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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments

Bureau of Verification and Compliance
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC
August 30, 2005


TABLE OF CONTENTS


I. Purpose
II. Scope of the Report 
III. Overview

Libyan Renunciation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
Expansion of START Compliance Section 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
Open Skies Treaty 

IV. Adherence to Agreements

A. Policy
B. U.S. Organizations and Programs to Evaluate and Ensure Treaty Compliance
C. Importance of Treaty and Commitment Enforcement

1. Noncompliance Challenges and Required Responses 
2. Enforcing Compliance 

D. U.S. Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments 

1. U.S. Institutional and Procedural Organization for Ensuring Compliance 
2. Treaty Compliance
3. Issues Raised by Other Treaty Parties Concerning U.S. Compliance

a. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
b. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 

V. Compliance by Successors To Treaties and Agreements Concluded Bilaterally with the Soviet Union

A. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
B. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)

VI. Compliance of Other Nations (Including Successors to the Soviet Union) with Multilateral Agreements

A. The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)

Country Assessments 

China
Cuba
Iran
Iraq 
Libya
North Korea
Russia
Syria

B. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)

Country Assessments

Armenia
Azerbaijan 
Belarus
Russia
Ukraine
Collective Obligations

C. The Vienna Documents of 1992, 1994, and 1999

D. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

Country Assessments

China
Iran
Libya
Russia
Sudan

E. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Agreement Provisions
Country Assessments

China
Iran
Iraq 
Libya 
North Korea

F. The Treaty on Open Skies

Country Assessments

Russia
Ukraine

VII. Compliance of Other Nations (Including Successors to the Soviet Union) with Their International Commitments

A. Missile Nonproliferation Commitments

Missile Technology Control Regime
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
Chinese Nonproliferation Commitments
Other Nonproliferation Commitments
Country Assessments

China
Russia


Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation,  and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments 

I. PURPOSE

This Noncompliance Report (NCR) is submitted pursuant to Section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2593) which requires a Report by the President on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.

This Report - the August 2005 edition of this Congressionally-mandated report - reflects the importance the Administration and the U.S. Congress place upon compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments. Such agreements and commitments only serve the national security interests of the United States if they are fully complied with. Other states' violations of such obligations can present grave threats to our security. For this reason, the United States places a very high priority upon verifying compliance with, and detecting violations of, such agreements and commitments - as well as upon ensuring that violators promptly return to compliance and that other would-be violators are deterred from breaking their own promises.

The United States has had some success in helping bring noncompliant countries back into compliance with their agreements and commitments, and in demonstrating that their return to compliance leads to improved relations with the United States. However, other countries have presented significant compliance problems, which are detailed herein, and of which U.S. decision-makers need to be aware. Particularly in a post-9/11 world in which there exists a very real threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) being used as weapons of terror, it is vital that the international community take all steps necessary to end noncompliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments and ensure that would-be future violators are deterred from taking such a provocative and dangerous course. The urgency of these tasks highlights the importance of the various initiatives President Bush has put forward to enhance compliance enforcement efforts, prevent WMD terrorism, and reduce proliferation risks. This Report contributes toward these goals by highlighting cases of noncompliance or of compliance concern so that policymakers can focus their attention upon returning violators to full compliance as rapidly as possible.

Another key objective of this Report is to make it very clear that the United States takes compliance assessment very seriously, and applies only the highest standards of analytical rigor in making its compliance findings. This point is not always well understood, particularly among countries that themselves may apply less rigorous approaches, or which may even make "compliance" judgments simply on the basis of policy likes or dislikes. Now more than ever, it is important that everyone understand the effort, seriousness, and rigor that go into U.S. compliance assessments. The unprecedented clarity and detail provided in this Report are designed to set the global standard for such work. 

 



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