Battle of Kursk II - August 2024
Operational surprise is clearly still possible despite proliferation of drones. Kiev’s troops crossed into Russia from Sumy Region 06 August 2024. Ukrainian forces used at least three German Marder fighting vehicles in the Kursk Region, the first German armor advance onto Russian soil since the Great Patriotic War. Something of this magnitude has not occurred in the Soviet Union/Russian Federation since the German attack on June 22, 1941. When the news of Marders entering Kursk emerged, many internet users labeled it the greatest irony of the century.
The first Battle of Kursk, fought between July 5 and August 23, 1943, was one of the largest and most significant battles of World War II. It took place on the Eastern Front near the city of Kursk in the Soviet Union and involved a massive confrontation between German and Soviet forces. The Battle of Kursk followed the failed German offensive at Stalingrad and was intended to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front. The Battle of Prokhorovka, fought on July 12, 1943, during the Kursk campaign, is often cited as the largest tank battle in history. The Battle of Kursk marked the last major German offensive on the Eastern Front and a decisive victory for the Soviet Union.
A bit more than eight decades years after Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia fought the first Battle of Kursk, a second battle is underway in Kursk following a surprise offensive launched by Ukrainian forces. One common element in both battles is the use of German armored vehicles against Soviet armor.
Ukrainian Presidential advisor Mykhailo Mykhailovych Podolyak on 14 August 2024 named 4 political goals of Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk region:
- Ukraine is waging a defensive war, squeezing Russian artillery to the required distance;
- Cut the logistics routes;
- Show the inability of Russian leadership.
- Transferring the war to Russia.
The Ukrainian maneuver warfare incursion into Kursk Oblast appears to have culminated around 20 August. The notion of a culmination point is identified with Carl von Clausewitz, who described it as the moment when “the remaining strength is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace.” Culmination did not receive proper attention until operational art was revived during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In an article entitled “Why Strategy Is Difficult” that appeared in Summer 1999, Colin Gray discounted the utility of the concept of culminating points. On the Kursk salient, the culmination came as Russian forces were rapidly inserted, precluding further thunder runs by Ukrainian lightly equipped and agile Sabotage and Reconnaissance Groups.
The fighting began 06 August 2024 in the Sudzhansky and Korneevsky districts of Kursk Region. Russian forces prevented an attempted border incursion by a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group, the acting governor of Kursk Region, Aleksey Smirnov, said. Russian military bloggers claim that the city of Sudzha in the Kursk region had been captured by Ukrainian forces, and that Ukrainian troops are now as much as 25km deep into Russia. Radio silence in Kyiv. If true, Ukraine captured more land in the last 48hrs than in the entire summer 2023 counter-offensive. If Kyiv can hold it, it can perhaps trade it for occupied Ukrainian land — say in Kharkiv. Russian military Telegram channels are in full panic mode — vibes of the August 2022 collapse in Kharkiv and Kherson. Russia lost two combat helicopters and at least two tanks. Ukraine lost a number of Strykers and Humvees. Russian forces were caught by surprise, there is recrimination aplenty.
Ukrainian forces numbering 300 soldiers and 30 armored vehicles crossed into Russia’s Kursk Region on 06 August 2024, the Defense Ministry in Moscow has said. Half of the enemy armor has been destroyed so far, according to the ministry. The attack took place in the morning local time in the area of Nikolayevo-Daryino and Oleshnya, along the Russia-Ukraine border, the Russian Defense Ministry said in a statement. Ukrainian forces launched artillery and drone strikes before attacking with up to 300 troops of the 22nd Mechanized Brigade, supported by 11 tanks and 20 other armored vehicles. “Operational-tactical and attack aviation carried out strikes on concentrations of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and equipment in the areas of Basovka, Zhuravka, Khoten, Yunakovka, Belovody, Khrapovshchina in Sumy Region,” the Russian Defense Ministry said.
Ukrainian forces took a good number of Russians prisoner in Kursk. This seemed to be the largest single Russian surrender of the war so far. ChrisO_wiki suggestsed "Very likely teenage conscripts, who would have approximately the fighting ability of a lettuce."
