



Report to Congress on Implementation of the New START Treaty

**Pursuant to paragraph (a)(10) of the Senate's Resolution of Advice
and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty (Treaty Doc.
111-5)**

NEW START TREATY ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION REPORT

This report is transmitted in response to Condition (a)(10) of the Senate's December 22, 2010, Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the "New START Treaty"). The New START Treaty was signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on February 5, 2011, upon exchange of the instruments of ratification.

Condition (a)(10) of the Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty calls for the President to submit a report to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate not later than January 31 of each year, beginning with January 31, 2012, providing:

- A.** details on each Party's reductions in strategic offensive arms between the date the New START Treaty entered into force and December 31, 2011, or, in subsequent reports, during the previous year;
- B.** a certification that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty, or a detailed discussion of any noncompliance by the Russian Federation;
- C.** a certification that any conversion and elimination procedures adopted pursuant to Article VI of the New START Treaty and Part Three of the Protocol have not resulted in ambiguities that could defeat the object and purpose of the New START Treaty, or -
 - (i)** a list of any cases in which a conversion or elimination procedure that has been demonstrated by Russia within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission remains ambiguous or does not achieve the goals set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of Section I of Part Three of the Protocol; and
 - (ii)** a comprehensive explanation of the steps the United States has taken with respect to each such case;
- D.** an assessment of the operation of the New START Treaty's transparency mechanisms, including -
 - (i)** the extent to which either Party encrypted or otherwise impeded the collection of telemetric information; and

(ii) the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric information;
and

E. an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance exists that endangers the national security interests of the United States.

On November 2, 2011, the President delegated authority to submit the Condition (a)(10) Report to the Secretary of State. On December 14, 2011, the Secretary of State delegated this authority to the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. This Report is divided into sections covering each of the items listed in Condition (a)(10).

A. Details on each Party's reductions in strategic offensive arms subject to the New START Treaty between January 1, 2024, and December 31, 2024.

The New START Treaty obligates the Parties to reduce and limit their forces so that seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, that is, by February 5, 2018, and for the remaining duration of the Treaty, each Party's aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms as counted in accordance with the Treaty do not exceed: 700 for deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers; 1,550 for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

Starting on February 28, 2023, when the Russian Federation notified the United States of its purported suspension of the Treaty, the Russian Federation ceased providing all Treaty-mandated data and notifications to the United States, including those notifications related to the elimination or conversion of strategic offensive arms subject to the New START Treaty.

In response to Russia's ongoing violations of the New START Treaty, including its failure to provide updated data regarding its strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty as of March 1, 2023, the United States, as a lawful countermeasure, ceased to provide its updated data as of March 1, 2023. As an additional lawful countermeasure, on June 1, 2023, the United States began withholding notifications required under the Treaty, including updates on the status of Treaty-accountable items such as missiles and launchers.

The United States

From January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024, the United States eliminated six Minuteman III ICBMs (three by test launch, two by static firing, and one using New START Treaty elimination procedures), and eight Trident II SLBM first stages (four using New START Treaty elimination procedures and four by static testing), in accordance with New START Treaty provisions on means for removal from accountability.

The Russian Federation

As a result of Russia's failure to provide Treaty-mandated data and notifications regarding its strategic offensive arms subject to the New START Treaty, the United States is unable to provide details on the Russian Federation's aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms and any reductions. The Russian Federation's failure to transmit Treaty-mandated notifications deprived the United States of a principal means of obtaining information on Russia's elimination and conversion of strategic offensive arms. This issue is detailed further in Section B of this report.

B. Certification that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty, or a detailed discussion of any noncompliance by the Russian Federation.

Based on information available as of December 31, 2024, the United States cannot certify the Russian Federation to be in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty. Following previous Russian violations and the Russian Federation's purported suspension of the Treaty as of February 28, 2023, Russia continued to violate several New START Treaty provisions in 2024.

Since 2022, Russia has failed to comply with its obligations to facilitate U.S. inspection activities on Russian territory and to convene sessions of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). Additionally, in the wake of its legally invalid purported suspension of the New START Treaty starting in February 2023, Russia further violated the Treaty by failing to comply

with its obligations to provide Treaty-required notifications and data updates, as well as its obligations related to the exchange of telemetric information.

Even after it announced its purported suspension of the New START Treaty, the Russian Federation has publicly and privately claimed on numerous occasions that it will continue to adhere to the Treaty's central limits. However, Russia's violation of its obligations to facilitate inspection activities on Russian territory, provide biannual data updates, and send notifications pertaining to strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty negatively affects the ability of the United States to verify Russia's compliance with the New START Treaty's deployed warhead limit.

