Artillery is the god of war
– Stalin

Artillery in the Great Patriotic War

Towed Artillery
Anti-tank Guns
caliber	name	year	built
37mm	1K	1930	509
37mm	Type 1944	1944	472
45mm	Type 1932	1932	?
45-mm	53-K	1937	..
45mm	Type 1937	1937	37,354
45-mm	M-5	1942 prototype	..
45-mm	M-6	1942 prototype	..
45mm	M-42	1942	10,843
57mm	ZIS-2	1941	13,710
57-mm	ZIS-2S sample	1943	..
57-mm	ZIS-2SN model	1943	..
57-mm	M-16-2	1946 prototype	..
57-mm	LB-3	1946 prototype	..
76-mm	ZIS-S-58-1	1944 prototype	..
85-mm	D-48	..
85-mm	D-48N	..
85-mm	ZIS-S-8	1945 prototype	..
100mm	BS-3 field gun	1944	3,916
Mountain guns
caliber	name	year	built
76mm	Type 1909	1909	?
76mm	Type 1938	1938	1,068
Battalion and regimental guns
caliber	name	year	built
76mm	Type 1927	1927	18,000
76-mm	F-24	1939 type	..
76-mm	regimental gun. Prototype	1927/1942 years	..
76-mm	C-5-1.	1943 prototype	..
76mm	OB-25	1943	5,192
76-mm	M-27. Prototype	1943	..
Kurchevsky - Dynamo-Reactive Gun DRP
caliber	name	year	built
76mm	Towed DRP	1932	+++
Mountain Guns
caliber	name	year	built
76-mm	cannon model	1909
76-mm	35-K	1935 prototype	..
76-mm	mountain cannon model	1938	..
76-mm	GP (M-99)	1958	..
Divisional Guns
caliber	name	year	built
76mm	Type 1902/30	1902	4,350
76-mm	F-20	1935 prototype	.
76mm	F-22	1936	2,932
76mm	SPM	1939	9,812
76mm	ZIS-3	1942	103,000
76-mm	BL-14	1944 prototype	..
85 mm	D-44	..
85 mm	BL-25	1944 prototype	..
107mm	Type M-60	1940	139
122mm	Type 1909/37	1909	900
122mm	Type 1910/30	1910	5,900
122 mm	A-19 cannon	1931/1937 model	..
122-mm	D-30 howitzer	..
122mm	M-30	1938	19,266
152mm	NM	1931	129
Corps Army Guns
caliber	name	year	built
107mm	Type 1910/30	1910	863
122mm	A-19	1931	450
122mm	A-19	1931	2,450
152mm	Type 1909/30	1909	2,611
152mm	Type 1910/37	1910	99
152mm	Type 1910/30	1910	152
152mm	Type 1910/34	1910	275
152mm	M-10	1938	1,522
152mm	D-1	1943	2,827
152mm	ML-20	1937	6,884
Anti-aircraft Guns
caliber	name	year	built
25mm	72K	1940	4,860
37mm	61K	1939	18,872
76mm	3K	1931	3821
76mm	Type 1938	1938	?
85mm	52K	1939	14,422
Large Mortars
caliber	name	year	built
107-mm	mountain-mortar	1938	..
120-mm	regimental mortar model	1938	..
152-mm	gun "Hyacinth-B" 2A36	..
160-mm	division mortar M-160	..
240 mm	mortar M-240	..
Large and special power Guns
caliber	name	year	built
152mm	BR-2	1935	37
203mm	B-4	1931	1010
210mm	BR-17	1939	9
280mm	BR-5	1939	47
305mm	BR-18	1939	3
Railway Artillery
caliber	name	year	built
180mm	TM-1-180	19..	20
305mm	TM-2-12	19..
305mm	TM-3-12	19..	3
356mm	TM-1-14	19..	6
356mm	TP-1	19..	1
500mm	TG-1	19..	1

On artillery and artillery industry, Stalin showed the greatest concern. In relation to Stalin's artillery and artillery industry felt a special sympathy. It is possible that this was due to his memories of his past military activity, when only artillery decide the outcome of battles, and all other types of equipment have not yet reached such a high degree of development, what they got before World War II. Stalin expressed his attitude to guns, repeating the catch phrase: "The artillery - the god of war."

In the period between the two world wars artillery systems had undergone radical modification and improvement based on the latest scientific and technological achievements. New types of weapons were developed and tested in the USSR long before the beginning of World War II and remained largely unchanged until the final defeat of the enemy. Overall, the Red Army artillery weapons system throughout the war did not feel the need for new calibres or urgent need to radically new designs.

