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Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

December 2007
Report to Congress
In accordance with the
Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007
(Section 9010, Public Law 109-289)

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Section 1-Stability and Security

1.3 Security Environment

The increase in U.S. and Iraqi force levels and the emphasis on population security, along with several other developments, have improved the security environment during the past quarter and are creating the conditions for establishing momentum towards sustainable stability. Overall attacks for the past seven weeks have fallen to levels seen in January 2006—the last month before weekly attacks began a 17-month upward trend that peaked in June 2007. The last period during which attacks were consistently at this level was the summer of 2005. Overall civilian deaths, to include those associated with hostile actions, followed a similar trend both Iraq-wide and in the Baghdad security districts.

The overall reduction in attacks is a result of increased Coalition and Iraq force levels in support of operation Fardh al-Qanoon, pervasive pressure on AQI and militia extremists and their sanctuaries, the Sadr ceasefire, the shift from previously mixed sectarian communities into more homogeneous neighborhoods in parts of Baghdad, growth in local security volunteer initiatives, increased capability of the Iraqi forces, and sustained presence of Coalition and Iraqi forces among the population. Coordinated operations pushed AQI from strongholds within the capital, disrupted its supply networks in the area around Baghdad, and established a presence among the population that greatly enhances the effectiveness of security operations.

Overall Assessment of the Security Environment

In many parts of Iraq, the reopening of schools, clinics, markets and improvements in essential services all suggest improvements resulting from hard-fought security gains. These improvements coincide with the growing willingness of Sunni and Shi’a tribal leaders to cooperate with efforts to stabilize Iraq. Efforts to enhance population security, such as the establishment of Joint Security Stations in key areas to maintain a persistent presence, enhance Coalition and Iraqi forces’ ability to interact with local residents and obtain information on insurgents and illegal militia activity.

The growing support of the local population resulted in the establishment of the Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) program in which a growing number of local citizens take part in the protection of their neighbor-hoods.⁷ Some CLC groups form neighbor-hood watches, while others have been placed under U.S.-funded contracts to protect critical infrastructure. Some of the participants are reviewed for hiring by the Ministry of Interior (MoI). About 69,000 individuals are partici-pating as members of the CLC program; approximately 80% are Sunni and 20% are Shi’a. Members of CLC groups have chosen to protect their neighborhoods and many are from former insurgent and other illegally armed groups. They have been persuaded to fight against extremists under Coalition force supervision. The GoI has issued an order to the Iraqi Army and police forces requiring cooperation with CLCs. The CLC program is proving crucial to the counterinsurgency effort but the slow pace of integrating the CLC members into GoI institutions, lack of alternative employment and fears by the Maliki government that these forces may return to violence or form new militias are of concern. The CLCs will require continued assistance from Coalition forces until the GoI assumes full responsibility for the program.

Shi’a extremist and criminal activities have become growing threats to security and stability as the role of insurgents and AQI wanes. The conflicts among communal groups for political power and resources continue, though AQI’s ability to exacerbate these tensions with high profile attacks—while still a serious threat—has been degraded. Foreign malign influence continues to affect the security situation in Iraq. Foreign terrorists and suicide bombers still enter Iraq through Syria, albeit at a significantly reduced rate likely owing in part to increasing internal security efforts by the Syrians. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Qods Force (IRGC-QF) efforts to train, equip, and fund Shi’a extremists also continue despite reported assurances to Prime Minister Maliki that Iran will cease lethal aid. Unequal adherence to Muqtada al-Sadr’s call for a Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) forces ceasefire has resulted in schisms within the Office of Martyr Sadr and JAM, particularly among JAM special groups, but has also opened the door for increased engagement with the Shi’a community.

Overall Trends and Violence

The downward trend in civilian deaths across Iraq has continued since December 2006. Although there have been periodic high-profile car bombings, they have failed to disrupt the overall trend. The more striking trend is the reduction in ethno-sectarian incidents and deaths. Both measures of ethno-sectarian violence have fallen below one-fifth of the levels of a year ago—and are now mostly limited to the mixed Sunni-Shi’a areas of west Baghdad and Rusafa. Earlier practices in which the community targeted by a car bomb retaliated, with a resulting increase in ethno-sectarian killings, have become less common over the past few months. This is in part attributable to the call for restraint by community leaders and by security measures such as the Joint Security Stations, checkpoints and “gated communities,” which promote better population security. The overall decrease in violence, high-profile attacks, murders and executions continued during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, historically a time of increased attacks of all types.

