Yuri Andropov - In Power
Once in power, Andropov wasted no time in promoting his supporters. In June 1983, he assumed the post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, thus becoming the ceremonial head of state. Brezhnev had needed thirteen years to acquire this post. During his short rule, Andropov replaced more than one-fifth of the Soviet ministers and regional party first secretaries and more than one-third of the department heads within the Central Committee apparatus. But Andropov's ability to reshape the top leadership was constrained by his poor health and the influence of his rival Chernenko, who had previously supervised personnel matters in the Central Committee.
Many factors promoted Andropov's triumph over his moderate challenger, Konstantin Chernenko. The wave of deaths (Brezhnev, Suslov, Podgorny, and Kosygin) and incapacitating illnesses (Kirilenko and Pelshe) of the older generation in the last two years removed many of Brezhnev's associates. In terms of experience, intelligence, and pragmatism, Andropov possessed the best qualifications for the post.
Andropov's domestic policy leaned heavily toward restoring discipline and order to Soviet society. He eschewed radical political and economic reforms, promoting instead a small degree of candor in politics and mild economic experiments similar to those that had been associated with Kosygin in the mid-1960s. The struggle to improve the economic position of the state, in which the elements of stagnation were clearly traced, began with a large-scale campaign to establish elementary order and production discipline. For Andropov, it was the "zero cycle" of reforms. Without this, it was simply impossible to embark on the realization of the potential that was laid in the socio-political system. The demographic problem was aggravated in the country, and it was necessary to involve all the labor resources, direct them to the main lines, in order to fulfill the five-year plan and the food program, which was already failing.
Andropov also tried to boost labor discipline. Throughout the country, police stopped and questioned people in parks, public baths, and shops during working hours in an effort to reduce the rate of job absenteeism. In practice, the struggle for discipline turned out to be odd, when zealous local bosses organized raids on their employees, who, for example, "ran to the shops" during working hours. When Andropov was informed of such local initiatives, he softened his "draconian" measures.
The campaign to establish discipline and order, however, has yielded positive results. In the first quarter of 1983, the volume of production was increased by 6%. For the entire "Andropov" 1983, the increase in national income was 3.1%, while industrial production grew by 4%. But Andropov understood that such means can achieve only a minor and short-term effect and it is necessary to fundamentally improve the economy and, above all, the management of production.
Andropov conceived a real restructuring of the economy, starting this process with cautious steps. In his opinion, first, it is necessary to gradually rebuild industry and agriculture and, only having received positive results, to take over the reorganization of political institutions towards their democratization. The natural boundaries of these processes, according to Andropov, were determined by the national deep interests of the USSR - Great Russia and the preservation of the potential of socialism. A number of joint decisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on measures to regulate the development of industries based on purely economic methods, on increasing the role of labor collectives was adopted. Andropov set the task of partially decentralizing the economy, making the planned system less directive-administrative and less comprehensive, sharply increase the economic interest of workers and enterprises themselves in the efficiency of production, without changing the values of socialism. Here a special role was played by the creative search for new methods and forms of economic activity.
Andropov authorized the conduct of large-scale experiments on the preparation of a new economic reform. For this purpose, a special economic department was created in the Central Committee of the CPSU, headed by NI Ryzhkov. Around Andropov began to form a group of scientists and specialists who were preparing to develop new ways of economic development.
In tandem with such economic experiments, Andropov launched an anticorruption drive that reached high into the government and party ranks. In his domestic policy, Andropov's short stay in power was primarily marked by an attempt to put an end to the most egregious manifestations of corruption that had spread in a kind of "family circles" of the party because of the stability of the situation and the absolute impunity under Brezhnev of a large number of local party leaders. Being the head of the KGB, Andropov had all the information about numerous cases (almost never made public) related to the family and corruption that were going on in the feudal destinies of the "Soviet princes," especially in the second half of the 1970s, when the shadow economy grew to that has penetrated into all spheres of economic activity.
Having led the country and conceived its gradual and cautious modernization from above, Andropov began to collect a team of associate figures. He introduced regional leaders to the top management: M. Gorbachev, E. K. Ligachev, V. I. Vorotnikov, N. I. Ryzhkov, V. M. Chebrikov, G. A. Aliev, G. V. Romanov and The selection of personnel was in accordance with Andropov's concept of perestroika, not Gorbachev's. This, perhaps, explains why Gorbachev in the future organically could not work with Andropov's team and completely disbanded it.
Andropov, of course, appreciated Gorbachev, he assumed that he might become his successor. But Yuri Vladimirovich saw not only his youth and energy, other positive qualities, but also shortcomings: ambition, superficiality, love of applause and glorification. Andropov was disappointed in Gorbachev by the end of 1983. He bluntly said that he did not feel Gorbachev's real help in solving the problems of agriculture. While retaining some confidence in Gorbachev, Andropov, in spite of the existing legends, did not make any "testament" about his future election as secretary general.
Andropov also conducted a moderate and cautious purge of the party and state apparatus, including security agencies. During the fifteen months of his reign, 18 Soviet ministers were replaced, and 37 first secretaries of regional committees, who were political governors on the ground, were re-elected. This alarmed the political elite, who feared changes and the loss of leadership positions.
Andropov himself made a fundamental article "The Teachings of Karl Marx and Some Problems of Socialist Construction in the USSR", where new provisions were voiced in the field of Marxist theory and critical assessments of the preceding socialist development. In the article it was pointed out that the concrete ways of the formation of a socialist society did not lie at all as the founders had assumed. At the June plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1983 Andropov developed this idea: "To be frank, we still do not know to the proper extent the society in which we live and work, did not fully disclose the inherent laws, especially economic ones. Therefore, we are compelled to act, so to speak, empirically, by a very irrational method of trial and error." This Andropov statement actually meant the recognition that, that the declared "developed socialism" was an illusion.
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