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FM 34-80: Brigade And Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations

APPENDIX D

ARMY OF EXCELLENCE

Army of Excellence organizations were developed as a direct result of the Army's AOE study in 1983. The study recognized the necessity of implementing the revolutionary air-land battle doctrine but with organizations that could be manned and equipped at design authorized levels, particularly authorized level of organization 1. AOE design addressed the Army leadership's studied conclusion that the division was too large and cumbersome to effectively move about the battlefield. It was concluded that most of the corps was dedicated to supporting the division, and that divisions possessed combat support assets equal to or in excess of those at the corps. Under the Army's emerging air-land battle doctrine, the doctrinal requirements existed for the corps commander to orchestrate the battle through a corps operational plan. The operational level of war specifically addresses the desired plans and operations required to confront and defeat potential adversaries organized and deployed at a level commensurate with the US corps. AOE organizations represent the culmination of an effort of force design and force restructuring to facilitate the force modernization process, while reducing or eliminating the Army's "hollowness," and improving the corps commander's ability to execute air-land battle doctrine.

AOE IMPACT ON BATTALION/BRIGADE IEW OPERATIONS

The impact of AOE on IEW operations at battalion and brigade levels is considered to be a positive one. At the battalion and brigade levels, no significant changes have occurred in the AOE-designed combat organizations that would significantly change IEW operations previously described within this manual. AOE changes in supporting combat organizations such as DIVARTY, the combat aviation brigade and air defense battalion, as well as combat support and CSS organizations, have been offsetting. For example, while redundant and often dated acquisition systems have been reduced or eliminated, new collection capabilities have been incorporated into organizations within the division in response to intelligence, EW missions, and responsibilities mandated by the proper execution of air-land battle doctrine.

BATTALION IEW RESOURCES

AOE force design changes impose no changes to those IEW capabilities described earlier. However, capabilities supporting IEW resources provided by combat and combat support organizations such as the DIVARTY, air defense artillery battalion, and MI battalion have, in select cases, been changed by the number and types of sensors or acquisition capabilities provided in what may be regarded as the nominal "brigade slice."

BRIGADE IEW RESOURCES

IEW systems and resources available to support the brigade and subordinate maneuver battalions and task forces have been changed in some instances with the emergence of AOE organizations. Described below are the specific changes resulting from AOE.

FIELD ARTILLERY

Field artillery cannon support to the brigade remains unchanged. However, AOE changes the organization of target acquisition assets available within the division artillery's TAB. The TAB retains the countermortar, counterbattery capabilities provided by the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 (FIREFINDER) systems and the moving-target-locating radar surveillance capability provided by the AN/TPS-25A or AN/TPS-58B systems. Eliminated from the TAB under AOE are the four AN/TNS-10 sound-ranging sets which provide part of the passive countermortar, counterbattery detection capability of the TAB. With the development and fielding of the PADS and the resulting reconfiguration of survey elements with DIVARTY, flash ranging teams organized around these survey party members and associated with field artillery battalion observation posts have been similarly reduced. The net result of reductions within the sound and flash ranging sections has been the total elimination of the DIVARTY sound and flash platoon. Reductions in the number of air observers, from ten to six; and lasing teams, from three to one per DS artillery battalion, have also reduced the division's (as well as brigade's) observation capability by reducing the number of eyes observing the battlefield.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

MI resources dedicated to the IEW mission have been selectively altered in numbers and types based on AOE redesign criteria. Of significant impact is the knowledge that, while AOE has led to the formation of the new infantry division (light), it is also responsible for the creation of a specifically tailored MI battalion (CEWI) to support this type division. MI resources remain organized with multidisciplined capabilities found within the MI battalion structure of each type division. While variations are observed in the density of HUMINT vs. technical collection systems provided in the MI battalion structure for each type division, these variants have been specifically designed in concert with the scope of missions the IEW system is expected to support, the levels of conflict for which each type division is reorganized, force constraints, and the acknowledgement of acceptable risk to IEW mission performance prompted by constrained manpower ceilings. IEW resources organic or OPCON to the MI brigade and MI battalion continue to include IPW, CI, aerial surveillance and aerial EW assets, ground-based EW assets, GSR and, in the airborne, air assault, and light divisions, the REMBASS. The distribution of these IEW resources and their normal allocation of support to the division and its subordinate maneuver brigades and battalions are shown below.

