytsia drone-missile hybrid in August 2024, described by some officials as costing under $1 million, though military experts estimated closer to $160,000. More ambitiously, Ukraine was developing the Flamingo cruise missile with an advertised range of 1,800 miles, which President Zelensky hoped would reach full-scale production by early 2026. Ukraine was also testing domestically developed cruise and ballistic missiles, with plans to begin manufacturing them by mid-2025 according to defense export officials.
The Ukrainian government allocated $2.5 billion in 2024-2025 for local drone manufacturers, signing contracts with 76 companies. Ukraine's domestic arms industry was purchasing about $10 billion worth of weapons annually by mid-2025, representing a remarkable achievement for a country that had virtually no drone industry three years earlier. International partners increasingly placed orders with Ukrainian manufacturers, helping finance this dramatic expansion.
Russian glide bombs proved devastatingly effective against Ukrainian fortifications throughout early 2025. Russian forces deployed FAB-500, FAB-1500, and FAB-3000 glide bombs equipped with Universal Planning and Correction Module guidance kits, with ranges exceeding 65 kilometers. These weapons allowed Russian Su-34 fighter-bombers to strike targets while remaining outside the range of most Ukrainian air defenses. Russia upgraded these systems with larger wings and tail surfaces, extending range even further. The combination of glide bombs, kamikaze drones, and drone-guided artillery enabled Russian forces to maintain their advance despite Ukrainian FPV drone attacks.
Electronic warfare became increasingly sophisticated on both sides. Russia developed controlled radiation pattern antennas for its guided munitions and improved electronic warfare capabilities faster than Western suppliers could adapt. Equipment provided to Ukraine that was produced before 2020 proved largely unusable, while even systems from 2021-2022 showed limited effectiveness against evolved Russian jamming techniques. The latest development was fiber-optic-controlled FPV drones, which used physical cables instead of radio links, making them immune to electronic countermeasures. These proved extremely difficult to defeat, requiring either physical destruction or cutting the fiber cable.
Air defense remained critical for both sides. Ukraine relied on American Patriot systems, European IRIS-T, NASAMS, and SAMP/T batteries, supplemented by German Gepard anti-aircraft guns and domestically developed interceptor drones. Russia fielded S-400/S-300, Buk, Tor, and Pantsir systems. Ukraine's F-16 fighter jets, delivered by Western partners in 2024, helped intercept Russian attacks but at least four had been lost by March 2025. Both sides adapted to the drone threat, with Ukraine using light aircraft mounted with machine guns to intercept Russian reconnaissance drones.
Traditional heavy weapons became less prominent on battlefields saturated with cheap drones. Tanks and armored vehicles, once central to operations, were now deemed too expensive and vulnerable. Russian forces lost thousands of T-90, T-80, and T-72 tanks, while Ukraine's Western Leopard, Challenger, and Abrams tanks proved unable to penetrate well-prepared Russian defenses during the 2023 counteroffensive. Some units on both sides turned to motorcycles and quadbikes for transportation, as these smaller, faster vehicles were harder to spot and could disperse to avoid drone strikes more effectively than traditional armored personnel carriers.
Personnel Levels and Problems
Ukraine faced a severe and worsening manpower crisis in March 2025 that threatened the entire war effort. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reached peak strength of approximately 1.05 million soldiers in 2023 but struggled desperately to maintain these numbers through 2024 and into 2025. The number of troops directly engaged on the frontline was significantly lower, not exceeding 300,000 according to Ukrainian estimates. This shortage forced Ukraine to halt formation of new brigades in late January 2025, with only eight of ten planned brigades beginning formation in 2024.
Recruitment proved increasingly difficult as the initial flood of volunteers dried up by late 2023. In March 2025, Ukraine was recruiting an estimated 17,000 to 24,000 people per month, totaling between 204,000 and 288,000 per year. This fell far short of replacing casualties and addressing the desertion problem. Ukrainian casualties exceeded 63,500 confirmed deaths by mid-January 2025 according to open-source tracking, though total killed and wounded reached far higher. President Zelensky acknowledged in December 2024 that 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed and 370,000 injured, though US intelligence estimates suggested over 400,000 killed and wounded combined.
