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Military


Artillery is the god of war
Stalin

Artillery in the Great Patriotic War

Towed Artillery

Anti-tank Guns
calibernameyearbuilt
37mm1K1930509
37mmType 19441944472
45mmType 19321932?
45-mm53-K1937..
45mmType 1937193737,354
45-mmM-5 1942 prototype..
45-mmM-61942 prototype..
45mmM-42194210,843
57mmZIS-2194113,710
57-mmZIS-2S sample1943..
57-mmZIS-2SN model1943..
57-mmM-16-21946 prototype..
57-mmLB-3 1946 prototype..
76-mmZIS-S-58-11944 prototype..
85-mmD-48..
85-mmD-48N..
85-mmZIS-S-8 1945 prototype..
100mmBS-3 field gun19443,916
Mountain guns
calibernameyearbuilt
76mmType 19091909?
76mmType 193819381,068
Battalion and regimental guns
calibernameyearbuilt
76mmType 1927192718,000
76-mmF-241939 type..
76-mmregimental gun. Prototype1927/1942 years..
76-mmC-5-1.1943 prototype..
76mmOB-2519435,192
76-mmM-27. Prototype1943..
Kurchevsky - Dynamo-Reactive Gun DRP
calibernameyearbuilt
76mmTowed DRP1932+++
Mountain Guns
calibernameyearbuilt
76-mmcannon model1909
76-mm35-K 1935 prototype..
76-mmmountain cannon model1938..
76-mmGP (M-99)1958..
Divisional Guns
calibernameyearbuilt
76mmType 1902/3019024,350
76-mmF-201935 prototype.
76mmF-2219362,932
76mmSPM19399,812
76mmZIS-31942103,000
76-mmBL-14 1944 prototype..
85 mmD-44..
85 mmBL-251944 prototype..
107mmType M-601940139
122mmType 1909/371909900
122mmType 1910/3019105,900
122 mmA-19 cannon1931/1937 model..
122-mmD-30 howitzer ..
122mmM-30193819,266
152mmNM1931129
Corps Army Guns
calibernameyearbuilt
107mmType 1910/301910863
122mmA-191931450
122mmA-1919312,450
152mmType 1909/3019092,611
152mmType 1910/37191099
152mmType 1910/301910152
152mmType 1910/341910275
152mmM-1019381,522
152mmD-119432,827
152mmML-2019376,884
Anti-aircraft Guns
calibernameyearbuilt
25mm72K19404,860
37mm61K193918,872
76mm3K19313821
76mmType 19381938?
85mm52K193914,422
Large Mortarss
calibernameyearbuilt
107-mmmountain-mortar1938..
120-mmregimental mortar model1938..
152-mmgun "Hyacinth-B" 2A36..
160-mmdivision mortar M-160..
240 mmmortar M-240..
Large and special power Guns
calibernameyearbuilt
152mmBR-2193537
203mmB-419311010
210mmBR-1719399
280mmBR-5193947
305mmBR-1819393
Railway Artillery
calibernameyearbuilt
180mmTM-1-180 19..20
305mmTM-2-12 19..
305mmTM-3-12 19..3
356mmTM-1-14 19..6
356mmTP-1 19..1
500mmTG-1 19..1
On artillery and artillery industry, Stalin showed the greatest concern. In relation to Stalin's artillery and artillery industry felt a special sympathy. It is possible that this was due to his memories of his past military activity, when only artillery decide the outcome of battles, and all other types of equipment have not yet reached such a high degree of development, what they got before World War II. Stalin expressed his attitude to guns, repeating the catch phrase: "The artillery - the god of war."

In the period between the two world wars artillery systems had undergone radical modification and improvement based on the latest scientific and technological achievements. New types of weapons were developed and tested in the USSR long before the beginning of World War II and remained largely unchanged until the final defeat of the enemy. Overall, the Red Army artillery weapons system throughout the war did not feel the need for new calibres or urgent need to radically new designs.

The great work done in the pre-war period, enabled the designers and production-vooruzhentsam focus their creative efforts in the war on the further improvement of artillery weapons and improving its manufacturing process. This made it possible to improve the performance of systems that facilitate the design of parts and components, to better organize production, increase output and reduce its cost.

