Yuri Andropov - Early Life
Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was born June 15 (June 2, old style) in 1914 at the station Nagutskaya (now Stavropol Territory) in the Cossack village near Mozdok into a family of a railwayman. Early in life he was left without parents, and was brought up in the family of his stepfather. He graduated from school-seven in Mozdok. He started working at the age of 16 [some report from the age of 14 ], first as a loader, then as a telegraph operator. Since the age of 18 he worked on various ships as a sailor in the Volga Shipping Company.
In 1936 Andropov graduated from the technical school of water transport in the city of Rybinsk, Yaroslavl region. After graduating from the technical school of water transport, he worked at the Rybinsk shipyard. Since 1936, Yuri Andropov was at Komsomol work - was the secretary of the Komsomol organization of the technical school, which he graduated from, and the Komsomol of the Rybinsk Shipyard imeni Volodarsky. In 1937 he was elected secretary, in 1938 - first secretary of the Yaroslavl Regional Committee of the Komsomol. In 1939 he became a member of the CPSU(B.)/CPSU. He actively participated in all public events, under the conditions of Stalin's terror, which destroyed personnel, quickly moved along the Komsomol line - becomes the first secretary of the Yaroslavl Regional Committee of the Komsomol, and in 1940 already worked in Petrozavodsk. In June 1940, he was sent to work in the Karelo-Finnish SSR. At the first organizational plenum of the Central Committee of the Lenin Communist Youth League of the Karelian-Finnish SSR, held on June 3 of the same year, Andropov was elected its first secretary.
When the war began, Andropov continued to lead the Komsomol in the unoccupied territories and in the partisan movement. It was here, in a swampy and cold area, that Andropov developed kidney disease, which markedly complicated his life. Andropov participated in the organization of the partisan movement in Karelia, while at the same time continued to head the Komsomol organization in the unoccupied part of the republic. In 1943, Komsomolskaya Pravda published his article "Love of the people", which contained a latent criticism of A.A.Zhdanov and G.M.Malenkov for insufficient ideological work. For this, Andropov was removed from office. After the liberation of Karelia from the Nazis in 1944, he moved to party work. He soon became the second secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) of the Karelian-Finnish Republic. He worked in close contact with the leaders of the NKVD, since Karelia was the fiefdom of the GULAG.
The head of the republican party organization Otto Kuusinen, the founder of the Communist Party of Finland and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Karelian-Finnish Republic, managed to avoid a wide scale of repression in the so-called "Leningrad case." Andropov was waiting for his arrest, but he survived and for all his life retained such qualities as caution, secrecy, cunning, suspicion. Andropov was not able to get graduate higher education, although he studied at two universities. However, constantly engaged in self-training, he became one of the most theoretically savvy and erudite leaders of the party.
On September 3, 1944 Andropov was approved second secretary of the Petrozavodsk City Committee of the CPSU (b), in 1947 - the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Karelia.
In 1946-1951 he studied in absentia at the Faculty of History and Philology of the Karelian-Finnish State University, graduated from the Higher Party School attached to the Central Committee of the CPSU.
In the first half of the 1950s, Andropov worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B). But his career was hampered by a new conflict with Malenkov. (Andropov did not fulfill his instructions to prepare materials for the removal of the Lithuanian secretary Snechkus at the request of Suslov.) After the conflict Andropov moved to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he first headed the 4th European department, and then sent to work in the embassy in the Hungarian People's Republic as an adviser to the ambassador. An energetic and intelligent adviser, who studied the Hungarian language and was constantly engaged in self-education, was noticed by the new Moscow authorities and was soon appointed to the post of ambassador.
In Hungary at that time, the pro-Stalin leadership led by M. Rakosi carried out forced industrialization and collectivization, accompanied by repression. When Khrushchev's de-Stalinization began in the USSR, there was unrest in Hungary, as a result of which Rakosi was removed from the post of party leader. One of the leaders of Hungary was the party liberal Imre Nagy, who was in the 1930s was an agent of the NKVD, whose denunciations were used to liquidate dozens of political emigrants in the USSR. Imre Nagy actually led the opposition forces, legalized the activities of anti-communist parties, which led to aggravation of events and even acts of terror against the Communists.