Desertion emerged as a devastating problem undermining Ukrainian military cohesion. More than 100,000 criminal cases for desertion were initiated by the end of November 2024 according to the Prosecutor General's Office. The French-trained Anne of Kyiv 155th Mechanized Brigade saw up to 1,700 soldiers go absent without leave between March and November 2024, a staggering figure given average brigade strength of 4,000 to 5,000 troops. The combination of high casualties, inadequate training, poor leadership, declining trust in government, and exhaustion from prolonged combat created a vicious cycle depleting human resources.
The demographic situation was dire. Ukraine's population shrank from 41 million before the war to approximately 28-30 million by March 2025, with 6.5 million having fled the country and 3 million living under Russian occupation. The average age of Ukrainian soldiers was 40 or older, reflecting the reluctance to conscript younger citizens. The 18-24 age group comprised an estimated 800,000 men, but the government resisted lowering the conscription age below 25 despite intense pressure from Western allies.
Ukraine launched the Contract 18-24 program in February 2025, offering up to $24,000 in sign-up bonuses, attractive wages, free university tuition, mortgage incentives, and the right to travel abroad after service for young volunteers. However, only about 500 people signed up as of May. President Zelensky resisted calls to lower the draft age further, stating the priority should be saving lives rather than drafting younger soldiers. This decision, while understandable from a demographic perspective, severely constrained Ukraine's ability to field adequate forces.
The mobilization system suffered from corruption, poor organization, and lack of clear guidelines on service terms and rotation procedures. Approximately 950,000 men received deferments from military service at the request of businesses by January 2025. Spot ID checks in restaurants and nightclubs became common, creating social tension. The decentralization of recruitment responsibilities placed burdens on frontline brigades that deepened disparities between elite and regular units.
Russia faced manpower challenges but on a far more manageable scale given its larger population of over 140 million. Russian forces increased active-duty personnel to over 1.13 million by 2025, with recruitment rates reaching approximately 30,000 per month by early 2025. This gave Russia an annual recruitment advantage of roughly 70,000-150,000 over Ukraine. Russia offered substantial sign-up bonuses and economic incentives to attract contract soldiers rather than conducting general mobilization.
Russia's controversial use of prison inmates as soldiers proved effective in filling ranks. Throughout the war, prisoners including those convicted of murder and rape were released, issued rifles, and sent to fight in Ukraine, often in suicidal human wave assaults. If they survived six months, they returned as free men. Russia's prison population plummeted by 120,000 in two years to a record low of 313,000 by February 2025 as correctional facilities emptied. Russia also recruited heavily from ethnic minorities and regional populations, particularly from economically depressed areas.
North Korean troops provided Russia with critical manpower reinforcement. At least 10,000 North Korean soldiers were deployed to Kursk Oblast by early 2025 to help Russian forces retake territory seized by Ukraine in August 2024. By March 2025, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that North Korea had sent an additional 3,000 soldiers along with military equipment including short-range ballistic missiles. Casualties among North Korean forces were significant, with reports of several hundred killed and wounded by December 2024. Russian forces allegedly burned the faces of killed North Korean soldiers to conceal their presence, while survivors were issued false papers claiming they were ethnic Russians from Tuva.
In June 2025, former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced plans to deploy 1,000 North Korean military workers to Kursk for demining and another 5,000 for reconstruction. Separately, 25,000 North Korean workers were being sent to Russia's Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan to assist with manufacturing Shahed drones. The BBC reported that more than 10,000 North Korean workers were sent to Russia in 2024 in slave-like conditions violating UN sanctions, with estimates suggesting as many as 50,000 workers could be deployed in 2025.
International Support for Ukraine
International support for Ukraine underwent dramatic shifts in early 2025 following Donald Trump's return to the US presidency in January. The Trump administration adopted a fundamentally different approach from the Biden administration, prioritizing negotiated peace over open-ended military support. Trump suspended all US military aid to Ukraine in early March following a tense meeting with President Zelensky at the White House, though the freeze was partially lifted shortly after amid intense pressure and negotiations.
By the end of February 2022 through mid-2025, the United States provided approximately $66.9 billion in military assistance since Russia's full-scale invasion, and $69.7 billion since Russia's initial invasion in 2014. This made the US by far the largest single donor nation. However, Trump's administration refused to seek congressional approval for new funding packages and instead developed the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List mechanism, requiring European allies to purchase US weapons that would then be transferred to Ukraine.
