At the battle of Stirling Bridge, 11 September 1297, the movie Braveheart has William Wallace provoking the English to battle, saying "Here are Scotland's terms. Lower your flags, and march straight back to England, stopping at every home to beg forgiveness for 100 years of theft, rape, and murder. Do that and your men shall live. Do it not, and every one of you will die today. ... Before we let you leave, your commander must cross that field, present himself before this army, put his head between his legs, and kiss his own ass."
Putin's Nuclear Crisis - September 2025
During September 2025, Russian nuclear weapons policy occupied a pivotal position in international security discourse as the expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty loomed on the near horizon. The month witnessed the most significant Russian statement on nuclear arms control in years, delivered by President Vladimir Putin on September 22, when he announced Russia's conditional willingness to maintain treaty limits even after the agreement's February 2026 expiration. This statement emerged against a backdrop of heightened tensions between Russia and the West over the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, repeated violations of European airspace by Russian military aircraft and drones, and persistent uncertainty about the future of bilateral arms control between the world's two largest nuclear powers.
The Zapad-2025 exercise was a large-scale joint strategic operation conducted by the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus. Official reports from the Russian Ministry of Defence state that the exercise held on September 12-16 involves around 100,000 military personnel and is taking place across 41 training ground in Belarus.
One of the most sensitive aspects of Zapad 2025 was been the inclusion of nuclear planning scenarios. The Western press sold it as an “irresponsible escalation,” but the Russians said these are routine procedures within Russian military doctrine, conceived as a deterrence measure. During the maneuvers, simulations were conducted for the deployment and potential use of tactical nuclear weapons, such as Oreshnik hypersonic missiles. It is crucial to emphasize that these were theoretical drills that train forces in command procedures, decision-making chains, and strict security protocols.
Russian doctrine stipulates that these weapons are considered only in defensive “state survival” scenarios or when a massive strategic attack puts national integrity in doubt. Therefore, it is not an offensive policy, but a last resort to restore the balance of power if conventional forces were to be overwhelmed. The eventual deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory, discussed in various military forums, follows the same logic: to send an unequivocal message to NATO that any attempt to violate Russian-Belarusian security will be met with a proportional and decisive response.
Belarusian Deputy Defense Minister Pavel Muraveiko confirmed 16 September 2025 that the Zapad-2025 strategic maneuvers included exercises with Russian Oreshnik hypersonic ballistic missiles. “We have completed all the tasks we set for ourselves,” he said, specifying that the drills included not only the deployment of the Oreshnik missiles but also the simulation of nonstrategic nuclear weapon launches.
In 2023, Russia deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, where the Oreshniks are expected to be stationed before the end of 2025. The Oreshnik is a medium-range missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It could strike targets thousands of kilometers away with a margin of error of only a few dozen meters. These missiles gained notoriety in late 2024 when Russian forces struck a military plant in the Dnipropetrovsk region.
During the main stage of the joint strategic exercise Zapad-2025, units of the Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Protection (NBC) successfully conducted breach operations, enabling the advancement of assault forces. The maneuvers held at the Mulino training ground, the NBC protection units were tasked with creating secure passages through mine-explosive barriers, which is necessary for the further offensive operations of assault groups.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said Moscow will continue to adhere to a key nuclear arms control treaty signed with the US for one year after its expiration, provided Washington agrees to do the same. Speaking ahead of a Security Council meeting on 29 September 2025, Putin said global strategic stability has been increasingly threatened by what he described as the destructive actions of Western nations. He stressed that while Moscow is ready to meet any threat, it is and always has been interested in political and diplomatic methods of resolving conflicts.
"As a result of the destructive actions previously taken by Western countries, the foundations of constructive relations and practical cooperation between nuclear powers have been significantly undermined. The basis for dialogue within relevant bilateral and multilateral frameworks has been eroded. Gradually, the system of Soviet-American and Russian-American agreements on nuclear missile and strategic defense arms control – long relied upon to stabilize relations between the two largest nuclear powers and to enhance global security – has been nearly dismantled."
Russia is prepared to follow the 2010 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) treaty for one year after its expiration next February, provided the US reciprocates and refrains from actions that could break the nuclear status quo, such as deploying interceptor systems in space, Putin offered. The Russia-US treaty establishes limits on the numbers of intercontinental-range nuclear weapons both sides can deploy.
"Let me emphasize and let there be no doubt: Russia is fully capable of responding to any current or emerging threat, not with words, but through concrete military-technical measures. A clear example is our decision to end the unilateral moratorium on the deployment of ground-based short- and intermediate-range missiles. This was a forced move needed for ensuring an adequate response to the deployment of similar US and other Western-made weapons in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region, which poses a direct threat to Russia’s security....
