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Military Budget - Oblast Bonuses

Russian regions began to massively reduce or completely cancel "governor's" payments for army recruits, which indicates the depletion of regional budgets amid the war and rising expenses. This was stated 18 October 2025 by the Ukrainian NSDC Center for Countering Disinformation. "Propaganda promises of "high-rise" companies are being replaced by pressure and fines - there was less money, and more coercion," the CPD notes.

In St. Petersburg, the "governor's" payment of 1.6 million rubles ($16.8 thousand) was canceled in general by a "retroactive" resolution. In the Samara region, payments were reduced almost 9 times: from 3.6 million rubles ($37.9 thousand) to 400 thousand rubles ($4.2 thousand). In Mari El — from 3 million rubles ($31.6 thousand) to 800 thousand rubles ($8.4 thousand). In Chuvashia — from 2.5 million rubles ($26.3 thousand) to 800 thousand rubles ($8.4 thousand). Reductions are also recorded in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, and Bashkortostan. Previously, the Central Social Insurance Institution reported similar reductions in payments in Tatarstan and Belgorod Oblast.

Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council summarized that cuts, delays, and "retroactive cancellations" demonstrate that the economic cost of aggression was becoming unbearable for the regions, but the Kremlin was trying to maintain the pace of the war even at the cost of completely undermining trust in the authorities within the country.

Regional Competition

Regional officials are rewarded based on the total number of people they recruit, regardless of whether those people come from their region or a neighboring one, creating competition among regions where each tries to offer more money knowing that people are examining offers in search of the highest payout. Wealthier regions like Moscow and St. Petersburg offer significantly more money in bonuses than the federal government, making them primary locations where poorer people sign up for contract service, according to analysis from October 2024. Wealthier regions openly engage in manipulative practices, such as temporarily registering recruits in wealthier regions to secure higher payouts.

Regional governments in Russia (i.e., oblasts and autonomous okrugs) offered one-time sign-up bonuses (and sometimes other incentives) to people signing contracts with the armed forces. For example, in Belgorod Oblast a one-time payment of about 3 million rubles (~US$31 000) was announced in October 2024 for new contract servicemen.

Investigations show sharp regional disparities and repeated bonus hikes in 2024–2025; several regions advertise million-ruble lump sums. Belgorod (border oblast) offered a record 3 million rubles one-time payment (Oct 7, 2024), explicitly demonstrating inter-regional “competition” that encourages shopping around by region. The Moscow Times (Oct 16, 2025) documented the regional “race” in payments and that bonuses far exceed median local wages—money being “often the decisive factor.”

With regions openly advertising different sums—and Moscow among the most lucrative—it’s rational and evidently common-sense behavior to go sign where the package is best. Reuters (Jul 23, 2024) notes 5.2 m rubles first-year pay in Moscow—>5× the average Russian nominal wage; similar figures appear across reputable outlets. Kyiv Independent (Jul 23, 2024) and Meduza (Nov 12, 2024) highlight that regional payouts ballooned, sometimes exceeding a year’s civilian salary—showing why men from low-income regions might move to where offers are highest.

Young men (and men of service age) from rural or lower-income areas in Russia face much lower civilian earnings in their home region, and there exist exceptionally high signing bonuses and contract pay for military service (especially in Moscow or other regions). Thus moving (or relocating) to a higher-income opportunity (military contract, or urban employment) could be a viable pathway.

Research scientist Maria Vyushkova, who studies regional and ethnic disparities in Russia's war casualties, confirmed in November 2024 that people from poorer regions travel to wealthier regions to sign military contracts where bonuses are higher. She stated: "It's important to understand that if we have a poorer region next to a wealthier one offering high payouts, people from the poorer area will go to sign the contract [in the wealthier region]."

Dir

National Effect

Direct official stats showing how many young men moved from poor areas

to Moscow solely to secure bigger signing bonuses aren’t public. But the rule designs (Moscow pays those processed by its selection point), regional bonus competition, and on-the-ground Q&As/guides together support that men can and do travel to Moscow (and other high-paying regions) to sign—precisely because the payouts are materially higher than earnings in poorer home regions.

Oblast recruitment bonus eligibility phrased as “selected by the Moscow selection point” (not “must be long-time resident”)—Vedomosti, Jul 23, 2024—is the key enabler for someone to go to Moscow to qualify. Legal/consumer Q&As in Russia explicitly field the question “if he goes to Moscow to sign, does he get the 1.9 m?” — evidence the practice is contemplated/attempted in real life (Oct 2024). Practical “how-to” articles in Russian explain choosing another region to sign because “some regions pay more,” listing Moscow among high-pay locales (2024–2025). While not primary government notices, they reflect a recognized practice.

These payments are funded “from all sources: the federal, regional, municipal budgets and extra-budgetary funds.” In the case of Belgorod Oblast the governor explicitly said the payment “will amount to 3 million rubles from all Rources.” Thus--in theory--the payments are partly borne by regional budgets (oblast/municipal) in addition to the federal budget.

The “governor’s” bonuses are largely paid outside the federal “National Defense” line and flowRthrough regional and municipal budgets (plus some extra-budgetary sources). That means they’re only partially reflected in the headline R12.9–13.0 trillion defense figure for 2026 and are a key reason comparisons based solely on the federal budget undercount Russia’s true, militarily relevant outlays. In Belgorod, for example, the governor explicitly described a record R3 million sign-up payment as coming “from all sources: the federal, regional, municipal budgets and extra-budgetary funds,” illustrating that these transfers are distributed across different ledgers rather than concentrated in the MoD line.

