Intelligence

REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COVER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION 1
A. Understanding Intelligence Analysis 4
1. Developing Professional Intelligence Analysts 4
2. An Analyst's Daily Taskings 7
3. The Finished Product 7
B. Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities 8
1. What is an NIE? 9
2. The 2002 NIE on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction 12
3. Overall Conclusions - Weapons of Mass Destruction 14
C. Iraq's Ties to Terrorism 29
1. Overall Conclusions - Terrorism 32

II. NIGER 36
A. The Original Niger Reporting 36
B. Former Ambassador 39
C. Continuing Analysis 47
D. The British White Paper 49
E. The National Intelligence Estimate 51
F. The Cincinnati Speech 55
G. The Niger Documents 57
H. The Fact Sheet 60
I. The State of the Union 64
J. Secretary Powell's UN Speech 66
K. Niger Conclusions 72

III. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM 84
A. Background 84
B. Nuclear Reconstitution 85
1. Aluminum Tubes 87
a. The National Intelligence Estimate 95
b. Other Assessments of the Tubes 115
2. Procurement Attempts for Magnets, High-Speed Balancing Machines and Machine Tools 119
3. Iraq's Efforts to Re-Establish and Enhance Its Cadre of Weapons
Personnel as well as Activities at Several Suspect Nuclear Sites
120
a. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission is Expanding the Infrastructure - Research Laboratories, Production Facilities, and Procurement Networks - to Produce Nuclear Weapons 121
b. Many of Iraq's Nuclear Scientists Recently Have Been Reassigned to the IAEC 121
c. Renewed Regular Contact Between Saddam and the IAEC, as Well as Enhanced Security, Suggests the IAEC is Again the Focal Point of Saddam's Nuclear Program 122
d. Activity at Several Suspect Nuclear Sites 124
C. Niger 125
D. Explaining Uncertainties 126
E. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis on Reconstitution Prior to Publication of the NIE 126
F. Analysis of Iraq's Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Disclosure 128
G. Nuclear Conclusions 129

IV. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM 143
A. Background 143
B. Baghdad Has Transportable Facilities for Producing Bacterial and Toxin BW Agents 148
1. Other Sources 150
2. CURVE BALL 152
(  )3. 157
4. INC Source 160
(  )5. 161
6. Intelligence Community Mind Set Concerning Mobile BW Programs 161
C. Baghdad Has Been Able to Renovate and Expand its Fixed Dual-Use B W Agent Production Facilities 162
1. Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute 163
2. Habbaniyah I Castor Oil Plant 164
3. Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Plant 165
D. We Assess That Iraq Has Some BW Agent and Maintains the Capability to Produce a Variety of BW Agents 166
1. Smallpox 166
2. Other Agents 170
E. In the Absence of UN Inspectors, Iraq Probably Has Intensified and Expanded Research and Development in Support of Iraq's BW Program. Baghdad Probably Has Developed Genetically Engineered BW Agents 175
(  )1. Research Activity 176
2. Reported BW Testing Near Qadisiyah Reservoir 177
F. We Assess That Baghdad Also Has Increased the Effectiveness of its BW Arsenal by Mastering the Ability to Produce Dried Agent 178
G. Iraq's Capability to Manufacture Equipment and Materials and to Procure Other Necessary, Dual-use Materials... Makes Large-scale BW Agent Production Easily Attainable 179
1. Foreign Procurement 179
2. Indigenous Iraqi Efforts 181
H. The Nature and Amounts of Iraq's Stored BW Material Remain Unresolved by UNSCOM Accounting 182
I. We Judge That We Are Seeing Only a Portion of Iraq's WMD Efforts, Owing to Baghdad's Vigorous Denial and Deception Efforts 183
J. Explaining Uncertainties 184
K. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Prior to Publication of the NIE 185
L. Biological Conclusions 187

V. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) PROGRAM 195
A. Background 195
B. Baghdad Has Chemical Weapons 199
C. We Judge That Iraq Is Expanding its Chemical Industry Primarily to Support Chemical Weapons (CW) Production 202
D. We Assess That Baghdad Has Begun Renewed Production of Mustard, Sarin, GF (Cyclosarin), and VX 204
E. Although We Have Little Specific Information on Iraq's CWStockpile, Saddam Probably Has Stocked at Least 100 Metric Tons and Possibly as Much as 500 Metric Tons of CW Agents - Much of it Added in the Last Year 205
F. Iraq Had Experience in Manufacturing CW Bombs, Artillery Rockets, and Projectiles 206
G. Baghdad Probably Is Hiding Small-Scale Agent Production Within Legitimate Research Laboratories 206
H. Baghdad Has Procured Covertly the Types and Quantities of Chemicals and Equipment Sufficient to Allow Limited CW Production Hidden Within Iraq's Legitimate Chemical Industry 207
I. Chemical Weapons Defensive Posture and Procurements 208
J. Explaining Uncertainties 208
K. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Iraq's Chemical Weapons (CW) Prior to Publication of the NIE 208
L. Chemical Conclusions 211

VI. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S DELIVERY SYSTEMS 215
A. Background 215
B. Scud-Type Missiles 217
C. Iraq Was in the Final Stages of Development of the Al Samoud Missile (2000), May Be Preparing to Deploy the Al Samoud (2001), and Was Deploying the Al Samoud and Ababil-100 Short Range Ballistic Missiles, Both Which Exceed the 150-km UN Range Limit (2002) 218
D. Development of Medium-Range Missile Capabilities 220
E. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 221
F. Other Possible Missions for the UAVs 225
G. Using UAVs to Target the U.S. 227
(  )H. 231
I. Explaining Uncertainties 231
J. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Delivery Systems Prior to Publication of the NIE 232
K. Delivery Conclusions 234

