Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq
December 2007
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)
Section 2—Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance
2.3 Ministry of Defense
MoD forces currently have an authorized strength of approximately 208,000, with about 161,000 personnel on the payroll. The Iraqi Army (IA) has ten infantry divisions and one mechanized infantry division. Two additional divisions are being established as part of Prime Minister Maliki’s Expansion Initiative. The MoD has made solid gains in institutional capacity and force generation during this reporting period but is still developing capacity in other areas. A significant restructuring of the Joint Headquarters’ (JHQ) command and control arrangements has also been undertaken. Coalition assistance provides fielded forces with some logistical support, but the MoD has begun a renewed effort to attain self-sufficiency in life support, maintenance and logistics in the coming quarters. The MoD is showing slow but real progress in the acquisitions process and is demonstrating an approach to the planning and management of all ministry requirements that are joint and reflective of civil-military coordination.
Ministry of Defense Transition Issues
Ministry Capacity Development
Improvements in MoD performance in the execution of key ministerial functions have been slow but steady, showing incremental progress, noticeably in FMS management oversight and performing requirements-based budgeting. Overall, the MoD is assessed as “partially effective” at force management, resource management, personnel, acquisition, logistics and sustainment and training and development. Continued Coalition assistance is needed to provide fielded forces with required logistical support.
Force management. MoD force management efforts experienced success during this report-ing period in the areas of force planning, re-cruiting and command and control. The MoD and JHQ continue to strive to properly program the forces, equipment and basing required in accordance with MoD force generation priorities, but the challenge remains integrating activities across func-tional lines. The various expansion and replenishment initiatives of the past year were in part intended to generate forces to 120% of required levels to accommodate regular leave schedules. As of November 30, 2007, IA divisions have reached an average of 112% of authorized strength for all fully operational units. This average consists of just under 150% of authorizations for enlisted personnel, just under 45% of authorized NCOs and just under 60% of authorized officers. In the last nine months, present-for-duty strengths increased from 94,700 to 109,100. The Air Force and Navy are manned at 42% and 75% of authorized personnel, respectively. The IA has suffered up to 17% annual attrition, in part due to a casualty rate two to three times higher than that of Coalition forces. On average, 2,000 soldiers become absent without leave (AWOL) each week, though an unspecified number return for duty. In 2007, approximately 21,000 Iraqi soldiers have been dropped from the rolls for desertion or AWOL. A major remaining force management challenge is synchronizing all elements of unit management, including recruits, leaders, equipment, training and basing in the context of shifting force generation and rotation plans, driven by a continuously changing operational picture.
Resource Management. Since publication in May 2007 of the Ministry of Planning-authored Iraqi Procurement Law, the MoD has been updating its Contracts Policy and Procedures Manual, including the business process flow charts and delegated approval financial thresholds, to match the new legal requirements. Until these processes mature, the MoD will continue to pursue a substantial portion of its capital acquisition and sustainment requirements through U.S. FMS cases. Even their ability to benefit from FMS has been constrained by their difficulty in appropriately defining requirements to process Letters of Request. The MoD remains on track to develop and deliver the 2008 Capabilities Requirements Plan aligned to the expected 2008 budget allocation. Despite success in the planning for capabili-ties requirements, the MoD suffers from inefficiencies in the processes associated with committing funds and contracting. Budget execution remains constrained by bureaucratic stovepipes and convoluted acquisition processes, which reflect reluctance at every level to take personal responsibility and to delegate financial authority. The tendency, reinforced by the perceived need to avoid criticism by the Commission for Public Integrity, is for officials to refer decisions to the next higher level of authority.
Personnel. In addition to service-specific personnel programs, the MoD is improving its leader-to-led ratios through its re-joining initiative. During this period, nearly 500 officers and 2,000 NCOs from the former regime were vetted successfully and re-joined the IA. Prior-service officers and NCOs are attending a three-week “re-joining” course to prepare them for service in the IA. Up to 1,500 officers and 13,000 NCOs are expected to enter the force as a result of the current re-joining effort. Once the Accountability and Justice Law is passed, even more officers and NCOs from the former regime are expected to re-join the IA.