The United States is unable to make a determination that the Russian Federation remained in compliance throughout 2024 with its obligation to limit its deployed warheads on delivery vehicles subject to the New START Treaty to 1,550, due to Russia's proximity to the limit as of its last update and failure to fulfill its obligations with respect to the Treaty's verification regime. The United States assesses with high confidence that Russia did not engage in any large-scale activity above the Treaty limits in 2024. However, Russia was probably close to the deployed warhead limit during much of the year and may have exceeded the deployed warhead limit by a small number during portions of 2024. Therefore, this constitutes a serious compliance concern.

Further information regarding the United States' findings can be found in the classified annex to this report.

Although the United States cannot certify that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty, it does not determine, per Condition (a)(10) of the Senate's Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the New START Treaty, that Russia's noncompliance specified in this report threatens the national security interests of the United States.

Background: Russia's Purported Suspension of the New START Treaty

This report's analysis of Russia's compliance with the New START Treaty following its purported suspension of the Treaty from February 28, 2023, onward assumes the legal invalidity of that suspension, consistent with the United States' established conclusion in this regard.

On March 14, 2023, the United States informed Russia via diplomatic note of the U.S. determination that Russia's purported suspension of the New START Treaty was legally invalid, stating that, as a result:

As a matter of international law, the Russian Federation remains bound by its obligations under the New START Treaty. Any Russian failure to fulfill those obligations will constitute further noncompliance with the New START Treaty.

Refusal to Permit U.S. Inspection Activities on Russian Territory

Noncompliance Finding: Throughout 2024, the Russian Federation failed to comply with its obligation to facilitate inspection activities under paragraph 1 of Section I of Part Five of the Protocol to the Treaty, thus denying the United States its Article XI right to conduct such inspection activities.

Background: In the Condition (a)(10) compliance report covering 2023, the United States concluded that Russia had failed to comply with its obligation to facilitate inspection activities under paragraph 1 of Section I of Part Five of the Protocol to the Treaty, and thus denied the United States its Article XI right to conduct such inspection activities. In 2024, Russia did not resume facilitation of U.S. inspection activities on its territory.

Compliance Analysis: As discussed above and in last year's compliance report, Russia's purported suspension of the New START Treaty is legally invalid. Russia thus remained bound to facilitate U.S. inspection activities on its territory, but failed to do so.

Refusal to Convene Sessions of the BCC

Noncompliance Finding: The Russian Federation has failed to comply with the obligations under paragraph 1 of Section III of Part Six of the Protocol to the Treaty regarding convening no fewer than two sessions of the BCC each year unless otherwise agreed.

Background: Paragraph 1 of Section III of Part Six of the Protocol to the Treaty states: “No fewer than two sessions of the BCC shall be convened each year, unless otherwise agreed.”

In March 2023, shortly after the Russian Federation’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty, the United States proposed convening a BCC session on an emergency basis. The Russian Federation promptly rejected the U.S. proposal, in light of Russia’s purported suspension of the Treaty.

Due to Russia’s purported suspension of the Treaty, no sessions of the BCC have been convened in Treaty Year 2024-2025. The Parties never agreed to convene fewer than two BCC sessions this year, and, as was the case in 2023, Russia bears sole responsibility for the failure to convene any sessions of the BCC in this Treaty Year.

Compliance Analysis: By refusing to convene any BCC session in Treaty Year 2024-2025, without the agreement of the United States, the Russian Federation failed to comply with the obligation in paragraphs 1 of Section III of Part Six of the Protocol to the Treaty.

Failure to Provide Treaty-Mandated Notifications

Noncompliance Finding: The Russian Federation has failed to comply with its obligations under paragraph 2 of Article VII of the Treaty and Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty by failing to provide Treaty-mandated notifications to the United States.

Background: Paragraph 2 of Article VII of the New START Treaty states: “Each Party shall notify the other Party about changes in data and shall provide other notifications in a manner provided for in Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.”

On February 28, 2023, the same day Russia notified the United States of its purported suspension, Russia ceased sending the United States Treaty-mandated notifications.

Compliance Analysis: As discussed above, Russia’s purported suspension of the New START Treaty – which is Russia’s justification for its failure to provide notifications under the Treaty – is legally invalid. Russia thus remained bound to provide Treaty-mandated notifications to the United States, but failed to do so.

Failure to Provide Biannual Data Updates

Noncompliance Finding: In connection with Russia’s noncompliance with its obligations to provide Treaty-mandated notifications, the Russian Federation refused to comply with its obligation under paragraph 2 of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty to provide updated data by the Treaty-mandated biannual deadlines.

Background: Paragraph 2 of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty requires that each Party provide:

Notification, to be provided no later than 30 days
after the expiration of each six-month period

following the entry into force of the Treaty, providing updated data for each category of data contained in Part Two of this Protocol. The first of these six-month periods shall begin the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the Treaty enters into force.

