Great Patriotic War Navy - Personnel - Training
The chief difference between the U.S.Naval Academy and the Soviet Naval School at Baku was that while the U.S.Naval Academy turned out officers well-grounded in all the aspects of naval science and ready to receive, during the next two years, the practical experience necessary to make them useful officers, the Soviet Naval School at Baku produced deck officers who will immediately be able to carry their own weight in one of the small ships, of which the USSR Navy was largely composed.
In order to^o this, they avoid much of the mass of general information and understanding of the many skills involved in maintaining a warship, which midshipmen of the U.S.Naval Academy received. Great emphasis was placed on practical experience. Rear Admiral Ramishvili, Director of Naval Education, substantiated this fact when he stated in an article in "Red Fleet", organ of the Soviet Navy, that "The aim of the Naval schools was to organize practical study in order that the Fleet can receive well-trained officers, ready for action, who not only know and understand the theory, but can also use their knowledge in practise".
Although there were a large number of naval schools in the USSR, it was believed that the one at Baku was the only one which produced naval officers in the sense that the US Naval Academy did. This institution was called Naval School, in that Academy, in the USSR denoted an institution of higher learning, such as the U.S.Naval War College or the Army Staff College.
Post-graduate schools, to which officers were sent two years after graduation from the Naval School, gave special courses in engineering, ordnance, torpedoes, aerology, radio, etc. There was also a Staff Academy for the training of higher officers in strategy and tactics• In addition, Naval High Schools existed at least in Baku and Moscow, and perhaps in other cities, which were definitely official in character. Students who intended to go into the Navy, ordinarily chose high schools which included preliminary naval subjects in their curriculum.
In the Red Navy, as in the British, greater dependence was placed in "enlisted" men in the supervision and maintenance of special equipment. Red Navy petty officers were sent to shore schools for considerable periods to master below-decks specialties - in the case of radio, as long as two years. The officers, in general, apparently functioned more exclusively in the capacity of administrators than in the U.S. Navy and most of their efforts were to keeping the ship off the rocks, while the petty officers kept the engines and radio functioning.
The Polyarnoe Anti-Submarine School's instructional apparatus in 1942 was contained in four rooms on the ground floor of a large building. Room 1 was a large classroom in which a destroyer was installed. The installation had been well carried out in accordance with the drawings, the bridge hut, instrument cupboards and directing gear being clearly separated, so that classes under instruction could get a good idea of the general layout of the set. The dome was filled with water, and the set could be operated.
Room 2 contained the mass procedure teacher. This installation was not, at that time, complete and the signal injector had not arrived; the apparatus was, however, in operation. Room 3 contained the anti-submarine attack teacher. This room was divided by a partition, and this apparatus was also in working order. Room 4 contained a trawler. This set was well mounted, together with a clear idea of the general layout, but work had not been completed by May, 1942.
Three classes of ratings and one of anti-submarine control officers were under training. The three ratings classes were seen under instruction and averaged about 12 men in each class. For the most part, the ratings seemed to be very young. It appeared that the best ratings of the first classes were, themselves, in charge of subsequent classes.
In general, the installations were very well carried out, and instruction appeared to be well organized. Arrangements would shortly be made for Soviet ratings to gain sea experience in vessels of the First Minesweeping Flotilla, and a Soviet submarine would be made available for training purposes.
The school was well organized, and appeared to be making good progress, although training was possibly handicapped by the lack of higher ratings for instructional purposes.
Little information was available in the West on fleet training, but it did not appear to be extensive. During the latter part of 1941, there appeared to be little training going on in the Black Sea. All submarines were employed operationally, and did not exercise with surface craft, chiefly because anti-submarine measures were non-existent, nor did they practice attacks. A submarine commander stated at that time that it was not necessary to do any training then, since all submarines had completed their annual program before the war started. He did admit, however, that the question of attacks for commanding officers would require consideration. Newly built submarines, and those completing refits, got their training by going to easy and peaceful patrol positions.
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