Materiel Acquisition. MNSTC-I and the MoD continue to work together to purchase and distribute mission-critical items to the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF), such as up-armored HMMWVs, wheeled Armored Personnel Carriers, heavy machine guns and fuel trucks, to the agreed MTOE levels. The MoD continues to receive delivery of equipment, ammunition and repair parts through FMS using MoD funds. MNSTC-I and the MoD are improving security cooperation through a weekly Director General-level FMS Oversight Committee meeting. The MoD is also using FMS to acquire military line haul fuel tanker capabilities rather than rely on commercial transportation, and is steadily assuming greater responsibility for transportation of supplies, soldiers and equipment via a contract for line transportation.
Logistics and Sustainment. In general, logistics remains a key challenge to Iraqi forces’ ability to permanently assume missions from the Coalition. The MoD continues to require Coalition assistance, especially in warehouse, depot, transportation and distribution operations. However, this period has seen some steps forward. The MoD envisions a national depot system which is currently being improved and constructed to support the general supply requirements, ammunition and maintenance for the IAF. Development of these three depots is expected to be complete by late 2008. Additional achievements during this period include the generation of two Motor Transport Regiments (MTR) and one Logistics Support Battalion (LSB). The end strength of existing MTRs and BSUs were also increased. These help to improve Iraqi logistics, maintenance and support capability. MTRs and LSBs also experienced improve-ments in their operational readiness assess-ment ratings during this period. To date, Coalition forces have provided 1,869 heavy cargo trucks, 6,441 medium trucks, 7,765 light trucks and 3,078 tool sets. The MoD, the JHQ and the IA have also improved their logistics “common operational picture,” which allows commanders to have better visibility of logistics assets within the supply, maintenance and transportation systems. As an example of increased capability, the MoD, JHQ, IA and Air Force coordinated equip-ment deliveries by an Iraqi C-130 to IA divisions in Mosul, Tal Afar and Basrah. The Joint Transition Advisory Council continues to work with the JHQ to track the transition of the maintenance capability, make decisions on the timetable and provide assistance in overcoming obstacles.
The ability of the MoD forces to maintain accountability of equipment has been mixed. With regard to weapons, the Department of Defense Inspector General confirmed that Coalition and Iraqi procedures are in place and working, although some improvements are required. Accountability for other types of equipment, however, remains a challenge. The JHQ, the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) and MNSTC-I have initiated an effort to reconcile the differences between what was issued and what is on-hand by ordering joint accountability inspection teams to conduct 100% equipment inventories. These Iraqi initiatives are helping to improve equipment accountability at the unit level.
Training and Development. The MoD has begun to address the training deficiencies among its civilian work force. Many systemic problems within the Ministry, not unique to the MoD, relate to the lack of a core of professional civil servants. The training curriculum for civil servants is well advanced; new courses are being developed and future requirements are being defined. The Ministerial Training and Development Center is conducting courses in key areas for capacity building and self-reliance to include policy and requirements, acquisition, budget-ing, personnel management, infrastructure, intelligence and security, communications, inspections, media and legal services.
The MoD is currently implementing the Future Iraqi Army Training System. Previously, training was largely limited to the institutional (entry-level and military occupa-tional specialty qualification courses) training base. The Future Iraqi Army Training System incrementally builds on the institu-tional training base already in existence by adding a home-station training capability and a Combat Training Center (CTC) collective training capability. Institutional training is being improved by the availability of additional courses, such as corporal’s courses and organizational maintenance courses, and by upgrading range and training facilities at Regional Training Centers (RTCs). Home-station training is being enabled through the building of a division training center within the area of operation of every IA division. These training centers facilitate units conducting small unit collective training. An enhanced collective training capability has been established at CTC Besmaya. Through this system, the IA is developing individual leader skills; squad, platoon, and company collective skills; battlefield operating systems skills; and battalion staff skills.
