FM 34-80 - CHAPTER 3: Command and Control

FM 34-80: Brigade And Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations

CHAPTER 3 Command and Control

Tactical skill and effective leadership are the foremost elements of combat power on the air-land battlefields of today. Modern technology has compressed both the time and space required for effective combat operations. The high mobility of air-land combat forces, and the speed, range, precise accuracy, and lethality of modern weapon systems place stringent demands on all commanders and staff officers. Highly sophisticated, multidiscipline RSTA systems are all-seeing, and computers react faster and more accurately than man. These capabilities further compound the factors that contribute to victory or defeat. They render every area of the battlefield virtually insecure.

C² facilities are HPT for both friendly and enemy commanders. Both friendly and enemy commanders use a vast array of RSTA assets to rapidly identify and locate their adversary's critical C² facilities.

Enemy commanders conduct extensive RSTA operations and detailed planning prior to beginning an offensive operation. Targeting priorities are directly aligned to support preparatory air and artillery fires against the defender's main defensive forces, reserves, and key CPs. The enemy commanders continue their efforts to locate and destroy C² facilities once the attack begins. Their intent is to systematically disrupt their opponent's ability to command and control his available troops and supporting weapon systems. Their ultimate goal is to maximize the degradation of friendly C³I systems.

Enemy doctrine is founded on the Soviet military strategy known as Command and Control Disruption (C²D)--NARUSHENIE UPRAVLENIYA. This strategy, unlike the joint US strategy of C³CM, is purely offensive in nature. However, C²D is executed in conjunction with extensive cover and deception (MASKIROVKA) plans and operations. Thus, C²D, when combined with cover and deception, is the equivalent of C³CM strategy, which was defined in Chapter 1.

The application of C²D and C³CM strategies on the air-land battlefield results essentially in command and control warfare. C² warfare is an integral component of all combat operations today. It is a battle for time, speed, and efficiency--time to plan and make decisions; speed to communicate combat orders; and the efficiency of combat power applied at the critical time and place in battle.

The implications for C² of brigade and battalion combat operations are clear. The nature of the battlefield requires a responsive and efficient C² system. A fundamental element of this C² system is streamlined command posts to plan, conduct, and sustain the battle. In turn, command and staff relationships and staff procedures must reflect the efficiency and proficiency required to operate the various elements of each CP. Moreover, the C² system must be reliable, secure, fast, and durable. It must be capable of communicating intelligence and combat orders, coordinating support, and providing direction to the entire force under all battlefield conditions. Above all, the C² system must function faster and more effectively than that of the enemy. It must allow brigade and battalion commanders to receive information, process that information, and consistently make and execute decisions faster than the enemy.

Brigade and battalion commanders need IEW support. They must be able to see, hear, and assimilate the multitude of data essential to effective C². IEW support must be timely, accurate, and totally dedicated to extending the commander's perception of the battle.

This chapter provides the principles, procedures, and techniques of IEW doctrine as it applies to C² at the brigade and battalion level. It outlines an IEW C² system which allows brigade and battalion commanders to practice the basic tenets and operational concepts of air-land battle doctrine--initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization.

COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS

The success of brigade and battalion combat operations depends on accurate intelligence, sound tactical plans, "focused" elements of combat power, and quick exploitation of tactical advantages and opportunities. The C² process supports these requirements. It consists of the procedures and techniques used to make and execute tactical decisions.

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

Brigade and battalion commanders, their staffs, and all attached or supporting unit commanders use the basic military decision-making process to develop their battle plans. This process permits the full coordination among all commanders and staff officers, the development of staff estimates, and the preparation of detailed plans and orders. Planning, however, can only be as thorough as time will permit. Plans and SOPs must include criteria for actions to be taken when mission-type orders are used on the fluid battlefield. The military decision-making process and the specific procedures and techniques used by given staff personnel to plan IEW operations in support of the brigade and battalion are fully described in Chapter 4 of this manual. The entire IEW system, illustrated at the beginning of Chapter 2, provides the intelligence necessary to support the detailed planning effort. The brigade and battalion staffs must use all of the time available prior to combat to plan the operation. Their commanders' information and operational requirements for IEW support, as mentioned previously, must be forecast to the next higher headquarters early in the planning process.

The thorough planning of IEW operations allows command and staff functions to be performed on a proactive rather than a reactive basis. IEW resources are "focused" on HPT associated with each enemy course of action perceived. They provide the information essential for rapid processing at the brigade and battalion TOC in support of the decision-making process. The disposition and intentions of the enemy are determined by the HPT array depicted on the S2's situation map as information flows into the TOC. Friendly courses of action and the information thresholds for their execution, determined in the detailed planning phase, allow rapid decisions to be made and executed before the enemy commander can initiate or complete any given action. Effective OPSEC, deception, and countersurveillance measures impede the ability of the enemy commander to see the battlefield clearly enough to adjust his plan to friendly initiatives. The combined effects of maneuver, fire support, and COMJAM operations conducted at critical times in battle against the enemy commander's key C³I facilities further compound his seemingly proactive decision-making process. Tactical advantages and opportunities for decisive maneuver, anticipated in the detailed planning phase, are developed and exploited in combat to achieve success.

The division's close operations cannot be won by the brigade without C². And the battle for C² cannot be won without coherent plans. These plans must develop and ensure a firm understanding of the next higher commander's intent and concept of operations, encourage and develop the confidence in subordinate commanders and small unit leaders to seize the initiative and exploit the tactical opportunities which arise in war, and provide an indestructible C² system in combat. In short, critical actions in response to mission-type orders are the prerequisite for successful operation on the air-land battlefield.

Combat Requirements

Brigade and battalion commanders, their staffs, and all attached and supporting unit commanders or leaders use the related processes of troop-leading procedures and command and staff actions common to the military decision-making process. Tactical field SOPs, which detail the responsibilities of personnel and staff sections and routine operations, facilitate the rapid planning and execution processes in combat.