The geographical concentration of attacks continues to shift as Coalition and Iraqi forces keep pressure on AQI and extremists, driving AQI further east and north as it searches for more secure operating areas and confronts local extremist groups that previously controlled those areas. As a result, high-profile attacks have increased slightly in Ninewa Province, while they have fallen off in Anbar and Baghdad. Specifically, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Anbar Province have dropped 91% from January 2007 to November 2007, while attacks in the ten Baghdad security districts declined 67% for the same period.

Despite these gains, AQI retains the capability to conduct spectacular and highly lethal terrorist attacks in parts of central and northern Iraq. This helps explain the rise in car bomb attacks in July 2007 that temporar-ily disrupted an overall downward trend from February through November 2007. AQI has also shifted to a murder and intimidation campaign directed at its former Sunni allies in an attempt to counter the growing anti-AQI tribal movement. This strategy has not been productive, however, and the tribal movement continues to spread beyond western Iraq to other provinces such as Salah ad Din and Diyala, where the CLC program has been important in reducing AQI’s capabilities.

Between February 1 and November 16, 2007, over 3,600 AQI members were killed or captured. This number includes the loss of 233 key AQI leaders—54 Emirs or upper tier leaders, 38 foreign terrorist and logistical network facilitators, 24 couriers and logistical leaders and 35 military Emirs and vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) cell leaders. These losses have helped to significantly degrade AQI’s leadership cadre and the effectiveness of insurgent operations.

Although the majority of JAM elements in Baghdad appear to have complied with Sadr’s late August order to halt attacks, many members of the militia, to include Iranian-supported JAM special groups, continue to violate this order. Attacks with explosively formed penetrator (EFP) IEDs—a trademark weapon of JAM special groups—continued at significant levels during the ceasefire, although EFP attacks during this reporting period are about two-thirds of the levels seen during the previous six months. Anti-Coalition violence decreased in Basrah as British forces repositioned to bases outside the city, but violence against Iraqi forces and civilians in the province remains a concern. Prime Minister Maliki established the Basrah Operational Command to control all Iraqi forces in Basrah Province.

As a result of the overall reduction in the number and effectiveness of attacks, Coalition deaths across Iraq fell to about one-fourth of the high reached in May 2007. The number of attacks against Iraqi forces also decreased, with a slightly smaller proportionate reduction in deaths. During the reporting period, Coalition and Iraqi forces found and cleared nearly 140 weapons caches per week, well above pre-surge levels. By the end of October, Coalition forces had found and cleared over twice the number of caches found in all of 2006.

IEDs and VBIED/SVBIEDs/SVESTs

The reduction in IED incidents in Baghdad and the surrounding areas continued during this quarter. Weekly IED incidents have fallen 68% since the start of Operation of Phantom Thunder in late June 2007. Although this downward trend slowed during Ramadan, total weekly attacks during Ramadan were well below 2006 levels and approximated those seen in 2005. Weekly IED casualties over the last three weeks of November 2007 reached levels last seen in January 2006. This drop in IED incidents may be attributed to the disruption of insurgent networks that has hindered their operational capability. The number of IEDs found and cleared remained consistently high as CLCs and civilians, who are more trusting of Iraqi Government forces, continued to provide tips on IED locations and caches. While IEDs remain the primary cause of Coalition force casualties, the number of Coalition deaths from IED incidents fell to its lowest level since January 2006.

The number of high-profile attacks in Iraq declined by 62% since March 2007 as a result of constant pressure on AQI across Iraq from Coalition and Iraqi operations. Relentless pursuit of AQI VBIED cells and tips from CLCs are important drivers of these reductions. Despite a surge in high-profile attacks during Ramadan, the number of weekly high-profile attacks remained below levels prior to the start of the surge. With aggressive operations by Coalition and Iraqi forces targeting VBIED and suicide VBIED (SVBIED) networks, the effectiveness of VBIED and SVBIED attacks also declined and casualties have decreased correspond-ingly. The drop in effectiveness is likely linked to neutralization of networks and the death or detention of experienced facilitators. The focus of attacks has also shifted from targeting groups of civilians to targeting specific leaders. AQI cells remain able to conduct high profile attacks across Iraq despite a significant decrease in their effectiveness during this quarter.

Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs)

EFP incidents remain well below the peak levels of July 2007. Effectiveness of these attacks, as measured by casualties, has also decreased. This reduction may be attributed to effective interdiction of EFP networks, death or capture of EFP facilitators, seizure of caches and other factors. Most EFP attacks since September 2007 were of the type most associated with the Iranian-supported JAM special groups that have demonstrated clear disregard of Sadr’s cease-fire directive.

Civilian Casualties

Civilian casualties have declined since September 2007 and are below the February 2006 pre-Samarra Mosque bombing levels. Successful Coalition operations and the increasing opposition by local populations to AQI have reduced AQI support zones in Baghdad, the Baghdad belts and Anbar Province, and have forced AQI to operate away from population centers and reduced its ability to execute high-profile mass casualty events. In addition, AQI has shifted its focus from attacking Coalition forces to focusing on Iraqi forces, CLCs and tribal movement members. Their increased targeting of reconciliation group leaders who openly work against AQI or support Coalition efforts illustrate the growing importance of these groups as a threat to AQI’s freedom of movement and activities.

Assessment of the Security Environment—Baghdad

Although attacks in Baghdad continue, the security situation has improved. Sadr’s late August order to cease JAM violence and the continued degradation of AQI’s VBIED networks contributed to the reduction of violence. This was highlighted by the significant reduction of high-profile attacks in Baghdad this period. The increasingly effective Iraqi forces partnering with Coalition forces at the Joint Security Stations and Combat Outposts and the physical security measures, also contributed to the reduction in violence. While AQI elements retained the capability to assemble, transport and emplace VBIEDs and SVBIEDs inside Baghdad, the effectiveness of these operations has been degraded as a result of the cumulative effects of Coalition and Iraqi security measures, coupled with the elimination of experienced VBIED facilitators and a reduction in AQI’s freedom of movement due to the efforts of CLC groups and the elimination of long-held sanctuary areas in the Baghdad belts.

Assessment of the Security Environment—Western Iraq

Anbar Province continues to show dramatic improvements in security. A year ago, Anbar was the most violent province in Iraq accounting for more than 25% of all attacks throughout the country; this quarter, Anbar accounts for less than 6% of all attacks. Despite AQI’s assassination of Sheikh Abd al Sattar Biziah Fitikhan al Rishawi (Sheikh Sattar) on the first day of Ramadan, his tribal movement, Sahawa al Iraq (SAI), continued its opposition to AQI. Sheikh Ahmad Biziah Fitikhan al Rishawi (Sheikh Ahmad), Sheikh Sattar’s brother, was elected as the new leader of SAI shortly after the assassination. AQI intended to intimidate the SAI movements by targeting key leaders and reasserting its influence on the Sunni population of Anbar; instead, these attacks emboldened tribal leaders to oppose AQI. Attacks in Anbar remained at record low levels throughout November. Under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmad, SAI is demonstrating its ability to affect multiple levels of government in Anbar, including influencing the appointment of key officials such as the governor and the provincial chief of police. Sheikh Ahmad has also reached out to prominent Shi’a figures in other provinces to promote reconciliation and unity under the theme of “One Iraq.”

Assessment of the Security Environment – Central/Northern Iraq

As pressure on AQI in Anbar Province and Baghdad has increased, the group has become increasingly concentrated in the central and northern Tigris River Valley in Ninewa Province. Mosul in particular has been a focus for AQI operations. However, variations of awakening movements have taken shape in Ninewa, Salah ad Din, and Diyala Provinces, as well as in the southern provinces of Najaf and Babil. While there are many similarities between these movements and the Anbar movement, the Coalition and GoI responses require different approaches to Iraqi force integration and communal power arrangements. The resilience of SAI and similar awakening movements in the wake of successful AQI targeting of their respective leadership enabled these movements to overcome the many challenges of rooting out extremist influence within their regions. While some Sunni resistance groups in northern Iraq are ambivalent about cooperating with AQI, they continue to actively pursue an anti-Coalition and anti-Iraqi forces agenda. These groups view themselves as the protectors of Sunnis from the perceived encroachment of the Shi’a following AQI’s displacement from the province. Perceptions of Kurdish expansion-ism also fuel Sunni fears and allow AQI to survive as a potential partner for pursuing the Sunni extremist agenda.

