Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Latent cancer fatalities (LCF)

Accident consequences

Uninvolved

Offsite

Quantity

Uninvolved

Offsite

worker

MEI

population

Accident

released (curies)

Frequency

(per year)

worker

(rem)

MEIa

(rem)

population

(person-rem)

(Point estimate of increased risk per year)

(Increased risk of LCF per occurrence)

NO ACTION

H-Canyon (limiting solution source term)

Unpropagated fire in solution vessel

0.594

2.02E-02

2.15

0.355

2.62E+03

1.7E-05

8.6E-04

3.6E-06

1.8E-04

2.6E-02

1.3

Inadvertent transfer from a processing vessel to the ground outside the H-Canyon building

1.32

4.00E-04

31.0

1.42

8.27E+03

1.0E-05

2.4E-02

2.8E-07

7.1E-04

1.7E-03

4.1

Inadvertent transfer of solution to H-Canyon sump

3.15E-02

8.10E-02

0.114

1.88E-02

1.39E+02

3.7E-06

4.6E-05

7.6E-07

9.4E-06

5.6E-03

7.0E-02

Airborne release of solutions resulting from coil and tube failure in H-Canyon cooling system

2.08E-02

2.55E-03

0.136

6.25E-03

36

1.4E-07

5.4E-05

8.0E-09

3.1E-06

4.6E-05

1.8E-02

Inadvertent nuclear criticality

4.76E+04

1.56E-03

(b)

1.32E-03

(b)

(b)

(b)

1.0E-09

6.6E-07

(b)

(b)

Severe earthquake

1.17

2.00E-04

27.4

1.26

7.31E+03

4.4E-06

2.2E-02

1.3E-07

6.3E-04

7.3E-04

3.7

CONVERSION

H-Canyon (limiting solution source term)

Same accident analysis as that for the No-Action Alternative

HB-Line, Phase II (normal processing)

Severe earthquake

7.00E-04

2.00E-04

1.79E-02

8.82E-04

4.83

1.4E-09

7.2E-06

8.3E-11

4.1E-07

4.8E-07

2.4E-03

Unpropagated fire in gloveboxes

1.60E-03

4.70E-02

6.46E-03

1.07E-03

7.88

1.2E-07

2.6E-06

2.5E-08

5.4E-07

1.9E-04

3.9E-03

Latent cancer fatalities (LCF)

Accident consequences

Uninvolved

Offsite

Quantity

Uninvolved

Offsite

worker

MEI

population

Accident

released (curies)

Frequency

(per year)

worker

(rem)

MEIa

(rem)

population

(person-rem)

(Point estimate of increased risk per year)

(Increased risk of LCF per occurrence)

INTERIM STORAGE

Existing Vaults (235-F)

Rupture storage container (e.g., radiolytic decay)

5.14E-04

2.00E-02

8.62E-04

1.43E-04

1.05

6.9E-09

3.4E-07

1.4E-09

7.2E-08

1.1E-05

5.3E-04

Severe earthquake

1.05E-02

2.00E-04

0.60

7.0E-03

10

4.8E-08

2.4E-04

7.0E-10

3.5E-06

1.0E-06

5.0E-03

Fire

2.0E-5

5.0E-02

6.0E-04

2.0E-05

0.10

1.2E-08

2.4E-07

5.0E-10

1.0E-08

2.5E-06

5.0E-05

High-Level Waste Tanks

Severe earthquake

(b)

2.00E-04

(b)

3.41E-03

0.26

(b)

(b)

3.4E-10

1.7E-06

2.6E-08

1.3E-04

Hydrogen explosion in a tank

(b)

2.00E-05

0.291

1.13E-02

0.43

2.3E-09

1.2E-04

1.1E-10

5.7E-06

4.3E-09

2.2E-04

Waste tank filter fire

(b)

2.5E-02

9.55E-02

3.68E-03

8.5

9.6E-07

3.8E-05

4.6E-08

1.8E-06

1.1E-04

4.3E-03

F-Canyon (without dissolver)

Airborne release of plutonium solution resulting from coil and tube failure in F-Canyon water cooling tower

