Russo-Ukraine War - 2024
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On 24 February 2022, Ukraine was suddenly and deliberately attacked by land, naval and air forces of Russia, igniting the largest European war since the Great Patriotic War. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a "special military operation" (SVO - spetsialnaya voennaya operatsiya) in Ukraine. The military buildup in preceeding months makes it obvious that the unprovoked and dastardly Russian attack was deliberately planned long in advance. During the intervening time, the Russian government had deliberately sought to deceive the world by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.
"To initiate a war of aggression... is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." [Judgment of the International Military Tribunal]
Moscow, which describes the Ukraine conflict as a US-led proxy war against Russia, has pledged to achieve its goals by any means necessary as its national security depends on it. The West is willing “to fight to the last Ukrainian” to inflict damage on Russia, the Kremlin has argued.
At least 18 North Korean servicemen had already escaped from positions on Ukraine's border with the Bryansk and Kursk regions of Russia. Sources in the intelligence service informed the Society about this. According to sources, it happened 7 kilometers from the state border with Ukraine. Suspilny's interlocutor added that the motives for the escape of the soldiers from the DPRK have not yet been established, and the Russian military has begun searching for them. "At the same time, the Russian invaders are trying to hide this information from their higher command," said an intelligence source.
On October 15, Suspilnyi's intelligence sources reported that a so-called "special Buryat battalion" staffed by citizens of the DPRK is being formed at the base of the 11th ODSHBr of the Russian occupation army . It is noted that the estimated number of personnel is up to 3,000 people. Currently, the process of providing the battalion with small arms and ammunition is underway. It is likely that the battalion may be involved in combat missions near the settlement of Suja and the city of Kursk in the Russian Federation.
On October 14, Russian leader Vladimir Putin submitted to the Russian State Duma a draft on the ratification of the treaty on "comprehensive strategic partnership" between the Russian Federation and North Korea. Russia and the DPRK signed this treaty on June 19, 2024. According to a document released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency, the two sides agreed to provide each other with "military and other" assistance if one of them is subjected to an "armed attack."
The Center for Combating Disinformation stated that the agreement on the "comprehensive strategic partnership" between the Russian Federation and the DPRK , which the head of the Kremlin submitted to the State Duma for ratification, de facto means the creation of a military alliance, as it includes a clause on the provision of assistance "by all available means" in the event of an attack to one of the participating countries.
On October 13, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated that Russia and the DPRK are "increasing the alliance" and it is not only about the supply of weapons that are used against Ukraine, but also about the "handover of people" to the Russian troops. Already on October 14, Zelenskyi said that North Korea "actually joined" the war against Ukraine.
The United States continues to work with its Allies and partners to provide Ukraine with additional capabilities to defend itself. This includes Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative [USAI] and Ukraine Presidential Drawdown Replenishment. DoD Components provide estimations for valuing assets provided under Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). Excess Defense Articles [EDA] are provided to partner nation at a reduced price (based on the condition of the equipment) or as a grant once the Military Departments identify excess equipment.
Two years after Russia decided to invade Ukraine, Putin's attempt to swiftly conquer Ukraine has clearly failed. But Russian invaders continue their assault on the front line in Ukraine's east and south. Putin's forces continue to target innocent civilians across Ukraine with missiles and drones. But the more Putin tries to impose his imperial vision through violence and aggression, the more Ukraine resists and the more Ukraine's allies and partners come together. The Kremlin has isolated itself. It is left to seek weapons from ally -- from the likes of Iran and North Korea. Failure to counter Putin's war of choice will mean aggressors and autocrats worldwide will be emboldened.
"We have heard reports from the Ukrainian government that they have concerns -- from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and general staff that they are concerned that they believe that units are not -- do not have the stocks and the stores of ammunition that they require, and that is one of the reasons we have been focusing on the need to answer Congress's questions so that they are able to move forward on a decision to pass the supplemental." Assistant Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander said 24 January 2024.
