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Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

December 2007
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)

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Section 1-Stability and Security

1.1 Political Stability

During this reporting period, operations by Coalition and Iraqi forces produced strong improvements in security, enhancing conditions for reconciliation, political accommodation, economic development and the provision of basic public services. “Bottom-up” reconciliation initiatives gained momentum this quarter as growing numbers of Sunni and Shi’a tribal leaders worked with the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Coalition, including with Provincial Reconstruction Teams, to improve security and economic conditions at the local level. Iraqi national leaders have made only marginal progress on key legislation, constitutional revisions and in resolving other critical issues needed for political reform and reconciliation.

National Reconciliation

National reconciliation is required for long-term stability but continues to be hindered by slow progress and competing interests. Some progress has been made. For example, on October 3, 2007, the Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR) passed an amendment to the Unified Retirement Law. This law allows former civil servants to combine years of public service with those while in the private sector and has the potential to advance reconciliation by allowing former regime elements to retire and draw pensions. While the law was returned to the CoR to address concerns from the Presidency Council, it was finally passed on November 19, 2007. The Presidency Council subsequently signed the bill and it will enter into force after publication in the official government Gazette. Additionally, the Accountability and Justice Law (de-Ba’athification reform) was introduced into the CoR and has received its first and second reading. At the grass-roots level, the U.S. and Iraqi Governments are working with Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) who reject the extremists and are joining the political process by working through established governance institutions. In doing so, local political accommodation is taking place.

Political Commitments

Consensus among the top Shi’a, Sunni and Kurdish leaders was reached on a number of issues in the August 26, 2007 Leaders’ Conference communiqué, although implementation of that consensus is lagging and the CoR continues to miss or extend constitutional and legislative deadlines. The August 2007 resignation of six Sunni ministers from the Tawafuq and Iraqi National List bloc combined with the previous resignation of six Sadrist ministers continues to weaken the government and complicate efforts to reach consensus among Iraq’s three major ethno-sectarian groups. Prime Minister Maliki’s nominees for Ministers of Health and Agriculture were approved. These will replace Sadrists who had resigned their positions several months ago. The new ministers are Shi’a technocrats with no party affiliation. While these appointments appear promising, the Parliament is already hindering the forward momentum of ministerial shuffling by thwarting the Prime Ministers nominations for Ministers of Justice and Communications. Filling the remaining cabinet positions will be critical to enhancing Iraq’s ability to provide services to its citizens.

The CoR began a new session in early September and continued to work on key legislation, including the Accountability and Justice Law and the 2008 budget. Progress in passing the coming year’s budget is further along this year than at this time in 2006 but approval will be delayed until after the beginning of the new fiscal year on January 1, 2008 by the CoR’s recess beginning in early December. Key legislation includes:

A Package of Hydrocarbon Laws

The package of hydrocarbon laws awaiting action by the CoR has the potential to promote political unity by implementing a legal and regulatory framework that maximizes the value of the nation’s oil and gas resources while ensuring that all Iraqis benefit equitably from hydrocarbon revenues. While there is, at present, a de facto sharing of the revenue from Iraq’s hydrocarbon resources, it is important that legislation be enacted to codify the joint administration of these resources by the central government and regional and provincial governments as well as the specific revenue sharing formulas. Specifically, the framework law and three supporting implementing laws apportion revenues, re-organize the Ministry of Oil and reconstitute the Iraq National Oil Company. The framework law is with the CoR, although no action has been taken on it. The other three supporting implementing laws have yet to be submitted for parliamentary approval. Once passed, the laws should provide the legal framework necessary to attract the billions of dollars of capital needed to develop Iraq’s petroleum sector. Oil export proceeds provide the vast majority of the GoI’s revenues, which are allocated to national ministry and provincial programs.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) passed its own hydrocarbon law in August 2007, a move Baghdad declared illegal. Iraq’s Minister of Oil asserts that no regional petroleum law can precede federal law. The Minister cautions that foreign petroleum companies that make deals with the KRG may face legal action and could be precluded from signing contracts after national hydrocarbon legislation is passed. Despite these assertions, the KRG insists that its regional law legitimately represents principles found in the Iraqi Constitution. The KRG has signed several production sharing contracts with foreign companies, including three American firms (Hunt Oil, Hillwood Energy, and Aspect Energy).