17.0

4.00E-02

16.5

0.755

4.42E+03

2.6E-04

6.6E-03

1.5E-05

3.8E-04

8.8E-02

2.2

Severe earthquake

64.7

2.00E-04

9.91

0.447

2.64E+03

7.9E-07

4.0E-03

4.5E-08

2.2E-04

2.6E-04

1.3

Fire in a plutonium process vessel

56.2

6.10E-05

10.6

1.75

1.29E+04

2.6E-07

4.3E-03

5.3E-08

8.8E-04

3.9E-04

6.5

Inadvertent nuclear criticality

2.40E+05

1.60E-03

(b)

7.43E-03

12.9

(b)

(b)

5.9E-09

3.7E-06

1.0E-05

6.5E-03

Inadvertent transfer of plutonium solution from a processing vessel to the ground outside building

24.9

7.40E-05

1.61

7.24E-02

4.30E+02

4.8E-08

6.4E-04

2.7E-09

3.6E-05

1.6E-05

0.22

Latent cancer fatalities (LCF)

Accident consequences

Uninvolved

Offsite

Quantity

Uninvolved

Offsite

worker

MEI

population

Accident

released (curies)

Frequency

(per year)

worker

(rem)

MEIa

(rem)

population

(person-rem)

(Point estimate of increased risk per year)

(Increased risk of LCF per occurrence)

ADDITIONAL CONVERSION

Actinide Packaging Facility (FB-Line drying)

Severe earthquake

1.74

2.00E-04

4.54

0.208

1.22E+03

3.6E-07

1.8E-03

2.0E-08

1.0E-04

1.2E-04

0.62

Inadvertent nuclear criticality

(b)

5.26E-05

(b)

2.64E-03

2.93

(b)

(b)

6.9E-11

1.3E-06

7.7E-08

1.5E-03

Propagated fire in gloveboxes

3.37E-03

5.26E-03

1.39E-03

2.29E-04

1.69

2.9E-09

5.5E-07

6.1E-10

1.2E-07

4.5E-06

8.4E-04

FB-Line (processing)

Severe earthquake

4.34

2.00E-04

11.3

0.521

3.06E+03

9.0E-07

4.5E-03

5.2E-08

2.6E-04

3.0E-04

1.5

Inadvertent nuclear criticality in processing solution or solid

(b)

1.40E-04

(b)

2.64E-03

2.93

(b)

(b)

1.8E-10

1.3E-06

2.1E-07

1.5E-03

Propagated fire in processing vessels or gloveboxes

0.105

5.26E-03

4.33E-02

7.13E-03

52.7

9.1E-08

1.7E-05

1.9E-08

1.3E-06

1.4E-04

2.6E-02

F-Canyon (second plutonium cycle contribution)

Airborne release of plutonium solution resulting from coil and tube failure in F-Canyon water cooling tower

0.218

4.00E-02

0.531

2.44E-02

1.44E+02

8.8E-06

2.2E-04

4.8E-07

1.2E-05

2.9E-03

7.2E-02

Severe earthquake

0.365

2.00E-04

3.43

0.158

9.22E+02

2.8E-07

1.4E-03

1.6E-08

7.9E-05

9.2E-05

0.46

Fire in a plutonium process vessel

1.59

6.10E-05

2.27

0.378

2.78E+03

5.5E-08

9.0E-04

1.2E-08

1.9E-04

8.5E-05

1.4

Inadvertent nuclear criticality

2.40E+05

1.60E-03

(b)

7.43E-03

12.9

(b)

(b)

5.9E-09

3.7E-06

1.0E-05

6.5E-03

Inadvertent transfer of plutonium solution from a processing vessel to the ground outside building.

9.65E-02

7.40E-05

0.872

4.02E-02

2.35E+02

2.6E-08

3.5E-04

1.5E-09

2.0E-05

8.7E-06

0.12

Latent cancer fatalities (LCF)

Accident consequences

Uninvolved

Offsite

Quantity

Uninvolved

Offsite

worker

MEI

population

Accident

released (curies)

Frequency

(per year)

worker

(rem)

MEIa

(rem)

population

(person-rem)

(Point estimate of increased risk per year)

(Increased risk of LCF per occurrence)

POST-STABILIZATION STORAGE

Storage Vault

Severe earthquake

1.05E-02

2.00E-04

0.60

7.0E-03

10

4.8E-08

2.4E-04

7.0E-10

3.5E-06

1.0E-06

5.0E-03

Fire

2.0E-05

5.0E-02

6.0E-04

2.0E-05

0.10

1.2E-08

2.4E-07

5.0E-10

1.0E-08

2.5E-06

5.0E-05