The C² process used in combat consists of the eight troop-leading procedures. These procedures are particularly applicable to fast-paced combat situations in which limited staff input is possible. Brigade and battalion commanders use these procedures with some elements of the command and staff actions included as time and the situation permit. This combined set of procedures is the most frequently used C² process at the brigade and battalion levels. It permits staff participation when possible, and allows for rapid decision making and execution. This combined set of procedures is shown in the illustration which follows. Command and staff actions, which may be accomplished as time permits, are shown in parentheses under each troop-leading procedure or step.

The troop-leading procedures used at the battalion and brigade levels are fully described in FMs 71-2J, 71-3, and FM 7-30, respectively. The commanders and staff officers within the MI battalion and all of its subordinate units which support the brigade also use these same troop-leading procedures. Information pertaining to special troop-leading considerations unique to the internal operations of the MI battalion are provided in FM 34-10.

The combined set of procedures, shown in the preceding illustration, provides the framework for planning, preparing for, and executing assigned and implied missions. The C² process is initiated, formally or informally, each time information requiring some action is received. The commander collects and analyzes information, decides what to do, orders someone to do it, and supervises the execution of this decision. The types of information which initiate the C² process may be as complicated as an OPORD or as simple as something which causes the decision and action to be accomplished as a matter of SOP. The cycle begins each time a decision has to be made and continues until the mission is complete, a new mission is received, or the combat situation indicates the need for a new or alternate course of action.

The commander's decision cycle, as shown in the following illustration is designed to turn inside the decision cycle of the enemy commander. The commander must make better and quicker decisions than his adversary if he is to succeed in combat. The goal, proactive in nature, is to never give the enemy commander time to complete one tactical response before another is required. This forces the enemy commander to deal with more than one tactical decision at a time and to react to friendly plans rather than carry out his own.

Each phase of the decision cycle requires certain activities to take place and a certain amount of time for completion. If there is enough time, the commander completes each step of the troop-leading procedures in detail. The commander covers each step, however, even when time is limited. The time spent on each step may be only a few seconds. This does not mean that shortcuts are taken, because the resulting decision might be faulty or erroneous.

The illustration shows the relationship of the troop-leading procedure and each phase of the decision cycle. Time, speed, and efficiency are of paramount concern to brigade and battalion commanders. They reduce the decision-making time by establishing an organized, systematic C² process, making the process a matter of SOP, and by practicing command and staff drills at every opportunity.

Time, as shown in the above illustration, is the critical ingredient. Brigade and battalion commanders establish a "time-critical" factor for the completion of each step and phase in the decision cycle. The "time-critical" factor is keyed to the specific time in which the commander must make his decision in order to effect the action necessary to accomplish the task or mission at hand. Adherence to "time-critical" factors ensures greater speed and efficiency in the application of combat power.

These "time-critical" factors are developed as a result of wargaming and FTX experiences. They are specifically designed to ensure the brigade and battalion commanders' ability to function inside the enemy commander's decision cycle. IEW resources, deployed well forward in the brigade AO prior to and during hostilities, provide the basic information from which the enemy's course of action and associated event schedule is derived or confirmed. Knowing the enemy's event schedule is the key to effective C².

The enemy's event schedule is initially predicted as a result of the detailed situation and target development activities conducted at division, brigade, and battalion levels prior to combat or prior to the next anticipated engagement. Time measurements are estimated between each event anticipated. The aggregate result is a time-sequenced series of events clearly depicting the "time-critical" factors of the enemy commander. Friendly courses of action and corresponding time-sequenced event schedules are juxtaposed against each enemy event schedule. Friendly and enemy "time-critical" factors are compared and measured. The result is a series of friendly battle options designed to get ahead and stay ahead of the enemy commander. Information provided by IEW resources in combat reflect exactly where the enemy commander is in his event schedule. Appropriate battle options, or alternative courses of action, predetermined, can then be selected and executed by the commander in a very short of time.

Principles of IEW Support

The IEW missions described in Chapter 1, and the IEW functions, capabilities, and limitations described in Chapter 2, provide the basis for the principles of IEW support to both offensive and defensive combat operations. These IEW principles are directly keyed to the brigade and battalion C² requirements described above. The principles of IEW support are--

Knowing the battlefield--multidiscipline RSTA assets to provide essential information about the enemy, terrain, and weather.

Denying the enemy intelligence--EW and COMSEC resources to protect C³ and CI support to OPSEC deception, and rear operations

Disrupting and destroying enemy C³I facilities--COMJAM resources to disrupt HPT C³I facilities and ESM resources to target fire-support systems.

Maintaining the integrity of IEW operations--task organization to satisfy aggregate mission requirements and the full integration of IEW to maintain the integrity of the force as a whole.

IEW COMBAT POWER

The principles of IEW support provide commanders and staff officers a significant insight regarding the application of IEW combat power. The application of IEW combat power begins in the planning phase of combat operations and continues throughout the course of battle. IEW combat power, applied today in peacetime, adds a new dimension to brigade and battalion combat operations and the commanders' C² process, as well. This new dimension is portrayed in the following illustration.

The combat power IEW brings to the commanders' C² process is intelligence. In peacetime, intelligence supports contingency and battle plan development activities at all levels of command from the battalion through EAC and the national command authority. The intelligence available in peacetime provides the information essential to formal planning initiated from the top down. The topdown planning effort is supported by the lower-echelon commands that generate their information and operational requirements from the bottom up.

Three of the four decision-cycle functions portrayed in the preceding illustration--collect, process, and assess battle damage--are IEW functions. They are three major components of the intelligence cycle which is described in FM 34-1. The intelligence cycle is driven by the commander, his mission, and his concept of operations. Constant supervision and direction by the G2/S2 ensures a continuous flow of information to the commander and other staff members in both peace and war; that is, the dissemination of intelligence.

