Rocket and Artillery Troops

Towed Artillery Self-Propelled Artillery Artillery Rockets

In Russia, the artillery is often called 'the God of War' [Bog Voyny]. It was not without reason that Stalin called artillery "the God of War." Many analysts considered the old Soviet Army an "artillery army with a lot of tanks". The Soviet and Russian Armies have long given special emphasis to the "God of War"-the artillery.

In the introduction to his book, The Red God of War, British military analyst Chris Bellamy vividly describes some of the effects of massive artillery barrages. Basing his description on eyewitness reports from several wars, he recounts the "sheer horror" and the "sense of hopelessness" artillery barrages create among those on the receiving end. For soldiers subjected to massive artillery barrages, artillery is a "monstrous, apparently unstoppable machine, slicing mechanically through earth, rock, flesh, bone and spirit." The "psychological effect multiplies its cold lethality many times." Bellamy continues: "Artillery oppresses, jars, stuns and disorientates the enemy and lifts the morale of its own troops. Artillery and rockets provide the greatest firepower and sear a path for infantry, mechanized forces and armour both physically and spiritually. Throughout the centuries, no army has understood this better than the Russian."

Since its introduction into Moscow in the fourteenth century, artillery has arguably been the centerpiece of Russian combat power. According to medieval records, the Russians first used guns to defend Moscow against the Mongols in the late summer of 1382. Based on this chronicled date, in 1982 the Soviet Army celebrated the 600th anniversary of Russian artillery with great fanfare.

The Tsar-Cannon in the Moscow Kremlin is a memorial of ancient Russian artillery and founding art, a piece of ordnance of the biggest caliber in the world. Master of the Cannon-yard Andrey Chokhov cast it of bronze in 1586. The length of the cannon is 5,34 m, the caliber is 890 mm, the thickness of the barrel is 15 cm, and it weighs 40 tons. In the XVI-XVIl centuries the cannon was placed in Kitay-Gorod for defense of the Kremlin and the passage across the Moskva-river. However, the Tsar-Cannon has never shot. The decorative gun-carriage and empty-bodied cast-iron cannon-balls lying at the foot of the cannon were cast in 1835.

Generally, tactical Soviet field artillery weapons may be classified as cannon, small and large free-flight rockets, and guided missiles. Cannon includes all tube weapons such as mortars, guns, gun/howitzers, and howitzers. Rockets are either the smaller varieties fired from multiple launchers or the larger versions similar to the Honest John. Tactical guided missiles are classified as those with maximum ranges up to 700 nautical miles.

Stalin paid close attention to all sectors of the defense industry. For example, the aviation industry, he worked on a daily basis. The industry was led by AI Shakhurin, who visited him more than any other commissars, one might say, almost every day. Stalin studied the issue daily summaries of aircraft and aircraft engines, demanding explanations and action in each case of deviation from the schedule, examined in detail the issues related to the development of new aircraft and the development of the aviation industry. The same can be said about his involvement in addressing the work tank and military shipbuilding industry.

Artillery in the Great Patriotic War

On artillery and artillery industry, Stalin, showed the greatest concern. In relation to Stalin's artillery and artillery industry felt a special sympathy. It is possible that this was due to his memories of his past military activity, when only artillery decide the outcome of battles, and all other types of equipment have not yet reached such a high degree of development, what they got before World War II. Stalin expressed his attitude to guns, repeating the catch phrase: "The artillery - the god of war."

In the period between the two world wars artillery systems had undergone radical modification and improvement based on the latest scientific and technological achievements. New types of weapons were developed and tested in the USSR long before the beginning of World War II and remained largely unchanged until the final defeat of the enemy. Overall, the Red Army artillery weapons system throughout the war did not feel the need for new calibres or urgent need to radically new designs.

The great work done in the pre-war period, enabled the designers and production-vooruzhentsam focus their creative efforts in the war on the further improvement of artillery weapons and improving its manufacturing process. This made it possible to improve the performance of systems that facilitate the design of parts and components, to better organize production, increase output and reduce its cost.

After the Great War, work on construction of an anti-small arms in all major Western countries continued in the same direction, which is essentially limited the possibilities to get a good tactical and technical performance of antitank weapons. Increased machine guns caliber, bullet weight and its initial speed, while maintaining the necessary qualities for the anti-aircraft fire (in particular the rate of fire) as required to increase the weight and dimensions of the structures that make them unsuitable as an infantry anti-tank weapons. Gunsmiths came to the conclusion that "with increasing tank armor penetration heavy machine guns can not be considered sufficient and these guns gradually lose its former importance as antitank weapon" (Fedorov. The evolution of small arms. M., 1939). There was a further development of anti-tank weapons in the transition from a small-caliber small arms to artillery.

