1982-1984 - Andropov Foreign Relations
Since 1975 Andropov had been the contender who has been by far the more urgent in the pursuit of detente. In 1975, which was still a good year in Soviet-American relations, Suslov was expressing worry about ultrareactionary forces in the West. The Ukrainian leader Shcherbitsky was emphasizing that the nature of imperialism had not changed. But at this time Andropov was insisting: "A relaxation of International tension does not occur by Itself. It is necessary to actively struggle for it. There cannot be any pause or breathing space, since detente is a continuous process which demands constant movement forward".
The burden of investment for defense had been a major factor in lowering annual growth rates in the consumer durable and farm-machinery sectors of the economy. Disquiet over this situation was suggested by Andropov in his April 22, 1976, speech for the Lenin birth anniversary: "Delay in the process of relaxation of tension and, even more so, slipping back if only temporarily may cost a great deal, leading not only to aimless waste of material resources, for no purpose, but also dangerous aggravation of the international situation."
In 1979 he asserted: "It is impossible to estimate the danger of retarding the course of detente." In 1980 he was the only Politburo member to suggest that detente was in serious danger.
Moscow's basic approach to key US-Soviet issues had not changed substantially since the accession of Yuriy Andropov as General Secretary in November 1982. The Soviet conception of the USSR's relationship with the United States as fundamentally antagonistic provides the framework within which any Soviet leader operates. But the coming to power of a new Soviet leader can make a difference in the mix of Soviet tactics and the effectiveness with which they are carried out.
In foreign affairs, Andropov continued Brezhnev's policy of projecting Soviet power around the world. United States-Soviet relations, already poor since the late 1970s, began deteriorating more rapidly in March 1983, when President Ronald W. Reagan described the Soviet Union as an "evil empire . . . the focus of evil in the modern world," and Soviet spokesmen responded by attacking Reagan's "bellicose, lunatic anti-communism."
In the field of foreign policy, Andropov strove for reasonable compromises with foreign policy opponents of the USSR, but in the face of open mistrust of the USSR and the US, such a compromise did not take place. At that time, a crisis broke out in connection with the deployment in Europe of medium-range missiles of the USSR and the United States.
The US leadership hoped that the USSR could not for a long time, on an equal footing with the US, ensure parity in the arms race and deliberately posed a dilemma: either a compromise on our terms or a continuation of the arms race. Andropov and his new team could not find an adequate maneuver, and as a result, the arms race gained new momentum.
The case was greatly complicated by the fact that Soviet medium-range missiles did not reach the United States, and similar NATO missiles reached the USSR in 7 minutes. The foreign policy situation was aggravated by the ongoing confrontation with China, on the borders with which it was necessary to keep troops and build fortifications. The tragic burden was the war in Afghanistan.
But the apogee of tension was the tragedy of September 1, 1983, when in Soviet airspace the Soviet Union's air defense aircraft SU-15 shot down a wide-body Boeing-747 aircraft of a Korean airline with 269 passengers. According to Soviet sources, this flight was carried out with provocative aims under the control of the CIA, which, of course, subsequently denied all this. The propaganda of the United States and the whole Western world began a massive, coordinated campaign to expose the "brutal and ruthless" leadership of the USSR, which is an "evil empire."
This campaign allowed the US to remove the sharpness of Western public protests against the deployment of US missiles in Europe. The Soviet authorities made a major miscalculation, hiding the fact that the plane was destroyed by its fighter. Andropov was extremely unhappy with the incident, but ultimately supported his army and supported it in his statements.
Whether Andropov could have found a way out of the depths to which United States-Soviet relations had fallen, or whether he could have managed to lead the country out of its stagnation, will never be known. The Andropov regime was to last only fifteen months.
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