Interim Management of Nuclear Materials

CHAPTER 4. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

This analysis covers the 10-year period from 1995 to 2004. DOE chose this span because it represents the period that it might need to make and implement decisions on the ultimate disposition of the nuclear materials under consideration in this EIS. DOE used engineering studies to identify the activities that could be required to implement each alternative, the amount of time required for each step (or "phase") of the alternative, and the annual impacts estimated to occur during each phase. A number of assumptions were required to forecast or predict the environmental impacts that could occur during this period. To the extent practical, DOE used historic data to predict and estimate future impacts or trends. If an alternative would involve new facilities or processes, DOE extrapolated data from similar operations or facilities at the SRS.

Any delays associated with implementing alternatives to process programmatic materials or stabilize materials would result in impacts comparable to those of the No-Action Alternatives involving the continued storage of the materials in their present form and locations. Similarly, any delays during processing or stabilization operations would simply extend the period of impact at the same rate. For example, the generation of low-level radioactive waste in the form of protective clothing would result from personnel continuing their work in radiologically controlled areas.

This chapter and Appendixes D and E contain calculated or estimated impact data. The discussion of environmental factors might present data calculated to several decimal places. This does not imply that DOE predicts environmental consequences to that degree of precision. Rather, this assessment retained the number of decimal places in the calculated data to enable relative comparisons between the magnitudes of the impacts resulting from alternatives or combinations of alternatives. In some cases, the data are presented in this manner to illustrate that expected impacts would be small.

As described in Chapter 2, DOE has grouped the nuclear materials into three general categories: (1) stable, (2) programmatic, and (3) candidates for stabilization. DOE evaluated the environmental impacts of a reasonable range of alternatives for processing or stabilizing the nine types of material (americium and curium, neptunium-237, H-Canyon uranium solutions, etc.) included in categories 2 and 3 and the impacts of continuing storage for the category 1 material. The result of this effort was the analysis of environmental impacts for 39 alternatives. Appendix D presents the annual impacts expected from each alternative, dependent upon the activities being performed. Appendix E presents the potential impacts from accidents.

The Council on Environmental Quality regulations suggest that the impacts of alternatives be presented in a comparative form to define sharply the issues and choices placed before the decisionmaker (40 CFR 1502.14). Tables 2-2 through 2-11 were constructed to provide a direct comparison of the environmental impacts (over a 10-year period) between alternatives for each type of material.

DOE recognized that it would implement an alternative for each of the different material categories. The number of material categories and reasonable alternatives lead to large number of possible combinations (more than 200,000) which could be selected. Since presentation of such a large number of combinations is impractical, three scenarios are presented to illustrate the range of impacts as analyzed in Appendixes D and E.

The three scenarios cover the entire spectrum of alternatives and illustrate the contrast between the least impactive scenario and most impactive scenario which might result. For each environmental factor, DOE summed the 10-year impacts from all the No-Action alternatives; the tables in this chapter present this information in the No-Action Scenario column. The No-Action Alternatives were found to have the lowest impact over the 10-year period of analysis. Similarly, DOE summed the 10-year impacts from all the preferred alternatives; the Preferred Alternatives Scenario. To illustrate the highest impact likely to occur, DOE summed the 10-year impacts from selected alternatives; the Comparative Alternatives Scenario. Table 4-1 lists the alternatives that comprise the No-Action, Preferred Alternatives, and Comparative Alternatives Scenarios. As illustrated in the subsequent sections of this chapter, the variability of impacts across the range of alternatives represented by these three scenarios is relatively small. As a result, it is unnecessary to arbitrarily construct other scenarios in order to understand the cumulative effect of alternatives analyzed in this EIS. However, the reader should refer to Chapter 2 and Appendixes D and E to examine the relative impacts of all alternatives for any particular material.

No-Action Scenario - The impacts projected for this alternative could occur if current storage practices continue over the 10-year period. There is, however, a degree of uncertainty associated with these projections for factors such as worker and population radiation exposure, which are dictated by the performance characteristics of the stored material. For example, the continued degradation of fuel or targets in the SRS reactor basins would result in the release of more fission products to the basin water, which in turn could result in higher worker radiation exposures. Experience with the long-term storage of degrading fuel or other potentially unstable material such as plutonium or americium and curium solutions is limited and makes the prediction of future effects difficult.

Table 4-1. Composition of management scenarios.

Material	No Action	Preferred Alternatives	Comparative Alternatives
Stable material	Continuing Storage	Continuing Storage	Continuing Storage
Plutonium-242	Continuing Storage	Processing to Oxide	Processing to Oxide
Americium and curium	Continuing Storage	Vitrification (F-Canyon)	Vitrification (F-Canyon)
Neptunium	Continuing Storage	Processing to Oxide	Processing to Oxide
H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions	Continuing Storage	Processing to Oxide	Processing and Storage for Vitrification (DWPF)a
H-Canyon enriched uranium solutions	Continuing Storage	Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium	Processing to Oxide (USF)b
Plutonium and uranium stored in vaults	Continuing Storage	Processing to Metal^c Processing to Oxide^c Improving Storage^c	Vitrification (F-Canyon)
Plutonium and uranium stored in vaults (plutonium-238 scrap material)	Continuing Storage	Improving Storage	Processing to Oxide
Mark-31 targets	Continuing Storage	Processing to Metal	Previtrification stage
Mark-16 and -22 fuels	Continuing Storage	Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium	Processing and Storage for Vitrification (DWPF)
Other aluminum-clad fuel and targets	Continuing Storage	Processing and Storage for Vitrification (DWPF)	Processing and Storage for Vitrification (DWPF)

^a. DWPF = Defense Waste Processing Facility.
^b. USF = Uranium Solidification Facility.
^c. For the plutonium and uranium stored in vaults, there are three preferred alternatives. DOE will choose the appropriate alternative for a particular solid based on results of the material inspection. The analysis in this EIS presents the impacts from Processing to Metal (which would produce the greatest impacts of the three alternatives) as a conservative estimate of impacts.

Preferred Alternatives Scenario - The impacts from this scenario would be the sum of the impacts from the preferred alternative for each type of material over the 10-year period (i.e., No-Action for stable material + Plutonium-242 to Oxide + Americium/Curium Vitrification + Neptunium-237 to Oxide + H-Canyon Plutonium Solutions to Oxide + etc.). These impacts are derived from data associated with similar previous or processing operations at the SRS.
Comparative Alternatives Scenario - The impacts from this scenario would be the highest overall for the 10-year period for the environmental factors recognized in the Notice of Intent to prepare this EIS (59 FR 12588). These factors are worker and public health for both normal operations and accidents, and radioactive waste generation. DOE considered it appropriate to use these factors to identify the stabilization methods that would pose the greatest impacts based on estimated 10-year data. DOE evaluated the alternatives for each type of material to determine those that would result in the highest overall impact for the three environmental factors. Then DOE summed the impacts of the selected alternatives to determine the impacts represented in the Comparative Alternatives Scenario. In the case of four of the materials, as shown in Table 4-1, the alternative with the highest impact for a material was the same as the preferred alternative, and in the case of six of the materials, the preferred alternatives presented a lower impact than the comparative alternative. In the case of stable materials, there is no difference in the impacts for any of the scenarios. DOE recognizes that the Comparative Alternatives Scenario might not result in maximum impacts for every environmental factor considered; for example, an alternative for a given material could maximize worker and public health impacts but not those from radioactive waste generation. However, DOE believes that its consideration of the stated environmental factors in the choice of the appropriate alternatives has resulted in a Comparative Alternatives Scenario that indicates the upper range of environmental impacts that could occur from the selection of any other combination of alternatives.

Tables 2-2 through 2-11 are arranged by type of material (plutonium-242, americium and curium, neptunium-237, etc.). A review of the appropriate table can indicate the relative difference in impacts between alternatives for a particular type of material. The No-Action Scenario or a combination that consists predominantly of alternatives that would delay stabilization until near the end or after the 10-year period would result in the smallest estimated cumulative impact, because the analysis is limited to 10 years.

DOE would not realize the benefits of near-term stabilization (i.e., an annual reduction in radiation exposure to workers) without an initial increase in impacts caused by processing or repackaging the material. In some cases, a reduction in annual impacts would not occur until almost the end of the 10-year period. In general, the higher impacts reflected in the Preferred Alternatives and Comparative Alternatives Scenarios would be due to the fact that the near-term annual increases from stabilization activities would dominate the impacts summed over the 10-year period. The data in Appendix D indicates that the impacts from normal operations probably would be reduced after the implementation of many of the alternatives. Appendix E indicates a similar trend for the potential impacts form accidents before, during, and after the implementation of alternatives.

DOE considered a wide variety of subjects for evaluation to determine environmental impacts in this EIS. DOE conducted detailed evaluations of the following subjects:

Health Effects from Normal Operations (Section 4.1)
Health Effects from Accidents (Section 4.2 and Appendix E)
Transportation (Section 4.3)
Air Resources (Section 4.4)
Water Resources (Section 4.5)
Utilities (Section 4.6)
Waste Management (Section 4.7)

Only one alternative (Improving Storage) would require the potential construction of a new facility outside the industrialized F- and H-Areas. This facility would be for the dry storage of a spent nuclear fuel (see Appendix C). The impacts associated with the construction of this new facility would result in the conversion of no more than 0.4 square kilometer (100 acres) of pine forest to industrial use. If DOE selected this activity, it would prepare separate NEPA documentation to address the potential impacts of construction and operation. In addition, several alternatives would require modifications to existing facilities. DOE would confine the modifications within the existing facility structure(s). For alternatives that would involve new facilities to package and store plutonium, uranium, and other materials, DOE would construct the facilities within F- or H-Area. The construction would be a warehouse or concrete vault-type structure near existing nuclear facilities in those areas. Because construction would be confined to previously disturbed and developed areas, DOE expects little or no environmental impacts in the following areas:

Geologic Resources
Ecological Resources
Cultural Resources
Aesthetics and Scenic Resources

DOE analyzed the potential impacts associated with the alternatives in this EIS in relation to these areas. Because the activities associated with each alternative would involve the use of existing facilities (except as noted above) within industrialized areas and the existing SRS transportation infrastructure (i.e., highways, railways), the analyses indicate that there would be little or no impact on the affected environment discussed in Chapter 3. The amount of traffic would not change from current volumes, so there should be no change in the number of vehicle-wildlife collisions. DOE does not anticipate impacts to ecological resources, surface waters, or their associated wetlands because activities would be confined to developed areas. Because estimated radiological and nonradiological emissions would be small, impacts to ecological resources are not likely. The alternatives evaluated in this EIS would not affect endangered species because activities would not occur in areas such species inhabit.