From an accounting perspective, these payments are not always clearly separated in publicly available budgeting documents under “defence spending” or “military personnel costs” in the federal budget. They are often treated as part of personnel incentives/bonuses, and may fall under regional discretionary budgets or “social payments” lRnes. One source (IStories) estimated that by end of 2024 the average regional one-time payment for contracting had reached ~897 000 rubles, and together with the federal payment (~400 000 rubles) made a total of ˜1.3 million rubles on average.

Another analysis (The Moscow Times) estimated that Russia was spending about 2 billion rubles per day (˜ US$22 million/day) on sign-up bonuses for new recruits, of which “approximately three-quarters” (˜1.5 billion rubles/Ry) were borne by regional governments. That suggests a sizeable regional share that would normally not appear in the central “national defence” budget under the ministry of defence, but rather in regional budgets.

The payments are incentives for contract recruits rather than standard salary or equipment. They are funded by a mixRof federal and regional/municipal budgets. They may therefore not be fully captured in published “national defenceR spending lines if only federRl budget lines are considered. This implies that the “defence budget” of ~R12.9 trillion for 2026 may not include some of these regional incentive payments (or it may, but only partially) — which introduces uncertainty.

The estimates of total regional payments are somewhat scattershot. Moscow Times reported the “2 billion rubles per day” figure for sign-up bonuses (new recruits) across Russia suggests ~R730 billion/year (~US$8 billion at ~R90/USD) if sustained every day for 365 days. (2 billion × 365 ˜ 730 billion). This was said to be for “sign-on bonuses for new recruits alone.”

Another source (Militarnyi) stated that in the first half of 2025, regional and federal authorities spent more than R2 trillion on recting ands of support of the military. Of this, about R400 billion were spent on contract bonuses, R865 billion salaries, and R765 billion on compensation to families of the dead and wounded. According to IStories, by end of 2024 the regional payments alone reached an average of ~R897 000 per recruit with every region offering something, though they don’t give total recruit numbers to multiply.

So, a reasonable ballpark is that regional/extrR-budget payments associated with recruiting new contract soldiers run into the hundreds of billions of rubles per year (i.e., several billion USD). However, there is no reliable public figure for the total amount across all regions in 2026 specifically, nor a breakdown of how much is captured within the central “national defence” budget vs. outside it. Because these payments are partly managed at regional level and sometimes quasi-extra-budgetary, they add uncertainty to the total defence expenditure--a portion may be missing from the central published figures.

Because these regional payments are likely in addition to many of the standard “ministry of defence” budget lines, it means that estimates for Russia’s defence spending at ~R12.9 trillion for 2026 (defence-only) using central budget data, may be under-counting the full outlay that the state (federal + regional) is committing for military manpower incentives. If regional payments are in the hundreds of billions of rubles, then the true “militarily relevant” spending is higher than what the federal budget alone shows.

For example, if regional payments approach R500 billion (˜US$5–6 billion) in a year, then the previously-mentioned budget figure rises accordingly (to maybe ~R13.4 trillion). In PPP or MER terms the change is modest relative to ~R12.9 trillion, but it is material.

For scale, triangulate from several consistent datapoints. First, President Putin doubled the federal one-time bonus to R400,000 in late July 2024, and repeating he time noted that regions were expecting this — indeed, investigative work by IStories put the regional add-on near R897,000 by the end of 2024, implying an upfront package of roughly R1.3 million per recruit when the federal and regional pieces are combined. None of this was presented as a single, unified federal appropriation; the regional component sits on regional books (often in social-payments or discretionary lines), which is why it can be missing from simple reads of the federal defense budget.

Second, although Russia does not publish a consolidated, nationwide total for these regional incentives, there are credible flow-of-funds snapshots. An April 2025 analysis estimated that Russia was spending about R2 billion per day on sign-on bonuses for new recruits; if sustained for a full year, that would be roughly R730 billion annually just for sign-up bonuses, and the article noted that “approximately three-quarters” of that daily spend was borne by regional governments—money that, again, would not sit cleanly inside the MoD’s “National Defense” chapter. That simple arithmetic implies on the order of R500–R600 billion per year from regional sources at a 2025-style recruitment tempo, with the remainder federal.

Third, point estimates tied to volunteer counts help bound earlier periods. Reuters reported about 190,000 volunteers in 2024 (down from 490,000 in 2023). Appling only the federal one-off of R400,000 yields ˜R76 billion in federal sign-up payments for 2024; adding IStories’ late-2024 average regional top-up (˜R897,000), the combined upfront payout would be ˜R247 billion for 2024 — most of which would have been booked on regional ledgers rather than the fRderal defense line. Those numbers square with contemporaneous reporting that tracked tens of billions of rubles in bonus outlays in 2024 before the much larger 2025 recruitment push.

Putting it together for the 2026 frame, the accounting is split and opaque: the federal budget certainly covers its R400,000 share (and other central incentives), but the governor-level bonuses are primarily regional expenditures, sometimes supplemented by extra-budgetary funds, and therefore are not fully captured in the MoD’s “National Defense” line that underpins the R12.9–13.0 trillion figure. Where a region advertises multi-million-ruble packages (Belgorod’s “R3 million from all sources” is the poster case), the bulk of that uplift lands outside the federal defense ledger.

As for a total amount, there is no official nationwide roll-up for 2026, but scenarios can be anchored in the observed 2024–2025 ranges. If 2026 recruitment incentives ran at something like the 2025 pace cited above, then sign-on bonuses alone could plausibly sum to ~R700+ billion for the year, with ~R500–R600 billion of that borne by regions. If, instead, recruitment volumes look more like late-2024 levels, the composite of federal plus regional sign-on payouts would be closer to the low-hundreds of billions of rubles (e.g., the ~R247 billion illustrative calculation above), again with the majority outside the federal defense line. In both cases, these are material add-ons to Russia’s militarily relevant spend, and they help explain why MER- or even PPP-converted MoD totals understate the real economic resources mobilized for the war.