By 2020 it was apparent that the Russian Navy was actually two navies. One was composed of old ships, repairing the "old" fleet is mainly to maintain the Russian "big country navy" reputation. The other is a small-scale "lean" navy composed of new small and medium-sized ships that meets the actual needs of Russia. The main feature of this small-scale fleet is that almost all warships are equipped with "Kalibr" cruise missiles as much as possible. This is because the actual task of the Russian Navy is to frighten Europe. Now they can hit hundreds of cruise missiles at a time. After so many years of European arms slack, this firepower can be regarded as a deterrent.
In this case, the Russian Navy actually does not need an aircraft carrier - but Putin needs to maintain the decent status of Russia's big powers in front of its own people. Without follow-up ships, the decommissioning of this "Treasure Ship" obviously cannot stimulate the Russian people's Patriotic passion. But Russia does not have the money to build a new generation of aircraft carriers. There is no way. No matter how old, unusable, and practically meaningless the ship. Even if there are a hundred difficulties, Russia will work hard to overcome these difficulties and continue to maintain the carrier. This ship exists because it is a symbol of Russia's great power status. Even if the equipment inside the ship is old and endangers the life of the crew at any time, it is necessary to repaint the outside and show his face on the "military review" program.
The Russian Navy has historically been a submarine Navy. There was a period in the 1970s and 1980's where Gorshkov attempted to build a Blue Water Surface and Naval Air Capability. But it has returned to their roots - with front line nuclear submarines their essential Naval Force. There are four fleets [Pacific, Black Sea, Baltic, and Northern] virtually isolated from each other, in four maritime theaters with different climatic conditions. Ships in the Russian fleet were designed for one of these specific theaters of operations.
The primary missions of the naval forces are to provide strategic nuclear deterrence from the nuclear submarine fleet and to defend the sea-lanes approaching the Russian coast. In the post-Cold War era the Russian Navy was no longer interested in limiting American naval power in areas that did not affect Russian interests. The Russian Navy would be hard pressed to challenge Western command of the seas, and with the death of communist ideology and collapse of its overseas influence, there would appear little reason for attempting such a challenge.
The Navy Day holiday on 26 July 1992 was the occasion for most warships of the ex-Soviet Navy to haul down the hammer-and-sickle naval ensign and replace it with the flag of St. Andrews, traditionally flown on Russian warships since 1699. At that time, Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, commander in chief of Russian naval forces, said that the Russian navy would be smaller than the Soviet navy, with old vessels to be retired and manpower reductions totaling 100,000 men to be effected by 1995. Between 1990 and 1995 Naval Forces personnel was cut by 50 percent (fleet aviation personnel by 60 percent).
The year 1996 marked the tercentennial of the Russian Navy. It was celebrated on 28 July 1996 in a show of the main naval parade of the Russian fleet. In addition to Russian ships representing all four fleets and the North-West Border Guard District, vessels from ten foreign states participated in the naval parade.
As of 1996 the naval forces included about 200,000 sailors and marines, about 20 percent of whom were conscripts, and 500,000 reserves. There was no tradition of enlisted members staying in the Navy after their initial tour is over. Of the active-duty personnel, about 30,000 were in naval aviation and 24,000 in coastal defense forces.
According to the resolutions of the Security Council meeting of 11 August 2000, the major reform measures of the general purpose forces was to be accomplished by 2006. By that time these forces were to have over 800,000 servicemen, for a total reduction of 400,000 troops [possibly as soon as 2003]. The navy was to be reduced by more than 50,000.
The military builders completed the reconstruction and technical re-equipment of the Admiralty building to house the Navy High Command in St. Petersburg. This was announced 04 Swecember 2018 by Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov. "The construction and assembly work on the reconstruction, restoration and technical re-equipment of the Admiralty building to accommodate the Main Command of the Navy, in which we are currently located, has been completed," he said at an on-site extended meeting on the prospects for the construction of military facilities located in the city, under the leadership of Defense Minister General of the Russian Federation Sergei Shoigu.
According to him, the internal and external facades of the complex of buildings with a total area of more than 53 thousand square meters have been restored. Ivanov also said that during the reconstruction of the fixed assets of the former cadet missile and artillery corps, more than 40 thousand square meters were restored to accommodate the St. Petersburg Suvorov Military School. m facades of historic buildings, including the shape of the look of St. Petersburg on Moskovsky Prospekt, as well as recreated the unique interiors of the Vorontsov Palace with the home church.
"The most complex adaptation of existing buildings for modern use was carried out, the interiors were recreated, and the restoration of the unique truss system was carried out. Thus, genuine wall paintings of the 18th-19th centuries were discovered and restored and acquired the status of museum value," the deputy minister said.
What to do now, since Russia had practically no fleet? The leadership of the Navy needed to abandon the "high seas fleet", demonstrating for clarity "heterogeneous flotillas" (a term they invented). And what tasks can be posed to this rabble of diverse ships from 20-30 years ago?
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