The Largest Security-Cleared Career Network for Defense and Intelligence Jobs - JOIN NOW


People's Commissariat of Ship-building Industry
(NKSP - NarKomSudPro)

People's Commissariat of Ship-building Industry (NKSP)
Ivan Fedorovich Tevosyan11 January 1939 17 March 1940
Ivan Isidorovich Nosenko 17 March 1940 15 March 1946
Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry (Minsudprom / MSP)
Alex Adamovich Goregliad 19 March 1946 10 January 1950
Vyacheslav MalyshevJanuary 10 1950 31 October 1952
Ivan Isidorovich Nosenko 31 October 1952 05 March 1953
Division of the Ministry of Transport and Heavy machinery
??? 05 March 1953 19 April 1954
Ivan Isidorovich Nosenko 19 April 1954 02 August 1956
Andrew m. Red'kin 15 September 1956 14 December 1957
State Committee of Shipbuilding
Boris Evstafievich Butoma 14 December 1957 March 13 1963
State Committee for Shipbuilding
Boris Evstafievich Butoma March 13 1963 02 March 1965
Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry (Minsudprom / MSP)
Boris Evstafievich Butoma 02 March 1965 11 July 1976
Mikhail Vasilyevich Egorov19 July 1976 09 January 1984
Igor s.Belousov 9 January 1984 12 February 1988
Igor Vladimirovich Koksanov 20 February 1988 26 November 1991

Before World War II, when it was required to bring the affairs of the shipbuilding commissar violated by repressions to an elementary order, he placed the talented organizer IF Tevosyan, a metallurgist by education, in charge of the NKSP. In May 1940, having moved Tevosyan, who fulfilled his task, to the post of People's Commissar of Ferrous Metallurgy, he appointed a professional commissioner - I.I.Nosenko - as People's Commissar for Shipbuilding.

In the autumn of 1941, when it became obvious to the leader that the Navy would not play a significant role in the war with Germany, Stalin, having correctly prioritized, sent Nosenko's energy to the aid of the People's Commissar of Tank Industry V. Malyshev.

The actual leadership of the Sudprom during this period was carried out by A.M.Redkin, a cadre naval engineer who was transferred in 1937 from Navy personnel to work in the NKOP as one of the other "10,000-strong" to fill up the commissariat that was formed after cleansing the "pests" of the Specialists.

In 1946, when it was necessary to solve the most complicated task of implementing the post-war shipbuilding program, Stalin appointed Aleksey Adamovich Goreglyad, who had graduated from the Bauman Moscow Technical University in 1935 and worked at the NKOP after passing the school of the director of the Stalingrad tractor and Chelyabinsk His experience in organizing and directing the mass production of tanks became the basis for deciding on the appointment of the Minister of the Judiciary.

The Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry of the USSR was established on 15 March 1946 out of the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry. On April 19, 1954 shipbuilding was assigned to a Division of the newly formed Ministry of Transport and Heavy machinery of the USSR. March 13, 1963 it was transformed into the State Committee on Shipbuilding of the USSR, subordinated to the Supreme Economic Council of the USSR.

The Ministry of Transport and Heavy Machinery of the USSR was established March 5, 1953 by combining the Ministry of Transport Engineering of the USSR Ministry of Heavy Engineering of the USSR, the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry of the USSR, the Ministry of Construction and Road Engineering of the USSR. On April 19, 1954 year it was divided into four ministries: the Ministry of heavy machinery of the USSR, Ministry of the shipbuilding industry of the USSR, Ministry of Construction and Rroad machinery of the USSR, and the Ministry of Transport Engineering of the USSR.

The Division was abolished December 14, 1957, and was replaced by the USSR State Committee on shipbuilding. The third time the Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry was established it was on March 2, 1965, on the basis of the State Committee for Shipbuilding of the USSR. It was abolished on November 14, 1991.

The construction of ships, developed in 1916, was started and soon failed. By February 1917, the Russian bourgeois revolution had already taken place. The completely discredited imperial regime fell, and power went to the Provisional Government. In announcing the continuation of the war to the "finish", it nevertheless completely stopped the construction of large ships. It only built those ships that were currently in the fleet were badly needed - escort ships, trawlers, boats fighter. Everything else, except destroyers, especially in the Baltic, were simply unnecessary.