Because construction projects would be limited to modifications of existing facilities or construction of warehouse or vault-type facilities (i.e., not complex major nuclear facilities), DOE could use the existing SRS workforce to support these projects. Similarly, DOE would use the existing SRS workforce to implement any of the alternatives considered. The resource requirements would be effectively the same for each. As a result, DOE does not estimate any socioeconomic impacts from actions proposed in this EIS.

4.1 Health Effects of Normal Operations

This section discusses the radiological and nonradiological health effects on the public and workers from all the alternatives during normal operations, which are planned activities associated with each alternative (e.g., sampling and maintenance). Health effects are represented as additional latent cancer fatalities that could occur in the general population around the SRS and in the population of workers that would be associated with the alternatives.

4.1.1 RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH EFFECTS

DOE expects minimal public and worker health impacts from the radiological consequences of managing SRS nuclear materials. The 10-year total effects would vary little between the Preferred Alternatives and the Comparative Alternatives Scenarios but, consistent with the discussion in the introduction to this chapter, the No-Action Scenario would have the smallest cumulative impacts. The greatest calculated impact to the public could be 0.20 additional cancer death in the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Site, compared to a predicted 145,700 deaths from cancer due to all causes (23.5 percent of population of 620,100; see Section 3.5.1). The greatest calculated impact to workers could be 0.51 additional cancer death, compared to 411 cancers expected from all causes. Table 4-2 summarizes the possible health effects from radiological doses for each management scenario.

DOE calculated health effects based on (1) the 10-year collective dose to the population around the Site (approximately 620,000 people); (2) the 10-year collective dose to all workers in the affected group; (3) the 10-year dose to the hypothetical maximally exposed individual in the public; and (4) the dose to the maximally exposed worker. The collective population doses include the dose from airborne releases (Section 4.4) and the dose resulting from the use of the Savannah River for drinking water, recreation, and as a source of food (Section 4.5). The estimated worker doses are based on past operating experience and the projected schedule for implementing the alternative actions (WSRC 1994a). For the case of the maximally exposed worker, DOE assumes that no worker would receive an annual dose greater than 0.8 rem for any alternative because the SRS uses 0.8 rem as an administrative limit for normal operations (i.e., personnel receiving an annual dose at that level are normally assigned other duties in nonradiation areas). From these radiological doses, DOE calculated estimates of latent cancer fatalities using the conversion factor of 0.0004 latent cancer fatality per rem for workers and 0.0005 latent cancer fatality per rem for the public (56 FR 23363). The value of the conversion factor for the public is greater than that for workers because the public consists of all age groups (including children), while the worker population consists only of adults. Appendix D provides annual radiological dose data for each phase applicable to each alternative for each material.

Table 4-2. Estimated 10-year radiological health effects from normal operations.

Subject	No Action	Preferred Alternatives	Comparative Alternatives
Public additional cancer deaths	0.0023	0.16	0.20
Worker additional cancer deaths	0.17	0.50	0.51
Probability of cancer death from MEI^a dose	1 in 10 million	4 in 1 million	5 in 1 million
Probability of cancer death from worker maximum dose	3 in 1,000	3 in 1,000	3 in 1,000

^a. MEI = Maximally exposed individual in the public.

Under the No-Action Scenario, the lifetime effect on the public could be 0.0023 additional cancer death in the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Site. The lifetime effect to SRS workers involved with the No-Action Scenario could be 0.17 additional cancer death resulting from exposure to radiation over the 10-year period. The effects on the maximally exposed individual and the maximally exposed worker are expressed not as a latent cancer fatality but as the additional lifetime probability of contracting a fatal cancer. For the maximally exposed member of the public, the additional or incremental probability of contracting a fatal cancer associated with the 10-year exposure to radiation would be 1 in 10 million. For the worker, the incremental probability would be 3 in 1,000.

As Table 4-3 indicates, both the Preferred Alternatives Scenario and the Comparative Alternatives Scenario would increase the risk to the public. The lifetime risk to the maximally exposed individual in the public from the 10-year exposure would increase to a maximum 5-in-1-million probability of contracting a fatal cancer. The incremental risk for the maximally exposed worker would remain unchanged because administrative controls would limit maximum annual worker exposure. Tables 4-3 through 4-5 list 10-year dose data for all three scenarios, divided into the dose attributable to each applicable phase for each scenario.

Table 4-3. Estimated 10-year doses from the No-Action Scenario.

MEI^c dose (rem)	Collective population dose^d (person-rem)	Collective worker dose^e (person-rem)	Number of workers per year
2.8×10^-4	4.5	430	1,411^f

^a. Combination of effects from all materials in the No-Action Scenario.
^b. Values are rounded.
^c. MEI = Maximally exposed individual; dose at the SRS boundary, including doses from atmospheric and liquid releases.
^d. Dose to all people within 80 kilometers (50 miles) from atmospheric releases and to people using the Savannah River for drinking water, recreation, and as a source of food.
^e. Dose to all workers involved with the specific operation.
^f. Average number of radiation workers in the involved work groups for the years in which worker exposure occurred.

Table 4-4. Estimated 10-year doses from the Preferred Alternatives Scenario.

Phase	MEI^b dose (rem)	Collective population dose^c (person-rem)	Collective worker dose^d (person-rem)	Number of workers per year
Existing storage	9.7×10^-5	2.15	202	1,409
Characterization	4.3×10^-6	0.17	195	159
Conversion	7.8×10^-3	310	605	3,801
Interim storage	2.1×10^-5	0.24	79	328
Additional conversion (if required)	3.5×10^-6	0.15	20	774
Packaginrepackaging	4.3×10^-9	0.00018	18	785
Post-stabilization storage	3.7×10^-8	0.0016	124	400
Totals^e	7.9×10^-3	310	1,240	1,643^f

^a. Combination of effects from all materials in the Preferred Alternatives Scenario (see Table 4-1).
^b. MEI = Maximally exposed individual; dose at the SRS boundary, including doses from atmospheric and liquid releases.
^c. Dose to all people within 80 kilometers (50 miles) from atmospheric releases and to people using the Savannah River for drinking water, recreation, and as a source of food.
^d. Dose to all workers involved with the specific operation.
^e. Totals are rounded.
^f. Average number of radiation workers in the involved work groups for the years in which worker exposure occurred.

Table 4-5. Estimated 10-year doses from the Comparative Alternatives Scenario.

Phase	MEI^b dose (rem)	Collective population dose^c (person-rem)	Collective worker dose^d (person-rem)	Number of workers per year
Existing storage	1.0×10^-4	2.3	230	1,409
Conversion	9.8×10^-3	394	851	3,765
Interim storage	1.9×10^-5	0.22	61	129
Additional conversion (if required)	1.3×10^-11	5.3×10-7	94	4,662
Packaginrepackaging	2.4×10^-9	1.0×10-4	10	471
Post-stabilization storage	1.9×10^-8	8.1×10-4	65	256
Totals^e	9.9×10^-3	400	1,278	1,748^f

^a. Combination of effects from all materials in the Comparative Alternatives Scenario (see Table 4-1).
^b. MEI = Maximally exposed individual; dose at the SRS boundary, including doses from atmospheric and liquid releases.
^c. Dose to all people within 80 kilometers (50 miles) from atmospheric releases and to people using the Savannah River for drinking water, recreation, and as a source of food.
^d. Dose to all workers involved with the specific operation.
^e. Totals are rounded.
^f. Average number of radiation workers in the involved work groups for the years in which worker exposure occurred.

4.1.2 NONRADIOLOGICAL HEALTH EFFECTS

DOE evaluated the range of chemicals to which the public and workers would be exposed due to SRS nuclear material management activities, and expects minimal public and worker health impacts from nonradiological health effects. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 discuss the offsite chemical concentrations from air emissions and liquid discharges, respectively. DOE estimated the worker impacts using the EPA Industrial Source Complex Short Term No. 2 Model to calculate concentrations in and around work areas (WSRC 1994a,b,c) and compared them to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs) or ceiling limits for protecting worker health. All impacts are well below the limits.

OSHA limits (29 CFR Part 1910.1000) are time-weighted average concentrations that a facility cannot exceed during a prescribed duration of a 40-hour week. The facility cannot exceed OSHA ceiling concentrations during any part of the workday. These exposure limits refer to airborne concentrations of substances and represent conditions under which nearly all workers could be exposed day after day without adverse health effects. However, because of the wide variation in individual susceptibility, a small percentage of workers could experience discomfort from some substances at concentrations at or below the permissible limit. Table 4-6 summarizes the results of this comparison. Appendix D provides the detailed material- and alternative-specific analysis.

Table 4-6. Estimated maximum incremental onsite concentrations (milligrams per cubic meter) of nonradiological air pollutants regulated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

		Scenario
Pollutant	Averaging Time	OSHA PEL^b	No Action	Preferred Alternatives	Comparative Alternatives
Carbon monoxide	8-hour	55	0.015	0.11	0.11
Nitrogen oxides	1-hour	9^c	0.11	0.80	0.78
Sulfur dioxide	8-hour	13	0.000022	0.00016	0.00016
Carbon dioxide	8-hour	9,000	0.000011	0.000078	0.000077
Nitric acid	8-hour	5	0.0042	0.042	0.038

^a. Source: WSRC (1994a,b,c).
^b. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL).
^c. OSHA ceiling limit not to be exceeded at any time during the workday; modeled 1-hour concentrations are listed for comparison to ceiling limits.

Table 4-7. Annular sector factors for local dose evaluations.