Attack, the fourth function depicted in the preceding illustration, is also supported by, and endemic, to IEW. The intelligence provided by the IEW system supports the commander, G3/S3, and FSCOORD's efforts to select HPT, based on decisions on what, when, where, and how to attack. The attack plan may include IEW missions for COMJAM systems.

The combined intelligence and attack cycle, superimposed upon, and intertwined with, the decision cycle reflects the commander's targeting process, described in Chapter 4. The targeting and decision processes are inseparable in both peace and war. Substitute "plan" or "train" for "attack" and the cycle and processes continue to turn. Planning, training, and refining SOPs, followed by continued planning, training, and evaluation, ensures the combat readiness of the force. It also ensures that the commander's C² system and process can do the job in war. The commander's C² system must be well-exercised and stressed during peacetime.

The combat power of IEW is maximized when it is applied in accordance with C³CM strategy in war. C³CM strategy supports the topdown formal planning process mentioned above. It provides the corps, division, and brigade commanders with four options to protect and counter friendly and enemy C³I systems, respectively. The four C³CM options are defend (OPSEC), deceive (tactical deception), disrupt (jamming), and destroy (physical destruction), Intelligence supports all four C³CM options. Protect C³ is a "constant" on the battlefield; it is assured through the application of effective OPSEC and deception measures. Active support measures, such as demonstrations, feints, COMJAM screening, high-power communications support, and COMSEC monitoring also help to protect friendly C³ systems. OPSEC and deception measures to protect brigade and battalion C² systems are described in FMs 71-3 and 71-2J.

The offense is at the very heart of air-land battle doctrine. Thus, the disruption and destruction of enemy C³I facilities is the first and foremost consideration to protect friendly C³I facilities. Depth is extended, tactical opportunities arise, agility is exercised, initiatives are taken, and battles are won.

The combined effects of maneuver, fire support, and EW attacks against key C³I facilities in battle interdict and impede the enemy commanders' C² process and decision cycle. The cumulative degradation, shown in the last illustration, creates indecisiveness on the part of enemy commanders. The time needed to make decisions is lengthened, for key CPs and alternate C² facilities need to be reconstituted. The incessant attack against key C³I facilities renders the enemy commanders' C² system virtually ineffective. It can never be reconstituted long enough to regain effective C².

As mentioned previously, C³CM strategy is applied in a topdown planning process starting at EAC. Brigade and battalion commanders fully realize the intent of senior commanders who apply C³CM strategy to their battle plans. They must do so, since their C² systems extend to, and are a part of, the next higher commander's C² system. The entire system needs to be protected in a coherent, well-orchestrated manner. The maneuver brigades, their subordinate maneuver battalions, and supporting fire support and MI units are also the major action arms for attacking key C³I facilities supporting enemy close-in forces. Friendly C², in combat, cannot totally rely on the availability of all communications facilities at all times. Protecting and countering C³ actions must be considered on a regular basis in performing all C² functions. They must be executed using the same degree of initiative applied to other battle tasks. In fact, the application of C³CM strategy and commensurate IEW combat power is much more imperative when friendly forces are outnumbered and out-gunned on the air-land battlefields. A deaf, dumb, and blind enemy force is not too worthy an opponent. Available maneuver, fire support, and IEW systems must be employed against the highest payoff targets. Some of these HPT are key C³I facilities of the enemy force commander.

COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION AND FACILITIES

The brigade and battalion CP consists of the facilities and locations from which the respective commanders, assisted by their staffs, plan and direct the battle and sustain the force. Exercise of C² is focused in three major facilities at both commands--the tactical CP, the main CP, the rear CP at brigade, and the command group, TOC, and administration and logistics center (ALC) at battalion. This section outlines the IEW responsibilities of the staff personnel and describes the facilities through which the commander accomplishes his C² functions.

COMMANDERS AND STAFF

Brigade and battalion commanders define the IEW mission and explain how it supports their concept of operations. They coordinate with supporting IEW unit commanders, such as the MI IEW company team commander, to organize IEW resources for combat. They state their informational and operational needs, specify their desired effects, and assign missions to subordinate unit commanders. They ensure that all organic, attached, or supporting unit commanders understand their intentions for IEW support to combat operations. They provide subordinate commanders the necessary latitude to make decisions that can allow rapid reaction to fleeting tactical opportunities.

The commanders position themselves to effectively control their combat forces. They accurately determine where the IEW effort must provide support priorities to ensure success. The relative need for information from the depth and width of the AO and the synchronization of various IEW resources, arms, and services are the two tactical considerations which determine where to place CPs, and the commanders themselves.

Brigade and battalion commanders leave their CPs and position themselves at vantage points well forward in the AO, when circumstances so dictate. Regardless of location, the commanders monitor and follow enemy actions based on real-time combat information obtained by IEW resources positioned throughout their respective AOs. They track the actions of subordinate battalions and companies respectively, through close coordination with their subordinate unit commanders. They also remain cognizant of how units are being supported throughout their AO.

Succession of command and delegation of authority are established within all unit SOPs. At the brigade and battalion levels, the executive officers (XOs) know the commander's location and communicate with him by several alternate means--face to face, AM or FM radio, or messengers. Special staff officers at both brigade and battalion main CPs, such as the IEW support officers from the MI battalion, maintain similar contact with their unit commanders who are in support of brigade and battalion combat operations. Unit SOPs establish who is in charge. Succession of command in all units is planned to permit continued combat operations in the event of the commanders' incapacitation.

Brigade and battalion staffs are composed of people specifically ordered or detailed to assist the commander in the exercise of command. The staff reduces the demands on the commander's time and assists the commander and subordinate units by issuing warning orders, providing information, making estimates and recommendations, preparing plans and orders, and supervising the execution of established orders. The staff permits the commander to accomplish his duties without becoming continually involved in many of the specific details incident to command, thus allowing him to obtain first-hand knowledge by visiting subordinate units. The relationship between the commander and staff must be close and effective. The commander clearly articulates his concept and intent for all operations. The staff then takes appropriate actions before and during the battle to attain the commander's objectives. This must be done without constant communication with the commander. The staff, understanding the commander's intent, and fully aware of time and distance factors, takes appropriate actions as the conditions of battle change.