A De-Ba’athification Law

De-Ba’athification legislation, now known as the Accountability and Justice Law, involves justice, accountability, reconciliation and economic compensation issues. The Council of Ministers (CoM) recently approved the Leaders’ draft of the law and passed it to the CoR where it received its first and second reading. Despite the lack of implementing legislation, the GoI has conducted a signifi-cant amount of outreach to Sunnis and military members of the former regime, and Sunnis increasingly are cooperating in the fight against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). In addition, the GoI is working to provide pensions to former government officials, including outreach to former Iraqi Army officers, by offering retirement funds, positions within the military or public sector employment.

A Constitutional Review

On May 23, 2007, Iraq’s Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) outlined outstanding issues in a “semi-final” report to the CoR. These issues reflect longstanding disagreements among political leaders regarding the nature and the scope of presidential powers, the extent of the regional powers and the status of disputed territories under Article 140 of the Constitution, particularly Kirkuk. Progress on Article 140 normalization is proceeding slowly. There has been no progress on the constitutionally required census and referendum; however, the newly appointed United Nations (UN) Special Representative has agreed to focus on Article 140 issues. On September 8, 2007, the CoR approved an additional extension for the CRC until December 31, 2007, the formal end of the current legislative session, to produce a final report.

Provincial Election and Powers Laws

A Provincial Powers Law that defines the relationship between provincial governments and the central government was read in the CoR twice in 2007 but has been sent back to the Presidency Council for modification. Although the Provincial Powers Law is not technically required to conduct an election, many Iraqi officials believe it is a necessary pre-condition. The August 26, 2007 Iraqi Leaders’ Conference resulted in agreement on pressing forward with the legislation but details still need to be worked out. The lack of a recent census and a budget for elections, as well as the large number of internally displaced persons, will complicate election preparation and execution. Timing of an Article 140 vote regarding Kirkuk is an additional complicating factor. Even if the CoR immediately passed a provincial elections law and the GoI developed plans for electoral security and logistics, it is still unlikely that elections would occur before the middle of 2008.

In early September 2007, the Prime Minister’s office drafted an Elections Law that addresses elections at the governorate, district and sub-district levels. This draft requires extensive revision to address significant shortcomings and procedural problems. As of this reporting period, candidate lists for the Governorate Electoral Officer for twelve of the eighteen gover-norates have been submitted to the CoR and forwarded to the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC). The IHEC continues to focus on resolving logistical and security issues. For example, in early October 2007 it completed conversion of the Public Distribution System (PDS) database to a usable format to build a voter registry, a key prerequisite for provincial elections. U.S. efforts continue to focus on working with the UN to assist the IHEC in building staff capacity, particularly in public outreach and internal organization; building database capacity that will support new registration; and establishing provincial, district and precinct-level election bodies.

Government Reform

Ministerial Capacity Development

During this reporting period, U.S. efforts to build Iraqi ministerial capacity focused on improving internal oversight and expanding U.S. advisory teams. This focus addressed a Government Accountability Office report issued in October 2007 that recognized the quality of the individual work performed but noted that U.S. efforts lacked overall direction and coordination, sufficient ministerial performance measures, goals linked to GoI objectives and a study of costs and resources.³ The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Embassy’s Iraq Transition Assistance Office are responsible for leading efforts to assess current ministerial performance and to follow through with prioritized action plans, milestones and outcomes. Factors affecting progress in developing Iraqi ministerial capacity and performance are a lack of reliable data for assessments and limited staff assistance visits to many of the ministries. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) remains responsible for developing the Ministries of Defense and Interior.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

The PRTs and Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams (ePRTs) are essential elements in the U.S. civil-military stabilization and reconstruction effort. They draw on U.S. interagency expertise to focus on building decentralized governance capacity and to assist Iraq’s local, municipal, and provincial governments. There are 25 PRTs, with 11 working at the provincial level and another 14 ePRTs embedded with Brigade Combat Teams working at the local, district and neighborhood levels. In addition, there are seven smaller Provincial Support Teams. While the needs of each province vary, all PRTs conduct similar programs to foster social and economic development and to improve the quality of life through better delivery of basic services to the Iraqi people. PRTs are instrumental in helping the provincial governments spend their own money by strengthening local government capacity. PRTs also serve as powerful tools to support moderates who seek peaceful ways in which to resolve political differences.