Fraction of total population dose in sectorb

Fraction of total population dose that

is dose to average person in sectorb

Sectora	1 (8-16 km)	2 (16-32 km)	3 (32-48 km)	4 (48-64 km)	5 (64-80 km)	1 (8-16 km)	2 (16-32 km)	3 (32-48 km)	4 (48-64 km)	5 (64-80 km)
A (N)	3.09¥10-4	2.79¥10-2	2.70¥10-2	8.63¥10-3	1.49¥10-2	1.19¥10-5	5.25¥10-6	2.69¥10-6	1.70¥10-6	1.22¥10-6
B (NNE)	5.86¥10-5	5.75¥10-3	4.71¥10-3	6.50¥10-3	1.51¥10-2	9.77¥10-6	4.35¥10-6	2.28¥10-6	1.46¥10-6	1.05¥10-6
C (NE)	1.02¥10-5	1.35¥10-2	7.03¥10-3	8.33¥10-3	1.17¥10-2	1.02¥10-5	4.57¥10-6	2.40¥10-6	1.58¥10-6	1.15¥10-6
D (ENE)	2.76¥10-4	1.29¥10-2	9.56¥10-3	7.43¥10-3	4.15¥10-2	1.02¥10-5	4.12¥10-6	2.13¥10-6	1.39¥10-6	1.02¥10-6
E (E)	1.28¥10-3	2.21¥10-2	8.91¥10-3	9.67¥10-3	3.48¥10-3	8.27¥10-6	3.27¥10-6	1.68¥10-6	1.10¥10-6	8.02¥10-7
F (ESE)	2.55¥10-4	4.37¥10-3	2.79¥10-3	2.56¥10-3	2.24¥10-3	7.07¥10-6	2.81¥10-6	1.45¥10-6	9.44¥10-7	6.90¥10-7
G (SE)	1.29¥10-4	1.11¥10-3	6.78¥10-3	4.54¥10-3	4.25¥10-3	4.96¥10-6	2.02¥10-6	1.04¥10-6	6.79¥10-7	4.95¥10-7
H (SSE)	1.61¥10-4	6.63¥10-4	6.92¥10-4	8.10¥10-4	1.12¥10-3	4.04¥10-6	1.70¥10-6	9.00¥10-7	5.97¥10-7	4.40¥10-7
I (S)	2.25¥10-6	5.48¥10-4	7.24¥10-4	2.69¥10-3	9.34¥10-4	2.25¥10-6	9.83¥10-7	5.44¥10-7	3.71¥10-7	2.80¥10-7
J (SSW)	1.29¥10-5	2.42¥10-3	2.90¥10-3	4.11¥10-3	2.12¥10-3	6.46¥10-6	2.70¥10-6	1.45¥10-6	9.82¥10-7	7.22¥10-7
K (SW)	1.87¥10-4	4.17¥10-3	5.22¥10-3	4.06¥10-3	3.02¥10-3	1.10¥10-5	4.41¥10-6	2.33¥10-6	1.56¥10-6	1.14¥10-6
L (WSW)	5.18¥10-4	3.87¥10-3	1.32¥10-2	2.84¥10-3	5.31¥10-3	8.64¥10-6	3.50¥10-6	1.86¥10-6	1.24¥10-6	9.13¥10-7
M (W)	3.43¥10-4	8.52¥10-3	1.11¥10-2	7.51¥10-3	4.62¥10-3	6.24¥10-6	2.57¥10-6	1.40¥10-6	9.40¥10-7	6.82¥10-7
N (WNW)	2.89¥10-3	9.16¥10-3	1.57¥10-1	4.99¥10-2	8.33¥10-3	6.43¥10-6	2.74¥10-6	1.47¥10-6	9.92¥10-7	7.22¥10-7
O (NW)	2.23¥10-3	2.08¥10-2	1.57¥10-1	3.04¥10-2	2.48¥10-3	8.22¥10-6	3.52¥10-6	1.79¥10-6	1.14¥10-6	8.21¥10-7
P (NNW)	3.97¥10-3	8.47¥10-2	6.28¥10-2	9.74¥10-3	6.34¥10-3	1.09¥10-5	4.70¥10-6	2.31¥10-6	1.46¥10-6	1.04¥10-6

a. Sector letter is letter shown on Figure 4-1. Letters in parentheses after the sector letter indicate the compass direction of the sector.

b. km = kilometers; to convert to miles, multiply by 0.62137.

4.1.3 Environmental Justice Assessment

In general, traditional impact analyses have not examined the effects of emissions on the health of populations identified by race or economic status. This EIS examines whether communities of people of color or low income could be recipients of disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental impacts. Even though DOE does not expect adverse health impacts from any of the alternatives, it analyzed reasonably foreseeable impacts to determine whether there are "disproportionately high and adverse human, health or environmental effects of these alternatives on minority populations or low-income population" (Executive Order 12898). Figures 3-7 and 3-8 show communities of people of color and low income by census tract. This section discusses predicted average radiation doses received by individuals in those communities and compares them to the predicted per capita doses that could be received in the other communities in the 80-kilometer (50-mile) region. This section also discusses impacts of doses that could be received in the downstream communities from liquid effluents from all alternatives, and also discusses potential impacts from nonradiological pollutants.

Figure 4-1 shows a wheel with 22.5-degree sectors and concentric rings from 16 to 80 kilometers (10 to 50 miles) at 16-kilometer (10-mile) intervals. A fraction of the total population dose was calculated for each sector (Table 4-7), the sector wheel was laid over the census tract map, and each tract was assigned to a sector. For this analysis, if a tract fell in more than one sector, it was assigned to the sector with the largest value.

Figure 4-1. Annular sectors around the Savannah River Site.

DOE analyzed the impacts by comparing the per capita dose received by each type of community to the other types of communities within a defined region. To eliminate the possibility that impacts to a low-population community close to the SRS with a high dose per person would be diluted and masked by including it with a high-population community farther from the SRS, the analysis made comparisons within a series of concentric circles, the radii of which increase in 16-kilometer (10-mile) increments.

To determine the radiation dose received per person in each type of community, the number of people in each tract was multiplied by that tract's dose value to obtain a total population dose for each tract. These population doses for each type of community were summed over each concentric circle and divided by the total community population to obtain a community per capita dose for each circular area. Figure 4-2 shows these results for the Comparative Alternatives Scenario, which would be the maximum value alternative. Table 4-8 provides the supporting data.

Figure 4-2. Community impacts from Comparative Alternatives Scenario.

Table 4-8. Estimated per capita 10-year dose for identified communities in 80-kilometer (50-mile) region for the Comparative Alternatives Scenario.

Distance	Low income		Persons of color
Distance	Less than 25 percent of population	Equal or more than 25 percent of population	Less than 35 percent of population	35 percent to 50 percent of population	Equal or more than 50 percent of population	All communities
0-16 km^b (0-10 miles)	0.0044	0.0042	0.0040	0.0046	0.0040	0.0044
0-32 km (0-20 miles)	0.0021	0.0020	0.0019	0.0029	0.0016	0.0021
0-48 km (0-30 miles)	0.0011	0.0012	0.0012	0.0014	0.0009	0.0011
0-64 km (0-40 miles)	0.0009	0.0010	0.0009	0.0011	0.0008	0.0009
0-80 km (0-50 miles)	0.0008	0.0009	0.0009	0.0009	0.0007	0.0009

Table 4-10. Maximum estimated annualized point estimate of increased risk of latent cancer fatalities.

Preferred Alternatives Scenario

Comparative Alternatives Scenario

Receptor group

No Action/

Continuing Storage

Conversion

Interim Storage

Additional Conversion

(if required)

Post-Stabilization Storage

Conversion

Interim Storage

Additional Conversion

(if required)

Post-Stabilization Storage

Mark-31 targets

Population	3.7¥10-6	8.8¥10-2	1.1¥10-5	1.2¥10-4	2.5¥10-6	8.8¥10-2	1.1¥10-4	(a)	(a)
MEI	4.9¥10-9	1.5¥10-5	1.4¥10-9	2.0¥10-8	7.0¥10-10	1.5¥10-5	4.6¥10-8	(a)	(a)
Uninvolved worker	6.1¥10-9	2.6¥10-4	4.8¥10-8	3.6¥10-7	4.8¥10-8	2.6¥10-4	9.6¥10-7	(a)	(a)

Americium and curium solutions

Population	4.3¥10-4	8.8¥10-2	(b)	(b)	(c)	8.8¥10-2	(b)	(b)	(c)
MEI	5.7¥10-8	1.5¥10-5	(b)	(b)	(c)	1.5¥10-5	(b)	(b)	(c)
Uninvolved worker	1.6¥10-6	2.6¥10-4	(b)	(b)	(c)	2.6¥10-4	(b)	(b)	(c)

H-Canyon uranium solutions

Population	1.2¥10-3	1.1¥10-6	2.1¥10-6	(a)	(a)	2.1¥10-6	2.1¥10-6	(a)	(a)
MEI	9.6¥10-7	1.8¥10-10	1.5¥10-9	(a)	(a)	1.5¥10-9	1.5¥10-9	(a)	(a)
Uninvolved worker	1.3¥10-7	3.2¥10-9	1.5¥10-6	(a)	(a)	1.5¥10-6	1.5¥10-6	(a)	(a)

H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions

Population	2.6¥10-2	2.6¥10-2	1.1¥10-5	1.2¥10-4	2.5¥10-6	2.6¥10-2	1.1¥10-4	(a)	(a)
MEI	3.6¥10-6	3.6¥10-6	1.4¥10-9	2.0¥10-8	7.0¥10-10	3.6¥10-6	4.6¥10-8	(a)	(a)
Uninvolved worker	1.7¥10-5	1.7¥10-5	4.8¥10-8	3.6¥10-7	4.8¥10-8	1.7¥10-5	9.6¥10-7	(a)	(a)

H-Canyon neptunium solutions

Population	2.6¥10-2	2.6¥10-2	1.1¥10-5	1.2¥10-4	2.5¥10-6	2.6¥10-2	1.1¥10-5	1.2¥10-4	2.5¥10-6
MEI	3.6¥10-6	3.6¥10-6	1.4¥10-9	2.0¥10-8	7.0¥10-10	3.6¥10-6	1.4¥10-9	2.0¥10-8	7.0¥10-10
Uninvolved worker	1.7¥10-5	1.7¥10-5	4.8¥10-8	3.6¥10-7	4.8¥10-8	1.7¥10-5	4.8¥10-8	3.6¥10-7	4.8¥10-8

H-Canyon plutonium-242 solutions

Population	8.8¥10-2	8.8¥10-2	1.1¥10-5	(a)	(a)	8.8¥10-2	1.1¥10-5	(a)	(a)
MEI	1.5¥10-5	1.5¥10-5	1.4¥10-9	(a)	(a)	1.5¥10-5	1.4¥10-9	(a)	(a)
Uninvolved worker	2.6¥10-4	2.6¥10-4	4.8¥10-8	(a)	(a)	2.6¥10-4	4.8¥10-8	(a)	(a)

Preferred Alternatives Scenario

Comparative Alternatives Scenario

Receptor group

No Action/

Continuing Storage

Conversion

Interim Storage

Additional Conversion

(if required)

Post-Stabilization Storage

Conversion

Interim Storage

Additional Conversion

(if required)

Post-Stabilization Storage

Mark-16 and -22 fuels

Population	3.7¥10-6	2.6¥10-2	2.1¥10-6	(a)	(a)	2.6¥10-2	1.1¥10-4	(a)	(a)
MEI	4.9¥10-9	3.6¥10-6	1.5¥10-9	(a)	(a)	3.6¥10-6	4.6¥10-8	(a)	(a)
Uninvolved worker	6.1¥10-9	1.7¥10-5	1.5¥10-6	(a)	(a)	1.7¥10-5	9.6¥10-7	(a)	(a)

