Great Patriotic War Navy - Personnel - Psychology and Beliefs
The Russians, especially those in positions of authority, were above all, Soviet Russians. They were products of the Revolution. The extreme youth of Soviet naval officers meant that they had all grown to manhood since the Revolution. None of them had any more than the faintest recollection of conditions under the Tsarist regime. Therefore, they attribute all the advancement and the technical development of their country to Soviet rule.
It should be borne in mind that, while they had never experienced the food, the luxuries, and the broad education of western countries, they hardly knew this because they had no past experience on which to compare their present standard of living. Among sailors, there was the stolidity of character that was attributable to peasant birth. Among the officers who had seen western navies with all their technical developments and the civilization behind those developments, it was evident a kind of an inferiority complex had arisen from the feeling that perhaps their things were not as good as those of the outside world.
This resulted in a fundamental feeling of suspicion, which the Russians had toward foreigners. It was perhaps explicable by the fact that the Soviet Russians had something to cover up for this kind of inferiority feeling. Consequently, foreigners were very much distrusted by the Soviet Russians, because Soviet Russians had been taught that outside nations were all imperialist powers which had no real sympathy for the Soviet Union. This teaching added fuel to the fire of suspicion which the Russians had towards foreigners.
It should be kept in mind that the rapid development of the Soviet Union to its Stalinist economic and political form was accompanied by drastic methods. Soviet citizens were supposed not at any time nor in any circumstance to forget the rigid rules for which punishment was severe and far reaching. A rule was in effect prohibiting the acceptance of foreign decorations by Soviet citizens in general, but it had been released on occasions as the rewarding of U.S. Navy Crosses and Distinguished Service Medals to outstanding officers and men of the Soviet Navy.
It was obvious that the Soviet Russians would be reserved in what they said or did. It was a mistake to persuade them to weaken from their position, much as Americans were not in agreement with it, or to draw them into conversation on subjects which they were endeavoring to avoid. Political and religious matters should be avoided in discussion. In fact, the Soviet Russian was more likely to listen than to speak; he had a thirst for knowledge of his profession.
In the early days of the Soviet Union it was deemed essential by the Bolsheviks to secure the political safety of the state. Men were chosen for positions of responsibility on the basis of their adherence to the official political program rather than for their particular training or capabilities. The curriculum of all educational establishments was drastically curtailed by the Bolsheviks and only subjects pertaining to the professions were included in such abbreviated courses as there existed. The lack of training, as distinguished from education, in the case of many was feverishly made good in order that these people could be used in building up the industry of the Soviet Union and preserve its existence from what the Soviets regarded as the hostile reactionary world.
As a result of this pattern, the Soviet citizen was lacking in general knowledge and conscious understanding of the finer subjects, and gives the impression that he was coarse and not intellectual. This impression was one which all American and British pfficers experience in their contacts with Soviet officers. The fact that the average Soviet < naval officer does not present himself as possessing outward refinement, or what we associate with being educated in the ways of the world, does not mean that the Soviet officer lacks interest in the finer things of life. Nevertheless, the material side of life inthe USSR took precedence and was reflected in the appearance and conduct of the Soviet Russian of today. Russian naval personnel were specialists in tlie "technical type", that is, their training resembles more a technical rather than an educational course. This was particularly evident in the curriculum of the Soviet Naval Academy, which emphasizes very practical subjects and offers no "cultural" courses, as distinguished from the curriculum of the U. S. Naval Academy which had both practical and cultural subjects in its curriculum.
There had been a few cases where U. S. naval officers had actually been on Soviet men of war for periods of several weeks as liaison officers. These U. S. naval officers had reported their observations of the problems of joint operations. The Soviet Russian seems to had a one-track mind which was slow to act and its coordination was delayed. This was explainable by the fact that he had learned only one mechanical or technical routine.
First hand experience with Soviet Russian naval officers by U. S. naval officers had shown that the Soviet Russians in general were heavy-handed and ^nept to tools. They had two speeds, "full speed and stop". Their generalized mechanical sense was much inferior to that of U. S. personnel. They were not deliberately careless about cleaning, oiling, painting, and protecting from corrosion, for example,the many precision instruments on board a modern warship. They simply do not know any better.
In general, their operations seem to be "hit or miss" affairs. They like very much to make elaborate prearranged plans which they never follow. This was due perhaps to the fact that the Bolshevik indoctrination was filled with making plans for the future. Their literature, in almost every field of knowledge, emphasizes plans.
It should be pointed out, however, that in spite of the many weaknesses and inefficiencies of the Soviet Navy in its operations, it should be kept in mind that the £igM3£gspirit of the officers had been found to be strong. Althouglrthere Ts'good discipline and morale prevailing among both officers and men, extreme measures were sometimes taken to Insure the execution of orders at critical times. It was possible that this happens more in the Army than in the Navy. It had been rumored that, in order to guarantee the holding of the front when demanded by the tactical situation, N.K.V.D. troops had been stationed at the rear. While the Commissar system had been abolished in the Navy as well as the Army, naval personnel were constantly aware of the "secret police" which was every alert to report on their actions.
Even in spite of this, the propaganda system had been very successful in indoctrinating ideas of patriotism and invincibility in the minds of military and naval personnel. It was becoming more apparent that the fighting personnel was so imbued with these beliefs, that they go into the most daring operations with almost a spirit of recklessness.
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