European allies significantly increased their commitment to Ukraine in response to uncertain American support. The European Union and European countries collectively allocated approximately 167.4 billion euros to Ukraine, exceeding US contributions. Germany provided 21.29 billion euros, the United Kingdom 18.6 billion euros, and the EU institutions 63.19 billion euros through various mechanisms. France pledged an additional 2 billion euros in military aid in March 2025, including anti-tank missiles, air defense systems, armored vehicles, and additional Mirage fighter jets.
The PURL scheme gained momentum in mid-2025, with 16 European NATO allies eventually signing up to purchase US-made weapons for Ukraine. Initial participants included the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Canada, and Germany, with ten additional countries joining at an October meeting in Brussels. The mechanism aimed to ensure predictable flow of critical capabilities including air defenses, though implementation proved slower than hoped. Military aid to Ukraine plunged by 43 percent in July and August 2025 compared to the first half of the year according to Germany's Kiel Institute.
The United Kingdom and France emerged as leaders in European support for Ukraine. UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced formation of a coalition of the willing to develop peace plans and security guarantees for Ukraine. More than 30 countries participated in military planning discussions about potential peacekeeping forces to enforce any future ceasefire. French President Emmanuel Macron proposed sending reassurance forces to strategic locations in Ukraine to deter future Russian aggression, though these would not serve as peacekeepers on the frontline. The proposal generated significant debate about European military capacity and commitment.
Poland provided the largest number of tanks to Ukraine with 354 units, while the US led in infantry fighting vehicles with 305, howitzers with 201, air defense systems with 18, and HIMARS rocket launchers with 41. Sweden announced its largest military aid package to date worth $1.23 billion in early 2025, including Combat Boats, TOW anti-tank missiles, and support for Ukraine's defense industry. Norway increased its military aid commitment to approximately $7.8 billion for 2025, nearly tripling its earlier pledge.
NATO agreed in July 2024 to take a greater role in coordinating military assistance and training among allies, working in conjunction with the US-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group. The alliance created the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Center to connect urgent battlefield needs to technological responses. However, NATO maintained its position that it would not deploy combat forces to Ukraine or admit Ukraine as a member while the war continued.
Training programs continued to expand, with the UK's Operation Interflex training over 51,000 Ukrainian personnel by March 2025. Multiple European countries hosted training programs for Ukrainian forces on various weapon systems including F-16 aircraft, Patriot air defense systems, and Western tanks. The training burden increased as Ukraine struggled to provide adequate preparation for mobilized troops before sending them to the front.
Delays in assistance delivery in early 2024 were considered by NATO officials to have significantly hampered Ukraine's ability to defend its lines, enabling Russian tactical gains in eastern Ukraine. The ammunition shortage proved particularly critical, though production gradually increased throughout 2024 and into 2025. European countries worked to expand their defense industrial base to support Ukraine while also rebuilding their own military capabilities depleted by donations.
Financial and humanitarian support remained substantial, with the International Monetary Fund approving a $400 million tranche in March 2025 as part of its extended financing program. The G7 nations developed the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loans initiative, providing 10 billion euros to Ukraine in 2025 to be repaid with interest from frozen Russian assets. This innovative financing mechanism helped sustain Ukraine's government operations amid the economic devastation of war.
International Support for Russia
Russia received critical support from China, Iran, and North Korea throughout the war, forming what analysts termed the CRINK alliance or axis of upheaval. This cooperation intensified dramatically in 2024 and 2025, though it remained primarily bilateral in nature rather than forming a unified coalition. The relationships were driven by shared opposition to US-led international order, desire to circumvent Western sanctions, and mutual economic and military interests.
China emerged as Russia's most important economic partner, with bilateral trade reaching record levels exceeding $240 billion in 2023. China became Russia's largest trading partner following establishment of a no-limits partnership between President Xi Jinping and President Putin in early 2022. Russian oil and natural gas exports to China provided crucial revenue offsetting Western sanctions. China replaced Saudi Arabia as China's largest petroleum source, providing Russia with hard currency to sustain its war economy.
Chinese support extended beyond energy purchases to include dual-use equipment and technology critical for Russia's military production. According to US assessments, Chinese-manufactured microchips worth billions of dollars enabled Russia to maintain and expand weapons manufacturing. Chinese state-owned weapons manufacturer Norinco shipped assault rifles, drone parts, and body armor to Russia between June and December 2022, often via third countries including Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Chinese ammunition appeared on Ukrainian battlefields, though China officially maintained it was not providing military support to Russia.
