Russo-Ukraine War - June 2025
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On 24 February 2022, Ukraine was suddenly and deliberately attacked by land, naval and air forces of Russia, igniting the largest European war since the Great Patriotic War. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a "special military operation" (SVO - spetsialnaya voennaya operatsiya) in Ukraine. The military buildup in preceeding months makes it obvious that the unprovoked and dastardly Russian attack was deliberately planned long in advance. During the intervening time, the Russian government had deliberately sought to deceive the world by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.
"To initiate a war of aggression... is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole." [Judgment of the International Military Tribunal]
June 2025 witnessed continued Russian offensive operations across multiple sectors of the front, though territorial gains remained modest relative to the enormous costs. Russian forces maintained pressure along several key axes, particularly focusing on the Donetsk region where they attempted to advance toward strategically important cities like Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka. The month saw Russian troops making incremental progress, capturing approximately 216 square miles throughout June, representing a slight decrease from May's territorial gains. This slow advance came at an extraordinary human cost, with UK intelligence estimating that Russian forces suffered 32,000 casualties during June alone, averaging 1,080 daily.
The fighting centered on several critical areas. In the Donetsk region, Russian forces pushed westward in multiple directions, with particularly intense combat around Pokrovsk, a vital logistics hub for Ukrainian forces. Russian military bloggers claimed advances toward Novopavlivka as part of a multi-pronged effort to reach the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border. In some areas, Russian forces reportedly crossed into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast for the first time, though Ukrainian military officials disputed the extent of these incursions. The Russian strategy appeared focused on stretching Ukrainian defenses thin by attacking simultaneously in multiple directions.
In the northern theater, Russian forces expanded operations in Sumy Oblast after amassing approximately 50,000 troops in the region. This represented a significant concentration of forces aimed at opening a new axis of advance. In Kharkiv region, fighting continued around Vovchansk near the international border, with Russian forces claiming territorial gains though Ukrainian forces managed to stabilize parts of the frontline. Near Kherson City in the south, Ukrainian forces conducted limited counterattacks and managed to retake some settlements, demonstrating that despite Russian numerical superiority, Ukrainian forces retained the capability for tactical offensive operations.
The overall picture remained one of grinding attrition. Russian forces relied heavily on overwhelming firepower, particularly aerial bombardment with guided glide bombs, to gradually wear down Ukrainian positions. Ukrainian defensive tactics emphasized prepared positions including extensive trench systems, dragon's teeth anti-tank obstacles, minefields, and other barriers combined with artillery and drone strikes to exact maximum casualties from advancing Russian units. The transparent modern battlefield, dominated by ubiquitous drone surveillance and long-range precision fires, continued to favor defensive operations, making territorial advances extremely costly for the attacker.
Deep Battle: Missile and Drone Strikes
June 2025 marked a dramatic escalation in Russia's strategic bombardment campaign against Ukraine. The number of missiles and loitering munitions launched by Russian forces into Ukraine was over ten times higher than in June 2024, representing one of the most intense periods of aerial bombardment since the war began. On the night of June 8-9 alone, Russia launched what Ukrainian officials described as the largest air attack in over three years of war, with 479 Shahed drones and 20 missiles striking targets across Ukraine. Later in the month, another massive strike on June 23-24 resulted in over 100 civilian casualties, demonstrating Russia's continued targeting of civilian infrastructure and population centers.
The increased intensity of strikes reflected Russia's expanding domestic production capacity for unmanned aerial systems. Russian defense industries had successfully ramped up production of Geran drones, the Russian-manufactured version of Iranian Shahed designs, from previous levels to approximately 2,000 units per month with plans to reach 5,000 monthly. This surge in production was facilitated by the transfer of Iranian manufacturing technology and the construction of specialized production facilities in Russia's Tatarstan region, particularly at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone. Russian forces had also begun deploying these drones in new tactical roles, using them for short to mid-range frontline strikes rather than just deep strategic targets, taking advantage of improvements in speed, range, and payload capacity.
Ukrainian air defenses demonstrated remarkable effectiveness against this onslaught, regularly intercepting significant percentages of incoming threats. During the massive June 8-9 attack, Ukrainian systems destroyed 460 of the 479 drones launched, though the sheer volume of attacks meant that even small percentages of successful strikes could cause significant damage. The sustained bombardment campaign targeted multiple categories of infrastructure including energy facilities, with at least 13 attacks on energy infrastructure occurring during June in Ukrainian-controlled territory. These strikes continued Russia's systematic effort to degrade Ukraine's electrical generation and distribution capacity, which had already fallen from 56 gigawatts before the war to an estimated 9 gigawatts by late 2024.