Rule of Law

On September 20, 2007, Prime Minister Maliki took an important step in fostering the rule of law and providing Iraqi detainees fair treatment by signing an executive order requiring humane treatment of detainees and more expeditious processing of their cases. The order directs the Ministerial Committee for Rule of Law and Detention (MCROLD), which consists of senior representatives from relevant ministries, to meet weekly to address rule of law and detention issues. The MCROLD is required to report to the Ministerial Committee for National Security. The National Security Advisor oversees implementation of the order. The order also serves as an important means of fostering national reconciliation.

Since the last report, the number of Iraqi judges has increased by 100 to 1,200 but experience levels remain low, contributing to the length of time needed to review each case. Although the Higher Juridical Council has hired hundreds of new judges and judicial investigators in the past two years, thousands of detainees remain in Iraqi pre-trial confinement for extended periods of time pending investigation of their cases. The number of individuals tried has doubled over the past quarter while the rate of detention by the Iraqi police and Army has dropped significantly. In June 2007, Iraqi forces in Baghdad detained approximately 300 persons per week, but by September 2007, detentions had dropped to approximately 150 per week. Ongoing GoI and Coalition efforts to train and deploy additional judicial assets should help reduce the number of detainees who must wait for extended periods to have their cases resolved by an Iraqi judge.

Since the last report, Major Crimes Courts (MCCs) established in Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah ad Din, and Anbar Provinces as branch courts of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCC-I) held 51 trials that issued 33 death sentences and 18 life sentences. These MCCs serve as secure locations to hear major crimes cases. In Ninewa, considered the model, the panels hearing these cases are composed of traveling judges from the CCC-I in Baghdad. With the exception of the Anbar Criminal Court and the Salah ad Din MCC, both of which have recently begun to employ panels of local judges, logistical difficulties such as bringing judicial panels from other provinces to try cases hinder MCC efforts. In response to these difficulties, the U.S. Government began the expansion of the Rusafa Rule of Law Complex (ROLC) concept, establishing secure judicial complexes in key areas in Iraq that provide safe locations for judges and their families to reside and hear criminal cases, thus increasing judicial productiv-ity. The first such ROLC project outside Baghdad is currently being established in Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Province.

Problems associated with a nationwide shortage of space for pre-trial detainees are exacerbated by the current lack of available prison (post-trial) capacity. Currently, Iraq is utilizing all of its post-trial prison capacity. Although U.S.-funded construction at Nasiriyah, Fort Suse and Cham Chamal should provide another 6,000 prison beds by the end of 2009, these will not begin to become available until mid-2008. As a result, on behalf of the GoI, the Coalition is holding more than 600 personnel who have been convicted in Iraqi courts in Coalition detention centers at Camp Cropper and Camp Bucca. Although the Rusafa ROLC is intended to be a pre-trial detention facility, it also holds more than 300 post-trial detainees.

Transnational Issues

The U.S. continues to encourage support for Iraq among its neighbors, the region and the international community to ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq and to eliminate negative external influences. Some progress has been made in these areas. Additional movement was made on energy and refugee issues, building on the success of the May 2007 meetings hosted by Egypt for the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) and the November 2007 Expanded Neighbors of Iraq Ministerial.

Iranian Influence

In late September, Iranian President Ahmadinejad pledged to Prime Minister Maliki to help cut off weapons, funding and other militia and insurgent support that crosses the Iranian border. There has been no identified decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi’a militias in Iraq. Tehran’s support for Shi’a militant groups who attack Coalition and Iraq forces remains a significant impediment to progress towards stabilization. The Iranian Islamic Revolu-tionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) provides many of the explosives and ammunition used by these groups, to include Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). Although Sadr’s late August 2007 freeze on JAM activity is still in effect, some elements continue to attack Coalition forces with Iranian weapons. The GoI and the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq have made it clear to the Iranian Government that IRGC-QF’s lethal activities must cease.