The IA has also begun to improve specialized training. The Iraqi Small Arms Weapons Instructor Course, a five-week advanced course, is conducted at RTC Habbaniyah and is the first of its kind. The IA has also begun training on combat enablers like explosive ordnance disposal with the opening of the Bomb Disposal School on September 30, 2007 at CTC Besmaya. During this period in the logistics field, three new organizational maintenance courses began at RTC Kirkush, RTC Habbaniyah, and at Old Al Muthanna, with an annual training capacity of 1,000 soldiers per location. The Trauma Training Course trained nine MoD physicians and 49 other health personnel in the provision of trauma care during this period. The Basic Medic Course has trained 1,575 literate MoD personnel to be medics.
As part of the IA Training Base Expansion, training capacity has increased from 14,950 soldiers per training cycle to 25,100 soldiers per cycle. Capacity has increased at RTCs Habbaniyah, Kirkush, Taji, Numaniyah and Tallil; Division Training Centers (DTC) Hammam Al Alil and Al Kut; and CTC Besmaya. Additionally, DTC Al Kasik opened in August 2007. The annual IA Basic Combat Training capacity is now 104,230 soldiers.
Military Justice. Two military justice laws, the Military Crimes Code and the Military Procedures Code, were passed by the Iraqi Parliament and became effective in August and September 2007, respectively. These laws now allow military commanders to deliver swift discipline for minor criminal offenses and effectively deal with absenteeism and desertion, through the process of a Disciplinary Officer Proceeding (an expeditious form of non-judicial punishment). The Iraqis are tracking all offenses, and commander education on the new laws continues.
Embedded Advisory Support
Transition Teams (TTs) are embedded in the MoD, the JHQ and the IGFC and with most division, brigade and battalion headquarters. At the national level, there are two teams, one for the civilian leadership of the Ministry and one for the JHQ. Since 2004, the MoD-TT has been led by a Senior Executive Service-level UK MoD civil servant. The MoD-TT consists of approximately 70 advisors including seven U.S. military personnel and six British and two Australian civil servants; the rest are primarily contractors. An Australian general officer leads the 60-person TT that advises the JHQ. At the JHQ-TT, U.S. military personnel comprise about half of the advisors and the rest are split roughly between U.S. civilian contractors and military personnel from other Coalition countries. Both TTs report to MNSTC-I and provide mentoring support to senior officials in developing the Iraqi capacity to manage key ministerial functions. At the tactical level, the Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) assigned to the MNC-I usually consist of about ten personnel and advise Iraqi com-manders and staff on planning processes and combat operations. The requirement for MiTTs is one per command unit of battalion and above; 166 teams are now fielded with these units. The Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) has advisor teams with the Tactical Training Command, the CTC, six RTCs, and three DTCs supporting Iraqi institutional training and the CTC collective training. Iraqi institutional training includes basic combat training, specialized military occupational specialty courses and NCO training courses. The CTC at Besmaya provides capabilities for squad, platoon and company collective task training; battalion leader and staff training; and selected institutional training including officer training, mortar training and explosive ordnance training. To enhance the IA’s operational unit logistic capabilities, CMATT has teams at Taji National Depot, five BSUs and at multiple other logistics bases.
The Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) is responsible for assisting the Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) to develop needed airpower capabilities. This includes advising along the full spectrum of the IqAF hierarchy from the IqAF commander down to advising individual pilots and mechanics.
The Maritime Strategic Transition Team (MaSTT), headed by a British Royal Navy Captain, advises the Iraqi Head of Navy and the Iraqi Headquarters Staff assisting in the development of a capable and responsive Iraqi Navy. Its Naval Transition Team (NaTT) is embedded with the Iraqi Navy at the Umm Qasr Naval Base supporting the generation of a properly organized, trained and equipped naval force.
