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Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

December 2007
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)

Section 2—Iraqi Security Forces Training and Performance

2.1 Assessed Capabilities of the Iraqi Forces

The Iraqi forces’ ability to secure Iraq with significantly reduced Coalition support will improve as their readiness levels improve. Such improvements remain constrained, however, by MoD and MoI deficiencies in logistics, combat support functions and combat enablers and by shortages of officers at all operational and tactical levels. Therefore, the Coalition’s four main areas of emphasis in developing the MoD and MoI and their forces remain unchanged from the previous report. They are: (1) develop ministerial capacity; (2) improve the proficiency of the Iraqi forces; (3) build specific logistic, sustainment and training capacities; and (4) support the expansion of the MoD and MoI forces. Special problems within these areas include corruption and lack of professionalism, sectarian bias, leader shortfalls, logistics deficiencies and dependence on Coalition forces for many combat support functions.

Ministerial Capacity

Coalition leaders are focused on improving the security ministries’ capacity along several key functional lines: force management, personnel, materiel acquisition, resource management, sustainment, training and development. In general, progress developing ministerial capacity has been steady but inconsistent in these areas. Both ministries are making progress filling the shortages of leaders, conducting realistic training and issuing equipment to the forces. A current challenge is synchronizing force generation, training and replenishment efforts. Ministerial planners have recognized the need to synchronize ministerial planning, programming and budgeting efforts with longer-range plans.

Iraqi Forces Proficiency

As of November 15, 2007, 117 army battalions have been generated and are conducting operations, up from 105 in the last report. Another 42 are currently in or planned for force generation, and three Special Operations Battalions are capable of conducting operations with minimal Coalition support. Three of the 14 infrastructure battalions scheduled for redesignation as infantry units have completed training and are now operational infantry. Ten divisions, 34 brigades and 108 battalions have the lead in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in their areas of responsibility (AOR), an increase of one brigade and five battalions since the last report. Of all formed Iraqi Army units, 77% are rated as being able to plan, execute and sustain operations with minimal or no assis-tance from Coalition forces. Since September 2007, nine additional units have improved their proficiency and can now conduct COIN operations with Coalition support.

Another force demonstrating improved proficiency but still in need of increased professionalization is the National Police (NP), the MoI’s nationally deployable force. Of the 31 authorized NP battalions that are operational, an increase of four from the last report, ten are capable of planning, executing and sustaining operations with Coalition support, an increase of three from last report. NP units are not assigned the lead of a specific AOR. Some NP units lack person-nel, individual soldier equipment and reliable vehicles to conduct operations without Coalition support.

Logistics, Sustainment and Training Capacities

The MoD, and to a lesser extent, the MoI, have shown some improvement in logistics capabilities. The notable exception is an inability to adequately forecast life-support requirements and to promptly take action when contracts are expiring. The Minister of Defense had set an ambitious goal of December 1, 2007, for attempting again to assume life support self-reliance. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) advisors had recommended that implementation be phased in over time. So far, the implementation has been mixed. The construction of national-level maintenance and warehousing facilities at the Taji National Maintenance and Supply Depots should be completed by 2009. Training enough personnel in critical logistics trades to fully staff these depots will take longer. The MoD, Iraqi Joint Headquarters, Iraqi Ground Force Command, Army Divisions and MNSTC-I are working diligently on the process of training logisticians for combat, base support and depot-level positions.

Both ministries still receive substantial logistics support from the Coalition, mostly in the form of U.S.-funded contracts, but to some degree as direct support. The Iraqi forces are partially dependent on Coalition support to move supplies to Base Support Units (BSUs) (formerly Regional Support Units), Garrison Support Units and police warehouses. Once at the BSU or police warehouse, Iraqi forces distribute commodities to the end user. Both the MoD and the MoI are now capable of supplying fuel to their units, but at times, Coalition units provide fuel for Iraqi vehicles and generators on an emergency basis when allocations to the MoD and MoI from the Ministry of Oil (MoO) are below required levels. To normalize direct support, the Department of Defense and the MoD continued discussions during this quarter on the development of an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement for the reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies and services on a reimbursable basis.

The national logistics timeline conceived in 2006, as well as the MoD Logistics Action Plan and the MoI Concept of Support, have been overtaken by operational events. An updated Concept of Support and Logistics Action Plan is being developed and put into place iteratively in close coordination with key security ministry officials.

During this quarter, substantially increased quantities of Iraqi-funded equipment ordered through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system have entered into the transportation and distribution pipeline, resulting in a significant buildup of materiel extending from Iraq back to the departure point in Charleston, South Carolina. For example, there are approximately 75 pallets and nearly 250 vehicles awaiting transporta-tion in Charleston. In Iraq, several thousand M4 and M16A4 rifles, millions of rounds of ammunition, several hundred tactical radios, several hundred M1114 uparmored HMMWVs and M1151s with integrated armor and numerous other equipment items have arrived and are being processed. Various services that the MoD and MoI are buying through FMS are also being delivered each month to Iraq. As of November 15, 2007, the GoI had transferred US$2.9 billion cumulatively for FMS procurements to the New York Federal Reserve Bank. Deliveries have been made on US$669 million of the US$1.55 billion in 2006 funds deposited; the rest is obligated and the requested equipment is being manufactured. Of the US$1.318 billion in 2007 funds deposited, Letters of Offer and Acceptance totaling US$960 million were awaiting GoI signature as of November 15, 2007.

In addition, Letters of Request (LORs) were submitted for equipment sets for 17 Iraqi Army Infrastructure Battalions (IAIBs) and three of their brigade headquarters, the Presidential Brigade, one infantry division headquarters and five brigade headquarters. The infrastructure units will be re-armed, re-fitted, retrained and provided with upgraded facilities to bring their organization and infrastructure in line with that of standard infantry battalions. Due to substantial increases in the Iraqi-funded FMS case load—it has increased more than ten fold in dollar value in less than a year—the DoD established a task force in July 2007 to monitor efforts to improve the procurement and delivery of defense articles and services to Iraq using FMS authorities. The two key task force recommendations that are now being implemented are a substantial increase in the size of the Office of Security Cooperation at MNSTC-I with appropriately trained personnel to assist in more effectively defining requirements and processing cases along with upgrading the head of the office, at least temporarily, from a Colonel to a two-star general, and giving high priority within the Defense Transportation System to FMS materiel destined for the GoI. Assessment of other potential improvements in Iraq FMS supply chain logistics is under way.

The Iraqi Army and Police continue to expand basic combat and basic police training facilities, which are constantly operating at or near capacity. The result has been noticeable increases in the overall percentages of assigned unit strength. The leader-to-led ratio has also steadily improved. Between March and October 2007, the percentages across all units of Iraqi Army leader authorizations to which personnel had been assigned increased from 33% to 43% for noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and from 43% to 57% for officers. This will remain an area of key development for both ministries.

Force Expansion

Expansion of Iraqi forces to a current assigned strength of approximately 491,000 personnel during this period has been a result of three major factors: the opportunity to take advantage of operational successes and recruit from local tribal awakenings; the consolidation of units from various government agencies and ministries under the command and control of the MoD and MoI; and the GoI’s reassessment of Iraq’s security requirements.