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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Six-Party Talks

Korean Central News Agency of DPRK via Korea News Service (KNS)

    Pyongyang, September 20 (KCNA) -- A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement in connection with the close of the fourth six-party talks. Its full text reads as follows:
    @ @Statement of a Spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
    The second phase of the fourth six-party talks on the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. that opened in Beijing on Sept. 13, drawing the attention of the international community, closed on Sept. 19.
    The talks that started on the DPRK's positive initiative in August 2003 were held several times for the last more than two years, repeatedly going through twists and turns.
    The talks, however, repeatedly proved fruitless and unproductive due to the conflicting stands among the parties concerned, contrary to the unanimous expectation of the international community toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We have approached the talks with magnanimity, patience and sincerity, proceeding from the principled, fair and aboveboard stand to achieve the general goal of the denuclearization of the peninsula at any cost. As a result, we have at last succeeded in meeting all these challenges, making it possible to agree on the joint statement, "verbal commitments".
    The joint statement reflects our consistent stand on the settlement of the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. and, at the same time, the commitments of the U.S. and south Korea responsible for denuclearizing the whole of the peninsula. As already known, the issue over which the DPRK and the U.S. have had most serious differences in the "verbal commitments" to denuclearize the peninsula so far was the issue of the former's right to nuclear activity for a peaceful purpose, to be specific, the issue of the U.S. provision of light water reactors (LWR) to the former. It was due to these differences that the first phase of the fourth talks held in August last was compelled to go into recess without yielding any desired fruits. The present U.S. administration, denying in principle the DPRK the right to nuclear activity for a peaceful purpose which pertains to an independent right of a sovereign state, insisted that it could not provide LWRs in any case under the pretext that the DPRK pulled out of the NPT and is no longer member of the IAEA. Opposing this wrong stand of the U.S., we made it clear that the basis of finding a solution to the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. is to wipe out the distrust historically created between the two countries and a physical groundwork for building bilateral confidence is none other than the U.S. provision of LWRs to the DPRK. We strongly demanded that the U.S. remove the very cause that compelled the DPRK to withdraw from the NPT by providing LWRs to it.
    At the talks, all the parties concerned except the U.S. supported the discussion of the issue of respecting the DPRK's right to nuclear activity for a peaceful purpose and providing LWRs to it.
    This time the U.S. delegation got in touch with Washington several times under the pressure of the trend of the situation and had no option but to withdraw its assertion. The six-parties agreed to take harmonious measures to implement phase by phase the points agreed on in the joint statement in accordance with the principle of "action for action" in the days ahead.
    As clarified in the joint statement, we will return to the NPT and sign the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and comply with it immediately upon the U.S. provision of LWRs, a basis of confidence-building, to us.
    As already clarified more than once, we will feel no need to keep even a single nuclear weapon if the DPRK-U.S. relations are normalized, bilateral confidence is built and we are not exposed to the U.S. nuclear threat any longer.
    What is most essential is, therefore, for the U.S. to provide LWRs to the DPRK as early as possible as evidence proving the former's substantial recognition of the latter's nuclear activity for a peaceful purpose.
    The U.S. should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK's dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing LWRs, a physical guarantee for confidence-building. This is our just and consistent stand as solid as a deeply rooted rock. We have so far shaped our policies towards the U.S. hardliners and will do so in the future, too.
    One should wait and see how the U.S. will move in actuality at the phase of "action for action" in the future but should it again insist on "the DPRK's dismantlement of nuclear weapons before the provision of LWRs", there will be no change in the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. and its consequences will be very serious and complicated.
    If the U.S. opts for reneging on its promise, we will go ahead without an inch of deflection along the road indicated by the Songun line, our faith and signpost. September 20, Juche 94 (2005)



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