The above is also applicable to all attached or supporting IEW units in the brigade and battalion AO--especially the MI battalion's IEW company team and its subordinate or attached platoons, squads, and teams.

The Brigade Staff

The brigade staff consists of the officers and enlisted personnel required to plan and supervise brigade operations. The brigade staff monitors combat service support operations to ensure that adequate support is provided to all attached or supporting maneuver, fire support, and MI resources within its AO. The overall duties and responsibilities of the members of the brigade staff are detailed in FMs 71-3 and 7-30. Many of the specific IEW responsibilities of members of the brigade's coordinating and special staff were described in Chapter 2, where it was deemed essential to under-standing mission requirements based on the capabilities and limitations of given IEW systems and organizations.

The Intelligence Officer--S2. The S2 is the principal advisor to the brigade commander concerning the enemy, terrain, and weather. He manages intelligence operations to satisfy the commander's requirements. He assists the commander in identifying the specific information requirements such as are described in Chapter 1. He plans, supervises, and coordinates the collection and analysis efforts to ensure that combat information and intelligence are disseminated promptly to staff elements or subordinate units.

An S2's first and most important responsibility is to provide the intelligence his commander needs to make sound tactical decisions. He uses every means available to develop timely, complete, and accurate intelligence to satisfy these needs.

The S2 recommends IR to the commander. First, he identifies requirements to support planning. Planning requirements are based on the assigned and implied missions given the battalion or brigade, and the commander's planning guidance. They become the basis for the intelligence estimate, which supports other command and staff estimates. After the commander decides on the friendly course of action, the S2 develops intelligence requirements to support his concept of the operation.

Based on the concept of the operation, the S2 develops intelligence requirements to support every battlefield function that contributes to the accomplishment of the mission.

Requirements to support maneuver and fire support are always high priority. Other important functions that require intelligence support include--

OPSEC

Deception

ADA support

Combat aviation/tactical Air Force support

Engineer support

The S2 coordinates closely with the brigade commander, the brigade XO, the S3, and other staff officers. He also coordinates with subordinate and supporting commanders and staffs to determine what intelligence they need in order to plan and conduct operations within their functional areas of responsibility.

The S2 expresses intelligence requirements as PIR. The commander approves the PIR. The S2, with the assistance of the battlefield information control center (BICC), identifies other IR to satisfy the commander's information needs. The PIR, with associated IR, are the basis for the R&S plan.

The S2 develops and implements the R&S plan as the formal collection management tool. An informal collection plan may also be developed, but is not required at the brigade and battalion levels. He provides staff supervision over organic and allocated R&S assets. He coordinates with the S3 to ensure that the intelligence and resulting R&S plan supports the commander's concept of the operation.

The brigade S2 also manages the personnel and information security programs. He assists the S3 in planning and evaluating the effectiveness of the unit's OPSEC program by providing information on enemy intelligence collection capabilities, and assisting in evaluating friendly vulnerabilities. The brigade BICC provides the brigade S2 with an organic collection management, analysis, production, and reporting capability that enables him to supply the commander with the intelligence required for making decisions. Acting under the supervision of the brigade S2, the brigade BICC controls and coordinates the combat intelligence collection effort for the brigade. It expedites the dissemination of information and intelligence among the BICC, the brigade's subordinate maneuver battalions, the DS field artillery battalion, the air defense artillery battery, elements of the IEW company team from the division's MI battalion, adjacent brigades, and higher headquarters.

The brigade BICC assists the S2 in developing intelligence requirements. After the brigade commander approves the requirements, the BICC develops the R&S plan. It forwards collection requirements to the division G2 section that cannot be satisfied by resources assigned to, or supporting, the brigade.

The brigade R&S plan integrates intelligence requirements of units assigned to, or supporting, the brigade, adjacent brigades, and the division. The BICC receives division requirements in the intelligence annex of the division OPORD. Requirements may be stated as PIR, IR, or as assigned collection missions.

The BICC develops and manages the execution of the brigade R&S plan. It reviews the maneuver battalions' R&S plans and incorporates them into the brigade plan. It consolidates requests for aerial R&S support from the maneuver battalions with brigade requirements and submits the consolidated requirements to the division collection management and dissemination (CM&D) section.

The BICC maintains the current status of organic, attached, or supporting RSTA assets. The S2 coordinates tasking with the S3 to ensure compatibility with the brigade commander's scheme of maneuver and the tasked unit's primary mission. It tasks the DS IEW company team operating within the brigade AO through the IEWSE. It normally transmits tasking as fragmentary orders.

The brigade BICC processes incoming intelligence reports to develop the situation and targets in response to brigade requirements. It screens reports to isolate significant information, evaluates them for accuracy and reliability, correlates them with currently held information, and analyzes them to determine enemy intentions and to develop targets. It also develops intelligence to support brigade EW, OPSEC, and deception operations. It identifies gaps in the data base, which become new collection requirements. The BICC maintains the enemy part of the brigade situation map (SITMAP).

The BICC disseminates information and intelligence to all subordinate units of the brigade and to units supporting the brigade, to the division, and to adjacent brigades. It disseminates combat information immediately to those elements that need it.

The Operations and Training Officer--S3. The S3 is responsible to the brigade commander for plans, operations, and training. He plans and directs OPSEC, deception, and EW operations.

The S3 has a vital interest in the production of intelligence. He uses intelligence as the basis for all operations planning. He ensures that friendly courses of action are evaluated in light of the enemy situation, the battlefield terrain, and the weather conditions under which the battle will be fought. Through the application of intelligence to planning, the S3 ensures the most effective use of the combat resources at the right time and place to achieve the results the commander desires.

