CHAPTER
1
MILITARY
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
"Get
your major purpose clear, take off your plate all which hinders that purpose
and hold hard to all that helps it, and then go ahead with a clear conscience,
courage, sincerity, and selflessness."
Field
Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery
Prior
to implementing the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) in an time-constrained
environment, a commander and his staff must be proficient and have a mastery
of the all-encompassing spectrum of the MDMP. Therefore, a commander can identify
those key steps of the process that can be abbreviated without negating the
basic aspects of the process.
The
Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) in a time-constrained environment:
(FM 101-5, Staff
Organization and Operations,
pgs.
5-27-5-31)
Decision
making in a time-constrained environment usually occurs after a unit has entered
an area of operations and its day-to-day OPTEMPO does not allow for a more
deliberate approach. Time available for planning becomes the critical factor;
therefore, the MDMP must be expedited without eliminating any steps.
Certain
steps may be done mentally by the commander or with less staff involvement
than during a more deliberate process. A commander's increased involvement
allows him to make decisions during the process without waiting for detailed
briefings from the staff. He can also be more directive in his guidance, thereby
limiting options. If possible, he should also include subordinate commanders
in the process. These commanders are closer to the fight and can more accurately
portray the enemy's situation and that of their own unit. (FM 101-5, pg. 5-27)
The
following are some techniques that can be used in each step to save time.
1.
Receipt
of Mission:
a.
In this step and during the commander's initial guidance, the commander and
staff do a quick assessment to determine whether or not to shorten/abbreviate
the process. If it is to be shortened, they determine how to focus the process
and save time. (FM 101-5, pg. 5-5) b.
Parallel planning is maximized. (FM 101-5, pgs. 5-5, 5-28) Examples: subordinate
commanders, staff, and/or LNOs sit in on key brigade staff briefings; multiple
warning orders are issued that identify confirmed as well as be prepared missions;
radio/MSRT calls are made between brigade and battalion staff to talk key issues,
etc. 2.
Mission
Analysis:
a.
An effective leader/commander or staff reconnaissance must be conducted early
in the process to confirm or deny the initial assessments. This allows the
staff to focus on a specific course of action. b.
An initial reconnaissance and surveillance plan must be initiated early to
launch reconnaissance assets as soon as possible to begin the brigade collection
effort. (FM 101-5, pg. 5-29) (Leaders/LNOs from recon elements can sit in with
the brigade staff beginning with mission analysis [MA]. They can then work
R&S issues as well as get smart on them. Brigade should have a COA developed
before the R&S plan gets issued. R&S elements should receive multiple WARNOs
focused on their mission as well as generic WARNOs that go out--do everything
one can to support that element's TLP. BOS planners should dedicate someone
to focus on R&S needs early to put together the plan.) c.
The enemy event template must be as complete as possible prior to the mission
analysis brief. It must also be continually updated and should be what the
S2 fights from during the wargame, and then refined based on results from the
wargame. d.
If the commander has been directly involved in the mission analysis, he may
decide to skip the MA briefing completely. (FM 101-5, pg. 5-29) (Note: It is
not recommended that the commander skip the MA brief altogether. There are
other ways he can get this information, not necessarily in a group brief, but
the MA brief is also for the staff as well as the commander and helps foster
coordination, integration, and synchronization. Individual briefs should be
the option of last resort, conducted only when the commander is pressed for
time. An example would be indicative of decisions the commander might have
to make during the heat of battle, not during a more deliberate planning process.)
e.
Detailed , directive written guidance and intent from the commander is an effective
way to save time and keep the staff focused. (FM 101-5, pg. 5-29) In providing
detailed guidance outlining what he expects in each course of action (COA)
developed, the commander may better organize his thoughts by providing written
guidance. The commander's comments here should form the genesis of the concept
of the operations statement for each staff section (concept of fires, concept
of CSS). 3.
Course
of Action Development:
a.
Significant time is saved by increased commander involvement in COA development.
The commander and selected members of the staff save additional time by conducting
a hasty wargame of possible COAs to determine which COA is favored. The results
of the hasty wargame help establish feasibility, acceptability, and suitability
of the COA for early decision, refinement, and adjustments prior to the detailed
wargame. (FM 101-5, pg. 5-30) b.
A hasty wargame can also be used to select a single COA for further development.
An early decision to go with a single COA allows the staff to focus their efforts
on the single COA instead of multiple COAs. (FM 101-5, pg. 5-30) The staff
should still use an evaluation criteria when using a single COA, one based
primarily on what the commander decides is important to him as well as other
significant factors the staff may develop. c.
Through the commander's guidance, the commander can dictate particular evaluation
criteria to focus the staff and the COA analysis. d.