Ukraine demonstrated its own deep strike capabilities through an extraordinarily successful operation. On June 1, Ukrainian forces executed Operation Spider's Web, a complex operation that targeted multiple Russian airbases deep inside Russian territory. Using drones smuggled into position within Russia and launched from internal locations, Ukrainian forces struck facilities including Belaya air base in Irkutsk Oblast, more than 4,000 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. The operation destroyed an estimated 11 to 12 Russian strategic bombers including Tu-95s, Tu-22M3s, and A-50 airborne early warning aircraft across four separate airbases. Throughout June, Ukraine maintained pressure on Russian military-industrial targets, striking facilities producing navigation systems, microelectronics for missiles, and other critical defense components. Ukrainian drones also continued targeting Russia's energy sector, particularly oil refineries, temporarily disrupting approximately 17 percent of Russia's refining capacity by mid-year.
New Weapons, Production, and Effectiveness
The war in June 2025 showcased significant evolution in weapons technology and tactical innovation on both sides. Russian forces expanded their use of motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles along the frontline, developing this into a formal tactical doctrine. Facing high losses of armored vehicles to Ukrainian drones and anti-tank weapons, Russian military planners increasingly equipped assault units with motorcycles, ATVs, and lightweight buggies. These vehicles offered greater mobility and smaller signatures than traditional armored personnel carriers, though they left troops more vulnerable. Russian military documents revealed plans to equip over half of infantry forces with these lighter vehicles, with intentions to purchase up to 200,000 motorcycles and 60,000 other light vehicles. This represented a significant doctrinal shift driven by the reality of the transparent battlefield where slower armored vehicles had become highly vulnerable to precision strikes.
Russian forces also continued refining their use of fiber-optic controlled first-person view drones. These systems, resistant to electronic warfare jamming, enabled precision strikes against Ukrainian armor and fortifications. The technology transfer from North Korea included improvements to KN-23 ballistic missiles, which Russian assistance transformed from weapons with kilometer-level accuracy to precision strike systems capable of hitting specific targets. This collaboration demonstrated how the war was accelerating weapons development through the sharing of combat experience and technical knowledge between Russia's partners.
On the Ukrainian side, domestic weapons production reached new levels of sophistication and scale. Ukrainian defense industries now provided nearly 60 percent of the army's equipment needs, up from just 10 percent at the start of the full-scale invasion. Ukrainian manufacturers achieved particular success with unmanned aerial systems, with first-person view drones reportedly accounting for nearly 70 percent of Russian losses in manpower and weaponry within 15 kilometers of the frontline. Ukrainian companies developed new drone variants with improved capabilities, including quadcopters with enhanced range exceeding 20 kilometers, jamming resistance, and the ability to deliver six kilograms of guided munitions. Deep strike drones with ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers allowed Ukraine to threaten targets throughout Russia's strategic depth. The rapid innovation cycle in Ukrainian drone production, with companies able to scale production from 3,000 to 10,000 units annually within six weeks, demonstrated the advantage of agile manufacturing processes over traditional defense industry models.
Western weapons systems continued playing crucial roles despite production constraints. Ukrainian forces operated F-16 fighter aircraft, though losses occurred including a pilot killed in late June. The HIMARS rocket artillery system remained highly effective for striking command posts, ammunition depots, and other high-value targets in Russian-controlled territory. Germany and other European partners committed to joint production arrangements for long-range weapons, including plans for Ukrainian-German collaboration on systems capable of striking deeper into Russia. However, the United States redirected some aid, including 20,000 anti-drone missiles originally intended for Ukraine, to American forces in the Middle East, highlighting the ongoing uncertainty in Western support levels.
Personnel Levels and Problems
The personnel situation represented one of the war's most critical challenges for both sides. Russian casualties reached staggering levels, with various Western intelligence sources providing consistent estimates. UK intelligence assessed that Russian forces suffered 236,000 casualties killed and wounded during the first six months of 2025, with June accounting for 32,000 of these losses at an average rate of 1,080 daily. This brought cumulative Russian casualties since the war's beginning to approximately 950,000 to over one million killed and wounded according to different methodologies, with estimates of 250,000 killed. These figures represented roughly five times the fatalities Russia suffered in all Soviet and Russian conflicts combined between the end of World War II and the Ukraine invasion.