Wallander said "we are able to provide ammunition and interceptors that were contracted for in 2022 and 2023 under USAI, but those levels are not -- are not at the same level when we were able to provide on a regular basis ammunition and interceptors and other capabilities funded both by PDA and by USAI. So without USAI, we're not able to sustain the same levels of provision of capability to Ukraine."
The Biden administration and House Republicans failed to reach a funding deal that would have included an additional $60 billion in security assistance for Ukraine's military effort. In an interview 16 January 2024 with ABC News, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba said that this money would potentially allow Ukraine to avoid a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia, in which American troops would be forced to intervene. "Even if we run out of weapons, we will fight with shovels. Because the existence of this nation is at stake for Ukraine," he told ABC News during an interview in Kyiv.
"Basically every Democrat in Congress, along with many Republicans, wants to continue giving military aid to Ukraine so it can defend itself against Russia’s ongoing invasion. But because the issue splits the GOP, and Republicans control the House, passing this aid isn’t easy.... anti-Ukraine Republicans either don’t care about or actively support Russia’s goal of crushing Ukraine... Trump is running on border chaos as one of his biggest campaign issues. If President Biden signs a bipartisan bill to restrict asylum claims, then Trump won’t have this issue. Trump has been urging Republicans in Congress to tank the bill so he can keep the issue alive.... Trump has been very clear all along that he wants conditions in the country to be as horrible as possible in every way when he is out of power.... pro-Ukraine Republicans face the choice that they were trying to weasel their way out of. They can split their party and jam through aid to Ukraine. Or they can let Russia win the war." wrote Jonathan Chait, in New York Magazine 25 January 2024.
The "prospects for passing any deal on immigration policy and Ukraine aid in the Republican-led House are near zero... House Speaker Mike Johnson, who is beholden to his right wing and to former president Donald Trump.... in a leaked call with GOP members, Johnson went further, saying he wouldn’t accept any Senate deal and that he doesn’t think the border issue can be solved until a Republican becomes president.... Johnson has no political motivation to move against his right wing and defy Trump to support a Senate compromise. Why give President Biden a win on the border going into the general election? Setting extremist standards for immigration reform was part of MAGA’s plan to kill both efforts all along." wrote Josh Rogin in The Washington Post 19 January 2024.
Despite the huge American and Western aid amounting to more than $100 billion during 2023, its counterattack - which was much promoted - ended in great disappointment after Russia repelled it, and the Ukrainian army did not succeed in regaining the territory controlled by Moscow, which is estimated at a fifth of Ukrainian territory. If Kiev receives a large boost of US aid in 2024, as President Biden hoped, it may still have to consolidate its power and absorb the relentless Russian attacks.
The Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center noted that Russia commenced 2024 with the biggest air and drone strikes since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, attacking civilians and infrastructure in cities including Kyiv and Kharkiv, as ammunition for Western-provided air defense ran out and debates continued in Washington on whether to provide more. With deflated expectations on territorial progress by Ukraine, and attention shifted to the Israel-Hamas war, international media has largely deemed the ongoing counter-offensive a failure and the war on Ukraine a stalemate.
However, contrary the expectations of pessimists, Ukrainian strikes into the Black Sea and the Russian navy headquarters in Sevastopol crippled Russian naval efforts in the region and broken the long-standing blockade on Ukrainian trade. As recently as late December 2023, Ukrainian drone and missile strikes hit and destroyed key Russian warships and landing craft in occupied Crimea. Additionally, the Ukrainian military continued to repel Russian forces in cities in the east and south, inflicting possibly unsustainable manpower and equipment attrition on the Russian military.
The dubious framing of the war as a stalemate had become an argument against further Western support for Ukraine and led some to push for negotiations with the Kremlin. Such narratives discount the substantial successes Ukraine enjoyed in the Black Sea and ignored the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin had shown no real indication of moving away from his maximalist war aims for conquest of Ukraine and imposition of a New Europe. Nor had Putin shown the political will to conscript the army needed to realize such ambitions.
The Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center proposed the key quesitns for the new year - What does Ukraine need to succeed in 2024? How did the media narrative of the failed counteroffensive form, and how can Ukraine’s Western allies best maintain international support for continued aid? What is the true danger of accommodating a continuously aggressive Kremlin?
Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba stated 25 January 2024 that the gross domestic product of Ukraine and its allies is 21 times higher than that of Russia and its allies. The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported this in an interview with Foreign Affairs. "If you take the states that militarily support Ukraine and those that militarily support Russia, the combined GDP of our state and allies is 21 times greater than that of the Russian "coalition," Kuleba said. The minister emphasized that, "according to this, the world has enough resources for Ukraine's victory even in a war of attrition."
Kuleba emphasized that even when analyzing the ability to create coalitions, Ukraine exceeds the capabilities of the Russian Federation in this regard. "And it's funny, because Ukraine is not a member of the G7, and yet the G7 is much more united in helping Ukraine protect its interests. Russia is one of the founders of BRICS, but BRICS is much less supportive of the Russian Federation, even though it is supposedly a member of their families," said the minister.
During May 16-22, 2024 and June 20-25, 2024, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted two separate all-Ukrainian surveys of public opinion “Omnibus”, to which, on its own initiative, added its own monitoring question about readiness for territorial concessions for end the war and about the perception of certain possible peace agreements. KIIS regularly asks question about the population's readiness for territorial concessions in order to achieve peace and maintain independence as soon as possible.
In the period from May 2022 to May 2023, the situation was relatively stable: about 8-10% of respondents were ready for territorial concessions, and the absolute majority – 82-87% – consistently opposed any concessions. After May 2023, a gradual increase in the share of those ready for territorial concessions can be observed. Thus, by the end of 2023, the readiness to make concessions increased to 19%, in February 2024 – to 26%, in May 2024 – to 32%. The share of those who oppose no territorial concessions, accordingly, steadily decreased in the specified period. At the same time, despite everything, as of May 2024, the majority of Ukrainians – 55% – opposed any territorial concessions.
Among those who are generally ready for concessions, 73% want to be fenced off from Russia – that borders, visas, and customs should be closed between Ukraine and Russia (a similar indicator among those who are against any concessions is 79%). As for Russia’s goal, these people feel the existential threat a little less, but even among them 46% believe that Russia seeks to destroy the Ukrainian nation or carry out physical genocide (among those who are against no concessions – 68%). At the same time, only the same 5% share the truly pro-Russian narrative that Russia “seeks to carry out denazification and demilitarization without encroaching on the independence of Ukraine”.
Alexey Melnik, political scientist of the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Research named after Alexander Razumkov, emphasized in July 2024: “Today, it is impossible to evaluate offensive potential based on the quantity and quality of tanks. This is not entirely correct. Because in the tactics that Russian troops are using at the front today, tanks are often used for other than their intended purpose. Sometimes they are used simply as a means of transport, sometimes as artillery firing from an ambush. And only occasionally do such single duels occur.”
"According to my calculations, in the six months since October of last year, when Russia seized the initiative, its troops have advanced an average of 500 meters along the front line", says Alexey Melnik: “At this rate, it would take decades to reach not only Kiev, but even the borders of the Donetsk region, not to mention the Zaporizhzhya or Kherson regions, which Putin is also laying claim to. It would seem a paradox, but at the same time, Russia is winning strategically. Almost every day there are reports of minor victories or small advances by its troops. For the domestic Russian audience, the illusion is created that everything is going according to plan, that the Russian army is winning. This is important for Putin in terms of domestic mobilization. But for the external public, Western partners, this means that Ukraine is allegedly not capable of winning the war.”