The Bolsheviks made peace in 1918. Most of the ships were without crews. Some were sold to Germany for cutting the metal, and the remaining scrapped ["conserved"]. Summing up the results of the Civil War as it relates to the Navy, Frunze wrote: "The share of the Navy fell particularly hard blows. As a result, we lost the greater and better part of the material composition of the vast majority of experienced and knowledgeable officers who play in the life and work of the fleet even greater role than in all sorts of weapons, have lost a number of bases, and finally lost the core of Red Fleet [Krasnoflotsky] composition. In sum, all this meant we do not have a fleet."

A Special Commission of the revolutionary Republic, examining the State of the Navy, came to the conclusion that "the Navy needed not piecemeal fixes, but full reform." The first shipbuilding programs said a lot. Almost all of them went awry. The economy was still quite weak, and 1927, the military showed it was nothing. There was no modern army. From the Imperial fleet there were only magnificent guns-102, 130-305-mm calibre and, a great number of 47-mm shells. Having a New Economic Policy, the country opted for industrialization, the imposed order and the amended draft also added many ships.

From the Imperial heritage there remained unfinished eight light cruisers. The first two in 1927, entered into operation nearly unchanged. In the Black Sea-Ukraine "Chervona" (formerly "Admiral Nakhimov"), in the Baltic Sea – "Profintern" (former «Svetlana»). The other two were simply barbaric, by redesigning the tankers Azneft and "Grozneft" (former "Admiral Greig» and «Admiral Spiridov»). Well, some of them were tankers, with their narrow and long chassis? But the Navy lost 2 cruisers, which at that time did not have.

Two Black Sea Cruiser "Admiral Istomin and Admiral Kornilov, with a small degree of readiness, were disassembled to metal. On the changed project was completed "Krasny Caucasus" (formerly the "Admiral Lazarev"), which entered service in 1932, was armed with 4 x 180-mm cannons, one in the turret. This caliber was pure Soviet invention. An attempt was made to to create something more powerful than light cruisers at a small displacement. Then it will take on a more modern Project 26 Cruiser, but then quickly give up in favor of 152-mm artillery at the Project 68. Here came into effect the main rule of naval combat, that as the number of projectiles released in a minute increases, with the increasing caliber the firing rate decreases. In addition, the limit range shooting accuracy is sharply decreased.

The 180-mm MK-1-180 were very powerful, with a range of up to 203 cables. The projectile weight of 97.5 kg had an initial velocity 920 m/s. But barrel was just 55 calibers. The rate of fire was 6 rounds/min. The ship also received 4 x 100-mm twin anti-aircraft gun of the Italian system of Minizini and 4 45-mm semiautomatic. It also had a strong submarine torpedo armament. The ship, although it cannot be considered as modern, but it was a first approximation to what really wanted to. Unfortunately, by the beginning of the war the ship was already completely not capable due to the poor state of artillery.

The last Baltic Cruiser "Admiral Butakov" had long stood at the dock waiting for its fate. It was rebuilt, but somehow permanently delayed. At first, it was renamed the "Voroshilov" and in the early 1930's were going to finish the changed project. There was an option with 180-mm cannons. But then came the Project 78, with its completion as a training ship. The project was sufficiently elaborated and included all weapons systems control devices adopted for cruisers. It was approved, the Cruiser and renamed Aurora. The Corps was put in order and ready for completion. The ship was set-4 x 130 mm gun turret installations, 76-and 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 12.7-mm machine guns — to 8 banks of every caliber. There were torpedo tubes and one seaplane. But in early 1941, construction was halted due to high cost. So the fleet lost another good ship.

The Novik-type destroyers, also inherited from the Imperial fleet, all managed to be retained after the civil war. They were restored, built and were actively involved in the life of the fleet. In the 1930s, they coped with the tasks for that type of ships. During the Great Patriotic War they almost all were sunk doing their duty with honor.

Especially, it would be desirable to tell about the heavy Cruiser Rurik. The ship stayed afloat for 10 years, and was also sent for recycling. And there were plenty of opportunities to use it. It was enough to rearm, at least put the 2 turrets similar to those on the battleship type. Displacement was allowed, and in size, it was almost the same as the British "Dreadnought". It would be quite efficient ship that could be used as is, or use a monitor as a training ship for the initial training of crews for battleships.