"Let me remind you that the last major political and diplomatic achievement in the field of strategic stability was the conclusion of the Russian-American New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2010. However, owing to the profoundly hostile policies of the Biden administration, which undermined the fundamental principles on which this treaty was built, its full implementation was suspended in 2023....
"The New START Treaty will expire on February 5, 2026, signaling the imminent end of the last international accord directly limiting nuclear missile capabilities. A complete renunciation of this treaty’s legacy would, from many points, be a grave and short-sighted mistake. It would also have adverse implications for the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In order to prevent the emergence of a new strategic arms race and to preserve an acceptable degree of predictability and restraint, we consider it reasonable to maintain at this turbulent time the status quo established under New START. Accordingly, Russia is prepared to continue observing the treaty’s central quantitative restrictions for one year after February 5, 2026....
"Particular attention must be directed towards US plans to expand strategic components of its missile defense system, including preparations for the deployment of interceptors in outer space. We believe that the practical implementation of such destabilizing measures could nullify our efforts to maintain the status quo in the field of strategic offensive arms. We will respond appropriately in this case."
Putin's address to the permanent members of Russia's Security Council on September 22, 2025, represented the culmination of months of internal deliberation about Russia's strategic posture in the post-treaty environment. Speaking from the Kremlin in televised remarks broadcast throughout Russia and monitored closely by Western capitals, Putin delivered what many analysts considered a carefully calibrated message designed to project both strength and restraint. He began by characterizing the current situation in strategic stability as one of continuing deterioration, attributing this decline to what he described as the destructive actions of Western countries that had undermined the foundations of constructive relations and practical cooperation between nuclear powers. Putin declared that the system of Soviet-American and Russian-American agreements on nuclear missile and strategic defense arms control had been nearly dismantled, with the basis for dialogue within relevant bilateral and multilateral frameworks having been eroded over time.
The Russian president emphasized that his government attributed the numerous challenges that had accumulated in the strategic sphere since the beginning of the twenty-first century to Western actions, including what he characterized as destabilizing doctrines and military-technical programs designed to undermine global parity and pursue absolute, overwhelming superiority. He noted that Russia had consistently and thoroughly addressed these issues, criticized Western approaches, and repeatedly proposed concrete ideas for joint solutions, but asserted that Russian warnings and initiatives had not received a clear response from the United States and its allies. Putin stressed that Russia was fully capable of responding to any current or emerging threat not merely with words but through concrete military-technical measures, citing as evidence Russia's decision to end its unilateral moratorium on the deployment of ground-based short- and intermediate-range missiles, which he described as a forced move necessitated by the deployment of similar American and other Western-made weapons in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.
Turning to the specific question of the New START Treaty, Putin acknowledged that for nearly fifteen years this agreement had played a constructive role in maintaining balance and predictability in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons. He observed that the treaty would expire on February 5, 2026, signaling what he termed the imminent end of the last international accord directly limiting nuclear missile capabilities. Putin characterized a complete renunciation of the treaty's legacy as a grave and shortsighted mistake that would have adverse implications for the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In what represented the central announcement of his September 22 statement, Putin declared Russia's position in his own words: "To avoid provoking a further strategic arms race and to ensure an acceptable level of predictability and restraint, we believe it is justified to try to maintain the status quo established by the New START Treaty during the current, rather turbulent period. Therefore, Russia is prepared to keep adhering to the central quantitative limitations of the New START Treaty for one year after Feb. 5, 2026."
Putin added crucial conditions to this offer, emphasizing that Russia would make a definite decision on whether to uphold these voluntary self-limitations following that initial one-year period based on a careful assessment of the situation. He stressed that the measure would only be viable if the United States acted in a similar manner and refrained from steps that would undermine or disrupt the existing balance of deterrence potentials. The Russian president instructed relevant agencies to maintain close oversight of American activities related to the strategic offensive arms arsenal, with particular attention directed toward United States plans to expand strategic components of its missile defense system, including preparations for the deployment of interceptors in outer space. Putin warned explicitly that the practical implementation of such destabilizing measures could nullify Russian efforts to maintain the status quo in the field of strategic offensive arms, adding ominously that in such cases Russia would respond accordingly.
The Security Council meeting of September 22 was attended by Russia's most senior political and security officials, including Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko, State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Anton Vaino, Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, Defence Minister Andrei Belousov, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Sergei Naryshkin, and Special Presidential Representative for Environmental Protection, Ecology and Transport Sergei Ivanov. The presence of this full constellation of Russian power underscored the gravity with which the Kremlin viewed the strategic situation and the significance of Putin's announcement regarding the treaty limits.