EW operations are planned in detail at the division; they usually support the brigade battles. The division G3 allocates EW support to the brigades based on the aggregate requirements of the brigades and the division commander's overall concept of operations. The brigade staff plans and coordinates EW operations conducted within the assigned AO. The staff relies on the IEWSE from the divisional MI battalion to assist in planning and executing EW operations and to request additional EW support, when required.

The S3 has primary staff responsibility for planning and coordinating EW operations conducted in the brigade AO. He integrates EW with maneuver and fires to ensure that supporting EW resources are used effectively to support brigade and battalion combat operations. He establishes priorities and recommends deployment and missions for EW systems. The S3 forwards EW requirements to the division G3 for consideration and incorporation into the division and MI battalion's OPLAN/OPORD.

The MI battalion's IEW support element assists the brigade S3 in planning EW operations. The assistant brigade S3 is a specially trained EW staff officer and should have the additional 5M skill identifier. He assists the S3 in planning brigade EW operations and in integrating EW with the scheme of maneuver and supporting fire plan.

The S3, S2, and C-E officer coordinate closely in planning and executing EW operations.

The C-E officer ensures that friendly electronic systems are protected from enemy REC operations. Coordination between the S3 and the C-E officer ensures that ECM will not significantly degrade brigade communications.

The S3 manages the OPSEC program. He analyzes the commander's concept of the operation to determine sensitive aspects that must be protected from enemy intelligence. He recommends EEFI to the commander. He relies on the S2 to assess enemy intelligence collection capabilities and friendly indicators that might compromise the EEFI.

The S3, in coordination with the S2, performs a risk analysis and develops appropriate OPSEC and deception measures, as well as other lethal and nonlethal counteractions. He monitors the effectiveness of the brigade's OPSEC program and deception operations, making adjustments as required.

The IEW Support Element. The MI battalion provides an IEWSE to support each maneuver brigade staff and coordinates all MI operations in support of the brigade. The IEWSE is the essential link between the brigade TOC, the IEW company team commander, and the MI battalion tactical operations center. It provides assistance in planning the use of MI assets and in identifying and requesting additional support from the MI battalion.

The IEWSE normally is collocated at the brigade TOC. Personnel assigned or attached to the IEWSE perform the following functions:

Advise the brigade S2 and S3 on the capabilities, limitations, and employment of supporting MI assets.

Assist the brigade S1 and S3 in planning the use of supporting MI assets and in preparing taskings for EPW interrogators, CI, GSR, and EW resources.

Coordinate with supporting MI elements or the IEW company team commander to ensure a rapid response to all requirements.

Ensure rapid dissemination of combat information from EW elements directly to the brigade S2, S3, and FSO.

Ensure that deployed EW elements are advised of friendly force maneuvers that directly affect their security.

Coordinate with the MI battalion tactical operations center on all matters concerning MI support within the brigade.

Coordinate with the brigade staff to ensure the availability of necessary support for MI elements.

Advise the brigade S2 and S3 of the organic capabilities of the MI assets at corps, and assist in the preparation of requests for that support via the division staff.

Brigade Command Posts. The single purpose of CPs at any echelon is to support the commander by providing the framework and system necessary to facilitate his rapid decision-making process. No CP can achieve its purpose if it does not survive. A single CP, degraded, suppressed, or destroyed, can greatly impede the commander's decision cycle--as shown in the last illustration. Thus, there are numerous imperatives each CP must meet if success is to be achieved. These CP imperatives are as shown below.

A simple comparison of the considerations and functions listed under the three CP imperatives, shown above, and the decision-cycle functions and troop-leading steps shown earlier, reflects the importance of CP survival on the air-land battlefield. Failure to survive is failure to operate, and failure to operate is defeat.

The brigade commander knows the importance of survival. He takes all the steps necessary to ensure maximum redundancy, austerity, dispersion, and mobility when organizing his C² system for combat. Minimum signatures for each CP and strict adherence to established OPSEC, SIGSEC, and ECCM procedures are demanded.

The brigade commander organizes his headquarters for combat by grouping staff sections or elements of sections within the headquarters by function for efficient staff coordination. Under ideal conditions, the organization of the brigade C² elements includes a main CP, a tactical CP, and a BSA.

The Main Command Post. Brigade C² is accomplished primarily through a main CP. For security, only essential elements are located in this CP. It consists of those coordinating and special staff personnel. and representatives from the division or other units necessary to carry out combat operations. It is concerned with the activities required to sustain current operations and plan for the future. This includes intelligence production and receiving and processing combat information, as well as submitting required reports to higher headquarters.

The main CP of the brigade is usually located to the rear of battalion task forces, out of range of enemy direct fire and mortar fire where possible. It is close enough to maintain FM communications with the CPs of subordinate elements. Since its location is often within range of enemy artillery, its electronic and visual signature, too, must be no larger than that of a battalion CP.

Most of the brigade staff operates from the brigade main CP. The S3; S2; fire support; chemical, biological, and radiological sections; TACP; IEWSE; FSE; engineer elements, and ADA elements are all present. Communications with division are established by elements from the division signal battalion.

The armored vehicles shown in the following illustration are located in the main CP complex and are an example of how a heavy division brigade CP (armor or mechanized) may be composed. These include one each from the S2 and FSE sections and two from the S3 (one S3 vehicle used to establish the TAC CP when necessary). These four vehicles make up the tactical operations center. The remaining two armored vehicles are the communications platoon's vehicle that carries the RATT, normally remoted from the CP and a vehicle (normally M113) for the TACP. Elements from supporting air defense artillery elements and engineer elements are also found in the CP. The TACCP vehicle is only located here when it is not employed elsewhere on the battlefield. These six armored vehicles and accompanying vehicles required to support the main CP are dispersed over an area of approximately 500 square meters.