However, China's support had limits. When Israel struck Iran in June 2025, China and Russia offered only rhetorical condemnation rather than military assistance, demonstrating the transactional nature of these relationships. China remained deeply integrated into the global economy and benefited from the existing international order far more than its partners, constraining how much it would sacrifice for deeper cooperation with Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
Iran provided critical military support to Russia, particularly unmanned aerial vehicles. Iran supplied blueprints for Shahed-136 drones and trained Russian personnel in their manufacture and employment. Russia established domestic production facilities for these drones east of Moscow with Iranian assistance. Iran also provided missiles and other munitions to support Russia's war effort. In exchange, Russia provided Iran with Su-35 fighter aircraft to replace its aged F-14 fleet, with Iran planning to operationalize these jets by end of 2025.
Russia and Iran signed a 20-year strategic partnership treaty in January 2025, though it lacked a mutual defense clause. The agreement called for cooperation against common military threats, sharing military technology, and conducting joint exercises. The two countries integrated their payment systems and activated a new free trade agreement to reduce dependence on the US dollar and circumvent sanctions. Trade between Russia and Iran increased significantly, with Russian exports to Iran rising 27 percent from January to October 2022.
However, Iran's relationship with Russia showed signs of strain by mid-2025. Following devastating Israeli and US attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities and military infrastructure in June 2025, Russia provided only limited support despite the strategic partnership. High-level meetings between Russian and Iranian officials declined from 13 in 2022 to eight in both 2023 and 2024, with only three meetings in the first months of 2025 before the June crisis. This suggested Iran was increasingly a junior partner whose needs could be subordinated to Russia's interests.
North Korea became Russia's most important military ally by March 2025, surpassing Iran in significance according to many analysts. North Korea provided millions of rounds of artillery ammunition and missiles critical for sustaining Russian offensive operations. Beyond ammunition, North Korea deployed thousands of troops to fight alongside Russian forces in Kursk Oblast, making it the only country to commit ground forces to support Russia's invasion. North Korea also sent tens of thousands of workers to Russia to support weapons manufacturing and reconstruction efforts.
Russia and North Korea signed a strategic partnership agreement in June 2024 containing a mutual defense clause, elevating their relationship beyond the pragmatic partnership maintained with Iran. Russia reopened long-dormant supply chains to North Korea, providing coal, fertilizers, iron ore, oil, and wheat in violation of international sanctions. Russia also unfroze North Korean assets worth several million dollars and participated in modernizing North Korea's port of Rajin to increase cargo flow through Vladivostok.
The Russia-North Korea relationship provided benefits to both sides. North Korea gained hard currency, access to modern military technology and combat experience, and leverage to reduce its overdependence on China. For Russia, North Korean ammunition proved critical for sustaining high-intensity artillery fire, while North Korean troops helped stabilize the Kursk front. Russia reportedly had 14 high-level meetings with North Korean officials by mid-2025, compared to none in 2022 and only one in 2023, demonstrating the dramatic deepening of ties.
However, the CRINK alliance faced significant limitations. Iran and North Korea had almost no direct cooperation with each other. China maintained separate relationships with each country rather than coordinating through multilateral mechanisms. Occasional joint military exercises like the Sea Security Belt naval exercises involving Russia, China, and Iran occurred primarily for symbolic purposes rather than operational integration. The coalition lacked formal institutional structures and cohesive strategic planning.
Western officials distinguished between ally and partner when describing these relationships. North Korea had mutual defense treaties with both China and Russia, making it a formal ally. Iran maintained only strategic partnerships without defense commitments. This legal distinction reflected deeper differences in the depth and durability of cooperation. Analysts remained divided on whether CRINK would evolve into a genuine anti-Western axis or remain a loose grouping of convenience driven by immediate needs rather than shared long-term vision.
The relationships created real problems for Western policy. Russian access to North Korean ammunition, Iranian drones, and Chinese technology significantly enhanced Russian military capabilities and resilience against sanctions. The economic cooperation helped all four countries circumvent Western financial pressure and maintain alternative trade networks. However, these partnerships also imposed costs, tying Russia more closely to authoritarian regimes and limiting its diplomatic flexibility with other nations.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