To sustain operations at this casualty rate, Russia maintained aggressive recruitment efforts. The Kremlin recruited approximately 50,000 to 60,000 new troops monthly through a combination of volunteer contracts, prisoner recruitment, and mobilization. Regional authorities had begun reducing the generous sign-on bonuses previously used to attract volunteers, suggesting the financial sustainability of these incentives faced strain. Russia also tapped into partnership with North Korea, which provided not only ammunition and missiles but also thousands of soldiers who fought alongside Russian forces. North Korean workers were being sent to Russian defense production facilities, with reports of 25,000 North Korean laborers heading to the Alabuga Special Economic Zone to assist with drone manufacturing.
The changing composition of Russian forces reflected the personnel challenges. Officers now comprised only 2 to 3 percent of Russian casualties, down from 10 percent in the war's early stages, as the army increasingly relied on hastily trained volunteer infantry who suffered vastly higher casualty rates than professional soldiers. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced plans to increase the total size of the armed forces by 180,000 personnel, bringing the total to 2.39 million. In a significant policy shift, Russia moved to year-round conscription, eliminating seasonal breaks and allowing military enlistment offices to process recruits continuously throughout the year. This change signaled Moscow's determination to maintain force levels for sustained operations.
Ukrainian personnel challenges received less public disclosure but remained acute. President Zelenskyy stated that Ukraine had suffered approximately 400,000 casualties killed and wounded, though some Western intelligence estimates suggested higher figures. Ukrainian forces faced the fundamental challenge of defending against a numerically superior adversary while lacking the population base to match Russian recruitment levels. Ukraine approved legislation allowing volunteers aged 18 to 24 to serve on one-year contracts, attempting to expand the available manpower pool without mandatory mobilization of the youngest age cohorts. The Ukrainian military's emphasis on technological solutions including extensive drone employment and precision strikes reflected in part the necessity of maximizing effectiveness despite numerical disadvantage. Ukrainian forces also suffered leadership changes, with Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi resigning as Commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces following a Russian missile strike on a training ground that killed twelve soldiers.
Support to Ukraine
Western support to Ukraine underwent significant evolution during June 2025, with European nations increasingly shouldering the burden of military assistance as American support became more uncertain under the Trump administration. Europe committed 10.5 billion euros in military aid during May and June combined, with a notable shift in how this assistance was provided. At least 4.6 billion euros of the European commitment came through procurement contracts with defense companies rather than existing stockpiles, representing a fundamental change toward industrial production of new weapons rather than donations of existing equipment. From the war's start through June, Europe allocated at least 35.1 billion euros in military aid via defense procurement, exceeding American procurement-based assistance by 4.4 billion euros.
Germany emerged as a particularly significant contributor with a 5 billion euro aid package announced in May, the largest bilateral commitment of the period. This package included commitments for joint weapons production with Ukraine, including long-range strike systems, with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stating this would enable a "new form of military industrial cooperation" between the two countries. German defense officials indicated that a significant number of systems would be manufactured by the end of 2025, with first deliveries expected within weeks. Other European nations maintained steady support, with Canada announcing aid packages including armored vehicles and electronic warfare systems valued at 25.5 million dollars.
Financial support increasingly relied on the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration loan mechanism approved by the G7, which provided Ukraine with 45 billion euros in loans financed through proceeds from frozen Russian assets. During May and June, the European Union disbursed 2 billion euros, Canada contributed 1.5 billion euros, and Japan allocated approximately 2.8 billion euros through this mechanism. This represented a crucial innovation in support structures, though questions remained about sustainability as the initially allocated funds were gradually disbursed.
The transformation of defense industrial cooperation marked a significant long-term development. Major European defense contractors including Rheinmetall and KNDS expanded operations in Ukraine, establishing production facilities and joint ventures with Ukrainian manufacturers. Western partners invested in Ukrainian domestic production capacity through programs like Zbroyari Manufacturing Freedom, which by mid-2025 had raised over 1.5 billion dollars from nine Western donor countries for investment in Ukrainian defense industries. Ukraine aimed to triple weapons production to approximately 30 billion dollars annually, though actual production remained closer to 15 billion dollars pending additional investment. These arrangements reflected European calculations that even without NATO membership for Ukraine, investing in Ukrainian military production capacity served European security interests by enabling Ukraine to sustain its defense while developing capabilities that could eventually supply European forces with combat-proven technologies, particularly in the drone and electronic warfare domains.
