PFI 1972 - Two-Aircraft Mixed Fleet
So, in 1972 it was decided in principle for the creation in the USSR two-aircraft mixed fleet of fighter aircraft, and the main role in this issue played a personal position Air Force Commander PS Kutahova. With the adoption of this decision, the customer had an urgent need to articulate the concept of construction of such a fleet. Discussion on this topic continued during the years 1972-1973 and they were far from painless. And although the solution to the problem was, in fact, already decided the joint position of the MAP and the Air Force leadership, complete unanimity, according to the then eyewitnesses, was not observed either in the industry or at the customer. Here's how A.V.Astashev remembers: "What do these planes? Under what concept to develop the Su-27 and lighter MiG-29? In what ratio should be in these aircraft weapons system? Rationale, design and coordination of the concepts of these aircraft continued for a long time.
"For a long time I discussed the economic concept, sponsored by NIIAS. According to this concept, the MiG-29 to be approximately 2 times cheaper than the Su-27. But the study of technical configuration options such aircraft in the bureau and TsAGI showed that the decrease in the cost of light fighter to a level leads to deterioration of performance characteristics and, consequently, a significant reduction in the efficiency of the aircraft in addressing destructive tasks. As a result, the combat effectiveness of dvuhsamoletny fleet of Su-27 and MiG-29 for the same cost in this case is significantly inferior homogeneously composed only of the Su-27.
"Thus, the Air Force did not accept the proposed NIIAS "economic" approach to the construction of a mixed fleet. At the customer's environment, while generally perceived only one option approach - to do what is necessary for the country's defense (and money for the defense budget items while not spared). Then it was decided that in determining the concepts of Su-27 and MiG-29 should not be the value of the cost of the aircraft, and their fighting qualities. Therefore, the Su-27 was proposed to call "superiority fighter in the air", and MiG-29 - "fighter escort." But the name of the Su-27, despite its "sound" is not allowed to reveal the fundamental differences between the Su-27 in the task of winning air supremacy of the MiG-29.
Ultimately, a simple formulation of fundamentally different concepts of warfare for both types of fighters was found, first proposed by Colonel MN Kushtapinym:
- MiG-29 is designed for combat operations in its information field;
- Su-27 is designed for combat operations off-line at any depth behind the line of contact (LBS), easier behind enemy lines;
This formulation was approved immediately by most employees NTC Air Force and head of the department ordered the Air Force. Being finally, clearly articulated, it is immediately identified the level of requirements to all the main performance characteristics of the aircraft. For example: its information field can be created at a depth of no more than 150 km of LBS, so tactical radius of the MiG-29 aircraft must be 250...300 km.
For the Su-27 tactical radius had to cover the entire area of action tactical aviation, all of the operational depth of the enemy defense. In accordance with the ideas of the time, this depth did not exceed the range of 300...400 km, and hence the tactical radius of the Su-27 was 400-600 km.
Both aircraft in aerial combat must destroy the same air targets, so the requirements for a range of altitudes and flight speeds, maneuverability and types of aircraft weapons for both aircraft and should be roughly equal. Autonomous action demanded increased survival, so the requirements for survivability of the Su-27, the complex defense of the aircraft, to a range of communications and fire unit to SD "air-air" on it higher than the MiG-29. The detection range for radar of the MiG-29, provided information support, was determined only launch range of SD "air-air" medium-range, and the Su-27, the range of radar actions to identify needs in the information field, which should be created at the autonomous action of this type of aircraft".
When operating in its information field all the necessary information about the air and ground tactical situation the aircraft or group of aircraft to foreign entry into the battle deliver external controls - ground and air command posts (WCP) and means of fighting: aircraft radar surveillance and monitoring (AEW ), jammers, scouts. It requires no installation on the aircraft avionics complex. In addition, the reduced requirements for on-board aircraft defense complex and its mathematical software.
When autonomous actions, the group of aircraft should be through the use of standard on-board equipment on their own to create a circular information field, which would provide the commander of the group full knowledge of air and ground tactical situation on the distances that provide security both on the ground and from the air of enemy weapons. With regard to the specific conditions of the early '70s, it meant that the radius of the field for the appropriate means fighter had to exceed the starting range as the missiles of enemy air defenses ( Hawk and Patriot SAM types), and SD-class "air-to-air" prospective enemy fighters (F-14, F-15).
The group was to ensure high survival at the expense of the respective combat survivability and maneuverability of each aircraft, as well as built-in weapons systems and airborne defense system capable of carrying out both individual and group protection mutually. For this defense system of each aircraft, in addition to the traditional station RTR was to include tools such as active jamming station teplopelengator device ejection passive jamming transmitters disposable interference and so on. The requirement to install a fighter of such a powerful defense complex was on that time "revolutionary" step.
Thus, the autonomy of the Su-27 in the conduct of hostilities assumed that a group of such aircraft must be able, to the extent necessary, to combine the functions of different tactical purpose: WCP, AEW aircraft, aircraft- scouts, jammers, and ensure, in this implementation of a wide range of tasks:.. strike group, the group cover from fighter attacks, reconnaissance group of air defense and destruction of air defense systems, etc. The implementation of these functions in full, in the case of the adoption of the proposed concept of the use of aircraft, would require the installation on board the Su 27 implementation of sophisticated equipment and a large volume of software.
Not everyone at that time clearly understood the need for the installation of such a complex system on a fighter, so approval of the relevant provisions of the concept has taken quite a long time.
Ultimately, with these proposals agreed upon by all stakeholders and agreed version of the concept adopted as a basis for the development of TTP to the Su-27 and MiG-29 to R & D stage, the development of which was conducted in 1973. The very fact of their "origin" of a single TTP for the TFIs on the preliminary design stage, the fate of the now tightly linked both these aircraft. Coordination and approval of TTZ on the ROC on the Su-27 and MiG-29 went almost simultaneously, and later throughout the period of the development of both of these programs were developed in parallel and in close contact with each other, mutually, "enriching" of each other. It is difficult to say to what extent it has benefited each of the aircraft separately, but the fact remains that in the period of development and testing, the Su-27 and MiG-29 became the Air Force for MAP and original "Siamese twins".
TTZ on both aircraft was created on the basis of already developed TTZ for PFI in terms of specificity and deeper detail all its provisions separately for each aircraft, in accordance with the provisions of the newly adopted concept of the structure of the park dvuhtipovoy fighter aircraft. For example, in terms of flight characteristics of both aircraft were set almost identical figures of maximum speed and acceleration characteristics, but in regard to the maximum operating overload, for the MiG-29 was set to 9 and Su-27 - 8. On the other hand in relation to the flight range of the situation It was reversed: the practical flight range at cruising speed, with full refueling and the main armament option for the MiG-29 was set equal to 2000 km, and the Su-27 - 4000 km.
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