VII. IRAQ WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE IN SECRETARY POWELL'S UNITED NATIONS SPEECH 239
A. Nuclear Program 242
B. Biological Weapons 243
C. Chemical Weapons 251
D. Delivery Systems 253
E. WMD Powell Conclusions 253

VIII. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AGAINST IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 258
A. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 260
B. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) 264
C. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) 265
D. Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) 266
E. Impact of Increased Collection on Analysis 267
F. Collection Directives 268
G. CIA HUMINT Compartmentation 268
H. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Collection Conclusions 269

IX. PRESSURE ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSTS REGARDING IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) CAPABILITIES 272
A. Allegations of Influence 277
B. INR Analyst 277
C Former INR Office Director 279
D. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Senior Intelligence Analyst 280
E. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Senior Intelligence Officer 282
F. Former Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Desk Officer 282
G. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Pressure Conclusions 284

X. WHITE PAPER ON IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS 286
A. Differences Between the Classified NIE and Unclassified White Paper 290
1. Nuclear Weapons 290
2. Biological Weapons 291
3. Chemical Weapons 292
4. Delivery Systems 293
B. Primary Differences in the Key Judgments of the Classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and Unclassified White Paper 294
C. White Paper Conclusions 295

XI THE RAPID PRODUCTION OF THE OCTOBER 2002 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAQ'S CONTINUING PROGRAMS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 298
A. Rapid Production of the National Intelligence Estimate Conclusions 302

XII. IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM 304
A. Intelligence Products Concerning Iraq's Links to Terrorism 304
B. September and October 2001 Papers 304
C. Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 2002 305
D. Alternate Analysis in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 307
E. Iraqi Support for Terrorism, September 2002 313
F. Iraqi Support for Terrorism, January 2003 314
G. CIA Assessments on Iraq's Links to Terrorism 314
H. Terrorist Activities Conducted by the IIS 315
I. Support for Regional Terrorist Groups 317
J . Iraq's Relationship with al-Qaida 321
K. Leadership Reporting 323
L. Detainee Debriefings - Comments on the Relationship 324
1. Abu Zubaydah 324
(  ) 2. 325
3. Khalid Shaikh Muhammad 325
M. Contacts Between the Iraqi Regime and al-Qaida 326
N. Training of al-Qaida by Iraq 329
(  ) 1. 330
2. Additional Reports from Varying Sources 331
(  ) 3. Reporting about Activity at Salman Pak 332
O. The Use of Iraq as a Safehaven 334
1. Discussions of Safehaven 335
2. Iraqi Regime Knowledge of al-Qaida Presence in Northeastern Iraq 336
3. Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Baghdad 337
P. Operational Cooperation Between Iraq and al-Qaida 338
1. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing 339
2. The September 11th Attacks 340
3. The Foley Assassination 341
Q. Iraq's Use of Terrorist Strikes in the Event of War with the United States 342
1. Saddam Hussein's Past Use of Terrorism 343
2. The Decision-Making Environment in Iraq 344
3. Iraq's Weapons Capabilities 344
R. Iraqi Links to Terrorism Conclusions 345

XIII. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AGAINST IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM 350
A. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 351
B. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) 353
C. Terrorism Collection Conclusions 355

XIV. PRESSURE ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSTS REGARDING IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM 357
A. Allegations of Influence 359
1. CIA Ombudsman for Politicization 359
2. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and "Alternative Analysis" 361
B. Terrorism Pressure Conclusion 363

XV. POWELL SPEECH - TERRORISM PORTION 366
A. Powell Speech Conclusions - Terrorism Portion 369

XVI. IRAQ'S THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY 371
A Background 371
B. IC Analysis on the Iraqi Threat 374
C. Agency Level Papers and Current Intelligence Products 375
D. Key Analysis Topics in Agency Level Documents 376
E. Review of IC Level Assessments 377
1. Summary of Assessments 1991-1994 378
2. Summary of Assessments 1995-1998 381
3. Summary of Assessments 1999- 2003 386
F. Iraq's Threat to Regional Stability and Security Conclusions 391

XVII. SADDAM HUSSEIN'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD 394
A. Background 394
B. Highlights of The Intelligence Record 395
C. Collection and Analytical Approaches 400
1. Information Sources 400
2. Collection Issues 401
3. Analysis Processes 401
D. Saddam Hussein's Human Rights Record Conclusions 402

XVIII. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE ON IRAQI SUSPECT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SITES WITH UNITED NATIONS INSPECTORS 404
A. Background 404
B. The Lead-up to Renewed Inspections 405
C. The Sharing of Information - the "Pull" Side of the Exchange 406
D. The Sharing of Information - the "Push " Side of the Exchange 407
E. Information Shared Compared to the Intelligence Community's Master Inspection List 410
F. Multiple Intelligence Community Lists 413
G. Statements Made by Administration Officials about the Sharing of Information 415
H. The Intelligence Community's Sharing of Intelligence on Iraqi Suspect Weapons of Mass Destruction Sites with United Nations Inspectors
Conclusions
417

APPENDIX A 423

APPENDIX B 429

GLOSSARY 431

ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS 437

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 441
Chairman Pat Roberts joined by Senator Christopher S. Bond, Senator Orrin G. Hatch 441
Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, Senator Carl Levin and Senator Richard Durbin 449
Senator Saxby Chambliss with Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Senator Trent Lott, Senator Chuck Hagel and Senator Christopher S. Bond 465
Senator Olympia Snowe 470
Senator John Warner 476
Senator Dianne Feinstein 479
Senator Ron Wyden 489
Senator Richard Durbin 498
Senator Barbara A. Mikulski 508



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