AOE represents a change in HUMINT collection capabilities with the addition of a long-range surveillance capability at the corps and division levels. Long-range surveillance operations are conducted in response to operational tasking from the ACofS, G2 at each respective echelon, and operations are targeted in areas across the FLOT in response to deep targeting and intelligence requirements. Interdiction of enemy forces is not an LRSU function. While this HUMINT capability is added, CI interrogation capabilities within the heavy division have been reduced due to force level constraints. Within the heavy corps, CI and interrogation teams operating within the division AO will require augmentation from the corps MI brigade if normal DS (to brigade) and GS capabilities are to be provided. When such augmentation is not available, specific plans will be required within the corps detailing IPW and CI support procedures to be followed at reduced support levels. Concepts commonly associated with light division operations, such as the area support concept, may apply to such operations as mobile CI team operations in forward brigade AOs. While these teams would be deployed as GS assets of the division, their operations under area support concepts should preclude interrupted CI support to forward deployed forces. IPW assets assigned to the MI battalion, heavy division, are found at minimum essential levels. The ACofS, G2, in coordination with the G3 and MI battalion commander and S3 will determine the desired command relationship under which these limited assets will be deployed. As IPW personnel within the heavy division are organized as an interrogation team with limited communications and mobility, they will normally be deployed in GS of the division as the nucleus of the division EPW collecting point in the division's rear area. IPW teams provided by the corps MI brigade will, when allocated, normally be deployed in DS of forward-deployed brigades within the division. CI or IPW resources allocated to the airborne and air assault divisions will normally be deployed in DS of brigades and GS of the division based on the type operations.

Within the newly created light division, the HUMINT capabilities provided by organic CI and IPW teams are significantly expanded when compared with similar disciplines within the heavy division. This results from the recognized need for an expanded HUMINT operational capability in support of light division operations in lower levels of conflict for which the division is optimized. Ground-based EW assets formerly found within the TEB of the corps' MI brigade have been reduced to minimum essential levels. The reserve component (RC) TEB is organized to increase the corps' total IEW capability in war when the full corps complement of divisions are deployed, that is, active and reserve divisions. Provided by the RC, TEB are ground-based HF collection, HF/VHF jamming, and ground-based ELINT capabilities. While pre-AOE TOEs for MI organizations included provisions for remote sensor teams augmenting the MI structure, the living TOE process does not. Remote sensors monitoring teams are currently documented in the TOE of the MI battalion (CEWI) of the airborne division only. REMBASS and remote sensor monitoring teams will be added to other type division MI battalion TOEs based on the basis of issue plan for the REMBASS, when fielded.

Ground Surveillance Radars

GSRs remain in the MI battalion structures of all type divisions. AOE design of GSR sections in each type division has resulted in a reduction in total numbers of GSR teams assigned to these divisions and, with the exception of the heavy division, greater reliance upon the lightweight, mobile AN/PPS-15 radar system. GSR allocations for each division under AOE are as shown in the following illustration.

GSR teams will continue to be provided DS or attached, less radar maintenance, to maneuver brigades and battalions or task forces based on reconnaissance and surveillance planning conducted by the ACofS, G2.

Enemy Prisoner of War Interrogators

Interrogators have been assigned to EPW sections in varying numbers by type division in anticipation of the expected need for this HUMINT capability. Manpower force ceilings have had impact on the total number of interrogators which could be placed in certain organizations, the heavy division, for example, where a conscious decision was made in decreasing HUMINT spaces in favor of the return and inclusion of technical collection assets. The reverse is also true. In the light division, where ground based ECM systems are not incorporated into the MI battalion TOE, due to their low intensity conflict (LIC) orientation, space savings were used to increase the strength of the CI and interrogation sections where this added HUMINT manpower was deemed most appropriate. The number of interrogators authorized within the MI battalions for all types of divisions under AOE are as follows.

Additional interrogators required for sustained EPW operations in the heavy, air assault, and airborne divisions will be obtained from interrogation assets available within the CI interrogation company, TEB of the MI brigade at corps.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

CI resources within each type division have undergone important changes in missions and resourcing with the emergence of AOE. SIGSEC assets have been removed from the division and corps and placed at EAC. Additionally, manpower limitations within the division base structure have caused a reduction in the number of CI authorizations within each type division, with the notable exception of the infantry division (light), where HUMINT resources have been given priority over technical collection systems and resources. While SIGSEC authorizations have been placed within the MI brigade at EAC, their employment in support of ECB remains integral to operating security doctrine.

CI resource authorizations for each type division are as follows.

As with interrogators, the sustainment of CI operations at ECB requires the augmentation of CI personnel from the CI interrogation company of the TEB, MI brigade at corps. This is particularly true for CI operations within the heavy division. CI team deployment using area support concepts rather than DS is expected to be prevalent when CI augmentation from corps is unavailable.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT

EW support in each type division has remained largely unchanged when compared to pre-AOE levels. Exceptions, however, are found in the allocation of EW systems within the MI battalion of the infantry division (light), and the corps MI brigade's TEB. Additionally, the QUICKFIX flight platoon has been placed within the combat division brigade structure based on its demonstrated performance in the airborne division under this organizational design in the past. In the infantry division light, the need for expanded HUMINT resources and constraints on the number of vehicles due to strategic mobility requirements has taken precedence over the allocation of ground-based ECM assets in the MI battalion structure. Airborne ECM, provide by the QUICKFIX flight platoon, constitutes the only ECM capability organic to the light division. The corps' TEB is organized with ground-based ECM and ELINT systems intended to roundout EW capabilities within the corps' sector by providing additional ECM and ELINT collection teams where most needed. Based on the retention of these few EW resources in the corps TEB, and in response to the impact of force level ceilings within the corps base structure as a whole, additional EW resources formerly found within the active component TEB of the corps' MI brigade have been removed. The EW capabilities provided by the reserve component TEB are designed to bring the corps EW arsenal up to full operating strength. With respect to maneuver battalion and brigade operations, the impact of these changes within the corps MI brigade's active component TEB are considered of less import than would have been the case if ground-based EW resources had been assigned to the corps MI brigade, rather than the division's MI battalion, and deployed forward to the FLOT or FEBA as augmentation resources to the division.