An important achievement of Soviet shipbuilding in the pre-war years was the creation of combat boats hovercraft, later named the DPC. Their author was Professor of Novocherkassk Polytechnical Institute, V. Levkov. For 1934-1941 the boats were created from l-1 to l-13, constantly increasing in size and different composition of the weapons.

In 1938 Isakov led the so-called "mission" in the United States. A number of agreements were concluded about designing for the Soviet Union battleships both classical and hybrid, i.e. battleships-aircraft carriers. A number of options were designed that varied in displacement and armament. One design project was executed for destroyers. The USSR was also buying and a range of equipment for ships, including propulsion systems for destroyers. After the war with Finland in December 1939, the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations, and Soviet representatives and negotiators were expelled from the United States with the interruption of all negotiations by announcing it was a "moral embargo".

Formation and further development of extended fleet required some re-organization and modernization of the fleet management system as well as enhancement and diversification of the shipbuilding industry management. In December, 1937, the People's Commissariat of the Navy was established, and in January 1939 - People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry.

The People's Commissariat of Shipbuilding Industry of the USSR (abbreviated NKSP) was the central governing body, administering the shipbuilding industry of the USSR from 11 January 1939 to 15 February 1946 the year. The Commissariat was formed as a result of division of the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry on the Commissariat into four Commissariats. The main objective was the implementation by the NKSP of the Navy of the USSR "Program of building warships and auxiliary vessels of the Navy in the 1938-1945 years."

The composition of the People's Commissariat originally included more than twenty large enterprises - research institutions, CDB, shipyards - uniting tens of thousands of workers and engineering staff. Commissariat was abolished in connection with the conversion of the same name in the ministry.

Formation and further development of extended fleet required some re-organization and modernization of the fleet management system as well as enhancement and diversification of the shipbuilding industry management. In December, 1937, the People's Commissariat of the Navy was established, and in January 1939 the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry (NKSP - NarKomSudPro) was one of four Commissariats formed from the Ministry of Defense Industry [NKOP]. The Ministry of Defense Industry itself had been formed in December 1936 from the Ministry of Heavy Industry [NKTP], which was formed in January 1932 from the Ministry of Industry [VSNKh], which dated to Decenber 1917. Five major groups of shipbuilding factories and shipyards started to appear: Leningrad group, South group, Far-Eastern group, Northern group and the Central one (river group). The first two produced up to 2/3 of total shipbuilding output.

Knowing the doctrine of Mahan, J.V.Stalin realized that to achieve his strategic aims he required not only a powerful land army, but large and powerful Navy. "Who owns the sea, possesses the world". Not for nothing was he in his own personal cinema perusing the Chronicle of the Battle of Jutland, he realized that on the path to world domination would be England. Therefore, focusing on the long-term, Stalin tried to create a naval Fleet of the USSR. And it's even given that priority should be given to the yet land forces, as in first place was Europe. On the construction of the fleet was constantly allocated big funds.

It should be mentioned about the serious factor which long years influenced the development of Soviet ship building. This was the "leading and guiding role" of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). I.V.Stalin considered himself expert in many questions, including in the building of the fleet. Often it was this individual, in spite of the opinion of seamen, who determined, what ships and in what quantity to build. Moreover his word was final and was not subject to criticism.

Therefore pre-war and the first postwar programs of military shipbuilding were unbalanced, the role of aircraft carriers and aviation in the naval action was underestimated. On the whim "of the father of the peoples" of the USSR it was the only in the world country, which continued also after the end of the Second World War of work on the creation of battleships and heavy cruisers. Stalin considered Italian ships worthy of imitation, and Italian firms rendered the Soviet Union technical assistance in the design of destroyers, whose housings under the conditions of the Northern Fleet broke, and cruisers, which, possessing the high running speed, they had weak anti-aircraft ["zenith"] armament.

Frequently the Leader made decisions even as to the separate elements of ships. Specifically, he solved, which for the heavy ships was completely sufficient 100-mm anti-aircraft cannon (seamen they proposed 130-mm). N.G.Kuznetsov recalled, as to strengthening PVO (Air Defense) of ships, Stalin stated on the request that in "war we will be not on America coasts". Sometimes he required of the designers and the seamen things that were impracticable, for example, 35-knot main speed for the cruisers of Project 82. Those who objected or argued could pay with their head, and examples to that were set. It was under such conditions that it was difficult to charge designers and seamen with the fact that Soviet ships had serious deficiencies.

