• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Note: Many of the observations listed below may seem to be common sense or SOP; however, after five or six days into a rotation (or combat), when staff personnel become stressed, tired, confused, or injured, the obvious is not the norm. Cognitive abilities are greatly diminished and the abnormal becomes almost normal. These observations do not necessarily represent approved doctrine; rather, they are comments from units who completed the Leaders Training Program and from LTP coaches. They are not listed by criticality.

• Ensure that the commander, XO, and S3 determine and provide guidance on the format the commander desires for his staff update and battle update prior to going into the box.

• Sketches incorporated into the order present a better picture and may reduce verbiage.

• Consolidated graphics at battalion and brigade are important. They must be detailed, neat, and updated on a regular basis.

• Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) representatives must be available and prepared to advise the S3 during planning should there be any critical issues regarding feasibility to support an operation. The XO and S3 should verify issues prior to briefing.

• If the commander fights from the TOC during the defense, ensure that TAC vehicles are within the TOC security perimeter, in a hide position, to protect them from ground/helicopter attack and artillery. The TAC must be prepared to move on short notice. Someone in the TOC should prepare maps and charts needed by the TAC.

• Battle captains need a smaller version of the TOC charts that the TAC requires so that they can be quickly filled out and provided to the TAC before it deploys.

• Ensure there is a viable rest plan within the TOC. The commander and staff cannot go without sleep. Guidance is four hours uninterrupted sleep per day to sustain oneself. A rest plan is key in the intermediate staging base (ISB); otherwise, the leaders and staff will be burned out before movement into the box.

• Brigade and battalions must continually work at obtaining graphics from their subordinate units after the operations order (OPORD). It is best for the brigade to send common graphics back to the battalions (and battalion to companies) to ensure that everyone knows what is going on, and that everyone (to include the brigade commander) has the same picture. It is important that battalions add their own control measures. Some brigades mandate that battalions will not use additional control measures other than those prescribed by brigade when passing reports. (Coaches comment: This is not the most optimal solution.) Another time to obtain graphics is after brigade/battalion rehearsals. By then most corrections have been made and all units are present at one time. Another solution is for brigade to require battalions to provide overlays with the control measures/graphics they want to use in reporting to the brigade; brigade can then add these control measures to their own graphics.

• When a battle captain comes on shift, he should call higher headquarters to ensure he has the latest warning order (WARNO) and fragmentary order (FRAGO), and then call lower and ensure they have everything.

• Prior to deployment to JRTC, battalions should have a predetermined method for providing orders and graphics to their companies. This method/plan should be rehearsed to ensure it works.

• Ensure that copies of all OPORDs, WARNOs, and FRAGOs are sent to higher HQS.

• Brigade and battalion commanders should consider time for subordinate commanders to conduct required rehearsals and backbriefs.

• The need for liaison officers (LNOs)/NCOs at the brigade level is important. Do not send the most expendable person. The LNO can greatly assist in tracking RFI and providing the next higher headquarters insight regarding orders and FRAGOs. The LNO is the battalion voice and representative at the higher headquarters.

• The LNO must have transportation and communications support. He must attend all MDMP/orders preparation briefs and be provided the documents produced for these briefings so that he can answer questions from his unit.

• All vehicle radios and multiple subscriber radio and telephones (MSRT) for the TAC must be constantly checked - especially the fills. Drivers must be reliable and become the radio/communications expert in that vehicle; however, all primary users of the vehicle should be completely knowledgeable with all communications equipment. This will not occur without a good train-up program followed by hands-on testing.

• TOC battle drill must be rehearsed during each shift. This sounds obvious, but many units do not practice these drills at all. One is told, "Well, they're in the TOC SOP and everyone knows them." All TOCs should consider rehearsing a quick reaction force (QRF) drill when moving into a new area, then rehearse the QRF again at night. Keep the drills simple and ensure subordinate units also practice them.

• Consider using concept sketches developed during the course of action (COA) development-planning phase as the initial decision support template (DST), and then post the sketches near the operations map for the battle captain and NCO to use as the operation develops. One battalion prepared a concept sketch during COA development, and used the same sketch with some refinement during the wargame. They then used it again, with additional refinement, during the backbrief to the brigade commander, and finally posted it next to the S3 operations map. The S3 then briefed the entire current shift regarding the upcoming attack using the same sketch. If initially developing two COAs, both COAs should be developed on similar COA charts; otherwise, it is difficult for the commander to see the difference.

• At times the brigade and battalion commander make weather calls; i.e., when will they move or not move via helicopter. They must provide aviation and the ground forces' commanders a REDCON on when to go or when to switch to truck or foot movement.

• Do not presume that the battle captain and NCOs are aware of all details concerning upcoming operations. The S3 must brief them. Emphasize the Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and advise them of any branches that may have been discussed with the commander.

• RTOs must understand the CCIR. Include these in the shift change brief. Post a 5x8 card with CCIR at their workstation. Do not forget to include CCIR changes in WOs and FRAGOs.

• CCIR should be posted with a latest time information is of value (LTIOV) designation.

• CCIR in the CP should have an as of date time group (DTG) designation.

• Proposed CCIR and updates should occur at each battle update brief (BUB).

• BOS representatives must keep the TOC informed of the status of ADA, engineer, and medical assets. If these representatives are away from the TOC, the battle captain must obtain the information.

• Changes in the CCIR must be one of the items covered in the shift change briefing. Staff huddle and FRAGOs should be used to get the word out quickly.

• Consider establishing a CCIR standard as a baseline.

• The wargame should include a short discussion of the "what if the enemy has success" probability. You cannot presume that you will always win. This may be a branch or sequel discussion. Do not wish away the "what-ifs" by counting on assets that you do not control. Army aviation assets and USAF close air support (CAS) will not always kill all the enemy mech counter attack force.