Other aluminum-clad fuels

Population	3.7¥10-6	2.6¥10-2	1.1¥10-4	(a)	(a)	2.6¥10-2	1.1¥10-4	(a)	(a)
MEI	4.9¥10-9	3.6¥10-6	4.6¥10-8	(a)	(a)	3.6¥10-6	4.6¥10-8	(a)	(a)
Uninvolved worker	6.1¥10-9	1.7¥10-5	9.6¥10-7	(a)	(a)	1.7¥10-5	9.6¥10-7	(a)	(a)

Vault solidsd

Population	6.1¥10-5	2.6¥10-2	1.1¥10-5	(a)	(a)	2.6¥10-2	1.1¥10-5	(a)	(a)
MEI	1.0¥10-8	3.6¥10-6	1.4¥10-9	(a)	(a)	3.6¥10-6	1.4¥10-9	(a)	(a)
Uninvolved worker	1.8¥10-7	1.7¥10-5	4.8¥10-8	(a)	(a)	1.7¥10-5	4.8¥10-8	(a)	(a)
Plutonium-238d
Population	1.1¥10-5	1.1¥10-5	2.5¥10-6	(a)	(a)	5.7¥10-2	1.1¥10-5	(a)	(a)
MEI	1.4¥10-9	1.4¥10-9	7.0¥10-10	(a)	(a)	2.2¥10-6	1.4¥10-9	(a)	(a)
Uninvolved worker	4.8¥10-8	4.8¥10-8	4.8¥10-8	(a)	(a)	1.9¥10-6	4.8¥10-8	(a)	(a)

a. Impacts from potential radiological accidents following completion of this alternative are beyond the timeframe of this EIS.

b. This phase is not applicable for this alternative.

c. No credible mechanism exists for measurable impacts for the storage of vitrified material; therefore, this impact would be approximately 0.

d. The impacts presented for vault solids do not include those form the special subcategory of solids representing plutonium-238 scrap. Appendix E tables provide the impacts for this subcategory.

^a. Total population dose = 400 person-rem.
^b. km = kilometers.

As shown, the per capita dose is extremely small for each community type. This analysis indicates that atmospheric releases would not disproportionately affect communities of people of color (population equal to or greater than 35 percent of the total population) or low income (equal to or greater than 25 percent of the total population) in the 80-kilometer (50-mile) region.

Section 4.5 discusses predicted doses to the offsite maximally exposed individual and to the downstream population from exposure to water resources. Those doses reflect people using the Savannah River for drinking water, sports, and food (fish). Because the identified communities in the areas downstream from the SRS are well distributed, there would be no disproportionate impacts among people of color or low-income communities.

The distribution of carcinogenic and criteria pollutant emissions due to routine operations, and of criteria pollutants from construction activities, would be essentially identical to those presented for airborne radiological emissions because distribution pathways would be the same. As a result, people of color or low income communities would not be disproportionately affected by nonradiological emissions from any of the alternatives. Because nonradiological pollutant emissions would have only minimal impacts for any of the alternatives, and would not be disproportionately distributed among types of communities, there are no environmental justice concerns related to these pollutants for any of the alternatives.

4.2 Health Effects from Accidents

This section summarizes risks to members of the public and workers from potential facility accidents associated with the alternatives for management of the nuclear materials stored at the SRS. An accident is a series of unexpected or undesirable events leading to a release of radioactive or hazardous material within a facility or to the environment. All the alternatives discussed in this EIS have a potential for accidents.

Safety analyses for the SRS facilities that process and store nuclear materials identify and describe potential accidents. DOE used information from these analyses, along with information on inventories of hazardous chemicals or radioactive materials involved with each alternative, to estimate the potential impacts from such accidents. The accidents analyzed could be the result of external events (aircraft crashes, nearby explosions), internal events (equipment failures, human errors), or natural phenomena (earthquakes, tornadoes). DOE considered accidents (i.e., both high- and low-frequency events and large- and small-consequence events) that could result in the release of both radioactive and hazardous materials. In addition, DOE analyzed a reasonable spectrum of events that could result in a release of radioactive or hazardous materials. For radiological accidents, this section presents consequences in terms of the dose to an individual or the collective dose to a population. DOE has converted these potential doses to health effects in the form of latent cancer fatalities. For hazardous material releases, consequences are presented as chemical concentrations.

To estimate the doses that would result from radiological accidents, DOE established an initial baseline by assuming a release of 1 curie of each type of radionuclide from a point on the SRS that is representative of the location of the nuclear facilities. Mathematical models predicted the dose to an individual hypothetically located 640 meters (2,100 feet) from the point of release. The mathematical models account for such factors as the meteorological conditions at the time of the accident and the rate at which the accident would deposit radioactive material over the landscape (i.e., deposition rate). DOE used the distance of 640 meters (2,100 feet) to estimate the impacts to an uninvolved worker (i.e., a worker not in the immediate vicinity of an accident, but potentially in a nearby facility or work area that is directly in the path of a radioactive plume). Similarly, DOE used the model to estimate the dose to an individual hypothetically located at a point on the SRS boundary that is directly in the path of a radioactive plume; this simulates potential impacts to a maximally exposed member of the public. DOE calculated the collective dose to the offsite population for individuals living within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Site who would be in the path of any release plume.

After developing the baseline information, DOE used the estimated amount of radioactive material released during each accident to calculate corresponding doses that could result to an uninvolved worker, maximally exposed offsite individual, and the offsite population. The estimated number of latent cancer fatalities were calculated using the radiological doses and conversion factors of 0.0005 latent cancer fatalities per person-rem and 0.0004 latent cancer fatalities per person-rem (0.0008 for projected doses above 20 rem) to determine health effects to the public or for workers, respectively. The conversion factor provides the estimated increase in fatal cancers over the next 50 years. As noted in Chapter 3, the national cancer fatality rate is greater than 20 percent (i.e., there is about a one in five chance that the cause of a death was cancer). The increase in latent cancer fatalities reflected in this section would be in addition to the number from all other causes.

DOE multiplied the resulting accident consequences, in terms of latent cancer fatalities, by the estimated accident frequency to calculate the point estimate of accident risk. The annualized point estimate of risk is provided to enable the consideration of accidents that might not have the highest consequence but that might pose a greater risk due to a higher frequency.

An example of this concept is the No-Action Alternative accidents related to the H-Canyon plutonium solutions listed in Table E-7. The inadvertent transfer from a processing vessel to the ground outside the H-Canyon building would result in the greatest consequence of 4.1 latent cancer fatalities per occurrence (Note: this number is in bold type in Table E-7). Because this accident is likely to occur only once in every 2,500 years [Table E-7 lists this frequency as 4.00E-04 (0.0004)], a time-weighted average of these consequences over the accident frequency time span (i.e., consequence times frequency) would result in an annualized point estimate of risk of 0.0017 latent cancer fatality per year. Although the unpropagated fire in a solution vessel would produce lower consequences of 1.3 latent cancer fatalities per occurrence, DOE estimates that this accident would occur once in every 45 years (a frequency of 0.0202), resulting in a higher point estimate of risk (0.026 latent cancer fatality per year). By factoring in the accident probability, DOE can compare the resulting risks.

This analysis discusses potential accident impacts to involved workers qualitatively; however, in the event of a criticality, the result could be prompt fatalities. For personnel other than workers who would be nearby, the impact would be delayed. The human health effect of concern is the delayed development of cancer (latent cancer) that proves fatal.

Tables 4-9 and 4-10 summarize the projected impacts of accidents on the population, maximally exposed offsite individual, and uninvolved worker. The No-Action, Preferred Alternatives, and

Comparative Alternatives Scenarios are listed for each material group. To facilitate comparison among the alternatives and among the varying phases of an alternative, two parameters (i.e., latent cancer fatalities and point estimate of risk) are listed for each material group. Actions such as characterizing materials and other monitoring are represented by accident analyses for the No-Action Alternative for each material group. Existing storage of material is part of each No-Action Alternative.

Table 4-9 lists the estimated increases in latent cancer fatalities resulting from the calculated population dose of the maximum consequence accident. This projected increase in latent cancer fatalities is conservative and could result only if the postulated, yet highly unlikely, accident occurred during highly unfavorable meteorological conditions. The table lists the potential population impacts for the most affected sector of the 80-kilometer (50-mile) population (i.e., the northwest direction). An examination of the distribution of communities of low-income persons and people of color did not reveal high and disproportionate impacts from potential actions.

Table 4-10 lists the point estimate of increased risk of latent cancer fatalities resulting from the calculated population dose for the accident that poses the greatest risk (i.e., the accident with the highest product when the population dose is multiplied by the accident frequency). This projected point estimate of increased risk considers the projected accident probability and, therefore, provides a more appropriate index of the hazard associated with each material and scenario.

According to the Environmental Protection Agency, the average annual cancer fatality risk to an individual is approximately 0.0019. Although the incremental risk to the maximally exposed individual from an accident would be well below this value, further stabilization actions could further reduce the risk. This reduction would be due to a twofold effect of stabilizing the particular material; in some cases the likelihood of an event that dispersed the same quantity of material would be smaller, and in others the physical form or packaging of the material after stabilization would be such that a large quantity could not be released. Solutions stored in locations not designed for long-term storage are examples of materials that would offer a dual benefit if solidified and packaged properly.

As indicated in the tables in this section and in Appendix E, the risk and the number of postulated accidents for each material would decrease for most of the materials after the performance of the alternative actions.

DOE evaluated the impacts associated with hazardous or toxic chemicals for each entire facility that would be involved in the storage or stabilization of nuclear materials rather than attempting to attribute the hazardous chemicals to the specific nuclear material process or activity the chemical supports. The approach used in this EIS for determining hazardous chemical impacts is similar to that typically used in a facility hazard assessment. Each facility was assumed to contain its maximum chemical inventory, which in turn was assumed to be totally released to the environment without postulating accident scenarios or release mechanisms. The use of this approach provides results that are bounding to all alternatives and scenarios. Appendix E presents the hazardous chemical impacts associated with this bounding condition.

As with radiological accidents, impacts to a close-in worker from a chemical accident can be severe or life-threatening. Some instances (i.e., the total release of the hydrofluoric or nitric acid inventory) could exceed the chemical emergency response threshold values for uninvolved workers. These threshold values could be life-threatening if individuals were exposed for longer than 1 hour. However, because these individuals would be notified and evacuated within 1 hour of an inadvertent release, DOE does not expect any life-threatening or long-term effects. The projected maximum chemical concentration at the Site boundary could exceed the first emergency response level for nitric acid. The short-term health effects from this level of exposure would be irritation of the eyes and an objectionable odor. If DOE implemented the preferred alternative for each nuclear material, the need for chemicals to support storage or processing of these materials would diminish over the 10-year period covered by this EIS.

As stated in Chapter 1, one of the primary objectives of DOE's proposed action is to eliminate or reduce the risks from potential accidents that could be associated with the continued storage of nuclear materials at the SRS. For example, a wide range of accidents could result in the release of radioactive material from solutions currently stored in stainless-steel tanks that contain a variety of radioisotopes (plutonium-239, americium-243, curium-244, uranium-235, etc.).

