Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq
December 2007
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)
Foortnotes
1 The data cutoff date for this report is November 30, 2007.
2 Translates as Awakening Movement of Iraq.
3 “Stabilizing and Securing Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” Government Accountability Office, October 2007. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08231t.pdf. Recognizing the need for greater coordination in assistance programs, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq in May 2007 named a Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq to head U.S. Government ministerial capacity development efforts through the Ministerial Engagement Coordinating Committee.
4 The Procurement Assistance Center (PAC), an ITAO-administered program, funds the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation in the establishment of PACs focused on clear and efficient procurement and contracting procedures. The PAC program supports both national ministries and provincial governments. PACs established in provinces are referred to as Provincial Procurement Assistance Teams (PPATs). PPATs have recently been established in a number of provinces. Provinces with the greatest difficulty in budget execution have been given priority.
5 This report uses average daily megawatt hours (MWh) to measure electricity generation output. Previous reports used megawatts (MW) to measure average daily peak supply and demand. Although average daily peak is a valid measurement, it is an instantaneous measure that does not capture overall production output. Production capacity is still measured in MW.
6 See Relief and Reconstruction Work at Mosul Dam, Mosul, Iraq by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, for an assessment of this project. (SIGIR-PA07-105, October 29, 2007) (http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/assessments/PA-07-105.pdf)
7 The term “Concerned Local Citizens” is generic and covers a number of security arrangements initiated at the unit level. These include the provision of security under Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP)-funded contracts and less formal voluntary arrangements in which financial rewards are given for handing in IEDs and weapons. Currently, there are about 69,000 CLCs across Iraq, including 17,000 in Baghdad.
8 Nationwide poll, October 2007: “How would you describe the situation today in your neighborhood?” and How would you describe the situation today in Iraq?” Nationwide, 61% of respondents described their neighborhood as "Calm" and 19% describe Iraq as "Calm." Sample size: ~12,000. Margin of error: ~1%, <8% provincial.
9 Nationwide poll, October 2007: “Do you agree with the following statements? I feel safe and secure in my neighborhood and I feel safe traveling outside my neighborhood.” Nationwide, 64% of respondents agree that they feel safe inside their neighborhoods and 34% feel safe traveling outside their neighborhoods. Sample size: ~12,000. Margin of error: ~1%, <8% provincial.
10 Nationwide poll, October 2007: “How would you rate the level of peace and stability in Iraq today?” Nationwide, 7% of Iraqis rate the country as "Stable," 67% rate the country as "Unstable," 26% "Don't Know" or "Refuse to Answer." Sample size: ~8700. Margin of error: ~ 1.5%, <10% provincial
12 Nationwide poll, October 2007: “How much confidence do you have in the following to protect you and your family against threats? Iraqi Police.” Nationwide, 62% of Iraqis had at least some confidence in the ability of the Iraqi Police to protect them/their family against threats. Sample size: ~8700. Margin of error: ~ 1.5%, <10% provincial.
13 Nationwide poll, October 2007: “How much confidence do you have in the following to protect you and your family against threats? Multi-National Force.” Nationwide, 12% of Iraqis had at least some confidence in the ability of Multi-National Force-Iraq to protect them/their family against threats. Sample size: ~8700. Margin of error: ~ 1.5%, <10% provincial.
14 Nationwide poll, October 2007: “Do you think the Iraqi Police are winning or losing the battle against fighting crime?” Nationwide, 65% of Iraqis answered “Winning.” Sample size: ~8700. Margin of error: ~ 1.5%, <10% provincial.
15 Nationwide poll, October 2007: “Do you think the Iraqi Army is winning or losing the battle against terrorists?” Nationwide, 64% of Iraqis answered “Winning.” Sample size: ~8700. Margin of error: ~ 1.5%, <10% provincial.
16 A new table is included during this reporting period to more accurately capture Iraq force personnel growth from three perspectives: “authorized,” “assigned,” and “trained.” The definition of “authorized” for MoD (Ministry of Defense) and Iraqi National Counter Terrorism Force (INCTF) forces is personnel strengths derived from MTOE (Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment) for all MoD and INCTF units. This definition accounts for units that are generated, in generation or planned, plus the Prime Minister’s initiative to man Iraqi Army units to 120% of authorized strength. The definition of “authorized” for MoI forces is based on authorized Ministry of Interior hiring orders. The definition of “assigned” is derived from monthly payroll data for both MoD and MoI forces and includes all personnel, trained and untrained, who received pay the previous month. The definition of “trained” is the cumulative number of personnel who have completed Basic Combat Training (BCT) for MoD forces, the Operators Course for INCTF and Basic Recruit Training (BRT) for MoI forces.
17 U.S. appropriated funds that have been used for generating Iraqi military and police forces include US$5 billion in the FY2004 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). It also includes US$5.4 billion in FY2005 for the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) followed by additional injections of $3 billion in 2006 and US$5.5 billion in 2007 and a pending US$3 billion for FY2008—a total of US$21.9 billion.
18 These totals include approximately 35,000 police trained as part of provincial police initiatives and some replenishments for the substantial attrition that Iraqi forces have suffered during the past four years. Previous quarterly reports focused mainly on the throughput of the U.S.-funded program while providing estimates of the number of personnel actually on the various forces. These reports measured totals for the MoI’s Objective Civil Security Force (OCSF) and the MoD’s Objective Counterinsurgency Force (OCF), including the Prime Minister’s force expansion initiatives announced in 2006.
19 This rapid expansion of police on the payroll is abetted by Coalition Provisional Authority Order 71 (CPA 71), which diluted the MoI’s control over the police by giving the provincial governments the power to approve hiring and initiate firing of provincial chiefs of police. The practical effect of CPA 71 has been to make provincial police chiefs more beholden to local pressures without regard to MoI funding constraints. This unpredictable process does not allow synchronization of required resources and growth projections; it creates confusion in effectively manning the force, undermines attempts to build a requirements-based force structure, and subsequently creates difficulties in properly training, equipping and budgeting for Iraqi Police salaries.
20 3rd Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division, which deployed to eastern Baghdad in November 2007, was the first unit to complete this program. 2nd Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division is currently conducting unit set fielding and training and will deploy to eastern Baghdad in December 2007. 2nd Brigade, 11th Iraqi Army Division will be followed by 3rd Brigade, 14th Iraqi Army Division in January 2008 and 4th Brigade, 5th Iraqi Army Division; 4th Brigade, 7th Iraqi Army Division; and Logistics Battalion, 4th Brigade, 9th Division in February 2008.
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