Battling the Invisible Enemy: One Year LaterDHS 26 Mar 2021 -- Volume II highlights S&T's response to COVID-19 through day 365 and beyond, including scientific studies, multifaceted support to DHS components and partners, and a look ahead to what’s next.
GEC Special Report: Pillars of Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda EcosystemUS Dept. of State Aug 2020 -- "(...) this report draws on publicly available reporting to provide an overview of Russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. Russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem is the collection of official, proxy, and unattributed communication channels and platforms that Russia uses to create and amplify false narratives. The ecosystem consists of five main pillars: official government communications, state-funded global messaging, cultivation of proxy sources, weaponization of social media, and cyber-enabled disinformation. The Kremlin bears direct responsibility for cultivating these tactics and platforms as part of its approach to using information as a weapon. It invests massively in its propaganda channels, its intelligence services and its proxies to conduct malicious cyber activity to support their disinformation efforts, and it leverages outlets that masquerade as news sites or research institutions to spread these false and misleading narratives."
RussiaUK House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 21 Jul 2020 -- "The Report covers aspects of the Russian threat to the UK (Cyber; Disinformation and Influence; and Russian Expatriates) followed by an examination of how the UK Government – in particular the Agencies and Defence Intelligence – has responded (Allocation of Effort; Strategy, Co-ordination and Tasking; A Hard Target; Legislation; International Partnerships; and Engagement with Russia)."
The Trump-Ukraine Impeachment Inquiry ReportHouse Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 03 Dec 2019 [PDF Version] -- "As described in this executive summary and the report that follows, President Trump’s scheme subverted U.S. foreign policy toward Ukraine and undermined our national security in favor of two politically motivated investigations that would help his presidential reelection campaign. The President demanded that the newly-elected Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, publicly announce investigations into a political rival that he apparently feared the most, former Vice President Joe Biden, and into a discredited theory that it was Ukraine, not Russia, that interfered in the 2016 presidential election. To compel the Ukrainian President to do his political bidding, President Trump conditioned two official acts on the public announcement of the investigations: a coveted White House visit and critical U.S. military assistance Ukraine needed to fight its Russian adversary."
A cautious embrace: defending democracy in an age of autocraciesHouse of Commons - Foreign Affairs Committee 04 Nov 2019 -- "This report focuses on three policy areas: autocracies’ influence on academic freedom; the use of sanctions against autocracies; and the UK’s cooperation with other democracies in responding to autocracies. It is necessary for the Government to engage with autocracies, for reasons of security, trade and tackling issues such as climate change and modern slavery. We concentrate in particular on Russia and China. Our evidence suggests that both have engaged in overt and covert interference in the affairs of the UK and its partners."
Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident AttributionODNI Released 06 Jan 2017 -- "On December 9, 2016, President Barack Obama directed the Intelligence Community to conduct a full review and produce a comprehensive intelligence report assessing Russian activities and intentions in recent U.S. elections. We have completed this report and briefed President Obama as well as President-elect Trump and Congressional leadership. We declassified a version of this report for the public, consistent with our commitment to transparency while still protecting classified sources and methods.
The Intelligence Community did not make an assessment of the impact that Russian activities had on the outcome of the 2016 election, and DHS assesses that the types of systems the Russian actors targeted or compromised were not involved in vote tallying. "
GRIZZLY STEPPE – Russian Malicious Cyber ActivityDHS-NCCIC / FBI Released 29 Dec 2016 -- This Joint Analysis Report (JAR) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This document provides technical details regarding the tools and infrastructure used by the Russian civilian and military intelligence Services (RIS) to compromise and exploit networks and endpoints associated with the U.S. election, as well as a range of U.S. Government, political, and private sector entities. The U.S. Government is referring to this malicious cyber activity by RIS as GRIZZLY STEPPE.
Unclassified Version of March 6, 2015 Message to the Workforce from CIA Director John Brennan: Our Agency's Blueprint for the FutureCentral Intelligence Agency 06 Mar 2015 -- The "Agency's leadership team has made a number of decisions building upon the Agency's Strategic Direction that are designed to strengthen our Agency in the years ahead. (...) The initiatives described below are driven by two fundamental shifts in the national security landscape. The first is the marked increase in the range, diversity, complexity, and immediacy of issues confronting policymakers; and the second is the unprecedented pace and impact of technological advancements."