Design offices, including in the NKVD, the so-called "Sharaski", worked with the utmost tension. Unfortunately, all types of ships and their weapons defined by only one person, an expert in all matters, the great leader Stalin. He determined the estimated war theater, ship types, and their distribution on the fleets. Some projects were "saboteurs", others dying, being technically insolvent. And most importantly, the experience of the first world war at sea, which showed types of ships in battle, was not taken into account.

The country had developed shipbuilding programs — 1925-1930 program, program of "light force", 1933-1937, 1937, 1938. There was constant change in the hands of command of the fleet. With the arrival of the fleet of Kuznetsov, there at last came at least some stabilization. The shipbuilding program was developed for 10 years with year plans are on 1938-1942 and on the 1943-1947 the program, called the "Great Fleet".

At the first session of the USSR Supreme Council, held January 1938, V.M. Molotov, the Chairman of the People's Commissar Council, declared the following: “Our mighty Soviet power must have such sea and ocean fleet that would comply with her interests and would be worthy of our great mission”. The Soviet Premier's words reflected the point of view of the USSR government - first of all, its head - Stalin - which had undergone significant changes concerning the main aspects of the further Navy formation process. It was exactly the time when the 10-year “Big Shipbuilding program” was introduced in accordance with which it was planned to start battleships and heavy cruisers construction which would represent ocean might and strength of the country.

Following the initial version of the 19-year program, by 1946, the Soviet Fleet would have had 15 battleships, 15 heavy and 28 light cruisers, 144 destroyers, 336 submarines, dozens of ships of other types and hundreds of battle boats.

In contrast to the first and second “piatiletka” (five-year plan introduced by the Soviet government) where the main attention had been focused on means and instruments for a “small-scale war” at sea and, first and foremost, submarines, the “Big Shipbuilding program” was chiefly concentrated on battleships and cruisers construction.

However, the emphasis placed on large surface ships building did not exactly correspond to the demands of naval science as well as to the existing points of view on warfare at sea. In connection with rapid development of aviation and submarines, the era of battleships might and total supremacy was coming to its end.

There is no doubt that orientation of the Soviet shipbuilding policy was, to a large extent, influenced by those impressive results and experience shown by the leading sea powers which continued intensive battleships construction. In the middle of the 1930s, at the shipyards of six countries there were as many as 20 battleships under construction, though the proportion of the large surface ships in the foreign fleets became smaller. Though, they still continued to construct aircraft-carriers.

The fact that the USSR economy could not support and secure the construction of such a fleet was quite obvious. The construction costs of only four first battleships of the Soviet Union type amounted to as much as a quarter of the country annual budget. Nowadays, it is not a secret anymore that implementation of the plans drawn up for the 1st and 2nd piatiletkas had been systematically undermined. On the whole, both piatiletkas remained unfulfilled. The system of financing the current construction on account of future plans advances flourished. Thus, the percentage of “unfinished ships” increased.

And while Stalin and said that "kopecks will collect", construction of such a large number of large ships was becoming a burden on the country's economy. In addition, a huge amount of metal was required for land vehicles, which had to endure the brunt of combat in the theatre of war. In the end, Stalin's plans for the fleet was expected for another war with the "Queen of the Seas" for supremacy at sea. And the industry was not quite yet ready to the shipbuilding program. There were not even rolling mills for the production of steel armor thickness is up to 220 mm, as in the first World War. Turbines and almost all of the equipment had been ordered overseas. With the outbreak of war in Europe, of course, supply had been disrupted.

Just before the war the USSR had to stop work on battleships. On 19 October, 1940, the Soviet government made a decision on the termination of the battleships and heavy cruisers construction. One of the battleships under construction was sent for disassembling. It was ordered to concentrate all their efforts on small-size and medium-size warships building and to continue completion of large ships with high percentage of readiness availability.

On 22 June, 1941, at 4 o’clock in the morning, Germany, without any preliminary warning, treacherously attacked the Soviet Union. The first period of the Great Patriotic War began. The second period of the Great Patriotic War (November 1942 – end of 1943) was marked by the Soviet troops counter-offensive operations. The third period of the GPW (January 1944 - May 1945) was marked by the USSR Army conducting offensive operations on all the battle-fronts.

Join the mailing list

Page last modified: 16-08-2017 19:02:52 ZULU