CLC groups in Diyala and Salah ad Din Provinces have bolstered the Coalition and Iraqi forces’ ability to identify and counter extremist activity in their respective regions, particularly against AQI. CLCs provide intelligence, phone tips and verbal information on individuals and numerous weapons caches, greatly reducing the enemy's capability to cause harm and find safe haven. On October 18, 2007, Coalition and Iraqi forces discovered five separate weapons caches west of Tarmiyah, containing a total of 41,000 pounds of explosives as well as 35 projectiles, one of the largest caches found in Salah ad Din in the last 15 months. These caches were likely intended for use in VBIEDs; these finds highlight the improved tribal cooperation and effort against the VBIED networks. Despite the increasing number of anti-AQI tribal and community-based initiatives, AQI is still able to threaten the security of central and northern Iraq. AQI has mounted a focused campaign of violence primarily targeting CLC group leaders that openly work directly against AQI or assist the Coalition. CLC groups’ increasing numbers and effectiveness threatens to eliminate AQI’s freedom of movement and ability to conduct attacks.

Ninewa Province is one of the few provinces that continues to see attacks above 2006 levels. Even though attack levels were higher, Iraqi forces showed an increased ability to effectively limit the impact of the attacks. AQI was largely unable to conduct its trademark suicide VBIED attacks against concentrations of civilians because vehicles were interdicted at checkpoints, minimizing large-scale casualties. Notably, AQI is being forced further from population centers, thus limiting its ability to strike with impunity.

Assessment of the Security Environment – Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Area

The KRG region remained the least violent in Iraq. The situation within the KRG-controlled territory of Irbil, Dahuk, and Sulamaniyah remained generally stable, despite occasional AQI attempts to incite ethnic violence. While outside the area officially governed by the KRG, Tamim Province, as well as the resolution of Kirkuk’s status under the Article 140 referendum process, continues to be the focus of the KRG.

Prospects of a Turkish cross border operation targeting the Kurdistan Peoples Congress (KGK) have led to increased tensions among the KRG, the GoI and Turkey. Previously, the KRG has said that it is incapable of removing the KGK from Iraqi soil since the KGK are located in high, rugged mountains that straddle the Iraqi border with Turkey and Iran, and has pressed for “dialogue” to resolve the discord through peaceful means. The KRG has recently taken concrete actions against the KGK, labeling them a terrorist group, directing the closure of KGK offices in Iraq and adding checkpoints and more stringent airport screening.

Assessment of the Security Environment – Southern Iraq

Despite the assassinations of the Qadisiyah and Muthanna provincial governors in August 2007 and assassination attempts on other provincial leaders who vocally oppose JAM criminal activity, the security situation in the South has deteriorated only slightly. Although the recent agreement between Muqtada al-Sadr and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) leader Hakim to end violence between JAM and ISCI’s Badr Organization lacks substance, continued dialogue between the two organizations may help prevent violence from escalating. The GoI considered implementing the CLC concept in Shi’a areas, but Shi’a national political leaders are fearful of establishing and empowering organizations that may rival existing political structures. Despite this lack of governmental support, there is a growing initiative on the part of Shi’a tribes in south-central Iraq to form an awakening movement to combat Iranian influence.

Iranian-backed Shi’a extremists and rogue elements of JAM continued to attack Coalition and Iraqi forces in Qadisiyah, Babil and Dhi Qar Provinces. JAM attacks against Iraqi forces have slightly increased in Basrah since the British repositioning from Basrah City and as the Iraqi forces take on a more assertive role in the security of Basrah City in preparation for the transition of Basrah to PIC in December 2007. However, JAM attacks on the Coalition in Basrah have been minimal since mid-August. General Mohan, the Provincial Director of Operations in Basrah, attempted to coordinate a ceasefire agreement with JAM. Iraqi forces, particularly the police, have limited ability to counter militias and criminal elements without outside assistance; however, the situation remains tense and criminal elements remain largely unchallenged in the city as demonstrated by JAM’s brief seizure of multiple Iraqi police stations, police officers and equipment throughout Basrah on October 23, 2007. These elements are also unchallenged on the inland and coastal waterways.