In August, the Ukrainian troops launched a bold attack on Russia’s Kursk region in a remote area away from the main front. Both sides had unofficially acknowledged that territory west of Russia’s Belgorod region and Ukraine’s Kharkov region was a relatively quiet area, and neither side attempted to breach the border. However, in August, Ukrainian troops attacked precisely that area, overpowering Russian border units and advancing toward the city of Kursk itself and the nearby town of Kurchatov, with its nuclear power plant. This audacious move initially seemed successful. Ukraine wanted to achieve several goals at once. Firstly, the Ukrainians got the maximum propaganda benefit out of the situation: Ukrainian soldiers were on internationally recognized Russian territory! Secondly, capturing the nuclear power plant, along with the city of Kursk, could have had catastrophic consequences for Russia. And third — and most importantly — Ukraine wanted to force Russia to pull its forces from Donbass and redirect them to Kursk. The Russian command responded. Some forces were redeployed to Kursk Region but almost none were pulled from the Donbass front. Most reinforcements came from calm and well-protected sectors. The Ukrainian offensive became bogged down due to Russian counterattacks. However, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky considered it vital to hold onto any territorial gains in Kursk region. Consequently, the small area captured by Ukrainian troops was flooded with AFU brigades which were constantly attacked by the Russian air force and heavy artillery. The primary achievement of the Ukrainian forces was the capture of Sudzha, a small town with a population of around 5,000 people (most of whom had fled). So while the Ukrainian army executed a daring operation, it failed to secure a decisive victory. The strong brigades, well-equipped with combat vehicles, found themselves stuck in operational limbo, unable to either advance or withdraw. While battles raged on near Kursk, Russian forces managed to advance toward the city of Pokrovsk in Donbass. This area serves as a key logistics hub for the AFU in western Donbass and their primary stronghold in the region. Since the AFU pulled significant resources to Kursk, Russia was able to quickly breach Ukrainian defenses on the outskirts of Pokrovsk (also known as Krasnoarmeysk). Russian troops are now closing in on the city, and it seems that battles there will start in the early days of 2025. Positional battles also continued at other sections of the front. Russian forces were able to defeat the Ukrainians in some places, but the territorial gains were minor: a small town here, a ridge or access to a river there. Looking at the map, we see that Russia’s most notable achievement was to push Ukrainian forces further away from Donetsk, thereby reducing the shelling of the city. A leading expert on Russian foreign policy, James Nixey heads the Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House, a London-based research institute. He noted 04 October 2024 " Ukraine's victory is still pretty much what's in [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelenskiy's 10-point [peace] plan, which is the maximalist objective, the all-you-want-for-Christmas: It is the withdrawal of Russian soldiers to pre-2014 (when Russia seized Crimea and began backing separatists in Donbas) lines and reparations and judicial reckoning....
"By contrast, I can at least imagine what a Russian implosion [might look like], whether that's on the front line going toward Moscow, whether it's centered in Moscow, whether it goes through the regions...[as] some form of snowball. I'm not saying it will happen. I can't be a predictor of the future, and we shouldn't try it. But it does seem Russia is a little bit soft. We shouldn't underestimate how difficult this should be for Russia to fight this war....
"If you take the question of neutrality or non-NATO membership, non-EU membership even, it overtly accepts a Russian sphere of influence.... 2014? Crimea, the Donbas -- that was freezable. I find it hard to see people...going on with their lives in this situation, when so many have died, when it's been such a shakeup of a system, when Russia's gone all in, doubled down. It just makes freezing harder. Because it was hotter, it's harder to freeze...
"The wish is that somehow the West, [the] collective West, gets its act together and doubles down, has a real plan, [an] operational conclusion that it needs to win this, to help on all sorts of other problems, because it really would help on all sorts of other problems, not just China and so on. It doesn't, and this is what my problem is. What we do is we do just enough; we drip feed, we don't do badly, we're not awful, but we're just not good enough....
"It is ultimately true that the [U.S. President Joe] Biden administration and probably the [Democratic Party presidential candidate Kamala] Harris administration -- if there is one -- are not comfortable with a Russian defeat. They are genuinely worried that it would create anarchy, loose nukes, spillover, civil war, things they can't control. They want to be able to control this war. And a Russian defeat isn't controllable, because none of us, fair enough, knows how that will play out. ... you actually don't have a frozen conflict but a protracted conflict because we don't want to let it go, we don't want to win, we don't want to lose. That leads to paralysis....