Ministry of Defense Forces
Joint Headquarters – Command and Control
Under Coalition Provisional Authority Order 67, the Chief of Staff of the MoD JHQ is responsible for operational command and control of all Iraqi military forces. These forces are currently comprised of the IGFC, Navy, Air Force, and Training and Doctrine Command. The JHQ does not exercise command and control of Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) but provides administrative and logistical support. The MoD currently has an authorized strength of approximately 208,000 personnel centered on an army with ten infantry divisions, one mechanized infantry division and two divisions in force generation. In addition, there are associated combat support units, an air force consisting of seven squadrons and two training wings and a navy with two squadrons and one marine battalion.
At the operational level, Iraqi command and control is progressing gradually. The deployment of 2nd Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division from Taji to Basrah exemplifies the MoD, JHQ and IGFC ability to conduct operational planning and shift their focus as the needs on the battlefield change. While the 2nd Battalion did successfully deploy to Basrah, it did so with insufficient life support upon the unit’s arrival and an incomplete plan to provide vehicle maintenance. The move of the 2nd Battalion identified the need for more clearly delineated responsibilities, published orders and transparent command arrangements.
Army
As of November 30, 2007, the IA’s operational divisions consist of approxi-mately 137,000 assigned soldiers and officers. These divisions are currently manned at 112% of authorized strength in order to bolster present-for-duty strength (79% of authorized strength), compensating for the policy of monthly leave so soldiers can travel to their homes to bring pay to their families. There is a shortage of 30,000 officer and NCO leaders and future require-ments will require approximately an additional 20,000 in 2008. There are 11,932 former officers currently serving in the IA.
The MoD is attempting to improve accountability for IA personnel. Thus far in 2007, the MoD has dropped approximately 21,000 Iraqi soldiers from the rolls for desertion and being AWOL. The JHQ M1 does not track the reasons why soldiers go AWOL. There is, however, no factual or anecdotal evidence to support the claim that the policy of monthly leave so soldiers can take their pay home contributes substantially to the AWOL rate. Two military justice laws, the Military Crimes Code and the Military Procedures Code became law in August and September 2007, respectively, providing military commanders the ability to punish absenteeism and desertion. To date no one has been charged under the new laws; the Iraqis are tracking all offenses but are still in the process of approving all necessary forms and documents that will be used to carry out the laws.
The IA has developed and is starting to implement several concepts to increase the number of leaders. These initiatives include accelerated officer commissioning programs, quickened accessions of university graduates with technical degrees, waivers to current time in grade/time in service promotion requirements, and active recruitment of former Iraqi officers and NCOs. In one example, the top 10% of each Basic Combat Training class is being allowed to continue to Corporal’s Course.
A number of units are currently in force generation including one division headquar-ters, seven brigade headquarters and 27 battalions. By the end of 2007 three additional brigades, four support companies, five infantry battalions, a motor transport regiment, a logistics battalion and an infra-structure repair regiment will begin the force generation process. The IA continues to build units as planned. Efforts to bring units, the infrastructure battalions and the Presiden-tial Brigade under the command and control of the MoD have also contributed to the expansion. Two Kurdish Peshmerga Divisions may also be integrated into the IA. The MoD and JHQ will determine how best to properly program these divisions, provide the equipment and basing required and train them in accordance with MoD force generation priorities.
A new practice in the IA force generation process is unit set fielding. This process allows for generated units to enter the force at higher levels of manning, training, and equipping readiness. It is conducted at multiple locations, leveraging existing training capabilities. Initially, the Coalition leads planning and execution with IA support. After six months, the IA leads with the Coalition in support. Throughout the process, Coalition MiTTs are integrated and in an overwatch posture to advise unit set fielding to the greatest extent possible. Additionally, this process develops Iraqi Army capabilities for force generation, training, maintenance and property accountability. The unit set fielding and training begins with individual skill tasks and specialized equipment tasks and incrementally builds to small unit collective tasks.20
At the tactical level, the IA’s ability to plan and execute deployments progresses steadily. A number of units are able to plan and operate with minimal Coalition support, as evidenced by the Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) of two Iraqi brigades during on-going counterinsurgency opera-tions, one from the 10th Division and one from the 8th Division. These two divisions effectively conducted a successful RIP/TOA during September. During the same period, the 10th IA headquarters moved from Basrah to Camp Mittica in preparation for the estab-lishment of the 14th IA headquarters. Though the transfer experienced some difficulties, the move was planned without Coalition support and executed by the Iraqis with minimal Coalition support.
