At the battle of Stirling Bridge, 11 September 1297, the movie Braveheart has William Wallace provoking the English to battle, saying "Here are Scotland's terms. Lower your flags, and march straight back to England, stopping at every home to beg forgiveness for 100 years of theft, rape, and murder. Do that and your men shall live. Do it not, and every one of you will die today. ... Before we let you leave, your commander must cross that field, present himself before this army, put his head between his legs, and kiss his own ass."
Putin's Nuclear Crisis - March 2025
March 2025 marked a pivotal period in Russian nuclear rhetoric as Moscow navigated complex diplomatic negotiations with the United States while maintaining its strategic posture regarding nuclear weapons. The month was characterized by Russia's rejection of a proposed unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine, coupled with continued references to its nuclear capabilities as leverage in ongoing negotiations. Throughout this period, Russian officials consistently invoked nuclear matters in the context of broader discussions about the war in Ukraine, arms control, and strategic stability.
The diplomatic landscape of March 2025 was shaped by American efforts to broker a comprehensive ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. On March 11, Ukrainian and United States officials emerged from talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, having agreed to a ceasefire proposal that Ukraine was prepared to accept if Russia would do the same. The United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that Kyiv's readiness meant the ball was in Russia's court, adding that if the Kremlin rejected the proposal, then the world would unfortunately know what the impediment to peace was. This diplomatic initiative set the stage for Russia's response, which would be delivered through multiple channels and officials over the following days.
After nearly forty-eight hours of silence on the ceasefire proposal, Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov on March 13 dismissed the idea in stark terms. Ushakov described the proposed ceasefire as "a respite for the Ukrainian military" and indicated that President Vladimir Putin would comment on the matter later in the day.1 This initial rejection signaled Russia's fundamental objection to what it perceived as an arrangement that would allow Ukraine to regroup and rearm during any pause in hostilities. The Russian position reflected deeper strategic calculations about the trajectory of the war and Moscow's confidence in its military position on the ground.
When Putin himself addressed the ceasefire proposal on March 13, he raised a series of rhetorical questions that exposed the complexity of implementing any temporary truce. The Russian president questioned what would happen regarding the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region, asking: "What will we do about [Ukrainian army's] incursion into the Kursk region? If we halt hostilities for 30 days, what does that mean? That all [Ukrainian soldiers] there will simply leave without a fight?"2 Putin further elaborated on his concerns by noting that Russian forces were advancing in almost all sectors and questioning how the thirty days would be used, asking whether Ukraine would continue forced mobilization, receive more weapons, and train newly mobilized units, or whether none of that would happen. He also raised the fundamental issue of verification, asking how control and verification would be handled and what guarantees Russia would have that prohibited activities would not take place.3
Despite these significant reservations about an unconditional ceasefire, Putin adopted a somewhat conciliatory tone that left room for continued negotiation. He stated that "the idea in itself is the right one, and we certainly support it, but there are issues that we need to discuss."4 This formulation allowed Putin to appear engaged in the peace process while simultaneously placing conditions on Russian acceptance of any ceasefire agreement. His approach suggested that Moscow viewed the diplomatic engagement as an opportunity to extract concessions from the West rather than as a genuine pathway to an immediate cessation of hostilities. The Russian leader's references to the need for painstaking research and the complexity of reaching a ceasefire effectively delayed the proposed immediate short-term truce, allowing Russia to continue fighting as negotiations dragged on.
On March 18, 2025, the diplomatic landscape shifted when President Donald Trump and President Putin held a two-hour telephone call focused primarily on the war in Ukraine. This conversation resulted in a limited agreement to stop attacks on electrical infrastructure, representing a partial achievement even as broader ceasefire efforts stalled. The significance of this call extended beyond the Ukraine conflict to encompass broader issues of nuclear arms control and strategic stability. The Kremlin's official readout of the call noted that the two sides had discussed cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation.5 The United States statement on the call indicated that the presidents addressed "the need to stop proliferation of strategic weapons."6
The inclusion of nuclear nonproliferation and strategic weapons in the March 18 discussions between Trump and Putin raised important questions about the future of arms control arrangements between the two nuclear superpowers. With the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty set to expire on February 5, 2026, the two presidents' willingness to discuss nuclear matters suggested potential openings for future negotiations. What remained unclear after the call was whether the two presidents had begun to discuss specific ideas regarding how to manage the United States-Russian nuclear relationship and what arrangements might replace New START. Russian officials continued to indicate throughout March that they were ready to discuss arms control and strategic stability more generally with the United States, though they maintained that the onus was on Washington to bring China into any trilateral talks if the United States insisted on such an arrangement.
