5N32 Duga [Arc] - Early Work
In the mid-thirties a powerful radio station was set up in the USSR for broadcasting to America and Australia. After a while it turned out that the reception of broadcasting programs propagating the Soviet way of life in North America was extremely bad, unlike South America and Australia, although the distances to South America and, especially, to Australia were much greater than the distance to North America. The competent authorities qualified this fact in a well-known manner, the developers and personnel responsible for broadcasting to North America were arrested. But the polar ionosphere, and not the creators and the personnel of the radio station, were guilty for poor reception of signals.
In 1946, the designer N.I. Kabanov for the first time in the world proposed the idea of early (over-horizon) detection of aircraft in the shortwave waveband at a distance of up to 3000 kilometers. In the future, the research was carried out under VIR "Veer" , which ended in 1949. In the framework of the research work (VIR) "Veer" in Mytishchi a pilot plant was built, but it was not possible to find targets beyond the horizon because of unsolvable technical difficulties NI Kabanov at that time. Therefore, the opinion was established that it is impossible to detect targets beyond the horizon against the backdrop of powerful reflections from the Earth. The research work "Veer" was completed in 1949. After several years of work in this direction were continued and a model of an over-horizon radar was built, tracking from a range of 2500 km behind missile launches from Baikonur.
Work on the over-horizon radar in the USSR was resumed in 1958. the idea of creating a powerful short-wave radar again visited inquisitive minds. The chief designer of radio relay lines, the winner of the State Prize of the USSR Yefim Semyonovich Shtyrey, his supporters, the future Minister of Communications Vasily Shamshin, the young scientists Efir Ivanovich Shustov, Boris Samoilovich Kukis, Vladimir Andreevich Ko-rad and other comrades took up this time. Scientists again theoretically substantiated the possibility of creating a powerful over-the-horizon radar operating on shortwaves. This group of enthusiastic scientists developed a scientific report "Duga". The name accurately reflected the bold design. The report indicated, that such ZGRLS can detect targets thousands of kilometers above the round surface of the Earth.
The scientific report was reviewed and approved by the military and, in turn, sent to the Academy of Sciences of the USSR for verification. A special meeting of the commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences was held. Efim Semyonovich Shtyren argued that short-wave radiation can detect aircraft and missiles at out-of-range distances. His opponents proved the opposite. As an example, Kabanov's unsuccessful work was put, which was then highly respected. And it is not accidental that the truth is born in a dispute. The commission members found out that the group Shtyrena put forward an absolutely new idea, not like Kabanov's, of an over-the-horizon radar. As a result, it was suggested to Shtyren and his team to conduct experimental studies.
In the course of the work, it was proved that the aircraft could be horizontally detected at a range of one jump (3,000 km) and launching ballistic missiles at a range of two jumps (6,000 km). Practical implementation of the over-horizon location in the USSR is associated with the name of the chief designer of radio relay lines, laureate of the State Prize of the USSR Yefim Semyonovich Shtyren. He, not knowing about the discovery of Kabanov, in the late 1950's. made the same proposal for the detection of aircraft at ranges of 1000 - 3000 km.
Yefim Shtyren, his closest assistant and adherent Vasily Shamshin (who later became USSR minister of communications), young scientists Efir Shustov and Boris Kukis theoretically substantiated the possibility of creating a powerful shortwave over-the-horizon radar. They developed a scientific report called Duga [arc], so named because the discovery of targets thousands of kilometers passed over the round surface of the Earth. On January 1, 1961, a report on the research work "Duga" was presented, in which the results of calculations and experimental studies on the reflecting surfaces of aircraft and rockets, as well as the altitude track of the latter, were recorded, and a method for isolating a weak signal from the target against a background of powerful reflections from the earth's surface. The Commission, having considered the report, gave a positive evaluation and recommended to confirm the theoretically justified possibility of detection by direct experiments.
The steady improvement of ballistic missiles, the increase in their number from a credible adversary and the tense relations between the US and the USSR led to the emergence of a real threat of a missile attack on the Soviet Union. The leaders of the party and the country were aware of this, therefore, on November 15, 1962, the resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the creation of a system for the detection and targeting of the IP system, missile warning systems and an experimental set of means for ultra- long-range detection of launches of ballistic missiles, nuclear explosions and aircraft outside the horizon "and" On the establishment of the national space control service". Undoubtedly, these decisions opened a new milestone in the field of control of airspace and outer space.
In the USSR, a number of research and development (R&D) projects were launched to form and build up a group of early warning systems for launching intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). One of these decisions was assigned to the Research Institute of Long-Distance Radio Communication - NII DAR (F.V.Lukin, E.S.Shtyren), assigned the research work "Duga-1" to create an over-the-horizon radar. In August 1964, after discussing the status and prospects of work on the research work "Duga-1" at the Scientific and Technical Council of the Research Institute of DAR with the then appointed chief engineer of the Institute FA Kuzminsky, it was decided to report this question to the Minister of Radio Industry VD Kalmykov.
The meeting was attended by G.P. Kazanskiy (First Deputy Minister) and Academician A.L.Minz. Kazansky expressed a cautious point of view: the initial data are still insufficient, we must continue the experimental work. Mints objected to this: "At one time we began to design a synchrophasotron without the task and not knowing how to approach it. You can not oppose research and engineering and design work."
After listening to all the pros and cons, V.D.Kalmykov said: "The task of early warning for our country is extremely important. We do not have bases near the continent of the United States to detect ICBMs since their launch. Therefore, in spite of the absence of many initial data, it is necessary to take risks and create a prototype of ZGRLS in Nikolaev. I oblige you to develop in advance a draft of this radar in 1965 and to start developing technical documentation for the equipment, that is, to proceed to the ROC. "
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