The tables in Appendix E list abnormal events and accidents that could result in releases of radioactive material during each phase of storage or conversion. The data from these tables were used to generate Figure 4-3. The "Before" risk profiles on this figure indicate the range of evaluated accidents that could occur during the continued storage of nuclear material in its current form (i.e., the No-Action Alternative). The "After" risk profiles indicate the accidents that could occur after either the Preferred Alternatives or Comparative Alternatives Scenario stabilization actions were complete. Each individual data point represents an accident for one event involving one material group. Because certain facility accidents would be common for all materials, the figure shows some data points clustered so closely they appear to be a single point. If the figure shows the post-stabilization accidents either lower (reduction in consequences) or to the left (reduction in frequency) of the accidents that would occur before stabilization, the risk would be reduced.

The accidents discussed in this section would involve essentially the same nuclear materials, but stored in different forms. For example, after the conversion of solutions to a metal or oxide, the solutions would no longer exist and no accidents could result in a liquid release. The "Before" and "After" plots in Figure 4-3 shows both the number of accidents that could result in a release and the reduction of consequences from such accidents. This is an illustration of why DOE is proposing to convert these materials and the overall reductions in risk that DOE expects.

4.3 Traffic and Transportation

4.3.1 TRAFFIC

DOE analyzed impacts from each alternative to workers and members of the public from traffic activities. Road traffic related to facility operations would remain at or below current SRS levels because none of the alternatives would require the addition of employees to the SRS workforce. Rail traffic for the movement of spent fuel would increase less than 1 percent (HNUS 1994).

4.3.2 TRANSPORTATION

DOE used the RADTRAN (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992) and AXAIR89Q (Hamby 1994) computer codes configured with applicable SRS demographic data and transportation accident rates (HNUS 1994) to model the transportation of radioactive materials for each alternative. The analysis was limited to onsite movements because no offsite transportation was included in the alternatives.

The analysis calculated transportation-related radiological health effects consistent with risk assessment recommendations issued by the National Research Council (NRC 1990), and the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP 1977, 1991). DOE assumed that the recommended population-averaged, dose-to-risk conversion factors (0.0004 latent cancer fatality per rem for workers and 0.0005 latent cancer fatality per rem for the public) would apply in the

evaluation of individual risk, as discussed in Section 4.1.1. Prerequisite modeling calculations defined five hypothetical human receptor groups:

Uninvolved Worker - The SRS employee who is not assigned to the transportation activity but, as a casual observer along the normal transportation route, could receive radiation exposure from the normal transport shipment.
Onsite Population - The collective SRS employee population not assigned to the transportation activity that could receive external or internal radiation exposure from normal and accident transport shipments.
Involved Workers - The collective SRS employee population assigned to the transportation activity (i.e., transport crew and package handlers) that could receive external radiation exposure from normal transport shipments.
Maximally Exposed Individual - The member of the public at the SRS boundary with the highest ground-level radioactive material concentration who could receive external or internal radiation exposure from accident transport shipments.
Offsite Population - The collective members of the public in the meteorological sector most likely to experience radioactive material transport and dispersion phenomena resulting in the delivery of the maximum collective dose from accident transport shipments.

DOE considered both the probability and the consequences of vehicle (tractor-trailer, tractor-tanker, and train) accidents. The calculated probabilities reflect accident rate statistics, the probability for a given accident severity, and the total material-dependent distance traveled. The range of accident scenarios (severity categories based on impact as the result of an accident) resulting in reasonably foreseeable accident probabilities (greater than approximately 0.0000001) were selected for further analysis to determine the magnitude of accident consequences. The accident severity categories were typically medium to high probability events of low to medium severity.

The analysis defined reasonably foreseeable accident consequences by the identity and amount of radioactive material present at the applicable receptor locations (model limitations did not allow DOE to analyze the Uninvolved Worker and Involved Workers receptor groups) and determined the consequences on a radioactive material, category-specific basis. For most reasonably foreseeable accidents, the radiological consequences and projected additional health effects would be negligible because the transportation package is certified by the appropriate agency (DOE, the Department of Transportation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or the International Atomic Energy Agency) for full containment of the radioactive material under the most severe reasonably foreseeable accident conditions. However, the DOE analysis showed some consequences for accidents that involved three material categories (fuels, targets, and uranium solutions). These postulated accidents could release some radioactive material because the transport package is not certified for full containment under the most severe accident conditions. The calculated range of nonzero consequences for the on- and offsite populations would be 0.05 to 3 person-rem and 0.002 to 0.2 person-rem, respectively. At such collective dose levels, additional latent cancer fatalities are unlikely. As expected, the transportation of uranium solutions would yield the greatest on- and offsite accident impacts.

Tables 4-11 and 4-12 list the results of analyses performed to estimate the transportation radiological impacts for each scenario. The impacts are quantified as increments of effective dose equivalent that are likely to be delivered or committed to five receptors during the indicated year. The listed impacts cover the truck and rail transport scenarios analyzed, and the normal transport, highest consequence, and lowest consequence accident. The analysis did not calculate offsite receptor doses for normal transport because they would be smaller than corresponding onsite doses.

Tables 4-11 and 4-12 also list estimated human health effects corresponding to transportation radiological impacts. The health effect analyzed is the excess latent cancer fatality (i.e., incremental addition to the natural cancer fatality incidence attributable to the transportation activity). These data support the expectation that the excess health effect incidence caused by 10-year normal transport activities under any alternative would be a small fraction of the incidence caused by other routine SRS activities.

DOE has evaluated the transportation impacts associated with the alternatives not discussed in this section; these impacts would be similar to those listed in Tables 4-11 and 4-12.

Tables 4-13 and 4-14 list the results of analyses performed to estimate the impacts and human health effects from the transportation of radiological waste. These analyses quantified the impacts listed in a manner similar to that for the radioactive material categories described above. The incident-free impacts would be greater for waste handling than for the materials listed in Table 4-11 due to the large volume of waste to be shipped. In addition, impacts associated with accidents would be greater due primarily to a less robust shipping package and more easily dispersible matrix of the waste.

Table 4-11. Estimated incident-free impacts by material and scenario from transportation of radioactive materials.

Material	Receptor	Scenario
Material	Receptor	No Action	Preferred Alternatives	Comparative Alternatives
Plutonium-242	Uninvolved worker^a	NT^b	1.41×10^-7	1.41×10^-7
	Onsite population^c	NT	1.58×10^-4	1.58×10^-4
	Involved workers^c	NT	1.94×10-2	1.94×10-2
Americium and curium	Uninvolved worker	NT	NT	NT
	Onsite population	NT	NT	NT
	Involved workers	NT	NT	NT
Neptunium	Uninvolved worker	NT	1.66×10^-5	1.66×10^-5
	Onsite population	NT	1.41×10^-2	1.41×10^-2
	Involved workers	NT	1.38	1.38
H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions	Uninvolved worker	NT	5.46×10^-7	NT
	Onsite population	NT	6.18×10^-4	NT
	Involved workers	NT	7.47×10^-2	NT
H-Canyon enriched uranium solutions	Uninvolved worker	NT	7.20×10^-6	NT
	Onsite population	NT	9.55×10^-3	NT
	Involved workers	NT	5.00×10^-2	NT
Vault solids	Uninvolved worker	NT	3.45×10^-6	3.45×10^-6
	Onsite population	NT	3.90×10^-3	3.90×10^-3
	Involved workers	NT	0.467	0.467
Plutonium-238	Uninvolved worker	3.09×10^-8	NT	NT
	Onsite population	3.48×10^-5	NT	NT
	Involved workers	6.36×10^-3	NT	NT
Mark-31 targets	Uninvolved worker	NT	1.49×10^-4	1.49×10^-4
	Onsite population	NT	1.27×10-²	1.27×10^-2
	Involved workers	NT	0.125	0.125
Mark-16 and -22 fuels	Uninvolved worker	NT	5.71×10^-4	5.31×10^-4
	Onsite population	NT	9.80×10^-2	4.54×10^-2
	Involved workers	NT	0.720	0.445
Other Aluminum-clad fuels and targets	Uninvolved worker	NT	2.59×10^-5	2.59×10^-5
	Onsite population	NT	2.22×10^-3	2.22×10^-3
	Involved workers	NT	2.17×10^-2	2.17×10^-2
Total of all materials	Uninvolved worker	3.09×10^-8	7.74×10^-4	7.26×10^-4
	Onsite population	3.48×10^-5	0.141	7.86×10^-2
	Involved workers	6.36×10^-3	2.86	2.46
Latent cancer fatalities	Uninvolved worker^d	1.24×10^-11	3.10×10^-7	2.91×10^-7
	Onsite population	1.39×10-8	5.65×10-5	3.14×10-5
	Involved workers	2.54×10-6	1.14×10-3	9.85×10-4

^a. Dose in rem.
^b. NT = No transportation of materials listed.
^c. Dose in person-rem.
^d. Additional probability of a latent cancer fatality.

Table 4-12. Estimated accident impacts and associated probabilities by material.

Material	Accident severity	Accident probability	Onsite population^a	Offsite population^a	Offsite MEI^b
Plutonium-242	Low	3.59×10^-6	0	0	0
Plutonium-242	Medium	2.35×10^-6	0	0	0
Americium and curium	Low	NT	NT	NT	NT
Americium and curium	Medium	NT	NT	NT	NT
Neptunium	Low	6.53×10^-5	0	0	0
Neptunium	Medium	3.33×10^-5	0	0	0
H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions	Low	5.02×10^-6	0	0	0
H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions	Medium	2.56×10^-6	0	0	0
H-Canyon enriched uranium solutions	Low	5.02×10^-5	0	0	0
H-Canyon enriched uranium solutions	Medium	2.56×10^-5	2.78	0.164	2.16×10-⁵
Vault solids	Low	4.02×10^-5	0	0	0
Vault solids	Medium	2.05×10^-5	0	0	0
Plutonium-238	Low	7.53×10^-6	0	0	0
Plutonium-238	Medium	3.84×10^-6	0	0	0
Mark-31 targets	Low	8.26×10-⁵	0	0	0
Mark-31 targets	Medium	5.50×10^-7	4.91×10^-2	2.23×10^-3	3.17×10^-4
Mark-16 and -22 fuels	Low	2.51×10^-4	0	0	0
Mark-16 and -22 fuels	Medium	1.28×10^-4	2.78	0.164	2.16×10^-5
Other aluminum-clad fuels and targets	Low	3.59×10^-6	0	0	0
Other aluminum-clad fuels and targets	Medium	2.35×10^-6	0	0	0