The great work done in the pre-war period, enabled the designers and production-vooruzhentsam focus their creative efforts in the war on the further improvement of artillery weapons and improving its manufacturing process. This made it possible to improve the performance of systems that facilitate the design of parts and components, to better organize production, increase output and reduce its cost.

After the Great War, work on construction of an anti-small arms in all major Western countries continued in the same direction, which is essentially limited the possibilities to get a good tactical and technical performance of antitank weapons. Increased machine guns caliber, bullet weight and its initial speed, while maintaining the necessary qualities for the anti-aircraft fire (in particular the rate of fire) as required to increase the weight and dimensions of the structures that make them unsuitable as an infantry anti-tank weapons. Gunsmiths came to the conclusion that "with increasing tank armor penetration heavy machine guns can not be considered sufficient and these guns gradually lose its former importance as antitank weapon" (Fedorov. The evolution of small arms. M., 1939). There was a further development of anti-tank weapons in the transition from a small-caliber small arms to artillery.

Soviet designers Degtyarev, Tokarev and Simonov created a semi-automatic and non-automatic anti-tank guns caliber 14.5 mm with an initial 1,000 meters bullet per second or more. They had good tactical and technical indicators: were simple in design, comfortable, reasonable weight and size, in the campaign two soldiers without much effort could carry a weapon.

And at the same time there was a proposal to remove from production the cannons of caliber 45 and 76 millimeters, as allegedly ineffective in combat against tanks. Apparently, it was based on outdated data, and perhaps even on the misinformation being spread by Hitler's command regarding the anti-tank and equipment of the Wehrmacht. But the Soviet military, while exaggerating the power of the German tanks, explicitly downplayed the effectiveness of the German anti-tank weapons. They were late in the evaluation of these funds.

The artillery of the Red Army of the late 1930s was beginning to reap the benefits of Stalin's Five Year Plans. Large numbers of modern 76-, 122- and 152-mm guns and howitzers were leaving state factories and entering the artillery regiments. The first test of these new weapons came in late 1939 when Stalin launched his assault on Finland. The Russians then concentrated the majority of true guns and howitzers in non-divisional regiments and brigades.

As the War progressed, the Red Army concentrated more and more of its guns and howitzers into large non-divisional units. Whereas the 19,000-man 1939 rifle division had 82 guns and howitzers, the late-1941 rifle division had 12,000 men with only 24 artillery weapons. As partial compensation, the number of mortars (82- and 120-mm) went from 30 to 108. The reasons for this were simple: it was going to take many months for the factories to replace the huge losses of 1941, and in the meantime, mortars were far simpler for hastily trained replacements to use and much easier to produce.

By the end of the War, the Russians had created more than 90 artillery divisions (usually with 288 guns and howitzers) and some 140 separate artillery brigades. In 1941, roughly 20 percent of Soviet artillery was in non-divisional units; by 1944, more than 65 percent of the artillery was in artillery divisions and brigades. In 1943, the Russians formed artillery corps headquarters to control particularly dense concentrations of guns. By the end of World War II, the Red Army was supported by a huge artillery organization, manning more than 500 divisional artillery units, 149 independent brigades and 90 artillery divisions. Additionally, the Soviet artillery had built up a rocket force without parallel, with units as large as rocket divisions.

The only area in which the Red Army showed much interest in mobile indirect-fire artillery was the Guards mortar, better known as Katyushas or multiple rocket launchers. The Red Army pioneered the use of multiple rocket launchers for artillery use, and used them in greater profusion than any other army during the Great Patriotic War. These artillery rocket launchers were usually mounted on trucks, and by the end of the war, over 10,000 launchers had been manufactured. A total of 40 independent battalions, 105 independent regiments, 40 independent brigades and 7 divisions had been equipped with these weapons, not to mention the numerous divisional guards mortar units.

The Katyushas were popular with the Red Army for two reasons. On the logistical side, many Soviet artillery factories had been overrun by the Germans in the opening months of the war. Conventional tubed artillery requires elaborate (and expensive) machining. Katyushas, on the other hand, can be readily manufactured by small machine shops with little specialized equipment. The second attraction of the Katyushas for the Red Army was their applicability to the style of massed firepower favored by Russian artillery men. A single truck mounted launcher could ripple fire a rocket salvo, equivalent to a battery of conventional guns. The Katyushas were mounted on trucks since their very distinctive back-blast when fired required frequent movement to avoid hostile counter-battery fire. The limited accuracy of this style of weapons was not a major concern, since they were intended to supplement conventional artillery, not replace it. Conventional artillery could be used in roles, such as counter- battery fire, where accuracy was demanded.