As of November 2007, the IGFC has assumed command and control of 11 IA divisions including 37 brigade headquarters and 113 battalions. The 6th and 9th Divisions have subsequently been subordinated to the MoD’s Baghdad Operations Command with IGFC retaining administrative control. Operations commands have expanded to include Karbala, Samarra, Basrah and Diyala. These are seen as relatively inexpensive interim steps that may ultimately result in establishing four Corps Headquarters, an Iraqi conceived concept still in development.
The Iraqi Army Infrastructure Battalions (IAIBs), formerly known as Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs), are conducting a retraining and reequipping process that will transform them into regular IA Battalions. The MoD decided the units will be converted to a light infantry structure and trained in infrastructure protection using equipment on hand. The first two battalions have completed training, and the third battalion has transitioned in stride and is currently in training. An Infrastructure Repair Regiment is being developed by the IA. This unit is being developed in coordination with the MoD, MoE and MoO. This unit will be generated in two phases between December 2007 and May 2008. Phase I will include generation of a Headquarters and Service Company, two Security Companies and an Electric Repair Company. In Phase II, a Pipeline Repair Company will be generated. This unit will provide the IA critical capability to repair damaged electrical power lines and oil pipelines in unsecured areas.
The MoD and JHQ are working with MNSTC-I to transfer responsibility for national level maintenance from contractors to the IA. The Iraqi Army Maintenance Program (IAMP) currently runs to the end of November at which point eight of ten third-line maintenance sites will have transferred to IA control. The contract has been extended through May 2008 to work off a backlog of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) repairs, improve IA information technology and develop the level of repair part support. Expanding the IA’s maintenance capability is a challenge that has been and continues to be a focus of Coalition efforts. A progressive plan is in place to effectively build IA maintenance capability and enable Iraqi self-sustainment.
The IA has expanded fielding of units and training on U.S.-standard weapons, such as M16A4s and M4s that the MoD has procured through FMS. Accountability of M16A4s and M4s is enforced through a process that uses multiple forms of identification, including biometrics (voice print, fingerprint, palm print and retina scan). This Iraqi-owned process includes verification of national identity (Jinsiya) cards, verification of individual status on a unit pay roster and collection of personal data using biometrics. As of this report, MNSTC-I and the IA have fielded approximately 12,150 M16A4 and M4s and have conducted weapons familiarization. In conjunction with the M16A4 and M4 fielding and training, MNSTC-I and the IA have trained up to 1,265 IA officers and NCOs as trainers on these weapon systems and up to 210 IA soldiers as weapons maintainers to date.
Navy
The Iraqi Navy has approximately 1,100 assigned officers, sailors and marines. This will increase to 1,500 by February 2008 as more personnel are trained. The Navy has been assigned 111% of its officer, 58% of its NCO and 76% of its enlisted authorizations. As of November 30, 2007, 51% of authorized personnel are on duty at any given time. The headquarters element is at the MoD in Baghdad; the rest of the Navy is based in Umm Qasr and is comprised of an operational headquarters, one afloat squadron, one support squadron and one battalion of marines mainly for point defense of the offshore oil platforms. The Navy is projected to increase to 2,500 personnel to support a fleet of two offshore support vessels (OSVs), four patrol ships (PSs) and 15 patrol boats (PBs) and numerous fast insertion and interdiction craft by 2011. MoD contracts for the direct commercial purchase of the two OSVs, four PSs and three PBs have been finalized, and building should commence this month with a projected delivery date of October 2008 for the first PB with delivery completed by the middle of 2009. Further procurement of equipment, remaining PBs and fast craft, and infrastructure is now planned through FMS.