Material	Accident severity	Accident probability	Onsite population^a	Offsite population^a	Offsite MEI^b
Latent cancer fatalities as a result of transportation accidents
Plutonium-242	Low	3.59×10^-6	0	0	0
Plutonium-242	Medium	2.35×10^-6	0	0	0
Americium and curium	Low	NT	NT	NT	NT
Americium and curium	Medium	NT	NT	NT	NT
Neptunium	Low	6.53×10^-5	0	0	0
Neptunium	Medium	3.33×10^-5	0	0	0
H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions	Low	5.02×10^-6	0	0	0
H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions	Medium	2.56×10^-6	0	0	0
H-Canyon enriched uranium solutions	Low	5.02×10^-5	0	0	0
H-Canyon enriched uranium solutions	Medium	2.56×10^-5	1.11×10^-3	8.21×10^-5	1.08×10^-8
Vault solids	Low	4.02×10^-5	0	0	0
Vault solids	Medium	2.05×10^-5	0	0	0
Plutonium-238	Low	7.53×10^-6	0	0	0
Plutonium-238	Medium	3.84×10^-6	0	0	0
Mark-31 targets	Low	8.26×10^-5	0	0	0
Mark-31 targets	Medium	5.50×10^-7	1.96×10^-5	1.12×10^-6	1.59×10^-7
Mark-16 and -22 fuels	Low	2.51×10^-4	0	0	0
Mark-16 and -22 fuels	Medium	1.28×10^-4	1.11×10^-3	8.21×10^-5	1.08×10^-8
Other aluminum-clad fuels and targets	Low	3.59×10^-6	0	0	0
	Medium	2.35×10^-6	0	0	0

^a. Dose in person-rem.
^b. MEI = Maximally exposed individual; dose in rem.
^c. NT = No transportation of materials listed.

Table 4-13. Estimated incident-free impacts by waste type and scenario from transportation of radioactive materials.

Waste type	Receptor	Scenario
Waste type	Receptor	No Action	Preferred Alternatives	Comparative Alternatives
DWPF^a	Uninvolved worker^b	NT^c	NT	NT
	Involved workers^d	NT	NT	NT
	Onsite population^d	NT	NT	NT
Saltstone	Uninvolved worker	2.56×10^-5	6.18×10^-5	9.04×10^-5
	Involved workers	9.91	23.9	35.0
	Onsite population	4.96×10^-1	1.20	1.75
Transuranic waste	Uninvolved worker	1.25×10^-6	2.72×10^-6	2.57×10^-6
	Involved workers	0.460	0.998	0.943
	Onsite population	2.42×10^-2	5.25×10^-2	4.96×10^-2
Mixed waste	Uninvolved worker	1.97×10^-6	3.58×10^-6	3.94×10^-6
	Involved workers	1.48	2.70	2.97
	Onsite population	3.82×10^-2	6.94×10^-2	7.64×10^-2
Low-level waste	Uninvolved worker	1.06×10^-4	9.87×10^-5	1.06×10^-4
	Involved workers	83.4	77.5	83.4
	Onsite population	2.06	1.91	2.06
Total dose from all waste types	Uninvolved worker	1.35×10^-4	1.67×10^-4	2.03×10^-4
	Involved workers	95.3	1.05×102	1.22×102
	Onsite population	2.62	3.23	3.94
Latent cancer fatalities^e	Uninvolved worker^d	5.40×10^-8	6.67×10^-8	8.13×10^-8
	Involved workers	3.81×10^-2	4.20×10^-2	4.89×10^-2
	Onsite population	1.05×10^-3	1.29×10^-3	1.57×10^-3

^a. DWPF = Defense Waste Processing Facility.
^b. Uninvolved worker dose in rem.
^c. NT = No transportation.
^d. Involved workers and onsite population dose in person-rem.
^e. Estimated number of latent cancer fatalities.

4.4 Air Resources

This section discusses radiological and nonradiological offsite air quality impacts from normal operation for the three management scenarios evaluated in this EIS. The information in this section was one of the bases for the public health effects discussed in Section 4.1 (which discusses the effects of onsite air impacts on workers). Appendix D includes a detailed presentation of air impacts by material category or subcategory, alternative, and activities associated with each phase of the alternative.

Table 4-14. Estimated accident impacts and associated probabilities by waste type.

Waste type	Accident severity	Accident probability	Onsite population^a	Offsite population^a	Offsite MEI^b
DWPF^c	Low	NT^d	NT	NT	NT
DWPF^c	Medium	NT	NT	NT	NT
Saltstone	Low	7.15×10^-3	5.01×10^-4	1.10×10^-4	6.72×10^-9
Saltstone	Medium	4.49×10^-3	5.01×10^-2	1.10×10^-2	6.72×10^-7
Transuranic waste	Low	5.59×10^-4	4.61×10²	40.5	5.78×10^-3
Transuranic waste	Medium	2.15×10^-4	4.61×10⁴	4.05×10³	0.578
Mixed waste	Low	1.45×10^-4	1.37×10^-4	1.36×10^-5	1.94×10^-9
Mixed waste	Medium	5.16×10^-5	1.37×10^-2	1.36×10^-3	1.94×10^-7
Low-level waste	Low	1.72×10^-2	3.83×10^-4	3.80×10^-5	5.42×10^-9
Low-level waste	Medium	3.29×10^-3	3.83×10^-2	3.80×10^-3	5.42×10^-7

Waste type	Accident severity	Accident probability	Onsite population^a	Offsite population^a	Offsite MEI^b
Latent cancer fatalities^e
DWPF	Low	NT	NT	NT	NT
DWPF	Medium	NT	NT	NT	NT
Saltstone	Low	7.15×10^-3	2.00×10^-7	5.52×10^-8	3.36×10^-12
Saltstone	Medium	4.49×10^-3	2.00×10^-5	5.52×10^-6	3.36×10-¹⁰
Transuranic waste	Low	5.59×10^-4	0.184	2.02×10^-2	2.89×10^-6
Transuranic waste	Medium	2.15×10^-4	18.4	2.02	2.89×10^-4
Mixed waste	Low	1.45×10^-4	5.48×10^-8	6.81×10^-9	9.72×10^-13
Mixed waste	Medium	5.16×10^-5	5.48×10^-6	^6.81×10-7	9.72×10^-11
Low-level waste	Low	1.72×10^-2	1.53×10^-7	1.90×10^-8	2.71×10^-12
Low-level waste	Medium	3.29×10^-3	1.53×10^-5	1.90×10^-6	2.71×10^-10

^a. Onsite and offsite population dose in person-rem.
^b. MEI = Maximally exposed individual; dose in rem.
^c. DWPF = Defense Waste Processing Facility.
^d. NT = No transportation.
^e. Estimated number of latent cancer fatalities.

4.4.1 Radiological IMPACTS

The radiological impacts assessment indicates that the doses from total SRS airborne emissions for nuclear materials management would remain within the applicable dose standards for DOE facilities. DOE conducted an assessment to establish the actions it would perform during the treatment of the materials evaluated in this EIS to facilitate its prediction of the radiological doses associated with each scenario. The assessment reviewed past and current SRS actions, identified those that are the same as or similar to potential future treatment actions, and quantified the associated airborne releases. These actions made it possible to estimate the releases associated with each material and alternative over the 10-year period of interest. The releases were converted to doses using the MAXIGASP and includes a 0.073 person-rem contribution from water pathways (Section 4.5), would be less than 0.5 percent of the proposed 100-person-rem threshold for notification (proposed 10 CFR Part 834). The 100-person-rem value represents neither an acceptable nor unacceptable dose; it is simply a reporting limit that will help DOE concentrate its regulatory and oversight resources and respond, if necessary, in a timely manner.

Table 4-15 indicates that the No-Action Scenario would result in lower maximum annual and 10-year doses than the other two scenarios (discussed below) because fewer activities would release radioactivity to the environment under No Action. However, as shown in Appendix D, the annual POPGASP computer codes (Simpkins 1994), which calculate the dose to a hypothetical maximally exposed individual at the SRS boundary and the collective dose to the population within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius, respectively. Both codes utilize the GASPAR (Eckerman et al. 1980) and XOQDOQ (Sagendorf et al. 1982) modules.

Table 4-15. Estimated radiological doses from airborne releases of radioactivity associated with each management scenario.

Receptor^c	Scenario
Receptor^c	No Action	Preferred Alternatives	Comparative Alternatives
MEI^d (rem) Maximum annual^e 10-year total	0.0000084 0.000084	0.0040 0.0077	0.0043 0.0097
Population^f (person-rem) Maximum annual^e 10-year total	0.38 3.8	163 310	176 400

^a. Based on data in Appendix D.
^b. Composite of all materials processed under that scenario.
^c. Atmospheric releases from total 1993 SRS operations produced a dose of 0.00011 rem to the maximally exposed member of the public and 7.6 person-rem to the regional population (Arnett, Karapatakis, and Mamatey 1994).
^d. Maximally exposed offsite individual.
^e. The analysis first determined the maximum annual dose for each material among the treatment phases, and then summed the maximum doses for all materials to obtain an upper bound dose value.
^f. Population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the SRS (regional population).

Table 4-15 lists the doses from airborne releases of radioactivity associated with the continued maintenance and storage of the materials evaluated in this EIS (i.e., the No-Action Scenario). For this scenario the doses would remain constant over the 10-year period and within the 1993 totals from all SRS operations. The highest annual dose to the maximally exposed member of the public associated with the No-Action Scenario, 0.0000084 rem (0.0084 millirem), would be less than 0.1 percent of the 10-millirem DOE limit for sitewide airborne releases (DOE Order 5400.5). The highest annual population dose associated with the No-Action Scenario would be 0.45 person-rem; this dose, which doses from the other two scenarios would be two orders of magnitude less than those from the No-Action Scenario after all the material had been processed, stabilized, and stored. The materials that would contribute the highest doses under the No-Action Scenario would be stable materials, F-Canyon americium and curium solutions, and H-Canyon enriched uranium solutions. The major radionuclide contributors would be plutonium-239, uranium-235 and -238, and americium-241.

For the Preferred Alternatives Scenario, the materials that would contribute the highest doses during the 10-year period would be vault solids, Mark-16 and -22 fuels, and neptunium solutions. The major radionuclide contributors would be plutonium-238 and -239, uranium-235 and -238, and americium-241. Table 4-15 lists the incremental doses associated with this scenario. The highest annual incremental dose to the maximally exposed individual from airborne releases during the 10-year interim management period could be 0.0040 rem (4.0 millirem). This incremental individual dose would represent 40 percent of the 10-millirem sitewide limit. The highest annual incremental dose to the regional population from airborne releases would be 163 person-rem. The incremental dose to the population, including the 0.25-person-rem contribution from water pathways (Section 4.5) could exceed the proposed 100-person-rem reporting limit.