International reaction to Putin's September 22 statement varied across capitals and analytical communities. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, speaking at a news conference on the same day, characterized the proposal as sounding "pretty good," though she provided no immediate commitment to reciprocal American action. Two weeks later, President Donald Trump, answering a question from a TASS reporter, affirmed the United States view of Putin's proposal by stating it sounded like a good idea to him. Trump had previously discussed nuclear weapons with Putin during their summit in Alaska in the preceding month, and in July had commented on the looming expiration of New START by noting that it represented a big problem for the world when nuclear restrictions were removed. The American president had also stated his desire to see a cessation in the development of nuclear weapons, noting that such weapons were so powerful that they could never be used and that their use might literally bring about the end of the world.
Behind the diplomatic exchanges lay substantial uncertainty about whether either side would actually adhere to treaty limits in the absence of the verification mechanisms that had been suspended since 2020. The New START Treaty, originally signed by then-Presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev in 2010, limited each country to no more than one thousand five hundred fifty deployed nuclear warheads and seven hundred deployed missiles and bombers. The treaty had envisaged sweeping on-site inspections to verify compliance, but these had been dormant since 2020, initially due to the pandemic and subsequently due to Russia's suspension of participation in the treaty in February 2023. At that time, Putin had justified the suspension by arguing that Russia could not allow American inspections of its nuclear sites when Washington and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies had openly declared Moscow's defeat in Ukraine as their goal. Russia had emphasized that it was not withdrawing from the pact altogether and pledged to respect the caps on nuclear weapons set under the treaty while continuing to notify the United States about test launches of ballistic missiles.
The September 2025 nuclear discourse must be understood within the context of Russia's November 2024 revision of its nuclear doctrine, which had lowered the threshold for potential nuclear weapons use and explicitly brought Belarus under Russia's nuclear umbrella. Although this doctrinal change preceded the September 2025 statements by nearly ten months, it continued to inform Western interpretations of Russian nuclear policy throughout the period. The revised doctrine, formally titled "Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence," had been announced by Putin at a Security Council meeting on September 25, 2024, and then formally signed into effect on November 19, 2024. This doctrine established that aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state with the participation or support of a nuclear power would be considered a joint attack potentially warranting nuclear response, that Russia could use nuclear weapons upon receipt of reliable information about a massive launch of air and space attack weapons crossing its borders, and that nuclear weapons might be employed in response to conventional attacks on Russia or Belarus that posed a critical threat to sovereignty.
The integration of Belarus into Russia's nuclear strategy represented a significant evolution in Russian deterrence policy, moving beyond previous more general references to allies and specifically naming Belarus as protected by the Russian nuclear umbrella. This development corresponded with Russia's deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarusian territory, which had been announced in March 2023 and reportedly implemented with the delivery of nuclear-capable Iskander-M missile systems and the modification of Belarusian Su-25 aircraft to carry nuclear bombs. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko had stated in December 2024 that Belarus was hosting dozens of Russian warheads, though he emphasized that operational control remained exclusively with Russia rather than being transferred to Belarusian forces. The deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus marked the first time Russia had stationed such weapons on the territory of another state since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Beyond Putin's primary statement on September 22, other Russian officials contributed to the nuclear discourse during September 2025, though their statements largely reinforced rather than departed from established positions. Dmitry Medvedev, the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council and former Russian president who had developed a reputation for inflammatory rhetoric on nuclear matters, addressed nuclear proliferation issues on September 30, 2025, when speaking at an artificial intelligence conference in Skolkovo. Medvedev predicted that the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons would gradually grow, drawing a comparison to the proliferation of generative artificial intelligence capabilities. He noted that among existing nuclear powers were states not officially recognized as such by the international community but which nonetheless possessed such weapons, and he suggested that this relatively exclusive club conferred great advantages that would be wise not to lose. While this statement did not constitute a direct threat or policy announcement, it reflected Russia's broader concern about strategic stability in an environment where nuclear restraint appeared to be eroding.
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio on September 24, 2025, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. According to the Russian statement summarizing the meeting, the two sides compared their positions on the entire bilateral agenda, but no progress was announced on arms control issues specifically. The meeting occurred in the immediate aftermath of Putin's September 22 announcement, and the lack of concrete progress suggested that substantial gaps remained between American and Russian positions despite the apparent rhetorical openness to maintaining treaty limits. Lavrov's public statements during this period continued to emphasize Russia's view that the West bore responsibility for the deterioration of the arms control architecture and that American actions, particularly regarding missile defense and conventional long-range strike capabilities, threatened the strategic balance.
