2014 - Russian Army Order of Battle

In 2008 reforms were initiated by Russian Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov to fundamentally change the personnel composition and structure within the Ground Forces, to be finished by 2012. The new management system was borrowed from the NATO / US experience. In practice, however, these plans proved to be “unbaked” and required online corrections and removal of deficiencies.

The main change was a move from the current vertical chain of command of the Armed Forces, a military district - army - division - regiment structure, to a united strategic commands (USC) - operative command [Armies] - brigade regime, in order to increase efficiency by abolishing redundant elements. Mobile permanent readiness brigades, consisting of battalions, will be capable of operating tactical maneuver groups, either independently or together with other brigades under joint command. In addition, each military district established rapid response brigades, which will most likely be formed out of airborne units. The non-combat (‘cadre-strength’) units with a minimal / reduced manpower were eliminated, and all army units were ‘troops of permanent readiness’ (combat units). In 2009, the structure of the Armed Forces changed from division-regiment based to the brigade-based one (except the Airborne Landing Forces and Strategic Missile Forces). The mumber of Military Units in Russian Ground Forces went from 1,890 in 2008 to 172 by 2012.

Changes in the personnel composition of the Armed Forces include reducing the commissioned officers' (CO) numbers from more than 400,000 in 2008 (over 30% of the current 1,200,000 servicemen) to around 150,000 (15% of the future 1,000,000). The cutback would mostly affect Logistics and staff COs and Generals, while the number of First and Second Lieutenants will increase from 50,000 to 60,000. A reduction in CO numbers will be accompanied by a boost in the size of the sergeant corps. The sergeant corps will play a much larger role in the future Russian Army. Well-trained and experienced professional sergeants will ensure fast and effective training of privates, both contract soldiers and conscripts.

Many of the specialized support [non-manuever] "brigades" have staff headcounts of only a thousand troops or fewer. The 70th Separate Signal Brigade at Naro-Fominsk had fewer than 400 troops on hand when it was disbanded. Others appear to be no more than small command staffs - as of the year 2011 the 119th Logistics Brigade at Orlovskie Dvoriki had only 24 persons on staff. A number of the units designated as "regiments" in fact had only a few dozen troops on hand.

While it might be tempting to think of this as indicative of under-manned units, it would be more helpful to think of these small units as over-officered. The post-Soviet Russian Army had a massive over-supply of officers. While drafted privates and sergeants could painlessly melt away, a too-rapid down-sizing of the officer corps could have produced political problems for Russia's rulers. Even too much constraint on promotion opportunities could have produced problems. So the answer, much like the army of Myanmar, was to over-officer small units.

Span of command rationales are not entirely apparent. In the Eastern Military District the 5th Army, 35th Army and 36th Army are generally similar in organization, and are really divisions, rather than armies, while 29th Army has far more units than could be conveniently commanded from a single headquarters. The persistence of Machinegun Artillery formations is peculiar. In the Central Military District, the lopsided allocation of units between 2nd Army, a small formation which lacks maneuver brigades, and 41st Army, which has them in abundance, requires some explanation.