Feinstein Statement on CIA Accountability Review Board, IG ReportsOffice of Sen. Feinstein 14 Jan 2015 -- “"Let me be clear: I continue to believe CIA’s actions constituted a violation of the constitutional separation of powers and unfortunately led to the CIA’s referral of unsubstantiated criminal charges to the Justice Department against committee staff."
NSA Reports to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB)National Security Agency Released 24 Dec 2014 -- Following a classification review, the National Security Agency (NSA) is releasing in redacted form NSA reports to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB). The release includes quarterly reports submitted from the fourth quarter of 2001 to the second quarter of 2013. The materials also include four annual reports (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010) which are consolidations of the relevant quarterly reports.
Feinstein Statement on Redactions in Detention, Interrogation StudyOffice of Sen. Feinstein 05 Aug 2014 -- “After further review of the redacted version of the executive summary, I have concluded that certain redactions eliminate or obscure key facts that support the report’s findings and conclusions. Until these redactions are addressed to the committee’s satisfaction, the report will not be made public."
Press Conference by the PresidentThe White House 01 Aug 2014 -- "And when we engaged in some of these enhanced interrogation techniques, techniques that I believe and I think any fair-minded person would believe were torture, we crossed a line. And that needs to be -- that needs to be understood and accepted. And we have to, as a country, take responsibility for that so that, hopefully, we don't do it again in the future."
Law Enforcement Disclosure Report - Legal AnnexeVodafone June 2014 -- This annexe to Vodafone’s Law Enforcement Disclosure report seeks to highlight some of the most important legal powers available to government agencies and authorities seeking to access customer communications across the 29 countries of operation covered in this report. Whilst the legal powers summarised here form part of local legislation in each of those countries and can therefore be accessed by the public, in practice very few people are aware of these powers or understand the extent to which they enable agencies and authorities to compel operators to provide assistance of this nature.
USAF RPA Vector: Vision and Enabling Concepts 2013–2038United States Air Force 17 Feb 2014, Released 4 Apr 2014 -- This document refines the Air Force strategic vision for the future of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) and reemphasizes the inherent potential and emerging capabilities of small unmanned aircraft systems (SUAS). The RPA Vector outlines concepts and capabilities needed over the next 25 years. It can inform the capabilities planning and requirements development process as well as inform the CFLIs as they execute their responsibilities for implementation planning in the plans, programming, budgeting and execution process.
Uncorrected Transcript of EvidenceUK Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 7 Nov 2013 -- Sir Iain Lobban, Director, Government Communication Headquarters; Mr Andrew Parker, Director General, Security Service, MI5; Sir John Sawers, Chief, Secret Intelligence Service, MI6 - "Today's open session, being the first ever, will involve an examination of a number of issues involving the Intelligence Agencies. It will include current controversies; it will include the threats that the Agencies are working to counter; the Agencies' conduct when performing their duties; the legal and policy framework within which they must operate; whether they need special legal powers; and whether it is right and necessary for them to receive, each year, £2 billion of public funds to carry out their work."
Administration White Paper: Bulk Collection Of Telephony Metadata Under Section 215 Of The USA Patriot ActUS Dept. of Justice Released 9 Aug 2013 -- "This white paper explains the Government’s legal basis for an intelligence collection program under which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtains court orders directing certain telecommunications service providers to produce telephony metadata in bulk. The bulk metadata is stored, queried and analyzed by the National Security Agency (NSA) for counterterrorism purposes. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“the FISC” or “the Court”) authorizes this program under the “business records” provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1861, enacted as section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 215)."
Global Trends 2030: Alternative WorldsNational Intelligence Council Dec 2012 -- "Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds is the fifth installment in the National Intelligence Council’s series aimed at providing a framework for thinking about the future." [PDF 20.5MB]
DNI RELEASES BUDGET FIGURE FOR 2010 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMOffice of the Director of National Intelligence 28 Oct 2010 -- Consistent with Section 364 of the "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010," Public Law 111-259, the Director of National Intelligence is disclosing to the public the aggregate amount of funds appropriated by Congress to the National Intelligence Program (NIP) for Fiscal Year 2010 not later than 30 days after the end of the fiscal year.