After the Great War, work on construction of an anti-small arms in all major Western countries continued in the same direction, which is essentially limited the possibilities to get a good tactical and technical performance of antitank weapons. Increased machine guns caliber, bullet weight and its initial speed, while maintaining the necessary qualities for the anti-aircraft fire (in particular the rate of fire) as required to increase the weight and dimensions of the structures that make them unsuitable as an infantry anti-tank weapons. Gunsmiths came to the conclusion that "with increasing tank armor penetration heavy machine guns can not be considered sufficient and these guns gradually lose its former importance as antitank weapon" (Fedorov. The evolution of small arms. M., 1939). There was a further development of anti-tank weapons in the transition from a small-caliber small arms to artillery.

Soviet designers Degtyarev, Tokarev and Simonov created a semi-automatic and non-automatic anti-tank guns caliber 14.5 mm with an initial 1,000 meters bullet per second or more. They had good tactical and technical indicators: were simple in design, comfortable, reasonable weight and size, in the campaign two soldiers without much effort could carry a weapon.

And at the same time there was a proposal to remove from production the cannons of caliber 45 and 76 millimeters, as allegedly ineffective in combat against tanks. Apparently, it was based on outdated data, and perhaps even on the misinformation being spread by Hitler's command regarding the anti-tank and equipment of the Wehrmacht. But the Soviet military, while exaggerating the power of the German tanks, explicitly downplayed the effectiveness of the German anti-tank weapons. They were late in the evaluation of these funds.

The artillery of the Red Army of the late 1930s was beginning to reap the benefits of Stalin's Five Year Plans. Large numbers of modern 76-, 122- and 152-mm guns and howitzers were leaving state factories and entering the artillery regiments. The first test of these new weapons came in late 1939 when Stalin launched his assault on Finland. The Russians then concentrated the majority of true guns and howitzers in non-divisional regiments and brigades.

As the War progressed, the Red Army concentrated more and more of its guns and howitzers into large non-divisional units. Whereas the 19,000-man 1939 rifle division had 82 guns and howitzers, the late-1941 rifle division had 12,000 men with only 24 artillery weapons. As partial compensation, the number of mortars (82- and 120-mm) went from 30 to 108. The reasons for this were simple: it was going to take many months for the factories to replace the huge losses of 1941, and in the meantime, mortars were far simpler for hastily trained replacements to use and much easier to produce.

By the end of the War, the Russians had created more than 90 artillery divisions (usually with 288 guns and howitzers) and some 140 separate artillery brigades. In 1941, roughly 20 percent of Soviet artillery was in non-divisional units; by 1944, more than 65 percent of the artillery was in artillery divisions and brigades. In 1943, the Russians formed artillery corps headquarters to control particularly dense concentrations of guns. By the end of World War II, the Red Army was supported by a huge artillery organization, manning more than 500 divisional artillery units, 149 independent brigades and 90 artillery divisions. Additionally, the Soviet artillery had built up a rocket force without parallel, with units as large as rocket divisions.

The only area in which the Red Army showed much interest in mobile indirect-fire artillery was the Guards mortar, better known as Katyushas or multiple rocket launchers. The Red Army pioneered the use of multiple rocket launchers for artillery use, and used them in greater profusion than any other army during the Great Patriotic War. These artillery rocket launchers were usually mounted on trucks, and by the end of the war, over 10,000 launchers had been manufactured. A total of 40 independent battalions, 105 independent regiments, 40 independent brigades and 7 divisions had been equipped with these weapons, not to mention the numerous divisional guards mortar units.

The Katyushas were popular with the Red Army for two reasons. On the logistical side, many Soviet artillery factories had been overrun by the Germans in the opening months of the war. Conventional tubed artillery requires elaborate (and expensive) machining. Katyushas, on the other hand, can be readily manufactured by small machine shops with little specialized equipment. The second attraction of the Katyushas for the Red Army was their applicability to the style of massed firepower favored by Russian artillery men. A single truck mounted launcher could ripple fire a rocket salvo, equivalent to a battery of conventional guns. The Katyushas were mounted on trucks since their very distinctive back-blast when fired required frequent movement to avoid hostile counter-battery fire. The limited accuracy of this style of weapons was not a major concern, since they were intended to supplement conventional artillery, not replace it. Conventional artillery could be used in roles, such as counter- battery fire, where accuracy was demanded.





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