The brigade main CP is primarily a coordination, information, communications, and planning center. It includes a TOC for operations and intelligence functions. The main CP is arranged to facilitate work and security, take advantage of cover, and permit quick displacement. Its physical arrangement is prescribed by unit SOP. The brigade main CP communicates with the brigade commander and subordinate battalion task forces over the brigade command net (FM). The brigade MAIN also communicates with subordinate elements over the brigade operations and intelligence net (FM) and the administrative logistics net (FM). Land line communications are used whenever possible as an alternate means of communication. The IEWSE, as mentioned previously, maintains communications with the IEW company team commander and MI battalion tactical operations center via VHF FM communications. The FSO and DS field artillery battalion communications interface was described in Chapter 2 in discussion of the overall fire support C² system.

Communications are maintained with the division using multichannel, radioteletype, division command net (FM), and division operations and intelligence net (FM). Single side-band (AM) communications are also used in communicating with the division TOC. Multichannel communications are provided to the brigade MAIN by the division signal battalion. Multichannel and voice communications are augmented by RATT nets which include the division operations/intelligence net and the division command net.

The Tactical Command Post. When required, a brigade commander may employ a TAC CP. This provides command and control of the immediate battle and contains only those personnel required for immediate control of the battle. The presence of a C² element well forward places the brigade commander near his subordinate commanders.

The TAC CP is used when a key phase of an operation is taking place that requires additional control: when the main CP is displacing, during river crossings, passage of lines, or when the disposition of brigade units requires that communications be relayed. A TAC CP is ideal for fast-moving mounted operations since it allows the commander to directly influence that battle while the remainder of his staff, supervised by the executive officer, operates from the main CP.

Brigade Support Area. The BSA of the brigade is located well to the rear and provides the CSS function required to support the brigade. The brigade S4 is responsible for the operation and displacement of this element. The S1 and the S4 maintain continuous contact with the brigade executive officer located at the main CP to ensure the adequacy of CSS operations. The forward area support team, or the forward support battalion CP from the division support command, is also located in this support area and provides support to the brigade units. This support team or battalion CP locates and displaces according to the directions of the brigade S4. Another unit located in this area is the brigade headquarters company minus those company elements located at the main. EPW collecting point, military police, and civil affairs personnel may be located with or in proximity to the BSA.

The Alternate Command and Control Facility. The brigade commander establishes an alternate C² facility in case his primary C² elements are destroyed. It may be the CP of a subordinate unit or supporting unit. Succession of brigade command is usually to the senior task force or battalion commander. These subordinate units are designated to implement this procedure when required.

The Battalion Staff

The Intelligence Officer--S2. The S2 has the staff responsibility for intelligence and security training. The S2 organizes for continuous operations during combat in coordination with the S3. The S2 and S3, through close coordination and cooperation, are prepared to perform each other's duties. The S2 is responsible for preparing and executing R&S plans. The S2 is normally located in the TOC during operations, although he may also be placed in the command group displaced forward. The battalion S2 is responsible for--

Recommending PIR and IR.

Directing and managing the command's reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition assets.

Processing information into intelligence.

Performing rapid target and situation development activities before and during combat and providing pertinent information to subordinate, higher, and adjacent units.

Coordinating and consolidating command requirements for weather and terrain analysis support.

Planning and supervising the implementation of countersurveillance measures to support all operations.

Supervising the command's personnel security and information security programs.

Disseminating combat information.

Assisting the S3 in targeting battalion weapon systems, and planning, executing, and assessing battle damage results.

The battalion S2 is primarily concerned with directing and coordinating the collection, reporting, and dissemination of combat information and targeting data. He plans and supervises R&S operations, using organic, attached, and supporting resources. He amplifies IPB products received from the brigade S2 based on the battalion commander's PIR. Requirements exceeding the capability of battalion resources are forwarded to the brigade.

The tactical intelligence officer works under the supervision of the S2 and is part of the two-man BICC. The BICC's primary responsibility is to effectively manage the unit intelligence collection, processing, and disseminating effort for the S2. The BICC normally operates in the TOC.

The battalion BICC is a vital link in the IEW system. It is the first element to begin the analysis and processing of front-line combat information. The BICC provides combat information, performs limited analysis of information, and acts as the intelligence resource management element for the battalion. It forwards requests for information outside the capability of the battalion's IEW resources to higher headquarters. The BICC also provides the S3 with intelligence support to OPSEC. Additionally, the BICC--

Develops and maintains an intelligence data base.

Plans and manages the battalion collection effort and prepares the battalion's R&S plan.

Integrates information and intelligence from all sources.

Processes and disseminates intelligence and information.

Prepares intelligence summaries and reports.

Assists the S3 in evaluating the command's OPSEC posture.

Assists the S3 in identifying friendly vulnerabilities to enemy intelligence collection systems.

Assists the S3 in identifying the type and amount of OPSEC support required.

The Operations and Training Officer--S3. The S3 has staff responsibility for matters pertaining to the organization, training, and operations of the battalion and attached units. He maintains necessary liaison with the brigade S3 and adjacent units' S3. The S3 supervises TOC operations. He is responsible for coordinating the actions of the FSO, engineer support officer, and other planners in preparing the battalion's OPLAN/OPORD. The S3 is normally in the TAC CP during operations. The S3 is also responsible for--

Identifying EW support requirements.

Coordinating with C-E officer to establish ECCM to protect battalion C³I facilities.

Identifying and recommending EEFI.

Battalion Command Posts. The battalion TOC is the C³ center for combat and IEW operations. The TOC is composed of the S2 and S3 sections, elements of the communications platoon, the FSE, and representatives from other attached elements, such as the GSR squad leader and ADA support officer. The organization of the TOC in terms of vehicles and personnel must be as small as possible to allow for rapid displacement but sufficiently manned to accomplish its C³ functions in support of the commander. The personnel in the TOC monitor operations on a 24-hour-a-day basis.

The functions of the TOC when the command group is deployed forward in a TAC CP are to monitor and assist in the C² of current operations by integrating CS and CSS into ongoing operations, maintaining coordination with higher and adjacent units, continuously updating the enemy situation, reporting to higher headquarters, and planning future operations. Factors which have immediate operational impact and must be monitored by the TOC and communicated to the commander are specified in priority (friendly or enemy) as follows:

FRIENDLY

Changes in mission or status of the task force or higher adjacent units.