The first stage of the incursion used maneuver groups in armored vehicles, driving deep forward and then waiting for the arrival of reserves to consolidate, which were already occupying the territory following those who had gone forward. Rob Lee noted 06 August 2024 "Some early thoughts about this operation. The most important factor in the war right now is Russia's manpower and force availability advantage, in particular with infantry. That is the primary reason why Ukraine is struggling to hold back Russian advances in Donetsk oblast. The Russian MoD and several Russian telegram channels say that Ukraine has conducted an advance into Kursk oblast today, including with elements from Ukraine's 22nd Mechanized Brigade and possibly Strykers from the 82nd Air Assault Brigade.
"The situation on the Pokrovsk and Toretsk fronts is serious. The war has not seen large swings of the front line since 2022, but Russia's advances on the Pokrovsk front over the past three weeks have been relatively rapid for the 2023-2024 period. So the question is how this operation will affect the fighting elsewhere and whether these forces could have been employed more effectively in Donetsk oblast.
"Compared to previous crossborder operations, this one is notable in that it appears to involve Ukrainian conventional forces and not just from GUR. Ukraine likely also is not able to employ HIMARS in support of the operation because the US only authorized strikes in Belgorod oblast relevant to Russia's Kharkiv offensive.
"Ultimately, the two previous large crossborder operations in May-June 2023 and March 2024 had little effect on the fighting on the priority axes. The 2023 operation caught Russia by surprise and may have been a relatively effective economy of force mission (though it did not force Russia to redeploy significant forces from priority areas) but the March 2024 operation was far less successful.
"Since then, Russia stood up a Northern Group of Forces leading the Kharkiv offensive, and has strengthened its forces on the border. So Russia already has greater forces/conventional capabilities in the area, better command and control, and it has conscript units that can be deployed, which are not used in Ukraine. It is unlikely this operation will force Russia to pull significant forces from Ukraine.
"Russia has improved its dynamic targeting with persistent ISR coverage from UAVs behind Ukrainian lines, which are used to locate targets for Lancets, Krasnopol, Iskander-M, and other PGMs. Russian UAV footage of Ukrainian units moving across the border suggests this problem has not been solved, which can make it dangerous to mass armor.
"A limited operation might be able to achieve limited goals, but a more ambitious operation carries greater risks. It is unlikely this operation will have a significant effect on the course of the war, and previous crossborder operations did not have serious domestic political ramifications for Putin. We only have limited information right now and the size and scope of the operation isn't clear, but largescale crossborder operations are more difficult now than they were in 2023 and Russia continues to advance in the Donbas.
"Offensive operations also risk taking higher casualties than in defense at a time when Ukrainian forces are stretched thin. Ukraine needs to maintain a favorable attrition ratio given the manpower situation, so taking heavy losses in this operation could make it more difficult for Ukraine to hold back future Russian assaults if it saps Ukraine's limited reserves."
The Russian command appeared to have refrained from ordering a major diversion of forces from the Pokrovsk area to the Kursk region. Russia apparetnly took battalions from each Regiment or Brigade and deployed them towards Kursk. Splitting higher units should decrease their combat capability. However, it appears that the Battalion Tactical Groups never went away. Russia simply started using Brigades and Regiments as administrative units rather than combat maneuver units. Russia took forces from all areas except the Pokrovsk Direction, further indicating that that is their main axis of attack, as there was a reduction in Russian attacks in South Ukraine which should mean that they have moved more forces from there.
One of the objectives of Ukraine's Kursk Oblast operation was to divert a significant number of Russian forces from other sectors, primarily from the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove sectors in Donetsk Oblast, Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said on 27 August 2024. Speaking at the "Ukraine 2024. Independence" forum in Kyiv, Syrskyi said that Moscow has redeployed about 30,000 of its troops from other sectors to the Kursk direction, "and this number is growing." At the same time, Russia deployed its most combat-ready units in the Pokrovsk sector.
"The enemy is trying to withdraw units from other directions, and on the contrary, it is increasing its efforts in Pokrovsk sectors," Syrskyi said. According to the general, Russia has reduced its activity in Ukraine's south, but continues to advance in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, trying to regain positions near the village of Robotyne. In partially occupied Kherson Oblast, Moscow's forces are trying to regain control of an island zone near the Dnipro River's delta, he said.
Ukrainian forces are intent on retaining the territory in Russia’s Kursk region they seized in their incursion for “some period of time” and any Russian counteroffensive will be a difficult fight, Deputy CIA Director David Cohen said on 28 August 2024. The announcement came after the Kremlin dismissed talk by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky about a plan to end the war and said Russia would continue what it calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine.