Andropov and the new leader of the Hungarian Communists, Janos Kadar, began to insist on the use of armed force by the Soviet forces to suppress the insurrection. November 4, Marshal G.K. Zhukov began Operation Whirlwind to disarm the rebels. In the course of the battles that took place, 2,550 insurgents and about 2,000 Soviet soldiers were killed. At this time, Andropov was the link between the Soviet and Hungarian leadership, as well as a consultant of both sides on the most pressing issues, but his role should not be overestimated, since the main decisions were made by Interior Minister Serov and personally Khrushchev. And yet, Andropov was indisputably an outstanding figure in these tragic events. On the recommendation of Andropov, the leader of the Hungarian communists was Janos Kadar, who quickly stabilized the situation. Later in Hungary, the most liberal regime in the states of the socialist system was established. As for Andropov, these events left a strong imprint on his personality, in particular, this formed his special alertness to political crises in the socialist countries and in the USSR. G.Arbatov called it the "Hungarian Syndrome", which in many ways determined the nature of Andropov. Participation in the suppression of the mutiny in Hungary, no doubt, was taken into account when transferring Andropov to the organs of state security.
After returning to Moscow, Andropov, as a highly qualified and proven socialist specialist, was appointed head of the 2nd International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, which deals with relations with the Communist Parties of the socialist countries. He enjoys great confidence in the leadership. The period from 1957 to 1967 became a controversial stage for Andropov, as, on the one hand, he grew into a professional politician, on the other, he was not always able to influence foreign policy. After the XXII Congress of the CPSU, Andropov became a member of the Central Committee and a secretary. He first created in the Central Committee apparatus a group of consultants from young intellectuals, headed by F.Burlatsky, who was a freethinker and had a thirst for change. Andropov loved intellectual work and personally participated in the process of creating political documents together with consultants.
Although little direct evidence is available on Andropov's policy orientation during this period, his personal connections were extremely suggestive. He almost surely was a protege of Kuusinen, who as CC secretary acted as a progressive counterweight to Suslov in the ideological foreign policy realm. (Kuusinen's propensities were indicated in his selection of Fedar Burlatskiy, probably the most vocal proponent of de-Stalinization in the Soviet media between 1954 and 1957, to head his full-time "group of consultants"-his main staff.) When Kuusinen died in 1964, Andropov inherited his group of consultants. He soon chose a new leader for it - Georgiy Arbatov, who had been writing pro-ddtente articles since the mid-1950s.
At this time, Andropov rather unexpectedly showed a relatively liberal attitude toward creative individuals and collectives, in particular, helped the Theater on Taganka, cautiously supported the Soviet avant-garde abstractionists, but never conflicted with Khrushchev and other higher-level party leaders. Moreover, Khrushchev's confidence in Andropov increased, and this found expression in raising the status of Andropov in the apparatus of the Central Committee. But this also led to the distrust of the Brezhnev-Shelepin group, which was preparing the displacement of Khrushchev. Andropov did not know about the secret collusion of party figures, and Khrushchev's dismissal for him was a complete surprise. Initially, he even mistakenly assumed that Khrushchev was removed for inconsistent and weak criticism of Stalinism.
December 6, 1964 in Pravda was published an editorial prepared by Andropov, which outlined such policy proposals as the rationale for the transition to economic reform, the development of democratic self-government, the party's concentration on political leadership, the development of new scientific and technical technologies. All this was not met with understanding either from Leonid Brezhnev or from other members of the Politburo, especially MASuslov, who was afraid of Andropov's competition in leading ideology.
In the country there was a conservative-traditionalist coup, with which Andropov did not agree. The new party leader, Brezhnev, treated Andropov with respect, but clearly did not want his rise, neglected his advice, and did not bring him into his circle. Andropov tried to make laudatory speeches and to show loyalty in every possible way, but he was obviously not sincere enough.
Andropov stood out from among the Communist elite and was not an ordinary party figure. Although he was not alien to a degree of intrigue, he was not inclined to excessive flattery before the leader. Being a diabetic, he shied away from Brezhnev's favorite entertainments such as luxurious feasting. He also avoided royal hunting, beautiful women, and a passion for gifts and rewards. Brezhnev felt this detachment and was not tempted to have in his entourage such a man who would have shackled him and reminded his presence of the need to restrain himself. He withdrew it from the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, but this can hardly be considered a real political disgrace, since Andropov remained a member of the elite of the political elite and received an appropriate high post.
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