Changes in status of supporting fires or CAS priority.

Loss of unit combat effectiveness of a platoon-size or larger equivalent force (including loss of DS or attached units both maneuver and support).

Strength, location, and activity of operational forces down to platoon level (including DS and attached units, both maneuver and IEW support).

Changes in status of major organic systems having a significant impact on combat power.

Class III and V status.

Priority of fires and CAS.

Status of friendly or enemy obstacles and contaminated areas.

ENEMY

Major contact with, or withdrawal of, platoon-size or large enemy units.

Changes in location or sighting of enemy platoon-size or larger units.

Employment of NBC weapons.

Appearance of nuclear fire support weapons.

Location, strength, identification and activity of units in contact and capability of enemy units to reinforce and support.

Significant changes in enemy logistics capabilities.

The TOC must be capable of continuous operations for extended periods of time. Because of the limited number of personnel available, continuous operations are usually conducted in two duty shifts. Although all personnel must be available during critical periods, off-duty personnel are usually performing maintenance on vehicles and equipment, providing security for the CP, and resting.

The battalion SOP describes specific responsibilities for each individual in the TOC. The responsibility for maintenance of friendly and enemy situation maps, entering and monitoring radio nets, maintaining daily journals, controlling access to the TOC, obtaining and maintaining current logistics status (ammunition, fuel, equipment availability rate, unit strengths, and so forth), and rendering required reports should be included.

The headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) XO is normally responsible for CP security. He coordinates with the S2 and S3 to determine--

Sector designations.

Mine and anti-intrusion device emplacement locations.

Chemical alarms.

Dismount points.

Parking areas.

Security arrangements are specified in the individual battalion SOP.

COMMAND GROUP

The command group is that element which the commander takes forward with him to help C² the battle. The composition of this command group depends on the situation and the desires of the commander. The command group will generally consist of the commander, S3, FSO, ALO, and the crews from the assigned tracked vehicles.

The command group is not a permanent organization and is normally prescribed by SOP and modified as necessary. The command group is highly mobile, enabling the commander to move about the battlefield as necessary. It is normally activated and employed for the actual conduct of the battle only, with the battalion TOC controlling subordinate battalion or battalion task forces during other periods.

The command group fights the battle. The commander will position himself so that he can "see the battle" and issue appropriate orders at the critical times. "Seeing the battle" consists of more than positioning this command group in a location to observe decision points and critical actions. It also implies that the command group is in a position to receive reports on those key indicators that he has discussed with his subordinates and, upon receipt of these reports, that he is in a position to order decisive action. The FSO must be in a position to coordinate indirect fires and respond to changes in the situation or mission with recommended changes to the fire support plan. The ALO must also be in a position to see the battlefield in order to coordinate CAS, shift preplanned CAS targets, and advise the commander on CAS issues.

The command group normally operates in two or three armored vehicles modified for C². The crews of the tracked vehicles in the command group assist in operating radios, posting maps, moving the vehicles, and providing security, thus freeing the commander and S3 to concentrate on the battle.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS CENTER

The ALC is the coordination center for CSS for the battalion. The battalion S4 is responsible for operations, movement, and security of the ALC. He is assisted by the S1. The ALC locates within, and is the control element of, the combat trains. It is located in a position on the battlefield to provide forward CSS to all elements of the battalion task force. The position also must allow the ALC to function as the alternate TOC if necessary, normally within 2 to 4 kilometers of the TOC. Although the ALC is normally designated as the alternate TOC, it must be understood that, if required to function as the TOC, its logistical functions will be degraded.

COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

The air-land battlefield is dynamic and lethal, and places demands on tactical communications systems not experienced in the past. Communications systems must be capable of delivering to the commander the information he requires for decision making quickly and in a form that facilitates the decision-making process. It is imperative that brigade and battalion commanders be able to turn their decision cycle inside that of the enemy. Rapid, reliable, and secure communications are the means by which this can be accomplished.

Rapid, reliable, and secure C³ provide a means for tasking and coordinating IEW resources and for receiving intelligence, combat information, and targeting data from these assets. They also provide a means for brigades and battalions to report information to the division, to disseminate intelligence, combat information, and targeting data to their subordinate maneuver units, and to support fire support systems.

This section describes the communications systems that support brigade and battalion IEW operations. It describes brigade and battalion IEW communications requirements, and the complementary intelligence and EW nets of the battalion and brigade.

The communications system supporting brigade and battalion IEW operations is primarily composed of the VHF FM and HF RATT intelligence nets, described earlier in Chapter 3. Intelligence nets are established at each level of command throughout the division.

COMMUNICATIONS MEANS

Brigades and battalions rely on multiple means of communications, Radio, wire, and other systems are integreted to complement each other. This provides maximum flexibility, reliability, and responsiveness to brigade and battalion commanders' IEW needs.

Radio Teletypewriter

HF RATT facilities are the primary backup means of communications in the division. They provide a rapid method of transmitting lengthy or technical information. HF RATT requires greater power, more maintenance, and higher quality circuits than simpler means of communications, such as wire or FM radio. Some EW elements located in the brigade or battalion AO may have RATT capability. However, this capability is used for communications with the MI battalion tactical operations center and TCAE. There are no direct RATT links to either the brigade or maneuver battalion from IEW elements operating within the brigade or battalion AO.

Radio (FM)

Secure VHF, FM, and HF AM communications means are used to interface most of the IEW elements located in brigade and battalion AO. These communications--especially the data systems--are fast, and can handle large amounts of traffic. They need a minimum number of personnel and space for equipment and can be remoted or operated while on the move. They can also be integrated into compatible wire systems. Retransmission of these secure communications increases their range for enhanced C². Limitations include a high susceptibility to jamming or interception and interference from atmosphere, terrain, or manmade sources. If security equipment is not used, FM radio is the least secure means of communications. Critical C³I facilities can be immediately identified by enemy SIGINT/REC units and targeted by both lethal and nonlethal attack systems.