The Iraqi Navy also faces significant challenges in meeting the training needs in leadership, operations, navigation and technical skills to match its ambitious acquisition program. MNSTC-I Maritime Strategic Transition Team, Naval Transition Team, Coalition Navy, Marine and Coast Guard forces continue to advise and develop the embryonic Iraqi Navy to meet the maritime transition timeline of late 2010. Some of the more sophisticated training needs may need to be conducted outside Iraq in other naval academies with elements of more routine training supported by the NATO Training Mission in theatre.
Air Force
Approximately 1,200 personnel are assigned to the Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) with a projected total of 1,500 by the end of 2007. As of November 30, 2007, 40% of authorized personnel are present for duty. The MoD currently has 51 assigned aircraft and 129 total pilots. In the long term, the IqAF plans to grow to over 12,000 personnel in 38 squadrons operating from ten main operating bases and five secondary bases.
The Iraqi Air Force Training Wing at Taji Air Base offers basic officer and enlisted training as well as 18 different specialist courses with more planned in the future. The Iraqi Air Force Flight Training Wing also opened at Kirkuk Air Base in October 2007, training both new and former IqAF pilots.
The IqAF rotary-wing fleet of 35 helicopters is located at Taji Air Base. In September 2007, 2 Squadron completed its first successful forward deployment to Basrah Air Base. The squadron continues to conduct battlefield mobility and VIP transport missions. The Mi-17 helicopters of 4 Squadron continue to have very limited employment capability due to defensive system limitations. However, MNSTC-I will augment IqAF repairs to the system. The IqAF is also progressing toward an FMS procurement of an additional 14 Mi-17s configured for counter-terrorism missions with a potential for an additional 14 Iraqi-funded Mi-17s and eight U.S.-funded Mi-17s. The 23 Squadron at New al Muthanna Air Base has three C-130E aircraft on which IqAF technicians perform routine maintenance with minimal Coalition support. The MoD requested three additional Excess Defense Article C-130s from the U.S. Government to bring the squadron size to six aircraft, as approved in the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act.
The IqAF has conducted limited COIN operations with its 13 assigned Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. The first significant joint IqAF and IA operation recently took place as the IqAF provided real-time ISR support to the 2nd Brigade 4th IA Division. Air operations command and control continues to progress toward an IOC of its Air Operations Center at Camp Victory by December 31 2007.
Counter-Terrorism Bureau
The transition of ISOF command and control from the MoD to the Counter-Terrorism Bureau (CTB) and Counter-Terrorism Command (CTC) is on track. An important aspect of this transition is that the CTB must vet and validate all proposed counter-terrorism targets and seek approval for them through the Ministerial Committee for National Security. CTC and CTB are currently manned to 61% and 76% of authorizations, respectively. The 1st ISOF Brigade is currently manned at 86% with approximately 3,500 soldiers, and is organized into a counter-terrorism battalion, a commando battalion, a support battalion and a special reconnaissance unit. Four expansion battalions are currently being established. The 1st ISOF Brigade has been formed, equipped and provided with initial training and is organized under the CTB, but command and control of the Brigade will not complete transition to the CTB until 2009. ISOF will have no special operations air capability until 2009. Additionally, a Special Operations Aviation capability is being developed to support counter-terrorist operations. This capability will reside in the Iraqi 15th Special Operations Aviation Squadron, IqAF. Pilots have been recruited and will begin night vision goggle (NVG) training and selection to the 15 Squadron in January 2008. Selected pilots will continue to log training hours with NVGs, reaching a proficiency level that will allow them to begin Special Operations specific training, provided by the U.S. military, in late summer 2008. Initial secure communications links were established in October 2007 between the CTB, CTC, and ISOF Brigade.
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