For the Comparative Alternatives Scenario, the materials that would contribute the highest doses would be vault solids, H-Canyon plutonium-239 solutions, and H-Canyon neptunium solutions. The major radionuclide contributors would be plutonium-238 and -239, uranium-235 and -238, and americium-241. Table 4-15 lists the incremental doses associated with this scenario. The highest annual incremental dose to the maximally exposed individual from airborne releases during the 10-year interim management period could be 0.0043 rem (4.3 millirem). This incremental individual dose would represent 43 percent of the 10-millirem limit. The highest annual incremental dose to the regional population from airborne releases during this 10-year period would be 176 person-rem. The incremental dose to the population, including the 0.62-person-rem contribution from water pathways (Section 4.5) could exceed the proposed 100-person-rem reporting limit. While this would not represent an unacceptable dose, the SRS would have to notify the appropriate DOE office.

4.4.2 NONRADIOLOGICAL IMPACTS

DOE used the EPA Industrial Source Complex Short-Term No. 2 model to estimate nonradiological air pollutant concentrations. Emissions data were input to the model along with the meteorological data discussed in Section 3.3.3. The model computed maximum boundary line concentrations at or beyond the SRS boundary.

Virtually all nonradiological air pollutant emissions for each material are associated with activities in F- and H-Areas. These emissions can be attributed to the F- and H-Area main stacks, diesel generators, and storage tanks. Emissions from the generators and storage tanks do not vary by material or treatment alternative, and thus are part of the facility baseline. These emissions, which are accounted for in Section 3.3.3, are not included in the incremental modeling results presented in this section.

Table 4-16 lists the estimated maximum concentrations associated with each scenario evaluated in this EIS. As listed, the maximum concentrations for the No-Action Scenario would be approximately a factor of 10 lower than the maximum concentrations for the Preferred Alternatives and Comparative Alternatives Scenarios. The maximum concentrations for the Preferred Alternatives and Comparative Alternatives Scenarios would be approximately the same.

Table 4-16. Estimated maximum incremental concentration (micrograms per cubic meter) of nonradiological air pollutants at the SRS boundary for each management scenario.

Pollutant	Averaging Time	Scenario
Pollutant	Averaging Time	No Action	Preferred Alternatives	Comparative Alternatives
Carbon monoxide	1-hour	9.6	68	67
Carbon monoxide	8-hour	2.3	16	16
Nitrogen oxides	Annual	0.19	1.3	1.3
Sulfur dioxide	3-hour	0.0056	0.040	0.039
	24-hour	0.0013	0.0089	0.0088
	Annual	0.000079	0.00056	0.00055
Gaseous fluorides	12-hour	0.016	0.18	0.16
(as HF)	24-hour	0.0086	0.095	0.084
	1-week	0.0034	0.037	0.033
	1-month	0.00095	0.010	0.0093
Nitric acid	24-hour	0.27	2.7	2.4
Nitric acid	Annual	0.018	0.18	0.16

^a. Source: WSRC (1994 a,b,c).

To provide a comparison between the predicted concentrations and nonradiological air quality standards, DOE added the maximum concentrations for each scenario to the estimated sitewide (baseline) concentrations presented in Section 3.3.3 and to (background) concentrations measured at various locations around the SRS. Table 4-17 lists the resulting total concentrations for each scenario and compares them to regulatory standards. As listed, all concentrations would be well below the standards. In addition, the incremental concentrations associated with each scenario (Table 4-16) would be a small part of the total concentrations listed in Table 4-17.

Table 4-17. Estimated maximum total concentration (micrograms per cubic meter) of nonradiological air pollutants at the SRS boundary for each management scenario.a

Scenario

No Action

Preferred Alternatives

Comparative Alternatives

Pollutant	Averaging time	Regulatory standard	SRS baseline concentration	Background concentration	Total concentration^b	Concentration standard (%)	Total concentration^b	Concentration standard (%)	Total concentration^b	Concentration standard (%)
Carbon monoxide	1-hour	40,000	180	NA^c	180	0.45	250	0.62	250	0.62
Carbon monoxide	8-hour	10,000	23	NA	23	0.23	39	0.39	39	0.39
Nitrogen oxides	Annual	100	4.0	8	12	12	13	13	13	13
Sulfur dioxide	3-hour	1,300	630	34	660	51	660	51	660	51
	24-hour	365	190	17	210	57	210	57	210	57
	Annual	80	10	3	13	16	13	16	13	16
Gaseous fluorides	12-hour	3.7	0.62	NA	0.62	17	0.80	22	0.78	21
(as HF)	24-hour	2.9	0.31	NA	0.31	11	0.40	14	0.39	14
	1-week	1.6	0.15	NA	0.15	9.4	0.19	12	0.18	11
	1-month	0.8	0.03	NA	0.03	3.8	0.040	5.1	0.039	4.9
Nitric acid	24-hour	125	6.7	NA	6.7	5.4	9.4	7.5	9.1	7.3
Nitric acid	Annual	None	NA	NA	0.018	NA	0.18	NA	0.16	NA

^a Sources: WSRC (1994a,b,c,d); SCDHEC (1992).
^b For the Preferred and Comparative alternatives, total concentration would be the sum of the incremental concentration (from Table 4-16), the baseline concentration, and the background concentration. For the No-Action Scenario, the total concentration would be equal to the baseline concentration plus the background concentration.

4.5 Water Resources

This section describes the normal effects associated with the three management scenarios. This information was one of the bases for the health effects discussed in Section 4.1. DOE expects minimal impacts to either surface water or groundwater. In addition, the analysis concludes that water resource impacts would vary little among the scenarios.

Because normal operations would not involve releases to groundwater, DOE has limited this section to surface-water impacts. The major sources of liquid effluents from involved facilities would be process cooling water and steam condensate that could contain small quantities of radionuclides and chemicals. The exposure pathways considered are drinking water, fish ingestion, shoreline exposure, swimming, and boating. Usage factors for the maximally exposed individual are consistent with regularly published SRS environmental reports (e.g., Arnett, Karapatakis, and Mamatey 1994). As described below, DOE used a mathematical model to calculate the dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual and the collective dose to the offsite population.

DOE conducted an assessment to establish the actions it would perform during the treatment of the materials evaluated in this EIS. The assessment reviewed past and current actions at the SRS, identified those that are the same or similar to future alternatives, and quantified the associated liquid releases; this made it possible to estimate the releases associated with each material and alternative over the 10-year period of interest.

Calculations of radiological doses through water pathways based on these releases are supported by the use of LADTAP II, a computer code developed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to estimate radiation doses associated with normal reactor system liquid effluent releases to individuals, populations groups, and biota. LADTAP II uses the models in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Regulatory Guide 1.109 (NRC 1977) to calculate doses received from water and fish ingestion and from recreational water activities.

Any radionuclide releases to surface water resulting from the alternative management scenarios would be to SRS streams that discharge to the Savannah River. Table 4-18 lists the maximum annual and total doses received from exposure to these materials over the 10-year period covered by this EIS. For the No-Action Scenario, the doses would remain constant over time. For the Preferred Alternatives and Comparative Alternatives Scenarios, the doses would increase by a factor of about four above those of the No-Action Scenario when processing of material was occurring and then, as shown in Appendix D, generally would decrease until, after all the material had been processed, stabilized, and stored, the annual doses would be at least 3 orders of magnitude less than those of the No-Action Scenario. As listed in Table 4-18, the dose for the Comparative Alternatives Scenario would be greater than those for the other scenarios.

Table 4-18. Estimated radiological doses from surface-water pathway exposures.

Dosea	Scenario
Dosea	No Action	Preferred Alternatives	Comparative Alternatives
MEI^b (rem) Maximum annual^c 10-year total	0.0000197 0.000197	0.000070 0.00020	0.00013 0.00023
Population (person-rem) Maximum annual 10-year total	0.073 0.73	0.25 0.78	0.62 0.88

^a Resulting from the use of Savannah River water between the SRS and the Atlantic Ocean.
^b MEI = Maximally exposed individual.
^c The analysis first determined the maximum annual dose for each material among the treatment phases, and then summed the maximum doses for all materials to obtain an upper bound dose value.

For all three scenarios, the ingestion of fish containing cesium-137 would contribute most of the exposure to both the maximally exposed individual and the population. Plutonium and uranium isotopes ingested with drinking water would be secondary contributors. The maximally exposed individual could receive annual doses from liquids as high as 14, 50, and 92 percent, respectively, of that from present liquid releases from the Site, which is itself a small fraction of the applicable Federal dose standard (Arnett, Karapatakis, and Mamatey 1994). The population doses from liquids could be as high as 5, 16, and 41 percent, respectively, of the dose from present SRS liquid releases. Section 4.4 discusses the regulatory aspects of the population dose from air and liquid pathways.

This assessment also compared chemical releases with applicable water quality standards. These standards are based on the preservation of aquatic biota populations, human health, and aesthetics (i.e., taste and odor). Figure 3-5 shows that none of the stabilization actions would occur within the 100-year floodplain. DOE would treat sanitary waste associated with personnel necessary to perform the selected treatment alternatives in existing sewage treatment plants; discharges from these plants (e.g., to L-Lake from L-Area, to Fourmile Branch from F-Area, to Fourmile Branch from H-Area) would continue to meet National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit limits.

Under the three scenarios, process cooling water treatment would result in releases of the following concentrations from F-Area to Upper Three Runs Creek:

Nitrate - 40 micrograms per liter
Ammonia - 30 micrograms per liter
Manganese - 10 micrograms per liter
Uranium - 20 micrograms per liter
Lead - 6 micrograms per liter

Nickel - 50 micrograms per liter
Chromium - 20 micrograms per liter
Aluminum - 200 micrograms per liter
Copper - 10 micrograms per liter
Zinc - 70 micrograms per liter

Similar or lower concentrations would be released from H-Area with the exception of those for nitrate and ammonia, which would be 100 and 500 micrograms per liter, respectively. Although proposed or final Federal drinking water standards do not apply to discharges, the SRS discharge concentrations would not exceed these standards (Arnett, Karapatakis, and Mamatey 1993). The discharges would also comply with South Carolina Water Quality Standards (SC 1994). In general, the release concentrations would be no greater than those measured in Upper Three Runs Creek and Fourmile Branch (Arnett 1993, 1994), with the exception of zinc and ammonia; however, zinc concentrations in the discharge would be two orders of magnitude less than South Carolina Water Quality Standards, which are based on the taste and odor of drinking water. Ammonia concentrations in the discharge (of which only H-Area releases would exceed stream concentrations) would be well within state standards. Lead, nickel, chromium, and copper were generally not detected in Upper Three Runs Creek and Fourmile Branch in 1993. The release concentrations of these metals would be no greater than those measured in 1992 and are well within state standards.