Message from the Director: Lessons from KhowstCentral Intelligence Agency 19 Oct 2010 -- "Earlier this year, I directed that a task force of seasoned Agency professionals conduct a review of the Khowst attack. The purpose was to examine what happened, what lessons were learned, and what steps should be taken to prevent such incidents in the future. In addition, I asked Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Charlie Allen, a highly accomplished former Agency officer, to conduct an independent study of the Khowst attack and to review the work of the task force. They concurred with its findings. One of CIA’s greatest strengths is our ability to learn from experience, refine our methods, and adapt to the shifting tactics of America’s enemies."
Rights Groups File Challenge To Targeted Killing By U.S.Center for Constitutional Rights 30 Aug 2010 -- The American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a lawsuit challenging the government's asserted authority to carry out "targeted killings" of US citizens located far from any armed conflict zone.
Report No. 2009-0013-AS: Unclassified Report On The President's Surveillance ProgramOffices of Inspectors General of the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Office of the Director of National Intelligence 10 Jul 2009 -- Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008 required the Inspectors General (IGs) of the elements of the Intelligence Community that participated in the President's Surveillance Program (PSP) to conduct a comprehensive review of the program. The IGs of the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence participated in the review required under the Act. The Act required the IGs to submit a comprehensive report on the review to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Committee on the Judiciary.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES - Re: Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 15 Jan 2009 -- The purpose of this memorandum is to confirm that certain propositions stated in several opinions issued by the Office of Legal Counsel in 2001-2003 respecting the allocation of authorities between the President and Congress in matters of war and national security do not reflect the current views of this Office. We have previously withdrawn or superseded a number of opinions that depended upon one or more of these propositions. For reasons discussed herein, today we explain why these propositions are not consistent with the current views of OLC, and we advise that caution should be exercised before relying in other respects on the remaining opinions identified below [PDF Version]
Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry Into The Treatment Of Detainees In U.S. CustodyUS Senate Armed Services Committee Released 11 Dec 2008 -- "The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed to the actions of "a few bad apples" acting on their own. The fact is that senior officials in the United States government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees. Those efforts damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that could save lives, strengthened the hand of our enemies, and compromised our moral authority. This report is a product of the Committee's inquiry into how those unfortunate results came about."
43 Retired Generals and Admirals to U.S. Senate: Require Single Standard for Interrogations 12 Feb 2008 -- "As retired military leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces, we write to express our strong support for Section 327 of the Conference Report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082. Section 327 would require intelligence agents of the U.S. government to adhere to the standards of prisoner treatment and interrogation contained in the U.S. Army Field Manual on Human Collector Operations (the Army Field Manual)."
Commanding General David H. Petraeus' Letter about ValuesMulti-National Forces - Iraq 10 May 2007 -- "Our values and the laws governing warfare teach us to respect human dignity, maintain our integrity, and do what is right. Adherence to our values distinguishes us from our enemy. This fight depends on securing the population, which must understand that we - not our enemies - occupy the moral high ground." [PDF Version]
al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist ThreatHouse Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence September 2006 -- "Almost five years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States remains a nation at war. Al-Qaeda and Islamist extremist terrorist groups with like-minded goals and ideologies remain one of the most immediate strategic threats to the national security of the United States. Nonetheless, the threat we face today is quite different from the terrorist threat that we faced prior to September 11, 2001."
Recognizing Iran as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence Challenge for the United StatesHouse Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy Released 23 Aug 2006 -- "This report provides an unclassified assessment of the Iran question to help the American public understand the seriousness of the Iranian threat and to discuss ways U.S. intelligence collection and analysis against Iran must be improved."
Legal Authorities Supporting The Activities Of The National Security Agency Described By The PresidentU.S. Department of Justice 19 Jan 2006 -- As the President has explained, since shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, he has authorized the National Security Agency (“NSA”) to intercept international communications into and out of the United States of persons linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations. The purpose of these intercepts is to establish an early warning system to detect and prevent another catastrophic terrorist attack on the United States. This paper addresses, in an unclassified form, the legal basis for the NSA activities described by the President (“NSA activities”).