Following its purported suspension of the New START Treaty, and as part of its overall failure to provide notifications as required under paragraph 2 of Article VII and Part Four of the Protocol, Russia failed to provide the United States updated data on a biannual basis in the Treaty Year 2024-2025.

Compliance Analysis: As discussed above, Russia's purported suspension of the New START Treaty – which is Russia's justification for its failure to provide its biannual data updates – is legally invalid. Russia thus remained bound to provide this data to the United States, but failed to do so.

Failure to Discuss and Agree on Telemetry Exchange

Noncompliance Finding: The Russian Federation failed to comply with Article IX of the Treaty and paragraph 2 of Part Seven of the Protocol to discuss and agree on the number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted in calendar year 2023 for which telemetric information would be exchanged.

Background: Article IX of the Treaty provides:

By mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be exchanged on a parity basis.

Paragraph 2 of Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty, as modified by BCC Agreement No. 6, provides:

On an annual basis, within 120 days of the beginning of the calendar year, within the framework of the BCC, the Parties shall discuss the issue of the exchange of telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, focusing on launches conducted in the previous calendar year, on which an exchange of telemetric information will be carried out. Following discussion within the framework of the BCC, the Parties shall take an agreed decision on the number of such launches.

Compliance Analysis: Because Russia refused to engage in the framework of the BCC or to otherwise discuss New START Treaty implementation matters with the United States in 2024, the Parties did not discuss or agree on the number of ICBM and SLBM launches conducted in calendar year 2023 for which telemetric information would be exchanged, as required by the Treaty. As a result, no exchange of telemetric information occurred.

Deployed Warhead Limit

Russia's violations of its obligations to facilitate inspection activities on Russian territory, provide biannual data updates, and send notifications pertaining to strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty negatively affect the ability of the United States to verify Russia's compliance with the New START Treaty's deployed warhead limit.

The United States is unable to make a determination that the Russian Federation remained in compliance throughout 2024 with its obligation to limit its deployed warheads on delivery vehicles subject to the New START Treaty to 1,550, due to Russia's proximity to the limit as of its last data update and failure to fulfill its obligations with respect to the Treaty's verification regime. The United States assesses with high confidence that Russia did not engage in any large-scale activity above the Treaty limits in 2024. However, Russia was probably close to the deployed warhead limit during much of the year and may have exceeded the deployed warhead limit by a small number during portions of 2024. Therefore, this constitutes a serious compliance concern.

Background: Subparagraph 1(b) of Article II of the New START Treaty limits the warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers to 1,550. For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads is the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and on deployed SLBMs. Each deployed heavy bomber subject to the Treaty counts as one warhead toward the 1,550 limit.

Although the Russian Federation purported to suspend the New START Treaty in its entirety on February 28, 2023, Russia has stated, both publicly and in diplomatic correspondence with the United States, that Russia will abide by the Treaty's central limits on strategic offensive arms, which includes the limit on deployed warheads.

Russia's noncompliance with the Treaty's verification provisions is depriving the United States of several Treaty measures that strengthen each side's ability to assess the other's compliance with the deployed warhead limit. These measures include:

Twice a year in data updates, each side must declare:

- the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers that count toward the 1,550 limit;
- the total number of warheads on deployed ICBMs;
- the total number of warheads on deployed SLBMs; and,
- the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs at each ICBM base and submarine base subject to inspection, respectively.

As part of a Type One inspection, the inspected party must declare the number of reentry vehicles on each deployed ICBM and deployed SLBM present at the ICBM base or submarine base subject to the inspection. The inspecting party then selects one deployed missile at the inspected

base and visually confirms the actual number of reentry vehicles emplaced on it.

Each side must notify the other of changes in deployment status and location of strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty. In particular, changes in deployment status of ICBMs and SLBMs can help inform assessments of Russia's compliance with the Treaty's warhead limit, as warheads emplaced on missiles that change from deployed to non-deployed, or vice versa, would undergo a corresponding change in deployment status. This can indicate both large and small fluctuations in Russian deployed warhead numbers (e.g., the warheads emplaced on a previously-deployed Russian ICBM that enters a storage facility or the warheads emplaced on previously-deployed SLBMs removed from a Russian ballistic submarine that enters long-term maintenance).

This regime of verification measures plays an important role in assessing Russia's compliance with the New START Treaty's deployed warhead limit by providing information on Russia's strategic offensive arms that national technical means (NTM) are not able to provide on their own.