JAM special groups in Qadisiyah and its provincial capital of Diwaniyah continue to attack Coalition and Iraqi forces despite Sadr’s call for a freeze on JAM activity. Shi’a extremists that have splintered from JAM still attack the Coalition base and patrols in Diwaniyah. JAM also broadcasts negative statements about the Coalition on the radio to influence public opinion. Iraqi forces recently began an operation to clear and hold Diwaniyah and this effort has at least temporarily significantly altered the balance of power in that city.

Since late August, Iraqi forces have reduced violence and JAM influence in Karbala Province as the GoI prepared to assume responsibility for security of the province from the Coalition on October 29, 2007. These efforts capitalized on public outrage over the outbreak of violence largely attributed to JAM during a major Shi’a religious celebration on August 27, 2007.

Public Perceptions of Security

National polls show that Iraqis believe their local security situation is better than the national situation. When Iraqis were asked to describe the situation today in Iraq, 19% said the country was calm and not violent.⁸ When asked the same question about their province, perceptions of calmness improved to 33%.

When asked about their individual neighborhoods, 61% of Iraqis replied that their neighborhoods were calm. Nationwide polling in October 2007 indicates that 64% of Iraqis feel safe in their neighborhoods, but only 34% feel they can safely travel outside their neighborhoods.⁹ These results correspond with the perceived levels of violence in Iraq, in provinces, and in neighborhoods. These results suggest that Iraqis feel safer within their neighborhoods and perceptions of violence increase as they consider their country from a neighborhood to province to country perspective. When Iraqis were asked how they rated the level of peace and stability in Iraq today, 7% of Iraqis felt the country was stable nationwide while 67% said that Iraq was unstable.¹⁰ Note that for this question 26% of Iraqis answered “neither stable nor unstable” or “didn’t know/refused to answer.”

When Iraqis were asked if they had confidence in the GoI and Iraqi forces to improve the overall security situation in Iraq, their highest confidence was in the Iraqi Police at 59%, an increase of ten percentage points from September 2007; average confidence in these groups increased eight percentage points from September 2007.¹¹ Overall confidence in GoI groups who provide security to citizens (Iraqi Police, Iraqi Army, national, provincial and local government and the Iraqi judicial system) increased an average of 20 percentage points from September 2007. National polls conducted in October 2007 indicate that 62% of Iraqis have at least some confidence in the Iraqi Police to protect their families against threats.¹² This is an increase of 21 percentage points over data from September 2007 and is the highest of any of the security forces. Of those polled, 12% had at least some confidence in the Multi-National Force to protect their families against threats.¹³ Polls also indicate that 65% of Iraqis believe that the Iraqi Police are winning the battle against crime.¹⁴ Najaf, Muthanna and Sulaymaniyah had the highest confidence while Ninewa and Diyala had the lowest. Similarly, 64% of Iraqis believe the Iraqi Army is winning the battle against terrorists.¹⁵ Again, Najaf, Muthanna and Sulaymaniyah had the highest confidence while Ninewa and Diyala had the lowest.

Conclusion

During this reporting period, the focus on population protection and growing cooperation from residents in securing their neighborhoods helped produce continued, tangible improvements in the security environment as overall attacks, sectarian violence, high-profile attacks, murders and casualties continued to decline.

While AQI retains the ability to conduct high profile attacks, it is mostly on the defensive and faces dwindling support within Iraq. Coordinated security operations have pushed much of AQI from its strongholds in the Baghdad area. “Bottom-up” reconciliation initiatives such as the tribal-based security initiatives and CLC movements have spread beyond Anbar to both Sunni and Shi’a tribes. Support from the international community for Iraq continues to build, and Iraq and Turkey have been able to manage increased tensions on their border. Sustaining these gains will depend on continued political, economic and diplomatic progress.