When time is severely limited, the quickest process comes from the commander
deciding to immediately begin personally developing one COA, with branch plans,
against the enemy's most likely COA. The commander determines which staff members
and subordinate commanders are critical to assist him in quickly developing
a flexible COA that will accomplish the mission. (FM 101-5, pg. 5-30) 4.
Course
of Action Analysis (Final Wargame):
a.
An early decision to limit the number of COAs wargamed, or to develop only
one COA, saves the greatest amount of time in this process. (FM 101-5, pg.
5-30) b.
The commander can supervise the wargame and be prepared to make decisions,
provide guidance, delete unsatisfactory concepts, and assist in keeping the
staff focused. If the commander is present during the wargaming of multiple
COAs, he may identify the COA he favors. He can then discard unwanted COAs,
allocating more time to refine the selected COA. (FM 101-5, pg. 5-30) c.
When only one COA is developed, the purpose of the COA wargame is to verify,
refine, synchronize, and integrate the commander's COA and recommend modifications
as required. (FM 101-5, pg. 5-31) (Integration should be initiated prior to
the wargame so that during the analysis participants can focus on action/reaction/counteraction
versus where to put the Stinger team.) d.
Warning Order No. 3, published after COA analysis, should contain sufficient
guidance and information to execute the overall plan and, if necessary, include
graphics done to scale. However, as a continual requirement, set a sketch as
a minimum. 5.
Course
of Action Comparison:
If
the commander decides to wargame only one COA, or if he chooses one during
the wargame, no course of action comparison is needed. (FM 101-5, pg. 5-31)
(It is recommended that throughout the wargame and afterwards, the XO/S3/commander
use the evaluation criteria as a tool to ensure they are not deviating from
significant factors already identified.) 6.
Course
of Action Approval:
If
only one COA is developed, no decision/approval is required, unless the developed
COA becomes unsuitable, infeasible, or unacceptable. (FM 101-5, pg. 5-31) (However,
it is hard to imagine a commander NOT wanting to approve/see the developed
COA, especially if his last input was planning guidance for the operation.
To stay abreast, the commander may personally participate in COA development
or he may require a COA decision briefing prior to the wargame.) 7.
Orders
Production:
a.
When time is short, accept less than an optimum product. Eliminate unnecessary
annexes and ensure tasks to subordinate units are articulated in paragraph
3. (FM 101-5, pg. H-4) (It is recommended to not delete a given staff section's
annex or appendix from the OPORD; however, it can be pared down to the bare
essentials. Subordinate unit supporting arms planners rely on these annexes
as guidance from higher headquarters. All annexes may not be directly important
to maneuver commanders, but they are important to the CS and CSS planners who
support them.) b.
Reduce all essential elements to their simplest form, eliminating elements
not essential to mission success. (FM 101-5, pg. H-4) c.
Send plans and orders to subordinates in time to allow them to adequately plan
and prepare their own actions. (FM 101-5, pg. H-4) NOTE:
The following links contain subject matter that may support you and your unit.
The information contains templates and tips as you work to develop procedures
during the staff planning process.
TIPS
ON STAFF PLANNING
RECEIPT
OF MISSION TIPS FOR THE COMMANDER
REVERSE
BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM (BOS) WORKSHEET SAMPLE
MISSION
ANALYSIS TIPS FOR THE COMMANDER
EXAMPLE
IMPLIED TASKS FOR MISSION ANALYSIS
COURSE
OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT/ANALYSIS TIPS FOR THE COMMANDER AND THE STAFF
LEADER/STAFF
RECONNAISSANCE PLAN
RECONNAISSANCE
AND SURVEILLANCE PLANNING
COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE
BRIGADE/BATTALION
COMMANDER PLANNING
POSITIONING
OF THE COMMANDER ON THE BATTLEFIELD
BRIGADE
COMMANDER JRTC DEBRIEF
SUGGESTED
TOPICS AND QUESTIONS FOR THE COMMANDER'S AAR
BATTLE
COMMANDERS - TRAINING PRIORITIES FOR CONSIDERATION
TOOLS
FOR COMMANDERS TO INFLUENCE THE FIGHT
BATTALION
COMMANDER'S BACKBRIEF TO BRIGADE COMMANDER
RISK
ASSESSMENT - A TECHNIQUE
BRIGADE
COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE CALL FORMAT
WARNING
ORDER FORMAT
EXAMPLE
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) TO OPORD XXXXX 00-01
COMMANDER'S
GUIDANCE WORKSHEET
OBSERVER/CONTROLLER
OBSERVATIONS ON THE TASK FORCE STAFF
COMBINED
ARMS REHEARSAL SEQUENCE
REHEARSE
CRITICAL PHASES, EVENTS AND TASKS
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