In the absence of biannual deployed warhead data declarations, the United States lacks a Treaty baseline upon which to base assessments of Russia's compliance with the deployed warhead number. Without Type One inspections, the United States lacks the more detailed Treaty snapshots of the number of reentry vehicles on each deployed ICBM and SLBM at Russian nuclear bases and the onsite ability to confirm the actual number of reentry vehicles emplaced on up to ten ICBMs and SLBMs per

Treaty year. The potential risk of U.S. detection of Russian inaccurate warhead declarations during Type One inspections can also act as a deterrent against Russia issuing false warhead declarations as a way of concealing possible cheating.

Analysis: The United States is unable to make a determination that the Russian Federation remained in compliance throughout 2024 with its obligation to limit its deployed warheads on delivery vehicles subject to the New START Treaty to 1,550, due to Russia's proximity to the limit as of its last data update and failure to fulfill its obligations with respect to the Treaty's verification regime. The United States assesses with high confidence that Russia did not engage in any large-scale activity above the Treaty limits in 2024. However, Russia was probably close to the deployed warhead limit during much of the year and may have exceeded the deployed warhead limit by a small number during portions of 2024. Therefore, this constitutes a serious compliance concern.

The United States has raised its concern regarding Russia's compliance with the New START Treaty central limits on a number of occasions. As recently as December 2024, the Russian Federation reaffirmed its intention to adhere to Treaty's central quantitative limits within the term of the duration of the Treaty but declined to discuss, or provide information to help allay, U.S. concerns regarding its compliance.

Resumption of inspection activities and provision of biannual data updates and notifications would not have eliminated all uncertainty regarding Russia's precise number of deployed warheads under the New

START Treaty in 2024. These measures, however, would have provided additional information to support U.S. assessments of the number of Russia's New START Treaty-accountable deployed warheads and thus would have been uniquely valuable for determining Russian compliance with its obligation under subparagraph 1(b) of Article II in 2024.

C. Certification that any conversion and elimination procedures adopted pursuant to Article VI of the New START Treaty and Part Three of the Protocol have not resulted in ambiguities that could defeat the object and purpose of the New START Treaty, or –

- (i) a list of any cases in which a conversion or elimination procedure that has been demonstrated by Russia within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission remains ambiguous or does not achieve the goals set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of Section I of Part Three of the Protocol; and
- (ii) a comprehensive explanation of the steps the United States has taken with respect to each such case.

During the course of this reporting period (January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024), no conversion or elimination procedures have been adopted pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty and Part Three of the Protocol.

D. An assessment of the operation of the New START Treaty's transparency mechanisms, including –

- (i) the extent to which either Party encrypted or otherwise impeded the collection of telemetric information; and
- (ii) the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric information.

The New START Treaty provides for the exchange of telemetric information on an equal number of U.S. and Russian launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, but no more than five per calendar year.

As discussed in Section B of this report, because the Russian Federation refused to engage in the framework of the BCC or otherwise discuss New START Treaty implementation matters with the United States in 2024, including the issue of the exchange of telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted in calendar year 2023, no exchange of telemetric information occurred in 2024.

E. An assessment of whether a strategic imbalance exists that endangers the national security interests of the United States.

The United States continues to assess that there is not a strategic imbalance between the United States and the Russian Federation that endangers the national security interests of the United States.

The United States retains a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal that is sufficient to deter strategic attack, assure allies and partners, and respond in the event of adversary attack. The Russian Federation's noncompliance with the New START Treaty further underscores the vital

importance of retaining and modernizing a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent and achieving a resilient and adaptive nuclear security enterprise.

Although Russia's violations of its obligations to facilitate inspection activities on Russian territory, provide biannual data updates, and send notifications pertaining to strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty negatively affect the ability of the United States to verify Russia's compliance with the New START Treaty deployed warhead limit, the United States continues to assess that the Russian Federation's violations of the Treaty do not currently threaten the national security interests of the United States.

The United States continues to monitor the strategic implications of Russia's development of new kinds of strategic offensive arms.

The United States has made clear its concerns about Russia's large arsenal of theater-range, or so-called nonstrategic, nuclear weapons. Theater-range nuclear weapons have strategic implications because any adversary use of nuclear weapons, regardless of location or yield, would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict and create the potential for uncontrolled escalation. The United States has repeatedly conveyed these sentiments to the Russian Federation.

The United States has expressed its willingness to engage the Russian Federation on a post-February 2026 arms control framework and remains committed to the objective of addressing all Russian nuclear weapons,

including its large arsenal of so-called nonstrategic nuclear weapons. As President Biden stated in written remarks to the 2022 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, “Today, my Administration is ready to expeditiously negotiate a new arms control framework to replace New START when it expires in 2026. But negotiation requires a willing partner operating in good faith.” Russia’s return to full compliance with the New START Treaty would be a critical step toward demonstrating good faith.