For the No-Action Scenario, the effluent discharge flow rate would be 5 percent of normal creek flow rates. For the Preferred Alternatives Scenario, an upper bound annual effluent discharge flow rate, calculated by assuming that all materials were processed in the same year, would be 170 percent of normal creek flow rates. The 10-year average flow rate for this scenario would be 35 percent of normal creek flow rates (decreasing to less than 1 percent after all the material had been processed and stored). Upper bound and 10-year average effluent flow rates for the Comparative Alternatives Scenario would be the same as and 25 percent higher, respectively, than those for the Preferred Alternatives Scenario; after all the material had been processed and stored, the flow rate for the Comparative Alternatives Scenario would be less than 1 percent of normal creek flow rates.

The liquid pathway dose, chemical releases, and effluent flow rates would initially be lower for the No-Action Scenario than for the Preferred Alternatives Scenario. However, as material processing was completed, the impacts to water resources would decrease until, after DOE had processed all the material, the impacts from the Preferred Alternatives Scenario would be at least an order of magnitude less than those of No Action. Comparative Alternatives Scenario impacts to water resources would generally be somewhat greater than those of the Preferred Alternatives Scenario.

4.6 Utilities

DOE based its estimates of water, electricity, steam, and fuel annual consumption rates on past operational experience and the projected usage for each material and alternative. Appendix D presents annual impacts for the various phases of stabilization by material. DOE compared the 10-year cumulative consumption of utilities by scenario (Table 4-19) to the SRS utility capacities listed in Table 4-20 to determine the potential for impacts. The existing SRS capacities and distribution systems would be adequate to support any of the alternatives; no new generation or treatment facilities would be necessary. Suitable groundwater from the deep aquifers at the Site is abundant and aquifer depletion is not a problem. Pumping from the deep aquifer to meet domestic, process, and other water uses has continued as needed since the early 1950s. This usage has not adversely affected water levels in the deep aquifer (Christensen and Gordon 1983).

Table 4-19. Estimated utility consumption for the management scenarios.

	Management Scenarios
Utilities	10-year total	Preferred	Comparative
Water, ML^b	38,400	36,400	39,600
Electricity, MW-hr^c	1,259,300	1,140,400	1,400,600
Steam, Mkg^d	5,900	4,900	6,500
Fuel, kL^e	36,300	29,900	40,700

^a Source: WSRC (1994a).
^b Millions of liters; to convert liters to gallons, multiply by 0.26418.
^c Millions of kilowatt-hours.
^d Millions of kilograms; to convert kilograms to pounds, multiply by 2.2046.
^e Thousands of liters.

DOE estimates that the smallest increase in demand for utilities during the 10-year period of interest would result from the Preferred Alternatives Scenario, and the greatest increase would result from the Comparative Alternatives Scenario.

4.7 Waste Management

The SRS generates several different types of waste, including low-level waste, high-level waste, transuranic waste, and mixed waste. Low-level waste constitutes a substantial portion of the generated

Table 4-20. Current capacities and usage of utilities and energy at the Savannah River Site.

ELECTRICITY
Consumption	659,000 megawatt-hours per year
Load	75 megavolt-amperes
Peak Demand	130 megavolt-amperes
Capacity	340 megavolt-amperes
WATER
Groundwater usage	11,920 billion liters (3,000 billion gallons) per year
Surface water usage (cooling)	75,700 billion liters (20,000 billion gallons) per year
FUEL
Oil	28.4 million liters (7.5 million gallons) per year
Coal	208,655 metric tons (230,000 tons) per year
Gasoline	4.7 million liters per year
WASTEWATER
Domestic capacity	3.97 million liters (1 million gallons) per day
Domestic load	1.89 million liters (500,000 gallons) per day
Industrial capacity^b,c	1.64 million liters (400,000 gallons) per day
Industrial load	43,836 liters (12,000 gallons) per day

^a Source: WSRC (1994a).
^b F/H Effluent Treatment Facility only.
^c Design capacity; permitted capacity is about 67 percent of this value.

waste and typically contains relatively small amounts of dispersed radioactive material. Compaction is often employed to reduce the volume of this type of waste and to minimize disposal space. High-level waste at the SRS is a liquid resulting from processing operations in the canyon facilities; DOE will treat this waste at the proposed Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) and convert it to a solid glass material encapsulated in stainless-steel canisters. This EIS expresses the generation of high-level waste as both the volume of high-level liquid waste and "equivalent DWPF canisters," even though this facility will not produce canisters during the early portion of the 10-year time period covered by this EIS. The volumes of liquid waste reported in this section are the volumes as they leave the canyon, and do not reflect final volumes that would enter the waste tanks after concentration and evaporation. The use of equivalent DWPF canisters for measuring high-level waste provides a better comparison among alternatives because liquid waste can be diluted or concentrated such that the volume of liquid is not an accurate indicator of the actual waste content.

Table 4-21 lists estimated generation rates of Defense Waste Processing Facility canisters and other waste types for each alternative. These estimates are based on current and past SRS operations (WSRC 1994a). As listed in Table 4-21, DOE estimates that the smallest increase for all waste types over the 10-year period would occur if it implemented the No-Action Scenario. The largest increase in waste would result from implementing the Comparative Alternatives Scenario.

Table 4-21. Estimated total waste generated over the 10-year time period by scenario.

Waste type	Scenario
Waste type	No-Action	Preferred Alternatives	Comparative Alternatives
High-level liquid waste (ML^c)	8.7	26	39
Equivalent DWPF^d canisters	200	300	500
Saltstone (cubic meters)	34,000	82,000	120,000
Transuranic waste (cubic meters)	830	1,800	1,700
Hazardous/mixed waste (cubic meters)	1,100	2,000	2,200
Low-level waste (cubic meters)	140,000	130,000	140,000

^a Source: Based on data from WSRC (1994a).
^b To convert cubic meters to cubic yards, multiply by 1.3079.
^c Millions of liters; to convert liters to gallons, multiply by 0.26418.
^d DWPF = Defense Waste Processing Facility.

With the exception of Processing and Storing for Vitrification in the Defense Waste Processing Facility, the impact on SRS waste management capacities from implementing any of the alternatives would be minimal because the Site could accommodate all the waste generated with existing and planned radioactive waste storage and disposal facilities.

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SC (South Carolina), 1994, 1993 Cumulative Supplement, Code of Laws of South Carolina, Binder 25, R61-68, Lawyers Cooperative Publishing, Rochester, New York.

SCDHEC (South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control), 1992, 1992 Air Pollution Measurements of the South Carolina Air Quality Surveillance Network, Columbia, South Carolina.

Simpkins, A. A., 1994, "Interim Management of Nuclear Materials EIS - Environmental Dosimetry Calculations," SRT-ETS-940079, internal memorandum to C. B. Shedrow, Westinghouse Savannah River Company, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.

WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company), 1994a, IMNM EIS Engineering Data Book, WSRC-TR-94-0310, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.

WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company), 1994b, "Air Dispersion Modeling for the SRS Interim Management of Nuclear Materials Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) - Nonradiological Emissions (Preliminary Draft)," Internal Memorandum C. H. Hunter to C. B. Shedrow, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina, June 30.

WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company), 1994c, "Air Quality Calculations for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) - H-Canyon Emissions," letter from C. H. Hunter to C. M. Haga (Halliburton NUS Corporation), Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina, August 4.

WSRC (Westinghouse Savannah River Company), 1994d, Air Dispersion Modeling for the Spent Nuclear Fuel Environmental Impact Statement - Nonradiological Emissions, Draft, WSRC-RP-94-147, Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina.

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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

a. MEI = Maximally exposed individual in the public.

a. Source: WSRC (1994a,b,c). b. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL). c. OSHA ceiling limit not to be exceeded at any time during the workday; modeled 1-hour concentrations are listed for comparison to ceiling limits.

a. Dose in rem. b. NT = No transportation of materials listed. c. Dose in person-rem. d. Additional probability of a latent cancer fatality.

a. Dose in person-rem. b. MEI = Maximally exposed individual; dose in rem. c. NT = No transportation of materials listed.

a. DWPF = Defense Waste Processing Facility. b. Uninvolved worker dose in rem. c. NT = No transportation. d. Involved workers and onsite population dose in person-rem. e. Estimated number of latent cancer fatalities.

a. Onsite and offsite population dose in person-rem. b. MEI = Maximally exposed individual; dose in rem. c. DWPF = Defense Waste Processing Facility. d. NT = No transportation. e. Estimated number of latent cancer fatalities.

a Source: WSRC (1994a). b Millions of liters; to convert liters to gallons, multiply by 0.26418. c Millions of kilowatt-hours. d Millions of kilograms; to convert kilograms to pounds, multiply by 2.2046. e Thousands of liters.

a Source: WSRC (1994a). b F/H Effluent Treatment Facility only. c Design capacity; permitted capacity is about 67 percent of this value.

a Source: Based on data from WSRC (1994a). b To convert cubic meters to cubic yards, multiply by 1.3079. c Millions of liters; to convert liters to gallons, multiply by 0.26418. d DWPF = Defense Waste Processing Facility.

REFERENCES

^a. MEI = Maximally exposed individual in the public.

^a. Source: WSRC (1994a,b,c).
^b. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL).
^c. OSHA ceiling limit not to be exceeded at any time during the workday; modeled 1-hour concentrations are listed for comparison to ceiling limits.

^a. Dose in rem.
^b. NT = No transportation of materials listed.
^c. Dose in person-rem.
^d. Additional probability of a latent cancer fatality.

^a. Dose in person-rem.
^b. MEI = Maximally exposed individual; dose in rem.
^c. NT = No transportation of materials listed.

^a. DWPF = Defense Waste Processing Facility.
^b. Uninvolved worker dose in rem.
^c. NT = No transportation.
^d. Involved workers and onsite population dose in person-rem.
^e. Estimated number of latent cancer fatalities.

^a. Onsite and offsite population dose in person-rem.
^b. MEI = Maximally exposed individual; dose in rem.
^c. DWPF = Defense Waste Processing Facility.
^d. NT = No transportation.
^e. Estimated number of latent cancer fatalities.

^a Source: WSRC (1994a).
^b Millions of liters; to convert liters to gallons, multiply by 0.26418.
^c Millions of kilowatt-hours.
^d Millions of kilograms; to convert kilograms to pounds, multiply by 2.2046.
^e Thousands of liters.

^a Source: WSRC (1994a).
^b F/H Effluent Treatment Facility only.
^c Design capacity; permitted capacity is about 67 percent of this value.

^a Source: Based on data from WSRC (1994a).
^b To convert cubic meters to cubic yards, multiply by 1.3079.
^c Millions of liters; to convert liters to gallons, multiply by 0.26418.
^d DWPF = Defense Waste Processing Facility.