Radio Address by the President to the NationThe White House 17 Dec 2005 -- "In the weeks following the terrorist attacks on our nation, I authorized the National Security Agency, consistent with U.S. law and the Constitution, to intercept the international communications of people with known links to al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations. "
DoD Directive No. 3115.09: DoD Intelligence Interrogations, Detainee Debriefings, and Tactical Questioning 03 Nov 2005 -- "By the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under references (a) through (c), this Directive: (...) Consolidates and codifies existing Departmental policies, including the requirement for humane treatment during all intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, or tactical questioning to gain intelligence from captured or detained personnel(...); Assigns responsibilities for intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, tactical questioning, and supporting activities conducted by DoD personnel (...); Establishes requirements for reporting violations of the policy regarding humane treatment during intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, or tactical questioning." [PDF 1.19MB]
The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of AmericaOffice of the Director of National Intelligence Released 26 Oct 2005 -- "The New concept of 'national intelligence' codified by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act passed by Congress in 2004 has its origins in the tragedy of September 11, 2001 and President Bush's National Security Strategy of the United States of America." [PDF 696 KB]
Letter by Retired Military Leaders to Senator John McCain 03 Oct 2005 -- "We strongly support your proposed amendments to the Defense Department Authorization bill concerning detainee policy, including requiring all interrogations of detainees in DOD custody to conform to the U.S. Army's Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation (FM 34-52), and prohibiting the use of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by any U.S. government agency."
President Nominates Negroponte as Director of National IntelligenceThe White House 17 Feb 2005 -- " I'm pleased to announce my decision to nominate Ambassador John Negroponte as Director of National Intelligence. The Director's responsibility is straightforward and demanding. John will make sure that those whose duty it is to defend America have the information we need to make the right decisions. John understands America's global intelligence needs because he spent the better part of his life in our foreign service, and is now serving with distinction in the sensitive post of our nation's first Ambassador to a free Iraq."
Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project National Intelligence Council December 2004, released January 2005 -- "Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project is the third unclassified report prepared by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in recent years that takes a long-term view of the future. It offers a fresh look at how key global trends might develop over the next decade and a half to influence world events. Mindful that there are many possible "futures," our report offers a range of possibilities and potential discontinuities, as a way of opening our minds to developments we might otherwise miss."
Report of an Inquiry into the Alternative Analysis of the Issue of an Iraq-al Qaeda RelationshipOffice of Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), Ranking Member, Senate Armed Services Committee 21 Oct 2004 -- "This report is the result of an inquiry initiated on June 27, 2003 by Senator Carl Levin, Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), and conducted by the SASC Minority Staff. The report focuses on 1) the establishment of a non-Intelligence Community source of intelligence analysis in the office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith; and 2) the extent to which policy makers utilized that alternative source rather than the analyses produced by the Intelligence Community (IC) with regard to the Iraq-al Qaeda relationship." [PDF 206 Kb]
White House Memo on H.R. 10 / S. 2845The White House 18 Oct 2004 -- "As the House Senate conference on intelligence reform legislation (H.R. 10 / S. 2845) meets, the Administration urges the Conferees to reach agreement on an effective bill to strengthen the nation's intelligence capabilities that both Houses can pass and the President can sign into law as soon as possible to meet the nation's security needs. There are many good provisions in both bills and the President endorses the best of each as outlined in this letter to strike a reasonable compromise that will best reorganize our intelligence capabilities and will make the country safer and stronger."
S. 2845US Senate 6 Oct 2004 -- To reform the intelligence community and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, and for other purposes.
H. R. 10US House of Representatives 24 Sep 2004 -- To provide for reform of the intelligence community, terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and international cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes
Iraq Survey Group Final ReportCentral Intelligence Agency 30 Sep 2004 -- " Given Iraq's investments in technology and infrastructure improvements, an effective procurement network, skilled scientists, and designs already on the books for longer range missiles, ISG assesses that Saddam clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and that the systems potentially were for WMD. (...) Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity and signifi cance of the pre-1991 Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq's ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed after that date. (...) Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable (...) In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons."
