PFI 1969 - Fighter + Interceptor
This activity concerned all types of aircraft, but being a native of the fighters, PS Kutahya, special attention is paid to the fighter aircraft. The project TTZ on the new fighter, developed in 30 CRI, was considered rich combat experience in Vietnam and the Middle East, which confirmed the importance of high maneuverability characteristics of the aircraft. As a result, a promising frontline fighter was set to Single, high maneuverability (maximum operating overload - 9, thrust-weight ratio -. At least 1.1 These requirements are formulated personally, commander in chief of the Air Force The aircraft was equipped with radar, highly manoeuvrable missiles and medium-range and melee. high-caliber gun of at least 30 mm.
The prospective new fighter was supposed to be the same for the air force and air defense forces, ie, it was assumed that it will be established as a general TTZ. In practice, with the realization of this thesis, there were serious difficulties. The fact is that according to the institutionalized order of the Minister of Defence order, one client for all types of aircraft in the Armed Forces of the USSR were the Air Force. Initially, while the armed forces air defense consisted of the same type of fighter that the Air Force, ie, MiG-15 and MiG-17 of various modifications, this did not cause any major difficulties.
But over time, it added to the usual fighter specialized type of aircraft - the so-called interceptors, and most of them were now delivered to air defense aviation forces. As a result, since the late 1950s, the management of air defense forces, referring to its specific character, failed to defend the Defense Minister and the leadership of his country's "special" status. This was expressed, inter alia, that, Command of the air defense forces have repeatedly been able to initiate and implement programs to create a highly specialized interceptor aircraft such as the Tu-128, Yak-28P, Su-15 and MiG-25P, destined only to solve tasks of air defense and comes exclusively in air defense forces. In addition, for each new aircraft created a completely new system of weapons, which included on-board radar and guided missiles "air-to-air." Examples of interspecific unification were the exception rather than the rule.
The development of a large number of different types of weapons systems was not always properly justified, with time, cost factor in the creation of each new aircraft played an increasingly important role, as the state could no longer be as before, widely scatter funds for the implementation of diverse weapons programs. A huge, even for the Soviet Army, a type of fighter planes created significant problems in terms of the customer - the Ministry of Defence, as unjustifiably growing cost of maintenance and repair of aircraft, significantly decreased the mobility of air units and formations, especially when operating with multiple dispersed and relocation, which has been repeatedly confirmed by experience in command and staff exercises. It was necessary to reduce the type of fighter. It was clear to all. The General Staff and the General Staff of the STC in particular, endeavored to the widest possible unification and the creation of inter-specific weapons programs.
As a result, at the initiative of Defence Ministry on 08 April 1968 the CPSU Central Committee adopted the Resolution "On measures for further development of standardization and unification of the military hardware", and a year later, in March 1969 the All-Union cross-sectoral meeting which has taken on the subjects deployed solution.
In accordance with this decision, it was supposed to start in the USSR programs Intra-unification of weapons systems. The proposed option of creating a single aircraft for the Air Force and Air Defense prospective fighter was the best fit into this scheme. Prepared in 30 Central Research Institute of the Air Force the TTZ for the project in early 1970, it was sent for approval to the Main Command of Air Defense.
The leadership of air defense at this stage of the work took a "wait and see" position. Colonel-General Andrei Egorovich Borovyk was appointed Commander of the Aviation of the Air Defense Forces of the USSR in 1969. Besides him, the issues related to the development of new aircraft for air defense of the country was in charge of Deputy Commander for Armaments Lieutenant General N.D.Grebennikov, but compared with the Air Force, air defense, the service was not complete ordering management: aviation theme here dealt with only a small group of officers led by Colonel V,N, Malanicheva.
Options Science Center, an identical 30 CRI Defense in defense to make 2 Central Research Institute of Ministry of Defense, was headed by Lieutenant-General of Artillery BA Korolev (1980 - Lieutenant-General S. Sapegin), and with the application of aviation in the structure of the defense forces in the institute engaged in the management, the chief of which was Colonel (later - Major General Aviation) B.M. Dolzhenko.
The commander of the air defense forces, Colonel-General AE Borovo, to which the document came to agree, in principle no objection to defense in a new promising fighter, but insisted that in addition to his continued work and the long-range interceptors. Research on this subject were held in conjunction with the defense OKB Mikoyan in the development of the MiG-25P on the basis of the government decree of 24 May 1968, and later found its embodiment in a specialized fighter-interceptor MiG-31.
Upon inquiry initiated by the General Staff, a project was prepared in the Command of the defense, which was reported in a letter to the Chief of Staff Marshal M.V.Zakharova, 17 March 1970. Commander of Air Defense Marshal PF Batitsky wrote: "... Given the proximity of the main tactical and technical data interceptor fighter aircraft to the Air Force proposed a new tactical fighter, I consider it necessary to conduct simultaneous projects for two variabts of prospective fighter: Air Force tactical fighter and fighter-interceptor defense. The proposed defense interceptor to replace the Su-15 and allow the destruction of air targets at altitudes from 10 meters to 25 kilometers, including the maintenance of effective air combat maneuvering with the F-15 and F-14 aircraft ... "
The annex to the letter outlining the basis for Tactical and Technical Requirements for PFI in terms of air defense tasks, basic paragraphs reiterates the requirement already formulated by the Air Force. Differences concerned exactly the specifics of air defense forces. For example, the normalized parameters in terms of the duration of the Air Force was on duty in the air at a predetermined distance from the airport, and for the defense - the minimum time to a predetermined altitude or specified line of attack; for the Air Force was enough to ensure maximum speed fighter of 2700 km / h, and for the defense required to 3200 km / h; etc.
Later TTZ developed in 30 Central Research Institute with the participation of specialists in aviation from 2 CRI Defense. The preparation of the final document involved a large team of staff. Responsible institute 30 for the preparation of the project as a whole and TTZ operativne requirements for the aircraft was appointed Colonel V.N.Lutsenko responsible for the divisions TTZ: Colonel A.P.Bako (flight performance of the aircraft and systems), Colonel V.A.Pashkov (power plant), Colonel K.Kul'kov (radar), Colonel V.I.Demuh (airborne weapons). These were highly qualified staff.
Based on the existing scientific and technical experience in the industry and the results of the executed and carried out research dedicated to the justification of "Guidelines for the development of weapons and military aircraft programs," they analyzed and summarized all the designs offers co-ordinated with the Ministry of Defense, the Air Force and Air Defence.
NEWSLETTER
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|