"I would imagine that the Biden administration will not come out very well. History will not judge it well, just like it doesn't judge [former U.S. President Barack] Obama well, unfortunately, because they're good people, Biden's a good person. I suspect that if we have this continual arc of instability in whatever form, however this turns out but beyond [the] borders of Ukraine, then we will be able to point to this administration for its inability, albeit hamstrung by Congress etc., for its inability to exert its power."
The Russian army’s 2024 offensive was far less ambitious than the 2022 offensive. The main fighting took place west of Donetsk, which is home to around one million people and is the capital and largest city in the Donetsk People’s Republic. Russian troops first encircled and captured Avdeevka on the outskirts of Donetsk and then pushed the enemy further away from Donetsk, which was under direct artillery fire. This situation was reminiscent of WWI. The pace of the advance corresponded to the pace of infantry assault troops and the main tasks were carried out by small units.
Often, just a handful of soldiers, backed by military equipment, would attack a stronghold. “A drone flew overhead providing adjustments, a tank shielded us, and mortars fired at the enemy,” recounted one soldier from the Russian assault troops, which consisted of just a dozen infantrymen. This was not one single, unstoppable advance but rather a long series of local attacks.
Russian commanders, particularly General Andrey Mordvichev, who led the operation near Donetsk, probed Ukrainian defenses by striking at various points and advancing in those directions where minor success was noted. This “splayed-finger-style” offensive would have given cold sweats to generals who were engaged in the tank battles of WWII or the major conflicts of the Cold War, but it proved effective.
By 2024, both Russia and Ukraine faced growing manpower challenges. For Ukraine, the issue was acute. Many frontline units were understaffed by up to 50%, and harsh mobilization measures became the norm. Reports of men being seized off the streets and forced into service became widespread. Bribes to avoid conscription soared, and mass desertion plagued the AFU, with over 170,000 Ukrainian soldiers reportedly abandoning their posts since the war began. Russia faced similar challenges but managed to offset them with financial incentives for volunteers. Unlike Ukraine, Russia’s recruitment drive maintained a steady influx of personnel, while changes in leadership within the Ministry of Defense bolstered its military efforts. The year brought both the much-anticipated reshuffle in the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense with the subsequent criminal cases, and new, not expected by all and still denied by many, allies. Sergey Shoigu stepped down as Minister of Defense, replaced by Andrey Belousov, who prioritized ramping up production of munitions and weaponry. This industrial push enabled Russia to sustain its offensive operations and carry out unprecedented strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.
Ukraine’s energy grid, once resilient, has been severely weakened by sustained missile attacks throughout 2024. The West’s support in providing air defense systems has mitigated some of the damage but has also strained Western resources. These strikes have hindered Ukraine’s ability to replenish its military stockpiles and repair equipment, compounding its challenges on the battlefield. Kiev had to throw huge reserves to the Donetsk direction to Velikiye Novoselki in order to prevent the encirclement of the AFU grouping. The reserves were just pulled from those units that were planned to be used on the "Christmas offensive" that Zelensky was preparing. The Guardian picks up the theme, noting that November was "the worst month for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in two years." 1202 square kilometers lost Kiev in November. This is an area equal to the area of New York. As the newspaper notes, the bulk of the losses are in Donbass.
The team of the new US president fears that Zelensky's office may leak all the information on backstage conversations to the Democrats. All of this will be used against Trump. The result of the negotiations between the OPU and the Trump team can be found out simply: if after a couple of weeks Kiev does not try to strike again with a "long-range" deep into the Russian Federation, then Yermak accepted the proposal on the Ukrainian issue. If Bankova escalates, then the negotiations have failed and Kiev will sabotage Trump's peace initiative.