Soviet designers Degtyarev, Tokarev and Simonov created a semi-automatic and non-automatic anti-tank guns caliber 14.5 mm with an initial 1,000 meters bullet per second or more. They had good tactical and technical indicators: were simple in design, comfortable, reasonable weight and size, in the campaign two soldiers without much effort could carry a weapon.

And at the same time there was a proposal to remove from productionthe cannons of caliber 45 and 76 millimeters, as allegedly ineffective in combat against tanks. Apparently, it was based on outdated data, and perhaps even on the misinformation being spread by Hitler's command regarding the anti-tank and equipment of the Wehrmacht. But the Soviet military, while exaggerating the power of the German tanks, explicitly downplayed the effectiveness of the German anti-tank weapons. They were late in the evaluation of these funds.

The artillery of the Red Army of the late 1930s was beginning to reap the benefits of Stalin's Five Year Plans. Large numbers of modern 76-, 122- and 152-mm guns and howitzers were leaving state factories and entering the artillery regiments. The first test of these new weapons came in late 1939 when Stalin launched his assault on Finland. The Russians then concentrated the majority of true guns and howitzers in non-divisional regiments and brigades.

As World War II progressed, the Red Army concentrated more and more of its guns and howitzers into large non-divisional units. Whereas the 19,000-man 1939 rifle division had 82 guns and howitzers, the late-1941 rifle division had 12,000 men with only 24 artillery weapons. As partial compensation, the number of mortars (82- and 120-mm) went from 30 to 108. The reasons for this were simple: it was going to take many months for the factories to replace the huge losses of 1941, and in the meantime, mortars were far simpler for hastily trained replacements to use and much easier to produce.

By the end of the War, the Russians had created more than 90 artillery divisions (usually with 288 guns and howitzers) and some 140 separate artillery brigades. In 1941, roughly 20 percent of Soviet artillery was in non-divisional units; by 1944, more than 65 percent of the artillery was in artillery divisions and brigades. In 1943, the Russians formed artillery corps headquarters to control particularly dense concentrations of guns. By the end of World War II, the Red Army was supported by a huge artillery organization, manning more than 500 divisional artillery units, 149 independent brigades and 90 artillery divisions. Additionally, the Soviet artillery had built up a rocket force without parallel, with units as large as rocket divisions.

Artillery in the Cold War

With the fall of Khruschev, the Soviet Army began to re-think the possibility of an East-West conflict's having a protracted, non-nuclear phase. Simultaneously, the overall size of the Army began to grow rapidly. In 1965, the Soviet Army had 147 divisions. By 1974, they had 167 and by 1987, more than 200 divisions. As part of this increase, there was an unprecedented growth in conventional artillery strength.

By the early 1960s, as in World War II, approximately one-third of the Soviet combat forces wore the artillery insignia. Since World War II, Soviet artillery experienced a rate of growth and development unequaled by any power in modern times. It was, modestly speaking, the very backbone of defense and the striking force of the attack. The Soviets, true to their unswerving belief in the tactic of MASS, attach at least as great a significance to massed artillery as they do to massed infantry or massed armor. The very fact that Russian artillerymen have substituted the term "artillery attack" for the traditional "artillery preparation" manifests the emphasis placed on artillery.

In Great Patriotic War, when large numbers of cheap, unrefined and relatively simple cannon and multiple rocket launchers, were often employed "hub-to-hub," the Soviets were able to place effective massed fires on their enemies. By the 1960s, the weapons were not so unrefined, inaccurate, and cumbersome. Indeed, they were sophisticated and highly mobile weapons.

By the early 1960s the division artillery consisted of two artillery regiments, each with two howitzer battalions of twelve 122-mm howitzers each. One regiment had a mortar battalion of twelve 160-mm mortars; the other, a gun battalion of twelve 85-mm towed guns. Most howitzer battalions are equipped with the 122-mm howitzer M1938 (fig 28). The 160-mm mortar M1953 has a long tube which breaks near the base plate for loading. The round is then inserted through the open breech, and the weapon is fired by a trigger.

The antiaircraft artillery regiment of 1960 had two light batteries of six twin 57-mm SP AA guns each and two medium batteries of six towed 85-mm AA guns. By 1980 the Tank Division might have a Surface to Air Missile regiment equipped with SA-8 SAM or an AAA regiment equipped with S-60 AA Guns instead of the SA-6 SAM regiment.

The Soviets employ rockets on a larger scale than any other army. The rocket battalion has twelve 150-mm BM-14 multiple launchers. These may be replaced by a six-round launcher, which first appeared in a Moscow parade in 1957. These 17-foot rockets were estimated to be 240-mm in caliber. Apparently, the Soviets intend to expand the use of these mobile area fire weapons, which have served them so well in the past.

With the realization that the battlefield might not be nuclear, it was obvious that an increase in field artillery was the best solution. The latter half of the 1970s saw many Soviet moves in this direction.