American support during June remained substantial but uncertain. The United States had provided approximately 64.6 billion dollars in military aid since the invasion began, comprising roughly 30 percent of weapons Ukraine employed on the battlefield. However, the Trump administration redirected some promised systems, including 20,000 anti-drone missiles, to American forces in the Middle East. President Trump made repeated calls for combat freezes and showed frustration with the conflict's continuation, creating uncertainty about future American support levels. For the first time since Trump's inauguration, the United States in May approved major arms exports to Ukraine, though structured as sales requiring Ukrainian financing rather than military aid grants. This shift toward commercial sales rather than aid represented a potentially significant change in the support relationship.
Support for Russia
Russia's ability to sustain its war effort depended heavily on a network of partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea, relationships that deepened significantly during 2025. These partnerships provided Russia with critical dual-use components, weapons systems, and military technology that helped offset Western sanctions and enabled continued offensive operations. China emerged as the most important enabler of Russia's war effort, though Beijing refrained from openly supplying weapons to avoid Western sanctions. Instead, China provided vital dual-use components including semiconductors, ball bearings, and machine tools through complex networks of shell companies based in China and Hong Kong. These components enabled Russia to refurbish and modernize Soviet-era equipment from its vast stockpiles, keeping tanks, artillery systems, and missiles operational despite sanctions intended to cut off access to Western technology.
Chinese-manufactured commercial drones and drone components flowed continuously to Russia through various intermediaries despite announced restrictions by manufacturers like DJI. Beyond material support, Chinese economic engagement provided Russia with crucial markets for oil and gas exports, generating revenue that funded military operations. The economic relationship gave China significant leverage over Russia, with Chinese officials watching the accelerating Russia-North Korea relationship with some concern about potential challenges to Chinese regional influence. Nevertheless, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin maintained their "no limits" partnership, with both leaders appearing together at Moscow's Victory Day parade in May alongside North Korean representatives.
North Korea evolved from a supplier of ammunition to an increasingly integrated military-industrial partner. Beyond providing artillery shells and ballistic missiles that Russian forces used extensively against Ukrainian targets, North Korea sent thousands of troops to fight alongside Russian forces, marking the first time since the Korean War that North Korean forces engaged in significant combat operations abroad. The military cooperation expanded further with North Korea sending approximately 25,000 workers to Russian defense production facilities, particularly the Alabuga Special Economic Zone where they assisted in manufacturing Shahed-type drones. Satellite imagery confirmed new dormitory construction at Alabuga to accommodate North Korean workers, supporting Russian plans to increase drone production from 2,000 to 5,000 units monthly.
Russia reciprocated by providing North Korea with advanced military technology including assistance with missile carrier systems and submarine-based launch platforms that North Korea had struggled to develop independently. Russian support helped transform North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles from unreliable weapons with several-kilometer accuracy deviations into precision strike systems. Russia agreed to help North Korea establish domestic production facilities for Iranian-designed Shahed drones, representing a significant technology transfer that would enhance North Korean military capabilities beyond the Ukraine conflict. During Putin's June 2024 visit to North Korea, the two nations signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty including mutual defense provisions, formalizing what had become a close military alliance driven by shared opposition to Western influence.
Iran's role diminished somewhat during mid-2025 following Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military facilities. Nevertheless, Iran had provided crucial support during earlier phases through supplying thousands of Shahed attack drones and Fateh-110 ballistic missiles with ranges up to 435 miles. Iranian technical assistance enabled Russia to establish domestic production of Shahed-type drones, with facilities in Tatarstan capable of producing thousands of units annually. Iran and Russia signed a 20-year strategic partnership treaty in January 2025 calling for cooperation against common military threats and technology sharing, though without explicit mutual defense obligations. When Israel struck Iran in June, both Russia and China offered primarily rhetorical support rather than military intervention, highlighting that these remained largely transactional relationships driven by narrow national interests rather than true alliances.
Russia's domestic defense industrial base demonstrated remarkable resilience and expansion despite Western sanctions. Russian defense industries produced in three months what all of NATO produced in a year in terms of ammunition, with production expected to reach 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored vehicles, and 200 Iskander missiles during 2025. This production relied heavily on drawing from Soviet-era equipment stockpiles for refurbishment, a finite resource that analysts estimated would face diminishing availability in coming years. The sustainability of Russian weapons production depended on continued access to foreign components and technology, making the relationships with China, Iran, and North Korea essential for Moscow's ability to continue offensive operations. The deepening of these partnerships reshaped the geopolitical landscape, creating what some Western analysts characterized as an "axis of upheaval" united by opposition to the American-led international order and willingness to support each other's military objectives.
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