WarTranslated (Dmitri) reported 07 September 2024 that Russians state that initial assessments of the Kursk incursion underestimated the scale of the invasion, revealing issues with defense preparedness and leading to personnel changes. The Ukrainian forces continue to attempt breakthroughs and there's no chance of knocking them out any time soon. "1/2 For a month and one day, the Russian Army has been repelling the armed invasion of the regular Ukrainian Armed Forces into the Kursk region. Initial assessments of the scale of the invasion by respected agencies quickly turned out to be not entirely objective; personnel decisions are being made, but not at the level that many expected given the unpreparedness of the second echelons of defense and the ongoing arrests of high-ranking "old" employees of the Ministry of Defense. So far, the showdown is taking place in the administrative and economic sector. The enemy in the Kursk region is tied down in battle, but does not give up trying to push through our defense, pulling reserves into the region.
"In the Russian Army, the problem of coordinating disparate units and subdivisions, supplying the front directly with drones, communications, and modern technical surveillance equipment has not been fully overcome in this direction. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are suffering serious losses under the blows of our missiles, aviation, and artillery, which permanently reduces the likelihood of further movement to Kursk and Rylsk. At the same time, the river crossings in the Glushkovsky district are under attack, which complicates logistics against the background of the destruction of our bridges. The enemy is consolidating the occupied lines and the liberation of the territories occupied by him is not expected in the short term. Heavy fighting is underway.
"The question of terminating military-technical assistance to Kyiv by people the West is not on the table. Europe, under pressure from the United States, is preparing to transfer dozens of Leopard tanks, air defense systems and other equipment. The trophies of our troops in the Kursk region show that the invasion group of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was largely provided by NATO, which once again indicates the direct involvement of the Alliance in the war with Russia. The shelling of Kursk, Belgorod, and the DPR with Western weapons and the promotion of information about permission to strike our territories with air-launched missiles to an ever greater depth also demonstrate that the North Atlantic Alliance does not feel any discomfort about the escalation of the conflict, while continuing to conduct military exercises near our borders, preparing its countries for mobilization and rebuilding military factories.
"There are no grounds for an early end to the war. There are still many difficult days left before achieving the declared and periodically changing goals of the SMO, which range from complete denazification and demilitarization of all of Ukraine to the liberation of the territories of new regions from the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Meanwhile, the West is trying to wear down our military and economic potential on Ukraine, to destabilize the domestic political situation, which could be an even more serious threat to Russia. And the liberation of the Kursk region is not expected in the coming week. "
WarTranslated (Dmitri) reported 07 September 2024 that evaluating Kursk, Russians noted a severe personnel shortage that prevents them from "pushing out" the forces in Kursk zone and implementing further offensive plans in Donetsk Oblast. The risk of additional incursions remaine. "Tactically, unfortunately, it is turning into a push-pull, not because the hohols [Ukrainians] are so good, but because we simply do not have enough forces and resources. There is a lack of human resources. There is enough artillery, we are more or less overcoming the shell shortage with varying degrees of success, we are trying to do something about fpv. Good, bad, but it is clear that solutions are being found. The problem is that there is no systemic solution for personnel. Lack of people! And why are the operational plans of the command both in the Donetsk and Kursk directions not yet being implemented as we would like? Because... there is no one! And this is the main problem. What will the hohol plan for the next step? He has two options. This is an attempt to cut off Crimea from the mainland, landing troops in Crimea, although from a military point of view this is sheer madness, because the storm season is coming, and how will the infrastructure for the landing be provided? This is a one-way landing - "go and die". From the point of view of PR and the capture of a settlement like Yalta they can very well do this, simultaneously striking the bridge and shouting that they cut the bridge and captured the city.
"Another option a dangerous one is an attempt at an incursion in the Bryansk direction, because from the border to Bryansk there are practically forests. If you bypass Bryansk, then there are forests to Kaluga. The enemy is hatching plans to bring serious light infantry sabotage and reconnaissance groups into the forests to organize sabotage actions ambushes, cutting off infrastructure, attacks on columns, military units, government agencies. This is pure Basayevism, similar to the attack on Budyonnovsk in 1995. It is correctly called a sabotage or sabotage-terrorist raid. Such actions are not undertaken in groups of 5 people. Now the enemy is tempted to bring groups of 150-200 people. Considering how they can conduct tactical landings using helicopters at extremely low altitudes, this cannot be ruled out. If the infrastructure of the landing in Crimea causes skepticism, then all options must be taken into account here.""
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