The September 2025 statements on nuclear weapons occurred against a backdrop of ongoing military conflict in Ukraine and repeated incidents of Russian military provocations in European airspace. Throughout September, NATO member states reported multiple violations of their airspace by Russian drones and military aircraft, with Poland and Estonia experiencing particularly serious incidents. These violations heightened tensions and contributed to the overall sense that the risk of direct conflict between Russia and the Western alliance remained elevated. European leaders responded with condemnation of what they characterized as Russian provocations, while Russian officials portrayed their actions as legitimate responses to Western aggression and interference in what Moscow considered its sphere of influence.
The question of whether Russia would actually maintain New START limits after February 2026 remained subject to considerable debate among Western analysts throughout September and beyond. Skeptics pointed to Russia's suspension of treaty participation in 2023, its cessation of data exchanges with the United States since that time, and its broader pattern of disregarding international commitments as evidence that Moscow's pledges could not be taken at face value. The January 2025 State Department compliance report had noted that the United States was unable to make a determination that the Russian Federation remained in compliance throughout 2024 with its obligation to limit deployed warheads to one thousand five hundred fifty due to Russia's proximity to the limit as of its last update and its failure to fulfill verification obligations. This assessment underscored the practical difficulties in monitoring Russian compliance absent the inspection and data exchange mechanisms that had been suspended.
Other analysts adopted a more cautiously optimistic view, arguing that Russia had genuine strategic incentives to avoid an unconstrained nuclear arms race that would impose substantial economic burdens while potentially accelerating American and Chinese nuclear modernization programs. These observers noted that Putin's conditional offer provided a framework for both sides to maintain predictability and restraint during a turbulent period, even if formal treaty obligations had lapsed. They emphasized that Russia had continued to provide advance notification of ballistic missile test launches even after suspending treaty participation, suggesting a residual commitment to crisis stability measures. The question of whether sufficient trust and verification arrangements could be established to give confidence in mutual adherence to informal limits remained unresolved as September drew to a close.
The September 2025 nuclear discourse also reflected broader Russian concerns about the expanding scope of American missile defense capabilities, particularly plans for space-based interceptors. Putin's specific warning about American preparations for the deployment of interceptors in outer space signaled Russian anxiety that such systems could undermine the credibility of its nuclear deterrent by threatening its ability to conduct retaliatory strikes. Throughout the post-Cold War period, Russia had consistently opposed American missile defense programs, arguing that they disrupted strategic stability by creating incentives for first strikes and arms race dynamics. The prospect of space-based interceptors represented a qualitative escalation of these concerns, as such systems could potentially intercept Russian missiles during their boost phase before warheads separated and countermeasures deployed.
Russian military modernization efforts continued throughout September 2025 as part of the decades-long program to replace Soviet-era nuclear delivery systems with modern versions. Despite the September 22 pledge to observe New START limits, Russia maintained its development of new nuclear-capable systems including the continued work on the Sarmat heavy intercontinental ballistic missile, which had experienced testing setbacks, and the nuclear-powered Burevestnik cruise missile, which remained in experimental phases. Reports from late October 2025 indicated that the Burevestik had achieved a flight test of approximately fifteen hours covering some fourteen thousand kilometers, though these claims could not be independently verified. The Russian strategic submarine fleet continued its modernization with the Borei-class submarines gradually replacing older Delta-class boats, while the bomber force worked to upgrade its Tu-160 and Tu-95 aircraft with new cruise missiles.
The positioning of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in Belarus remained a significant element of Moscow's deterrence posture throughout September 2025, even as the month's primary focus centered on strategic arms control. Intelligence assessments from Western agencies indicated that nuclear weapons storage facilities in Belarus appeared to be nearing completion, though conclusive open-source evidence of warheads actually being stored on Belarusian territory remained elusive. The deployment of delivery systems was more clearly established, with Belarusian forces operating nuclear-capable Iskander-M systems and modified Su-25 aircraft. Russian and Belarusian forces had conducted joint exercises involving simulated nuclear weapons employment earlier in 2025, demonstrating the operational integration of these capabilities even while Russia maintained exclusive control over nuclear release authority.
As September 2025 concluded, the future of nuclear arms control between the United States and Russia remained profoundly uncertain despite Putin's conditional offer to maintain treaty limits. The expiration of New START in February 2026 would mark the first time since 1972 that no treaty limiting American and Russian strategic nuclear forces was in effect, potentially opening the door to unconstrained competition in the most destructive weapons ever created. Whether Putin's September 22 statement would lead to a genuine framework for continuing restraint or merely represented a tactical pause in Russia's pursuit of nuclear advantage remained to be determined by the actions of both sides in the months ahead. The statements of September 2025 thus represented not a resolution of the strategic stability crisis but rather an inflection point at which the major nuclear powers faced fundamental choices about whether to preserve elements of the arms control architecture that had contributed to their survival through the Cold War and beyond.