EW collection and jamming resources for the AOE divisions are summarized in the following illustrations.

AOE restructuring has permitted the refinement of organizational and other concepts key to describing how EW resources are employed. By example, noncommunications intercept teams of the heavy division were formerly placed singularly within the organization of the EW platoons with little noncommunications analysis or ELINT DF anticipated. While the product-improved TEAMPACK system will be netted electronically by a data link in a manner similar to TRAILBLAZER, the AOE MI battalion structure for the heavy division places the noncommunications intercept teams within the SIGINT processing platoon. COMINT analysts and noncommunications intercept operators or analysts, MOS 98J, assigned to the analysis section of the SIGINT processing platoon conduct initial correlation of COMINT/ELINT DF reporting and provide for the enhanced C² of these critical resources. Similarly, team restructuring under AOE and modern equipment has permitted the replacement of generator mechanics (MOS 52D) at each of the three RSSs within the SIGINT processing platoon with EW/SIGINT voice intercept operators (98G) enhancing their independent voice collection and gisting or reporting capabilities when automatic DF operations are not in effect.

AOE has not changed other key doctrinal concepts stated in FM 34-1, or in previous chapters within this manual. IEW company teams will normally be deployed in a brigade sector when sufficient MI battalion resources are deployed forward to warrant the formation of the company team and the need for a single MI commander representing all IEW elements in the sector is deemed appropriate for the successful execution of IEW missions.

OTHER COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS

AOE redesign of other divisional organizations has also produced changes within the overall area of IEW support provided commanders. The reduction in the number of FAARs from eight to six systems in the heavy division has reduced the overall air threat warning capability within the division, though for intelligence purposes, this reduction will be more than compensated for in the foreseeable future with innovative changes being evaluated in the integration and exchange of air threat warning information between corps and division air defense organizations. The loss of engineer battalion reconnaissance teams for terrain reconnaissance, brigade classification, and damage assessment or weather effects assessments necessitates greater reliance, as in the past, on similar assessment being provided by cavalry reconnaissance elements, scouts, air observers, and other units throughout the division. While the loss of engineer reconnaissance teams can have an impact on intelligence support provided to commanders, training of other elements to accomplish these tasks, and concise statements of intelligence requirements related to the terrain intelligence function remedy their loss. IEW support provided by other combat support organizations described earlier in this manual remain unaffected by AOE design.

LONG-RANGE SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS

The formation of long range surveillance organizations within the division and corps MI organization under AOE represents the most significant change in IEW support to forward maneuver forces. The primary mission of the long-range surveillance detachment (LRSD), division, is to provide collection by HUMINT means within the division's areas of operations and interest; and to observe and report enemy dispositions, facilities, and activities, as well as terrain and weather conditions. Specifically, the LRSU--

• Conducts long-range information collection through surveillance and reconnaissance.
• Determines and reports the location, strength, equipment, disposition, organization, and movement of enemy forces and determines the location of high-value targets, to include NBC weapon delivery systems; nuclear weapon storage sites; reserves; C² elements; and key installations, including both fixed and mobile facilities.
• Conducts damage assessment and NBC monitoring.
• Emplaces and employs unattended sensors and electronic intelligence, target acquisition, and designation equipment.
• Employs photographic and night image enhancement devices.
• Obtains information on possible drop and landing zones for airborne and airmobile or air assault operations.
• Provides information on terrain and weather conditions.
• Provides an assessment of indigenous communications facilities for possible future allied use.

The LRSU (heavy division) is organized as shown in the following chart.

The C² element includes the detachment headquarters and a subelement for communications support. It directs the functions and activities of all elements of the LRSD. The base station section operates base communications stations to maintain communications with deployed reconnaissance teams and forwards combat information by secure communications and messenger immediately to the CM&D section within the G2. The reconnaissance teams obtain and report information about enemy forces, activities, terrain, and weather within their assigned areas of surveillance and are capable of operating independently. The LRSD may be augmented by an additional base station from the corps long-range surveillance company for timely receipt of combat information from corps long-range surveillance teams deployed beyond the range of surveillance provided by LRSD teams. Long-range surveillance plans of the divisions and corps are coordinated to ensure complementary surveillance coverage.

The LRSD is organic to the MI battalion of the division. The LRSD provides the division with the capability to conduct long-range surveillance missions to supplement intelligence collection and surveillance provided by other IEW sources. The results of these long-range surveillance operations will significantly enhance the IEW system in providing current intelligence to tactical commanders as to threat formations within their respective areas of operations and interest.