• Brigade and battalion timelines should incorporate subordinate commanders' travel times, backbriefs, and rehearsals. This should be available for all personnel in the TOC. Brigade does not help matters by taking the battalion commander away from his TOC for hours at a time on a recurring basis. Conference calls and radio updates can help, as well as having the higher commander visit his subordinates. The S3 needs to take a person to record results of the visits, so the information can be shared with everyone.

• Mass "weight the main effort, be strong at the decisive point." Giving each subordinate headquarters a piece of the combat multiplier "pie" does not necessarily weight the main effort for success. Ensure the staff understands all the assets that are available to weight the main effort. BOS representatives must know what is available from the higher headquarters and how to obtain it. They must understand the plan so they can reinforce the case for additional assets.

• Brigade must prioritize and battalions must execute. Just because a battalion has four small emplacement excavators (SEEs) and a tank platoon does not mean they will keep them longer than it makes sense. Task organization is done for a purpose and must be reviewed during the conduct of operations and phases. The key to allocation is information management. Once a unit has achieved an end-state consider reallocation. As soon as a unit receives additional assets and determines who will receive them, send out a WARNO so the subordinate unit has maximum planning time with that unit. Conduct a staff huddle and ensure everyone knows about the new asset. Do not forget the S1, S4, and trains.

• There is a tendency to try someone's "great idea" for the first time while at JRTC. This can be accomplished with coordination, but never discard the fundamental basics. Do what is in your SOP, do what you have trained and do it to standard.

• Have a cut time for changes to your SOP, otherwise the subordinate units will not be able to publish their changes and drill their SOP before deployment/JRTC. A 75-percent solution that everyone understands is better than a 100-percent solution most people do not understand or receive without adequate time to react.

• Many battle captains and NCOs have not been told what is important: CCIR. Many units come to the JRTC without the required battle tracking charts and internal information management systems that enable a commander to see what is occurring as the battle develops. Simply logging an event accomplishes nothing. The purpose of the event, what impact it has on the battalion/brigade, who needs to know about it and when - that is important.

• Develop TOC charts before deployment. Get NCO input; they are the ones who update them. Ensure that these charts provide information that the commander needs. They should be tied in with reports from the companies. Ensure the commander, XO, and S3 review them. If any of these personnel change the chart format, the information requirements may change also.

• Battle captains must take time to become familiar with the OPORDs, WARNOs, and FRAGOs. This may involve reading them prior to the shift change. Battle captains should attend orders briefs if possible. A battle captain that does not understand the order will be reactive rather than proactive.

• Clearly define which decisions the battle captain and NCOs can make and which must be made by the S3, XO, or commander. Do this by the type of operation.

• Ensure all charts and maps have an "as of" date/time group, and designate someone (by duty position) to update them.

• BOS representatives must keep the S3 and battle captain updated on BOS assets moving in and out of the AO in order to prevent fratricide.

• Graphics and terminology are important. Many officers use words imprecisely; know and adhere to approved terms and use them correctly. Use doctrinal lexicon. Over 30 percent of infantry company grade officers cannot explain the difference between "defeat" and "destroy." Use common symbols and terms in your SOP and consider testing your officers and NCOs on them.

• Many units draw lines on maps that cannot be found on the ground. Graphics should speak for themselves. They must be simple and deconflicted. Always exchange and deconflict higher, lower, and laterally. Remember that the enemy is not bound by graphics. The enemy looks for seams and gaps, and, once found, they can unhinge the best defense or disrupt and attack formations. Be precise: A marker that covers 250 meters on a 1/50,000-map sheet is not the standard.

• The battle captain should check the TOC after a graphics change to ensure the entire staff has the change and that it is posted correctly. Always publish a FRAGO to ensure subordinate companies and separate platoons have received the change.

• Backbriefs are not an entertainment show; commanders and certain principals must attend. It is important to get things resolved. All of the key players must "keep their head in the game" - it is work. In many instances it is a continuation of "synching the fight." Brigade/battalion must have standardized charts to ensure everyone is on the same sheet of music. There must be a common view of the battlefield, ensuring the plan is supportable at all levels. Ensure all units have format and briefing requirements. Time is wasted redoing briefings because no one knows what the commander wants.

• The commander and S3 should be asking, "Is the operation a brigade or a battalion fight?" Some missions demand brigade orchestration. Others urge decentralization. There is no single solution. In most instances the airborne/air assault forced entry, defense, and deliberate attack are brigade fights.

• Command and control of air assaults must be drilled and rehearsed. Units need backpack capability for long-haul communications. Assume nothing about the aircraft. On-board systems periodically fail, and there are times when a unit must off-load troops or ground helicopters.

• Staff drills must be trained. Do this before and during the operation. Be prepared to respond to likely contingencies. Think through mass casualty (MASCAL) situations, enemy contact, Q-36 activation, downed aircraft, artillery/mortar attack on the TOC/TAC, and so on. Develop standard drills, put them in the TOC SOP, and practice them.

• Ensure the commander's intent makes sense. At times the commander may just babble. Stick to basic fundamentals (key tasks and endstate) and do not become overly creative.

• Reverse-plan all air assaults. Do not let the army airspace command and control (A2C2) clerk drive the train. In any air assault ask the question, "What is the defeat mechanism?" Plan from there. Involve the aviation liaison officer early in the process. Consider not only aircraft available, but also fighter management and maintenance problems. Have a good bump plan. Aviators need to be at rehearsals.

• Keep plans simple, especially for operations conducted during periods of limited visibility. Plans with too many moving parts are doomed to failure.

• Ensure that responsibility for the brigade rear area is clearly delineated in the brigade order and on brigade operational graphics.