A Case to Answer: A first report on the potential impeachment of the Prime Minister for High Crimes and Misdemeanours in relation to the invasion of Iraq. by Glen Rangwala and Dan Plesch for Adam Price MP ImpeashBlair.org Aug 2004 -- "This report sets out compelling evidence of deliberate repeated distortion, seriously misleading statements and culpable negligence on the part of the Prime Minister. This misconduct is in itself more than sufficient to require his resignation. (...) The core conclusion of this report is that the impeachment of the Prime Minister has a strong basis in fact, and established precedent in parliamentary law. It is on this basis that a number of parliamentary colleagues have declared their intention to bring a Commons motion of impeachment as an indictment of the methods, practices and conduct of the Prime Minister in relation to the war in Iraq." [PDF 606 Kb]
Detainee Operations InspectionDepartment of the Army: The Inspector General 21 Jul 2004 -- "This inspection report responds to the Acting Secretary of the Army's 10 February 2004 directive to conduct a functional analysis of the Army's conduct of detainee and interrogation operations to identify any capability shortfalls with respect to internment, enemy prisoner of war, detention operations, and interrogation procedures and recommend appropriate resolutions or changes if required." [PDF 2.287 Mb]
Remarks by the President on Intelligence ReformThe White House 02 Aug 2004 -- "Today I'm asking Congress to create the position of a National Intelligence Director. That person -- the person in that office will be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and will serve at the pleasure of the President. The National Intelligence Director will serve as the President's principal intelligence advisor and will oversee and coordinate the foreign and domestic activities of the intelligence committee. (...) Today, I also announce that we will establish a National Counter-Terrorism Center. This new center will build on the analytical work, the really good analytical work of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, and will become our government's knowledge bank for information about known and suspected terrorists. The new center will coordinate and monitor counter-terrorism plans and activities of all government agencies and departments to ensure effective joint action, and that our efforts are unified in priority and purpose. The center will also be responsible for preparing the daily terrorism threat report for the President and senior officials."
Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence AgenciesAustralian Goverment 22 Jul 2004 -- "On 4 March 2004, the Prime Minister appointed Mr Philip Flood to inquire into the Australian intelligence agencies, consistent with a recommendation of the earlier report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee into ASIO, ASIS and DSD (PJCAAD) inquiry into intelligence on Iraq 's weapons of mass destruction. The report of this inquiry - Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies - considers the effectiveness of the intelligence community's current oversight and accountability mechanisms and the delivery of high quality and independent intelligence advice to the government, and includes case studies on Iraq , Jemaah Islamiyah and the Solomon Islands."
Revealing Some of the Top Secret Follow-on Reconnaissance Satellite Imagery & Data from Open Sources By (c) Charles P. Vick 7 Jun 2004 -- "Declassification of formerly classified U.S. intelligence imagery, documents and the former Soviet Union/Russian space industry histories are helping fill in large gaps in the historical record of the Soviet side of the manned Lunar race as illuminated by both Russian and American perspectives. (...) This present research report covers a ten step process to identify the data that can now be defined from open sources in spite of it not having yet been declassified by the U. S government."
Declassified August 6, 2001 Daily Presidential Brief: Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in USThe White House Declassiffied and Approved for Release 10 Apr 2004 -- "Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 11998 that his followers would follow the example of WOrld Trade Center bombing Ramzi Yousef and "bring the fighting to America."" [PDF 214 Kb]
Inquiry into Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)Australia Parliamentary Joint Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD Released on 01 Mar 2004 -- "The United States and the United Kingdom argued that war against Iraq was necessary because Iraq had defied, over a period of 12 years, United Nations Security Council resolutions, which sought the disarmament of Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. In particular, both governments and the Australian government which joined in the coalition, argued that intelligence had revealed that Iraq continued to possess and indeed was increasing its holdings of weapons of mass destruction. (...) The arguments about the need to go to war were controversial (...) In Australia, the Senate referred this matter to the Joint Parliamentary Committee on ASIO, ASIS and DSD on 18 June 2003. The Committee was asked to consider the nature, accuracy and independence of the intelligence used by the Australian government and the accuracy and completeness of the presentation of that intelligence by the Australian government to the Parliament and people of Australian."