Wire

Wire communications (telephone) is a backup system for FM radio. It is one of the most dependable means of communications and is more secure than radio. It is not vulnerable to enemy disruption or DF, although wire can be tapped (with or without a physical connection) if the wire is not covered or guarded. Wire is generally used to interconnect closely located activities, to integrate radio with wire, or to tap into existing commercial lines.

One of the major disadvantages of wire is that it cannot be used under mobile conditions. It also requires more time, men, and equipment to install and maintain than radio. Even when it is laid properly, signal integrity diminishes over long distances. When it is not laid properly, it may be damaged by tracked and wheeled vehicles or be susceptible to wiretaps.

Brigades and battalions normally use wire for internal communications within their CP area and assembly areas. MI and other units located in the brigade or battalion AO use wire to remote active COMJAM sysems and other C³ emitters from their actual locations for survival purposes, when the situation permits.

Messengers

Messengers provide a secure means of delivery for bulky items or large quantities of message traffic. The use of messengers is limited only by the availability of trained personnel and transportation, and by the tactical situation. Using messengers reduces the electromagnetic signature and provides a means of communicating if electrical means are destroyed or their use is inadvisable. Although messenger service is very flexible, it is slower than electrical transmission. Weather, terrain, and operational considerations also impact on the type and frequency of messenger service.

At the brigade and battalions, messengers are used regularly between CPs, trains, higher headquarters, and subordinate elements. MI and other units do not have the assets to establish a regular messenger service. However, depending upon the nature of the material and the combat situation, special messenger service may be performed by IEW company team personnel or established by the supported battalion or brigade. Specific instances when this may be required is the evacuation of captured enemy documents for immediate exploitation at higher headquarters. Messenger operations are described in FM 21-1.

TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

There are two major means of radio communications available to support IEW operations within the brigade AO--HF RATT and VHF FM. When these individual systems are supplemented with wire and net radio interface (NRI), they become part of the division's comprehensive tactical communications system. This system provides the brigade with the ability to coordinate, task, report, and disseminate intelligence and combat information with higher, lower, and adjacent units within the division.

The Multichannel System

The maneuver battalions, field artillery, MI, and other supporting units in the brigade or battalion AO do not have a multi-channel capability. They rely on the forward area signal center (FASC) in the BSA for multichannel communications when required. CI and EPW interrogators from the MI battalion may require access to these multichannel facilities for intelligence reporting purposes. The normal deployment of FASC is shown in the following illustration.

HF RATT Communications System

The brigade communications platoon establishes an HF RATT net between the brigade and its subordinate battalion headquarters. This net provides a means to disseminate and report intelligence and combat information between the brigade and its subordinate battalions. The MI battalion's service support company installs, operates, and maintains RATT nets that link the EW platoons and the SIGINT processing platoon with the TCAE and S3 at the MI battalion tactical operations center. This provides a means to send and receive record copy traffic and large volumes of technical data to and from the platoons and the TCAE. The EW platoon has no direct RATT or FM link with the brigade or the brigade's subordinate battalions. The illustration below depicts the RATT communications system in the brigade AO.

VHF FM Communications System

Division Nets. Brigade VHF FM communications links to the division are established through two division FM nets: the command net and the operations/intelligence (O/I) net. The brigade receives C² information and operational tasking from the division G3 via the FM command net.

The FM division O/I net provides the brigade with a means for receiving intelligence and information from the division G2 and other commands within the division. The brigade S2 uses this net to report information and intelligence developed by the brigade and to pass requirements and requests for additional IEW support to the division G2. The MI battalion S2 and S3 are sub scribers on the division O/I net; they report information to, and receive intelligence products and IEW mission tasks from, the division G2 and G3 sections.

Brigade Nets. The brigade O/I net links the battalion S2 and other units, as required, to the brigade S2 section (BICC). This net provides a means for coordinating, tasking, and disseminating combat information and intelligence.

Supporting GSR/REMS teams, CI support teams, and EPW interrogator teams located in the brigade or battalion AO, may also be assigned to this net for tasking and reporting purposes when operating in direct support of the brigade. This net gives the brigade S2 the capability to task and receive reports and information from these MI resources. Such tasking is coordinated with the IEWSE at the brigade TOC. The IEW company team commander is always informed of any major requirements.

Military Intelligence Nets. The IEW support officer who heads the IEWSE is a subscriber on the MI battalion operations center/TCAE SIGINT/EW tasking and reporting net (FM) to the EW platoon operating in the respective brigade's AO. The EW platoon headquarters located in each brigade AO is also a subscriber on its respective EW tasking and reporting net.

Maneuver Battalion Nets. Maneuver battalions rely primarily on FM radio communications to transmit highly perishable information. Intelligence and combat information is passed to the battalion TOC from the brigade through the brigade intelligence net (FM). A secure command net is used for C² of the battalion, itself. All organic and attached units normally operate in this net to include the FSO, ALO, and leaders of supporting elements, such as GSR squads or team leaders. The command net is controlled by the S3 or S2 in the battalion TOC.

Maneuver battalions may use a surveillance net or establish a separate O/I net, if required. The battalion may establish an O/I net by unit SOP if required. The purpose of the O/I net is to transmit routine, lengthy reports, thus freeing the command net of this type of traffic. Reports such as routine unit situation reports, bridge/route reports, obstacle reports, NBC reports, and so forth, would be transmitted on this net. This net may also be used by the S3 or commander to relay instructions to the TOC regarding upcoming operations. One radio at the TOC will monitor the O/I frequency.

The scout platoon net may function as a surveillance net when required. The S2 and elements assigned surveillance missions operate on these nets.

OTHER COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS AND NETS

Information about the specific network structures and other communications systems, some of which were mentioned in Chapter 2, is beyond the scope of this manual. Such information is provided in FMs 71-3, 71-2J, 34-10,7-20, and 7-30.

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