  • The artillery battery in motorized rifle regiments became a battalion.
  • Many army-level artillery regiments began converting to four-battalion brigades.
  • The 2S1(122-mm) and 2S3(152-mm) self-propelled weapons were introduced into maneuver divisions.
  • Specialized artillery support and reconnaissance vehicles based on MT-LB (armored personnel carrier) and BMP chassis were introduced.
In the fifteen years up to 1980 Soviet ground forces dramatically increased their conventional military power to the point where they have become the most heavily armed force in the world. The United States Army has responded to these increases in many respects, but significant gaps still remain. As in so many categories of conventional military power, the Soviet Army possesses a dramatic numerical superiority in artillery.

As the 1980s began, further steps were taken to improve the quantity and quality of Soviet artillery. Many non-divisional units increased their guns from six to eight per battery. New munitions were introduced, such as high performance flechette rounds for suppressive fires and incendiary rounds for multiple rocket launchers. Much equipment was added:

  • BM-27 rocket launcher (MRL).
  • The 2S1 self-propelled, amphibious howitzer, fielded in 1974, was used by the Soviets in Afghanistan.
  • The Soviet 2S3, 152-mm howitzer, basically a copy of the American M109, 155-mm howitzer, was used at the division level.
  • 2S5, long-range, self-propelled 152-mm gun.
  • 2S7 self-propelled 203-mm gun.
  • 82-mm automatic mortar.
  • Computerized fire control equipment.
  • Some divisional battalions increased to 24 weapons per battalion.

With the realization of the possibility (indeed the increasing probability) of a conventional phase to any future war, the Soviets conducted exhaustive studies of their own and others military historical experience to determine solutions to the problems such a battlefield might present. A major aspect of this analysis was the realization that artillery will have to accomplish many of the missions previously allocated to nuclear weapons, particularly during the initial period of war. As a result, significant emphasis has been placed on developing the artillery force structure and concepts of employment in the last decade. This was apparent from the increased deployment of artillery systems in general and self- propelled systems in particular as well as the substantial attention artillery tactics receives in the Soviet military press. The allocation of gun tubes in the Motorized Rifle Divisions increased from 168 to 228. The Army Artillery Regiments had likewise grown from 54 to 96 tubes. Development of new systems like the M1975 240 mm mortar and 120 mm airborne howitzer-mortar also pointed to continued interest in new designs.

By the late 1980s the Soviets probably had flooded the division with as much organic artillery as it can reasonably control: seven battalions of cannons, an MRL battalion, a free rocket over ground (FROG) battalion and an antitank battalion. Now the Soviets have more artillery battalions organic to a motorized rifle division than infantry battalions (nine). The introduction of six-weapon "Vasilek" automatic mortar batteries as replacements for the 120-mm mortar at battalion level substantially increased the suppressive firepower available to motorized rifle units.

The Rocket Troops and Artillery have been an important combat arm of the Ground Forces because of the belief that firepower has tremendous destructive and psychological effect on the enemy. A single Soviet artillery battalion firing 18 BM-21 rocket launchers can place 35 tons of explosive rockets on a target 17 miles away in just 30 seconds. In 1989 the Ground Forces had eighteen artillery divisions, in addition to the artillery and missile units organic to armies and divisions. Artillery and surface-to-surface missile brigades were attached to each combined arms or tank army. An artillery regiment and a surface-to-surface missile battalion were parts of each Soviet motorized rifle and tank division. In 1989 the Rocket Troops and Artillery manned 1,400 "operational-tactical" surface-to-surface missile launchers.

The December 1987 INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union called for the elimination of all short-range ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers. The treaty required elimination of more than 900 Soviet SS-12 and SS-23 missile launchers. As of mid-1989, all SS-12 missiles had been eliminated. All SS-23 missiles had to be eliminated before the end of 1989, according to the terms of the treaty. After the reductions mandated in the treaty, the Soviet battlefield missile inventory still contained over 800 modern SS-21 missile launchers with a range of 100 kilometers, as well as older SS-1 launchers and unguided free rocket over ground (FROG) missiles that were fielded in the 1950s. These tactical missiles can deliver nuclear or chemical weapons as well as conventional munitions.

In 1989 the Rocket Troops and Artillery had approximately 30,000 artillery pieces; of these, 10,000 were capable of firing conventional high-explosive, nuclear, or chemical rounds. Since the 1970s, this powerful combat arm has fielded more than 5,000 selfpropelled 122mm and 152mm howitzers, 152mm and 203mm guns, and 240mm mortars. These artillery pieces, which are mounted on tank chassis, have replaced some towed artillery pieces. The Rocket Troops and Artillery also had truck-mounted multiple rocket launchers, each with forty tubes, to provide massive fire support for the Ground Forces.

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