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction - Intelligence and AssessmentsIntelligence and Security Committee Sep 2003 -- "The purpose of this Report is to examine whether the available intelligence, which informed the decision to invade Iraq, was adequate and properly assessed and whether it was accurately reflected in Government publications. This Report does not judge whether the decision to invade Iraq was correct." [PDF 600 Kb]
A Review of the FBI's Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip HanssenU.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General August 14, 2003 -- In this report, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) examines the performance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in deterring, detecting, and investigating the espionage of Robert Philip Hanssen, a former FBI Supervisory Special Agent. Hanssen's espionage began in November 1979 - three years after he joined the FBI - and continued intermittently until his arrest in February 2001, just two months before his mandatory retirement date. In addition to its management responsibility to detect espionage among its employees, the FBI is the lead agency for detecting and investigating espionage committed in the United States.
S. REPT. NO. 107- 351 / H. REPT. NO. 107-792: Report Of The Joint Inquiry Into The Terrorist Attacks Of September 11, 2001- By The House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence And The Senate Select Committee On Intelligence, December 2002, Released 2003
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: IRAQ'S CONTINUING PROGRAMS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION [EXCERPTS] October 2002 -- As Released by The White House on July 18, 2003 -- "We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon during this decade. (See INR alternative view at the end of these Key Judgments.)"
Press Release: CODEL Goss Visit to BaghdadPermanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House Of Representatives July 15, 2003 -- "Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Porter Goss (R-FL), Ranking Democrat Jane Harman (D-CA), and Congressmen Jim Gibbons (R-NV) and Robert "Bud" Cramer (D-AL) conducted a 3-day oversight mission focused on Iraq. (...) On July 10th, the CODEL met Coalition officials in Baghdad to review the efforts underway to determine the status of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and establish security in Iraq following Operation Iraqi Freedom." [PDF]
STATEMENT BY GEORGE J. TENET, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCECentral Intelligence Agency 11 Jul 2003 -- "Legitimate questions have arisen about how remarks on alleged Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium in Africa made it into the President's State of the Union speech. Let me be clear about several things right up front. First, CIA approved the President's State of the Union address before it was delivered. Second, I am responsible for the approval process in my Agency. And third, the President had every reason to believe that the text presented to him was sound. These 16 words should never have been included in the text written for the President."
The Decision to go to War in Iraq, Ninth Report of Session 2002-03, Volume IUnited Kingdom House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee July 7, 2003 -- "This Report seeks to establish whether the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, within the Government as a whole, presented accurate and complete information to Parliament in the period leading up to military action in Iraq, particularly in respect of weapons of mass destruction. The focus on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is because their removal was the Government's prime objective." [PDF 1.03 Mb]
Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2002-2003United Kingdom Intelligence and Security Committee June 2003 -- "This Annual Report covers the period May 2002 to April 2003 and is the second Annual Report produced by the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) under the chairmanship of the Rt. Hon. Ann Taylor MP. The Committee also produced a special Report Inquiry into Intelligence, Assessments and Advice prior to the Terrorist Bombings on Bali 12 October 2002 in December 2002." [PDF 443 Kb]
Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent Production PlantsCentral intelligence Agency 28 May 2003 -- "Coalition forces have uncovered the strongest evidence to date that Iraq was hiding a biological warfare program. (...) The design, equipment, and layout of the trailer found in late April is strikingly similar to descriptions provided by a source who was a chemical engineer that managed one of the mobile plants. Secretary of State Powell's description of the mobile plants in his speech in February 2003 to the United Nations (see inset below) was based primarily on reporting from this source." [PDF Version 741 Kb]
FBI's Management Of Information Technology Investments, Report No. 03-09, December 2002U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, December 19, 2002 -- Effective use of information technology (IT) is crucial to the FBI's ability to meet this priority as well as its other critical responsibilities. However, reviews conducted by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the General Accounting Office (GAO) have found major weaknesses associated with the FBI's IT. (...) We found that the lack of critical IT investment management processes contributed to missed milestones and led to uncertainties about cost, schedule, and technical goals. Specifically, despite $78 million in additional funding, the FBI missed its July 2002 milestone date for completing the physical IT infrastructure upgrades to field offices, including new computer hardware and networks. (...) In addition, the user application component of Trilogy, recognized by FBI officials as the most important aspect of the project in terms of improving agent performance, is at high risk of not being completed within the funding levels appropriated by Congress." [PDF 2.71 Mb]