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Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry
(Minsudprom / MSP)

People's Commissariat of Ship-building Industry (NKSP)
Ivan Fedorovich Tevosyan11 January 1939 17 March 1940
Ivan Isidorovich Nosenko 17 March 1940 15 March 1946
Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry (Minsudprom / MSP)
Alex Adamovich Goregliad 19 March 1946 10 January 1950
Vyacheslav MalyshevJanuary 10 1950 31 October 1952
Ivan Isidorovich Nosenko 31 October 1952 05 March 1953
Division of the Ministry of Transport and Heavy machinery
??? 05 March 1953 19 April 1954
Ivan Isidorovich Nosenko 19 April 1954 02 August 1956
Andrew m. Red'kin 15 September 1956 14 December 1957
State Committee of Shipbuilding
Boris Evstafievich Butoma 14 December 1957 March 13 1963
State Committee for Shipbuilding
Boris Evstafievich Butoma March 13 1963 02 March 1965
Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry (Minsudprom / MSP)
Boris Evstafievich Butoma 02 March 1965 11 July 1976
Mikhail Vasilyevich Egorov19 July 1976 09 January 1984
Igor s.Belousov 9 January 1984 12 February 1988
Igor Vladimirovich Koksanov 20 February 1988 26 November 1991

Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry
(Minsudprom / MSP)

And then there was the new conflict, this time the "Cold" war, in 1946, Again there was a need to arm. For part of the fleet, all that was left was no longer suited. Following the war a full analysis was conducted. Ships of all classes were unable to provide their own protection from air strikes and therefore needed an umbrella. The main shock force was aircraft, and the battleships as a class were a thing of the past. There was a huge role of patrol and escort force. This included torpedo boats, patrol boats, and submarine hunters. Another lesson of the war was a big role for mine hunters, as well as the amphibious forces.

When Stalin promoted the extensive post-war shipbuilding program, to the question: "When we construct these ships, then will our fleet as strong as American?", N.G.Kuznetsov honestly answered: "No." Then Stalin rightly remarked, "Then why do we need such a huge effort. Wouldn't it be better to spend the money on something more useful!"

J.V.Stalin, rightly argued that in the first post-war decade fleet will be coastal, and plans for future fleet can be prepared on any ships, not so ambitious as had been proposed.

In the post-war era, leapfrog cuts in the army and the Navy, led to the fact that the People's Commissariat of the Navy was abolished, and the fleet, having received a new name - the Navy of the USSR - was subordinated to the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR. From this moment, the stagnation of the USSR Navy began.

Soon Generalissimo J. Stalin, came to the conclusion that this decision was fatal for the fleet and in February 1950, it was decided to withdraw the Navy from the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR. An independent Naval Ministry and the Naval General Staff were formed.

As with G.K.Zhukov, Khrushchev removed Kuznetsov from the Navy command, as the new age needed new leaders. N.S.Khrushchev believed that at this stage surface ships were only needed for visits, parades and demonstrations of the flag, paying primary attention to submarines with missiles on board. While surface ships were allowed to build only a small series on the condition that they would be "small".

Opposing the Soviet State was the United States, with a huge surface fleet, which included numerous aircraft carriers, and powerful shipbuilding industry. Therefore, achieving parity in this area had been very problematic and would require many years and huge monetary and material costs. At the time, the Soviet Union was slightly behind the United States in creating nuclear submarines, and on the introduction of ballistic and cruise missiles, the fleet in the mid-1950s was ahead of all foreign states. In these circumstances, there is a was real opportunity to achieve relatively quickt parity with the US Navy in the striking power of submarines. This was considered by the military-political leadership of the USSR as a decisive factor in a possible confrontation at sea. It was decided to give priority to development of submarines, including the missile weapons. But this decision did not take into account that the combat stability of submarines gave aviation (hence, aircraft carriers) and surface ships of all classes a balanced fleet.

As the industry was not able to quickly deploy the construction of new types of ships, serial production of the previously designed destroyers, patrol boats, torpedo boats, and minesweepers coinued into the late 1950s. This was conducted in parallel with the creation of nuclear submarines and other submarines and surface ships with new weapons. Concurrent with the development of new weapon systems began intensive design work aimed at finding the best types of submarines and surface vessels, missiles and other new combat and technical facilities. There were developed more than 50 projects for submarines and more than 70 projects for surface ships and boats.

The cessation of construction of artillery cruisers allowed the release large slipways and starting the building mass civil vessels for various purposes in order to update the transport fleet, which was vital. Also there were put into operation new production facilities.

Since the beginning of 1956 began the era of Admiral C.G.Gorshkov, who determined the development of the fleet. Of the major surface ships in the early 1960s, only only two projects were built - projects 58 and 61. The lead missile destroyer Project 58 "Grozny" was put into operation December 30, 1962, and there were built 4 ships. Later, to give them a higher status, the ships were reclassified as missile cruisers, although the length of only 142 meters, they were far from cruisers. The ship was carrying two quad launchers for the missiles R-35. There was also a hangar for a reload. In practice, however, at sea, it was impossible.




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Page last modified: 04-11-2018 17:41:31 ZULU