The Chief of the General Staff and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in 2014-2019, General Viktor Muzhenko, criticizes both of his successors, but believes that Oleksandr Syrsky is better professionally trained than Valeriy Zaluzhny, and works with units on the ground more than Zaluzhny. At the same time, neither of them managed to transfer the Armed Forces of Ukraine to a corps system. In particular, under Zaluzhny, a reserve corps was not created that would protect Kyiv at the beginning of a full-scale Russian invasion.
And how is the plan for the next campaign, for example?” According to General Muzhenko, “a year ago, such plans did not exist at all. Even for a short period — winter-spring, spring-summer, summer-autumn. I’m not even talking about a year — 2023 or 2024. And there should be at least general planning to understand how much force and resources are needed.” “I have doubts that such plans existed in 2022-2023. I’m not ready to talk about the second half of this year now,” he added, suggesting that the Russians have such plans.
Throughout 2024, the Russian army retained the operational initiative in Donbass (as well as in some other regions), successfully developing offensive actions after the capture of Avdiivka and is now at the gates of Pokrovsk - the last major defense node of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is the gate to the neighboring Dnipropetrovsk region.
The pace of advance, compared to 2023, increased several times , although of course, looking at the overall picture relative to the whole of Ukraine or at least the SVO zone, it is still negligible . At the same time, Russian successes came at a very high price both in people and equipment. Despite Ukraine's heavy losses, it had not been possible to finally break the backbone of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and cause a stable, long-term collapse of the front in at least one of the areas.
By the end of 2024, the results were not particularly striking. Along an 80-kilometer front, Russian forces managed to advance 20-40 kilometers into Ukrainian-held territory. Almost all of this territory is located in Donbass region. This is roughly similar to the territorial changes on the Western Front during WWI over the course of the year 1917. Of course, far fewer troops are involved in battles this time, but the essence remains the same. However, there is an important trend. Throughout 2024, the Russian advance steadily picked up speed. During the fall months, Russian troops captured more territory than in the previous eight months. The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) suffered severe losses, both in terms of personnel and equipment.
Undoubtedly, the biggest event was the invasion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into the Kursk region. The preparation for the offensive was missed, and the built defense lines on the border were protected more by threatening statements of politicians than by troops on the ground. Nevertheless, the attack was stopped and a deep breakthrough was not allowed , and then the invasion was localized and by the end of the year the zone of control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the border area was reduced by more than half. Ukraine was unable to fully achieve its goals in this operation .
Ukraine tacitly acknowledged its inability to reclaim contested territories, while the West has begun floating the idea of freezing the conflict. US President-elect Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed his intention to broker a peace deal, but the path to negotiations is fraught with challenges. Russia’s demands remain firm. Moscow insists on formal recognition of Crimea and Donbass as Russian territory, along with any additional lands captured during the conflict. It also demands that Ukraine abandon its NATO ambitions and significantly reduce its military capacity. These terms, which were far less stringent in 2022, are now non-negotiable for Moscow but unacceptable for Kiev. Zelensky faces growing scrutiny at home and abroad, with his position increasingly precarious as Western fatigue with the war deepens. The most likely plans of the Russian command for 2025 will be the liberation of the Kursk region and the establishment of full control over the territory of Donbass , where the Armed Forces of Ukraine still hold positions. At the same time, there remains a high probability of another attempt by Ukraine to seize the initiative by repeating the "Kursk operation" in another Russian region.
Many people associate their expectations for the coming year with a cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of a sustainable peace. In our opinion, despite the obvious attempts of the parties to negotiate, this seems unlikely . The positions of Russia and Ukraine are still infinitely far apart, and total mutual distrust does not allow any concessions in the hope that the other side will not perceive this as weakness.
Most likely, 2025 will be marked by the failure of negotiations with the participation of Trump, and the continuation of military operations, where Russia will continue to try to improve its position "on the ground" as much as possible, and Ukraine will try with all its might to slow down the Russian advance and make attempts to switch attention to other areas of the front. Military cooperation with Iran and North Korea will continue and deepen, it is very likely that the supply of military equipment from the DPRK will only expand.
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