Syrian Influence

Terrorists, foreign fighters, and former Iraqi regime elements continue to find sanctuary, border transit opportunities and logistical support in Syria. Syria is estimated to be the entry point for 90% of all foreign terrorists known in Iraq. Recent efforts by the Syrian Government to stem the flow of foreign terrorists and suicide bombers inside of Syria may have had some effect in decreasing the flow of extremists into Iraq. The Syrian Government participates in the Neighbors Process framework, having hosted both the inaugural Border Security Working group in August 2007 and the follow-up Border Security Working group in November 2007. While these are positive diplomatic steps, it is not clear that Syria has made a strategic decision to persistently and comprehensively deal with foreign terrorists. The Syrian Government must take additional measures to further reduce the flow of foreign terrorists transiting Syria into Iraq.

Tensions on the Border with Turkey

Turkey’s primary concerns regarding Iraq continue to be terrorism conducted by the Kurdistan Peoples Congress (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)) from camps in northern Iraq, increased autonomy for the Kurdistan Regional Government from the central Iraqi Government and the final status of the oil rich city of Kirkuk. After the election of President Gul in Turkey and Prime Minister Maliki’s visit to Turkey, these governments signed a counter-terrorism cooperation agreement establishing a bilateral, interagency security commission to work towards curbing the actions of terrorist organizations, including the KGK and al Qaeda.

On October 7, 2007, the KGK was involved in attacks that killed at least 13 Turkish soldiers in Turkey’s Sirnak Province near the Iraqi border. On October 17, 2007, the Turkish Parliament approved a one-year authorization for cross-border military operations against KGK targets in Iraq. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has stated that he hopes not to engage in cross-border incursions. KRG officials have stepped up efforts to restrict KGK freedom of movement and operations in northern Iraq. Prime Minister Maliki has publicly stated that the KGK is a terrorist organization and it will not be tolerated in Iraqi territory. He also directed the offices of the KGK be closed. This announcement followed talks in Baghdad between Turkish Foreign Minister Babacan and members of the GoI. Foreign Minister Babacan stressed that Turkey wants to deal with the Kurdish separatists’ cross-border attacks through diplomatic means. The U.S. Government has committed to working with the Government of Turkey (GoT) to deal with KGK terrorism. Following his meeting with President Bush in Washington on November 5, 2007, Prime Minister Erdogan stated publicly that the GoT views this as important to helping stabilize northern Iraq.

Neighbors Conferences

Turkey hosted the second Expanded Neighbors of Iraq Ministerial in Istanbul on November 2-3, 2007. Attendees included representatives from all of Iraq’s neighbors, as well as from Egypt and Bahrain, the P5 members of the UN Security Council, the G8, the European Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League and the UN. The UN Secretary General reiterated his support for Iraq and asked the international community to help the Iraqi people in and outside of Iraq. Participants acknowledged the importance of the International Compact with Iraq (ICI), welcomed the new Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, supported the expanded mandate for the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), pledged assistance for displaced persons, supported Iraq’s unity and sovereignty and urged the opening of diplomatic missions in Iraq. The Conference concluded with a commitment to establish a temporary office in Baghdad in support of the Neighbors Process. The final statement of the Ministerial called for Iraq to not be used as a base for terrorism, for all parties to prevent smuggling operations and for convening the next sessions of the working groups established on refugees, energy and border security. Kuwait agreed to host the next Ministerial in early 2008.

International Compact with Iraq

Since the last report, Iraq has made progress in implementing some of the economic initiatives in the ICI. The ICI is the key international document that sets forth Iraqi commitments, pledges on economic, commercial and internal reforms, and seeks support from the private and public sectors of neighboring countries and the international community. The European Commission is funding a UN-administered contract to provide experts and consultants to assist with setting up and supporting the ICI Secretariat, which has a key role to play in implementing the ICI. UNAMI, the World Bank, the U.S., the U.K. and Italy are also providing advisors to the ICI Secretariat. The Secretariat will produce a progress report on the status of ICI reforms in early 2008.

Conclusion

Capitalizing on recent security gains, bottom-up reconciliation has made significant advances. Local leaders, both Sunni and Shi’a, are working with Coalition forces, including PRTs and the GoI to improve security and economic conditions in their areas. However, top-down political progress, such as passage of key legislation and relief for the judicial system, must be achieved. National issues such as corruption and transnational issues such as financing of terrorist criminal activity must be eliminated in order to further the Government of Iraq.

Although security gains, local accommoda-tions and progress against the flow of foreign fighters and lethal aid into Iraq have had a substantial effect, more needs to be done to foster national, “top-down” reconciliation to sustain these gains.