Throughout March 2025, Russia's nuclear posture remained grounded in the revised nuclear doctrine that Putin had formally signed in November 2024. This updated doctrine had lowered the threshold for Russia's use of nuclear weapons, allowing for a potential nuclear response even to a conventional attack on Russia by any nation supported by a nuclear power. The doctrine's implications continued to inform Russian rhetoric and strategic calculations during the March negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and other officials periodically reminded Western nations of this doctrine, emphasizing that Russia viewed Western military support to Ukraine through the lens of this expanded definition of threats requiring potential nuclear response. The doctrine thus served as a backdrop to all diplomatic exchanges during March, providing Moscow with a framework for nuclear signaling that stopped short of explicit threats while maintaining strategic ambiguity.
Putin also addressed Russian audiences during March about the nation's nuclear capabilities in the context of broader defense and security matters. On March 18, Putin spoke at the Congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in Moscow, where he discussed Russia's economic resilience in the face of Western sanctions and the country's strategic position.7 While the primary focus of this address was on economic and industrial matters, it occurred within the broader context of Russia's self-portrayal as a major power capable of withstanding international pressure. Throughout March, Russian media and official statements continued to emphasize Russia's status as one of the world's preeminent nuclear powers, with Putin at one point noting that Russia has the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons.
The pattern of Russian nuclear references during March 2025 revealed a sophisticated strategy of maintaining strategic deterrence while engaging in diplomatic negotiations. Moscow's approach combined conditional willingness to discuss arms control with firm rejection of any arrangements perceived as disadvantageous to Russian interests. The rejection of the unconditional thirty-day ceasefire, coupled with the agreement to limited measures such as the pause on energy infrastructure attacks, demonstrated Russia's selective engagement with peace proposals. Nuclear weapons remained central to Russia's strategic calculus not as weapons to be actively used but as instruments of coercion and leverage in negotiations. The frequent invocation of nuclear capabilities and doctrine served to remind Western nations of the risks of escalation while providing Moscow with bargaining power in discussions over Ukraine's future and broader European security arrangements.
As March drew to a close, the diplomatic situation remained in flux. Russia had agreed to the limited thirty-day pause on attacks against energy infrastructure that began on March 18, though the agreement's scope remained disputed between Moscow and Kyiv. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused Russia of effectively rejecting the proposal for a full ceasefire, stating that "today, Putin effectively rejected the proposal for a full ceasefire" and calling on the world to reject any attempts by Putin to prolong the war.8 Russian forces continued military operations throughout March, particularly focused on expelling Ukrainian forces from the Kursk region and advancing in the Donbas. The combination of limited diplomatic agreements with continued military operations characterized the complex reality of March 2025, as Russia sought to improve its position on the battlefield while managing international pressure and maintaining the threat of nuclear escalation as a deterrent to deeper Western involvement in the conflict.
The month concluded with fundamental questions unresolved about the trajectory of both the Ukraine conflict and broader nuclear arms control. Russia's references to nuclear weapons during March 2025 had served multiple purposes: deterring Western military escalation, providing leverage in ceasefire negotiations, maintaining domestic political support by portraying Putin as a strong defender of Russian interests, and keeping alive discussions about future arms control arrangements. The pattern established during March suggested that nuclear rhetoric would remain a feature of Russian strategy as the conflict continued, with Moscow carefully calibrating its messaging to maximize strategic advantage while avoiding actions that might trigger direct confrontation with NATO. As the international community looked ahead to the expiration of New START in early 2026, the discussions initiated during March between Trump and Putin offered a potential foundation for future negotiations, though significant obstacles remained regarding verification, the inclusion of China, and the linkage between arms control and the resolution of the Ukraine conflict.
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