Novorossia - Command and Control
The greatest problems of the 1st and 2nd AK are in management at the tactical and operational levels. The corps uses the Soviet decision-making system, typical of most of the RF Armed Forces and significantly hampered due to the dual control closed to the RF:
- There is practically no scope for the initiative of commanders of all levels.
- Due to the extended command chain, decision-making time is significantly increased at almost all levels.
- At each stage of this chain, the actual state of affairs is distorted due to erroneous perceptions of the situation (and these perceptions, in turn, are based on false reports of high combat capability).
- As a result, each decision goes through a circle of instances that are actually superfluous for its successful formation, and as a result, it is hopelessly distorted.
If in Soviet times such a process served as a kind of foolproofing and was not of critical importance, given that the potential adversary had similar command processes, now, 40 years later, both in NATO and, to a very large extent, in Ukraine, the very procedure for adopting military decisions, decision-making protocols and data transfer protocols have changed: the time required for the passage of information is much less. An example is the ISTAR artillery fire control system, which was repeatedly used in the JFO and proved to be an absolute superiority over the Soviet principles of artillery control.
It cannot be said that the 1st and 2nd ACs do not understand this problem at all. So, in the 2nd AC, the leadership is trying to build a counter-battery warfare system (KBB) taking into account the requirements of maximum flexibility and speed of information transfer, but such examples are rare.
Completely absent (moreover, impossible due to technical incompatibility) direct communication at the level of "company - brigade", "fire platoon - division", "battalion - corps", etc. Mandatory passage of information in accordance with the hierarchy is not critical values during defense in the low-intensity phase of hostilities, but with their intensification, the situation changes. Thus, it has been repeatedly recorded that even a slight increase in intensity leads to a critical overload of communication channels and slows down decision-making.
For example, the execution of a task by a fire platoon, as a rule, is completely disrupted in the case of the use of KKB means by the JFO forces due to the lack of direct interaction of the platoon with the command platoon of the chief of artillery (VUNA) and the inability to receive information about the real situation on the battlefield.
Practice shows that the reaction time of brigade reserves to aggravation for the most combat-ready units, such as a reconnaissance company, is at least 4 hours, while the reaction time of a combined arms reserve is at least 8 hours, and a corps reserve is at least a day. The exception is artillery reserves if they are on combat duty. The decision-making process is critically affected by the extremely low provision of the 1st and 2nd ACs with the means of RER, aerial reconnaissance, and real-time information transmission.
REM, air defense, remotely controlled aircraft (DULA) units above the battalion level, involved in the line of contact, as a rule, are directly subordinate to the Russian Federation, are staffed from the Russian Federation, so the exchange of information with them in most cases is ineffective even at the brigade level. An exception is the electronic warfare system, which the enemy has so far been able to use in real time on a number of sections of the contact line.
In general, all this leads to extremely stereotyped actions of the enemy, to their construction almost exclusively according to the reactive principle, and, accordingly, if necessary, makes it easy to impose on the 1st and 2nd AK the course of action necessary for the JFO forces.
The problem of the moral and psychological state of the personnel is critical for both corps. In all units, with the exception of individual battalions and companies of special forces or reconnaissance, the level of motivation of fighters is extremely low. The extremely low level of material support ($300-400 per month, including allowances for combat conditions) caused a natural outflow of military personnel - volunteers from the Russian Federation and their replacement by the local population, for whom such financial support is quite acceptable. Exercises, inspections, advanced training courses in the Russian Federation for command personnel with the subsequent assignment of senior officer ranks compensate for the low educational and managerial level of personnel only to a small extent.
